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Companies spend millions on training their sales representatives. Thousands of textbooks have been published; thousands of training videos have been recorded. Hundreds of good pieces of advice and tips for sales representatives have been presented along with hundreds of sales methods and techniques. Probably the largest number of indicators and measures are applied in sales and distribution. On the one hand, this is a result of the fact that sales provide revenue and profit to a company; on the other hand, the concept of management by objectives turns out to be most effective in regional sales teams with reference to sales representatives and methods of performance evaluation. As a result, a whole array of indices has been created which enable the evaluation of sales representatives’ work and make it possible to manage goods distribution in a better way.

The indices presented in this chapter are rooted in the consumer market and are applied most often to this type of market (particularly in relation to fast-moving consumer goods at the level of retail trade). Nevertheless, many of them can be used on other markets (services, means of production) and at other trade levels (wholesale).

Although the values of many indices presented herein are usually calculated by market research agencies and delivered to companies in the form of synthetic results, we have placed the emphasis on the ability to determine them independently, both in descriptive and exemplifying terms. We consider it important to understand the genesis of indices and build the ability to interpret them on that basis. What is significant is that the indices can be interpreted differently; the same index may provide a different assessment of a product’s, brand or company’s position in the market depending on the parameters taken into account. Therefore, we strive to show a certain way of thinking rather than give ready-made recipes and cite ‘proven’ principles. Sales and distribution are dynamic phenomena, and limiting them within the framework of ‘one proper’ interpretation would be an intellectual abuse.

This paper probes the factors which influence (i) the degree of internationalization and (ii) the subsequent economic performance, achieved by SMEs in India. These two objectives have been examined in the context of firm level push/pull factors, barriers/challenges, firm resources, and strategy.

This study is based on empirical data gathered through a semi-structured questionnaire from 84 exporting SMEs in the (most internationalized) engineering industry of Bangalore in India during January 2012 to February 2013. The two key research questions have been analyzed using stepwise multiple regression models. The degree of internationalization is defined as the percentage of foreign sales in total sales turn over, as of 2010/2011, and economic performance is represented by (i) the value of sales turnover as of 2010/2011, and (ii) growth of sales turnover from inception till 2010/2011, alternatively. Firm level variables (age of firms, firm size, nature of firm organization), entrepreneurial characteristics (age of the founder and education), time taken to enter the export market for the first time, mode of entry, degree of initial internationalization, years of experience in the international market, whether operated in the international market continuously or not, number of markets currently exported, and number of learnings made are used as the possible explanatory factors for the first objective. In addition, current degree of internationalization is used as the possible explanatory factor for the current level of economic performance whereas initial degree of internationalization for the growth of sales turnover.

It is firm age, size and experience, and education of the CEO which influenced the degree of internationalization of SMEs. In addition, continuous operation in the international market after an early entry, leading to more learnings positively influenced the degree of internationalization. Further, those who adopted the MNC route as the mode of entry achieved a higher degree. However, what is more significant is the degree of initial internationalization achieved by the SMEs which had strongly influenced its current degree of internationalization. All these bring out that (i) firm level resources & competence and (ii) firm level strategy, together significantly contributed to the degree of internationalization achieved by the SMEs in an emerging economy like India. However, the degree of internationalization had a negative influence on the current sales turnover achieved. Whereas those SMEs, older in age, organized as private limited companies and led by more qualified CEOs, which catered to more number of countries could achieve a higher sales turnover. But degree of internationalization did not have any influence on firm growth. Only younger and smaller firms grew faster than older and larger firms, irrespective of the degree of internationalization.

The above results bring out that to achieve a larger firm size, entering the international market need not be the only route, in the current era of globalization. It is possible to achieve a higher economic performance even with a domestic market focus, especially when the domestic market is registering a higher growth compared to the international market.

The degree of internationalization and its impact on the economic performance of SMEs have been hardly probed adequately based on empirical data in the context of emerging economies. This study fills this void. It reveals that in the era of globalization where domestic firms might have to face competition though not as much as those which operate in the international market, a larger firm size can be achieved with larger focus on the domestic market and with limited focus on the international market.

The present study investigates whether companies that exhibit high performance characteristics in the pre-financial crisis period can maintain their high performance in the financial crisis period of 2007–2009 and, in particular, the post-financial crisis period of 2010–2011.

The current study of 1,473 companies in 25 countries and 66 industries (MSCI index) (1) extends the empirical research of prior studies through the year 2011; (2) identifies the operating characteristics (performance drivers and performance measures) and associated risk factors which were most critical with regard to sustaining, exiting, and entering HPC companies during the five 10-year periods since 1998–2007, and (3) summarizes conclusions about HPC results from the 13 ten-year periods (1989–1998 to 2002–2011) in this stream of research.

(1) Companies that sustain high performance over periods of financial stress clearly excel in asset turnover performance driver and on the performance measures of growth in revenues, profit margin, return on equity and return on assets. Sustaining HPC had less debt than other companies and consistent cash flow yields. Operating turnover ratios became less important in recent years as an indicator of high performance. (2) Although exiting companies maintained profitability, financial risk and liquidity, the key factor in their dropping out of HPC status is their failure to grow revenues. (3) Entering companies did not exhibit the superior performance in all categories.

The results provide strategic direction for management of companies that aspire to HPC status and to maintain HPC status once gained, particularly in times of global financial stress.

Purpose – This study investigates the links between strategy, execution, and financial performance with particular attention to the underlying performance drivers that describe how a company executes strategy to create financial value.

Methodology – This study empirically investigates companies in the United States and 22 other countries over a 20-year period (11 successive 10n-year periods: 1988–2007): (1) to compare financial performance characteristics of HPC versus non-HPC; (2) to study the sustainability of performance in HPC; and (3) to identify the companies that exit or enter the HPC classification and the performance drivers and performance measures that characterized the change in HPC classification.

Findings – The 20-year longitudinal results confirm the results of prior studies as to the long-term superior performance of HPC over other companies (Objective 1). For sustaining HPC, results were consistent as to total asset management, profitability, financial risk, and liquidity (Objective 2). Declining HPC companies fail at total asset management, profitability, and operating asset management and significantly increase their financial risk. Emerging HPC companies improve liquidity through improved operating asset management and cash flows (Objective 3).

Practical implications – To become a HPC management must generate increased cash flows from income, manage receivables and inventory vigorously, and reduce its debt in relation to equity. Thereafter, management must concentrate on maintaining its asset turnover and growth in revenues while maintaining its profit margin and not increasing its debt to equity.

Value of the paper – The results provide direction for management of companies that aspire to HPC status and to maintain HPC status.

This study explores the question of whether investors can successfully detect management fraud using a firm's financial statements. Using financial ratios obtained from fraudulent companies’ financial statements, we examine the effectiveness of both logit and discriminant analyses in predicting the likelihood of fraud. Sixty-eight fraudulent companies used in the study are identified from the SEC's Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases. Our research design has addressed certain weaknesses present in prior fraud-detection studies. The empirical results suggest that ratio analysis is grossly ineffective in detecting financial statement fraud. We also discuss the implications of our findings on future research.

Entrepreneurship has an important role in the economic development of a country. One element that represents the entrepreneurship quality is its orientation. The orientation of entrepreneurship includes several dimensions which are needed for achievement, an internal locus of control, self-reliance, extroversion, being proactive, risk-taking, and innovation. These dimensions are believed to be able to improve the company’s performance. The purpose of this study is to find out how the entrepreneurship orientation influences the firm performance. This study aims to discover which dimensions of entrepreneurship orientation are the most influential toward the firm performance. The samples were comprised 40 entrepreneurs. The primary data were collected from the respondents by distributing questionnaires to the entrepreneurs of food firms in Salatiga, Indonesia. A multiple regression analysis method was applied in this study. The results show that among the dimensions in entrepreneurship orientation, only the risk-taking and innovative dimensions influence the company’s performance. Innovativeness has a higher effect on firm performance.

We examine the influence of ownership structure on a blockholder’s power in a firm. We first describe the presence and ownership stakes of blockholders in a comprehensive sample of US firms. We develop a measure of the influence of the ownership structure on a blockholder’s power and show that an average blockholder loses 12% of her potential power due to the presence and size of the ownership stakes of other blockholders. Further, the influence of ownership structure varies systematically with a blockholder’s rank and identity, with the second and nonfamily manager blockholders experiencing the largest loss of power.

In view of the recent enhanced concerns of the SEC and PCAOB that Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 23 (APB 23)–asserting firms do not comply with the “sufficient evidence” criteria of APB 23, we examine whether APB 23–asserting firms that declared their foreign earnings as permanently reinvested abroad are less likely to repatriate those foreign earnings under the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004, compared with similar non-asserting firms. The asserting firms are required to disclose sufficient evidence that validates an ability to meet their domestic cash needs with only earnings generated in the United States and their plans to indefinitely reinvest foreign earnings outside the United States. Estimates show that asserting firms are more likely to repatriate their foreign earnings than non-asserting firms. In addition, we find that the probability of making an election to repatriate permanently invested foreign earnings under the AJCA of 2004 is higher for firms with nonbinding foreign tax credit (FTC) limitations that have made an APB 23 declaration to permanently invest foreign earnings abroad. These findings suggest that asserting firms’ declarations to indefinitely reinvest foreign earnings abroad are not well grounded, thereby indirectly validating the SEC’s and PCAOB’s increased scrutiny for supporting evidence for APB 23 assertion. The estimates also show that the likelihood of making an election to repatriate foreign earnings under the AJCA of 2004 increases with asserting firms’ liquidity constraints and financial distress: the financial characteristics listed as part of APB 23 criteria of sufficient evidence and highlighted by the SEC and PCAOB comment letters, indicating that asserting firms raid permanently reinvested foreign earnings to satisfy their financial needs and constraints.

Purpose – We investigate the impact of CEO turnover on performance and accounting-based outcomes following major business restructurings.

Design/Methodology/Approach – We analyze a sample of 217 major operational restructurings during the period 1999–2007 using regressions and other statistical tests.

Findings – We document significant improvements in postrestructuring operating and investment efficiencies with little differentiation between restructurings that involve a change in CEO and those that involve continuing CEOs. However, we find evidence of lower accounting quality for the continuing CEO firms. First, restructuring charges of CEO turnover firms are associated with lower current period unexpected core earnings and higher future period unexpected core earnings (lower levels of classification shifting). Second, CEO turnover firms have a significantly lower percentage of (i) restructuring charge reversals and (ii) prereversal shortfalls (in meeting analyst forecast estimates) followed by reversals (suggesting lower levels of subsequent earnings management). Therefore, turnover CEOs are less likely to manipulate restructuring charges to mask true economic performance than continuing CEOs. Overall, our evidence suggests continuing CEOs undertake less substantial restructurings, while opportunistically reporting similar charges and performance improvements, consistent with attempts to pool with new CEO hires to keep their jobs.

Originality/Value – Overall, our results highlight the key economic role played by top corporate managers in major business restructurings, suggesting that CEO turnover leads to both real changes in managerial actions and altered reporting incentives.