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The purpose of this paper is to examine the remedies available under Iranian investment treaties for settlement of investment disputes. This includes the obligation of the Iranian Government to provide foreign investors access to international arbitration. The sensitivity of the controversial Iranian nuclear program and the imposition of economic and financial sanctions on Iran will lead to the termination of many contracts between companies from Europe and the West and Iran, therefore, a viable solution must exist to address the rights and remedies of foreign investors. This article aims to provide an insight into Iranian treaties.

The main method was a survey of different treaties signed by Iran.

The discussion revealed that there are currently more than 50 treaties signed and ratified by Iran which provide arbitration as a dispute resolution forum. There are many treaties between the member countries of the European Union which make it important for the research. Iranian treaties guarantee international law remedies to foreign companies with investment in Iran by allowing them to seek redress in an international forum.

Iran has not signed the ICS1D Convention, meaning that the arbitration proceedings will be subject to ad hoc arbitration rules of UNCITRAL. Furthermore, ICSID rules on enforcement of the award do not apply. Therefore, the winning party must go through the Iranian courts to enforce its awards.

The value of the paper is to government organization, international institutions and multinational companies with substantial economic interest in Iranian energy and natural resources. For the first time, the topic has been covered in a research paper. There are no articles in Iranian bilateral investment treaties (BITs) addressing dispute resolution through arbitration. This is the first piece of work that actually conducted a thorough analysis of Iranian BITs.

This paper complements previous research on investment in firm-specific human capital by applying real options analysis. Our framework suggests that the parties receive valuable options to exit the contract when information becomes revealed in the future, but these options may be more valuable for one party than the other. Companies and workers attempt to reduce the value of the options through contractual mechanisms that either shift wealth to the party granting the option or prevent the option from being exercised. In both cases, the mechanisms cause the parties to invest in firm-specific capital, resulting in higher output and higher wages.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically test whether enforceability mediates the relationship between property rights and investment in housing, using data from land formalization project in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The study was cross-sectional in design; data were collected from a sample of 210 households that benefited from the recent Addis Ababa city land and buildings formalization project. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to assess the goodness-of-fit of the latent structures underlying the constructs. Mediation was tested using the Baron and Kenny steps, combined with bootstrapping technique. Robustness of results was checked.

The results indicate statistically significant mediation effect of contract enforcement. However, the mediation is partial, there is still a substantial direct effect of security of property rights on investment.

Any initiative to land formalization projects needs to consider contract enforcement environment, as presence and size of property rights effects largely depend on whether those rights are properly enforced.

This is the first study that conceptualizes the mediating effect of contract enforcement on the relationship between property rights and investment from an African country perspective.

This paper aims to provide an essential framework for establishing Shariah-compliant deposit insurance scheme, by reviewing the Shariah provisions concerning the available approaches for deposit guarantee, types of deposits in Islamic financial institutions and the permissible party to incur the cost of this guarantee.

This paper reviews the Fiqh rules and principles approved by the well-known Islamic Fiqh references, as well as the resolutions of International Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA) and Shariah standards issued by Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), and presents these resolutions and judgments in a modern applicable way.

This paper recommends that the Islamic scheme for deposit insurance should be established based on Takaful insurance principle, and this scheme must adopt fund segregation principle to comply with Shariah provisions for guarantee permissibility.

The paper bridges the gap between theory and practice by highlighting how the proposed model can be initiated in practice, thus, it can influence public policy in countries with Islamic banking system.

This paper represents a significant contribution toward the establishment of a consensual Shariah-compliant Islamic deposit insurance model.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how Islamic banks' financing affects corporate investment efficiency.

To achieve the research purpose, an empirical model was constructed to describe the relationship between Islamic banks' financing and corporate investment efficiency. The empirical model was tested through generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation technique using a panel data of 163 Malaysian listed firms for the period 2007–2017.

This study provides evidence that Islamic banks' financing plays an important role in enhancing investment efficiency and that this positive effect comes mainly from non-PLS contracts. Moreover, the results show that the effect of Islamic banks' financing in preventing suboptimal investments is stronger in the financial crisis period. The results also reveal that the contribution of Islamic banks' financing in reducing suboptimal investments is more prominent when firms face over-investment problems.

This research contributes to the debate on the financial implications of Islamic banks' financing modes by exploring their effect on corporate investment efficiency.

From a managerial perspective, the research findings are beneficial to Islamic bank managers to the extent that they highlight the role of Islamic financial contracts in improving corporate investment efficiency. In addition, the lower effect of PLS contracts on investment efficiency implies that policymakers in Malaysia should multiply their efforts to further expand the PLS financing.

This paper offers some insights on the role of Islamic banks' financing in mitigating agency conflicts and reducing asymmetric information problems. It is the first attempt focusing on the role of Islamic financing in fostering corporate investment decisions.

The awarding of terminals to private operators is considered a prime task of landlord port authorities. Yet, terminal concessions in seaports have only recently gained interest in academic circles. The awarding process poses a complex set of managerial challenges to port authorities, one of the key issues being the determination of the duration of the concession.

Despite the importance of the duration of terminal concessions in seaports, the issue has not received much attention in academic circles. Factors impacting on the duration of contracts, leases or concessions have, however, been studied extensively in other research areas, such as agriculture, coal contracts, franchising and natural gas. This paper uses insights from these academic studies to obtain a better understanding of the impact of concession duration on the stakeholders involved and relates them to empirical evidence on concession length in European seaports. The paper then proposes a classification scheme for the exogenous determination of concession duration, based on techniques developed for Public-Private-Partnerships in large infrastructure projects. In the last section the paper discusses the importance of concession durations to various stakeholders in seaports and illustrates these principles using a case study.

This paper aims to investigate the extent to which relation-specific investments undertaken by the distributor favor the presence of various governance structures (formal contract and relational governance). Furthermore, it examines whether dependence moderates the effect of relationship-specific investments on these governance structures.

Survey data were gathered from 224 wholesalers from the food and beverage industry. Hypotheses were tested through regression analysis.

This study illustrates that property-based relationship-specific investments have a greater positive impact on the use of formal contracts than knowledge-based relationship-specific investments. Furthermore, knowledge-based relationship-specific investments have a greater positive impact on relational governance than property-based relationship-specific investments. The results also suggest that it is necessary to consider the moderating effect of cost-based dependence and benefit-based dependence. Finally, mixed governance structures (e.g. formal contracts combined with relational governance) have a positive impact on satisfaction and intention to maintain and extend the relationship.

The findings allow manufacturers to concentrate their efforts on mixed governance structures facilitating relationship-specific investments and benefit-based dependence from distributors to develop a competitive advantage.

Several investigations have obtained a relationship between investments in specific assets, governance structures and performance. Nevertheless, they have not identified different types of investments in specific assets. This study proposes that there are two types of relationship-specific investments: based on property and based on knowledge. Additionally, a two-dimensional model of dependence (cost-based and benefit-based) allows capturing the different theoretical spheres of this concept.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how collaborative contracts can improve industrial maintenance contract relationships.

The research compares performance contracts with collaborative contracts, a new contract type whereby the contract parties align their objectives. The study uses game theory and describes the contract types as mechanism designs to compare the contract types. The mechanisms are validated with case studies. The utility of the contract types is verified with Monte Carlo simulations using expert opinions.

The research demonstrates that, under certain conditions, collaborative contracts result in a higher utility than performance contracts for all contract parties.

The use of collaborative contracts between an operator of a technical system and a maintenance organisation reduces maintenance costs and improves the availability of the technical system, increasing the utility for all contract parties.

The collaborative contract is a new contract type for maintenance services and the research method provides a new approach to optimise industrial maintenance contract relationships.

Purpose – Study the role of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) as an example of foreign and politically connected large shareholders, and their impact on firm value.

Methodology/approach – Use a sample of SWF large U.S. investments where SWFs intend to actively engage with management to analyze not only whether but also why SWF investments outperform the market in both the short- and long term from the perspective of internationalization, political connections, and corporate governance.

Findings – Foreign and politically connected large investors, like SWFs, improve firm value through the provision of SWF domestic market access and government-related contracts. In the short run, the market welcomes SWF investments in expectation of potential monitoring and internationalization benefits. In the long run, the target firms’ degree of internationalization and Tobin's q increase substantially after SWF investments. The increase in q is directly related to the number of government-related contracts granted by SWF countries.

Social implications – SWF investment benefits appear to outweigh the costs for firm value and shareholders. The results point to the benefits of large and foreign investors for shareholders.

Originality/value of paper – This is the first work to provide evidence on how foreign government-related shareholders can affect firm value.

This paper aims to explain the economic impact of the change in the degree of contract enforcement in the USA since August 2008. This change, from solid enforcement (hard contracts), to uncertain enforcement (fuzzy contracts), is a result of political expediency during an economic crisis. The purpose of the paper is to point out that political decisions are not made in an economic vacuum, and that there is an economic impact to the move away from hard contracts.

The paper uses a time value of money, net present value approach with specific emphasis on the investor's adjustment to the required rate of return in the face of uncertain contract enforcement. Both closed and open economic systems are addressed.

The paper finds that in the shift to a fuzzy contract environment, investors will increase the required rate of return on future investment contracts, thereby lowering the value of those assets. Both individually, and in the aggregate, asset values will fall.

The paper makes no attempt to evaluate reasons for or against the institutional changes that produced the move to fuzzy contracts. The paper examines only the resulting impact of the change on asset valuations.

Reducing the certainty of contract enforcement reduces asset valuations and investment.

This paper fulfills a need to be cognizant of the fact that actions of politicians can have unintended economic consequences, using the specific example of the shift in contract enforcement in the USA since August 2008.