Search results

The purpose of this paper is to examine the linkage between Islamic financing principles and economic growth (EG) by taking into consideration two Islamic Financing Principles: Risk Sharing and non-risk sharing separately.

The data for this study are obtained from the annual reports of all Islamic banks from Bangladesh using Bank scope database and annual report for the period 1984-2014. The research uses an Autoregressive Distributive Lags (ARDL) approach. For robustness, this study also employs a continuous wavelet transform approach.

The empirical findings reveal that the risk sharing instruments are positively related to the EG of the country. On the other hand, non-risk sharing instruments are negatively related to the EG of the country.

The dominant use of non-risk sharing-based financing has undermined the greater possibility of Islamic banking to contribute more to the EG of the country. Banks and other financial institutions need to pay greater attention to systemic risk created by risk transfer and apply risk sharing methods of financing more vigorously to achieve greater equity, efficient allocation of resources, stability and growth of the financial system and welfare of the society as a whole.

This study has advanced the knowledge by examining the issue of Islamic financing principles and EG. This is probably one of the first attempts to find the linkage between Islamic financing principles and EG by taking into consideration two portfolios: risk sharing and non-risk sharing separately and provide significant insights for policy makers, market players and academicians.

This study aims to examine the nexus between CAMELS, risk-sharing financial performance and Islamic banks' stability. It also attempts to assess the conditioning effects of institutional quality in the relationship between risk-sharing contracts and the stability of Islamic banks.

The quantitative research design was employed using secondary data from 20 Islamic banks in six countries over the period 2007–2019. The study utilized the feasible generalized least squares method for the analysis.

The results indicate that not all CAMELS variables support the stability of Islamic banks. The musharakah contract induced stability of the banks, whereas mudarabah financing reduced it. The interaction between risk-sharing finance and the quality of institutions suggested that the mudarabah contract via institutional quality raises the stability of Islamic banks. On the other hand, the quality of institutions encourages the banks to offer more musharakah, but it leads to an increase in their risk-taking. We show the impact of changes in risk-sharing variables on stability amplified by institutional quality. The results were robust when alternative measures of stability were used.

Various stakeholders in banking activities could learn from the results of this study. Islamic banks could improve their positions in terms of screening for risk-sharing financing. They could also leverage more on musharakah, as it promotes stability and could generate more returns for the banks. The mudarabah financing can be improved if there is a proper evaluation of entrepreneurs. Policymakers would learn more about the importance of institutional quality, as it provides a friendly environment for both mudarabah and musharakah businesses to thrive. This could increase the participation of Islamic banks in the real economy.

Previous studies concentrated on the effects of CAMELS on the profitability of Islamic banks. This study shows that CAMELS alone might not necessarily capture the financial performance of Islamic banks. Therefore, the risk-sharing financing variables are included alongside CAMELS to determine their effects on stability. Second, unlike the past research, this study used the quality of institutions to moderate the nexus between risk-sharing financing and the stability of Islamic banks.

Islamic banks, despite being Shariah-compliant, have long been criticized for mimicking conventional banks in terms of their products and processes (Khan, 2010; Kuran, 1996). However, several Islamic banks do engage in philanthropy (zakat and charity) and risk-sharing financing (mudarabah and musharakah) instruments that better meet their raison d'etre, the fulfillment of Maqasid al-Shariah (Jatmiko et al., 2023). These contracts, however, are more susceptible to moral hazard and adverse selection problems than traditional debt-based finance (Azmat et al., 2015) and may impair Islamic bank stability. This paper explores the relationship between social finance and the stability of Islamic banks, and whether institutional quality moderates this relationship.

Using hand-collected annual data on social finance from 12 Islamic banks in four countries: Bangladesh, Bahrain, Indonesia and Malaysia, between 2006 and 2019, the authors employ the feasible generalized least squares and the panel-corrected standard errors methods for the analysis. The Stata version 16 software was used to analyze the data for the study.

The results indicate that mudarabah and musharakah financing raises the stability of Islamic banks. The authors also found that mudarabah and musharakah expose Islamic banks to more risk-taking behavior amidst the conditioning effect of institutional quality. On the other hand, charity induces the stability of Islamic banks, while zakat increases the risk-taking behavior of the banks. Further, when the quality of institutions was used as a moderator, both zakat and charity induced the stability of Islamic banks. The results were robust when liquidity risk was used and partially robust when portfolio risks were employed as measures of stability.

One concern regarding the application of Islamic social finance is that it might be a risky strategy for Islamic banks. In terms of research implications, the available evidence suggests that the use of Islamic social finance instruments is not detrimental to the stability of Islamic banks. Hence, regulators and policymakers should not penalize Islamic banks for using Islamic social finance instruments that help provide financial solutions to the underserved and unserved. In terms of research limitations, the study could not include other relevant Islamic social finance instruments such as waqf and qard al-hassan. Furthermore, data availability restricts the analysis to only 12 Islamic banks in fourcountries. As more Islamic banks in different countries venture into Islamic social finance, and the quantity and quality of information improve, future studies could explore the issue further.

The available evidence suggests that the use of Islamic social finance instruments does not worsen the stability of Islamic banks. Given the dominance of sale- and lease-based contracts in Islamic financing (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Šeho et al., 2020), these findings should encourage other Islamic banks to provide financial solutions using other Shariah-compliant contracts including those based on risk-sharing and philanthropy. This would be a better reflection of the Islamic banks’ value proposition as it helps boost social activities that have a high impact on the activities of small businesses, contributing to the real economy and promoting well-being in society.

Previous studies mainly relied on mudarabah, mushakarah and zakat separately as they relate to the performance of Islamic banks. This study explores the impact of social finance which includes charity and zakat to examine their impact on Islamic banks’ stability. Further, the authors use institutional quality as a moderating variable in the relationship between Islamic social finance instruments and the stability of Islamic banks.

The peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/IJSE-06-2022-0441

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the possibility of structuring an Islamic option which includes an element of risk sharing as opposed to risk transfer.

The approach adopted in this research involved a combination of a wa’ad (promise) and murabaha (cost plus sale) and examining if they could form a risk-sharing Islamic option. The payoffs were assumed to be dependent on bi-period outcomes.

The paper attempted to create a hybrid risk-sharing option by combining elements of both wa’ad (promise) and murabaha (cost plus sale). The results yielded are dependent on the eventual direction of the market (in-the-money, at-the-money and out-the-money). While the results are not definitive, they do provide arguments for the adoption of a risk-sharing, as opposed to a risk-transfer, methodology when it comes to structuring risk management instruments.

One of the major limitations of this research is the inability to assess the Shariah compliance of the proposed instrument. Shariah compliance is determined by a Shariah Supervisory Board, and every effort has been made to ensure that Shariah financial principles are adhered to in the creation of this structure.

The structure provides some interest arguments in the creation of risk management tools under a Shariah financial framework. The structure illustrates the benefits of having a risk-sharing mode over the conventional risk-transfer stances of most risk management tools.

The paper offers a new way of structuring a risk management tool in Islamic finance. It explores the highly debated area of derivatives in Islamic finance and proposes a new way of creating a risk management tool that involves some elements of risk sharing.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of risk sharing and non-risk sharing instruments on both the profitability of Islamic banks and the economic growth of the country. This study also aims to improve the profit and loss sharing-based asset growth of Islamic banks.

The data for this study are obtained from the annual reports of all Islamic banks from Bangladesh using Bank scope database and annual report for the period of 1983–2014. The research uses Autoregressive Distributive Lag approach.

The findings reveal that risk sharing instruments are positively related to profitability and the economic growth of the country. This study also finds that non-risk sharing instruments play a predominant role in the profitability of the Islamic bank but are negatively related to the economic growth of the country.

Banks and other financial institutions need to pay greater attention to systemic risk created by risk transfer and apply risk sharing methods of financing more vigorously than has hitherto been the case.

This study will also contribute to the literature as relatively few Islamic financial literatures deal with the relationship between equity financing and profitability which may make a strong contribution to the area of Islamic finance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the use of the social welfare concepts of Takaful and Tabarru’ (donations) as tools to guarantee deposits in the Islamic banking industry, and the effect of such practice on the concept of risk sharing in Islamic finance.

The study critically analyzes the Mudaraba contract used by Islamic banks to mobilize funds, the use of Profit Equalization Reserves and Investment Risk Reserves, the use of other income smoothing techniques and the insurance of Islamic banks’ by regulatory agencies in some countries based on the Takaful and Tabarru’ concepts.

This paper shows that Islamic banks are increasingly using the concepts of Takaful and Tabarru’, which are intended originally for social welfare, as tools to justify the move to more guaranteed-in-substance type of deposits, and hence, more risk shifting rather than risk sharing in the Mudaraba contract. This use, is argued, moves Islamic banking towards more market-oriented, but less Shariaa-compliant in substance.

This papers examined the behaviour of Islamic financial institutions and Islamic scholars based on the available literature. No empirical analysis was conducted.

This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the substance of Islamic banking transactions and the risk shifting inherent in such transactions. Furthermore, it is the first study that examines the extent of utilizing different social welfare concepts to legalize – from Shariaa perspective – Islamic banking transactions.

Islamic banks provide an alternative financial system based on Sharia’h (Islamic law). However, critics argue that operation at Islamic banks is violating Sharia’h particularly in terms of provision of interest free services, risk sharing and legal contract. The purpose of this paper is to empirically evaluate the Sharia’h practice at Islamic banks in Pakistan by considering some basic principles of Sharia’h.

Primary data are collected from 63 branches of Islamic banks in Pakistan. Questionnaire is used as an instrument. The study uses structural equation modeling that includes confirmatory factor analysis and regression analysis. Data are codified and analyzed using SPSS and Amos.

This study finds that Islamic banks are providing interest free services, ensuring that transactions and contracts offered by Islamic banks are legal and offering conflict-free environment to customers. In contrast, estimated results expose that Islamic banks are not sharing risk and Sharia’h supervisory board is not performing its role perfectly. Similarly, it is found that organization and distribution of zakat and qard-ul-hassan are weak at Islamic banks.

Data are collected from Islamabad federal capital of Pakistan that hold just 5 per cent share of Islamic banking industry. This small share may not provide true picture of Islamic banking sector.

To ensure risk sharing, Islamic banking industry must consider the development of new modes of financing and innovation of more products based on Sharia’h. State Bank of Pakistan should ensure separate regulatory framework that enable Islamic banks to provide qard-ul-hassan, organize and allocate zakat.

This paper discusses the perception of bankers, who are actually the executors, about Shariah’s practices at Islamic banks in Pakistan. There are not many discussions on this topic that could be found, and hence this could be considered as a significant contribution by this paper to the existing literature of Islamic finance.

This paper aims to critically investigate the liquidity risk management of Islamic banks and develop an alternative regulatory framework appropriate for liquidity management of these banks.

The specific risk profile of an Islamic bank requires developing a new and more efficient regulatory framework, which relies on risk- sharing and symmetric information among parties. The paper makes a differentiation between small local banks and internationally active Islamic banks and proposes to apply liquidity requirements only for internationally active Islamic banks.

A new proposal for the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) of Islamic banks is developed in this paper towards mitigating risks and concurrently protecting the interests of investment account holders. Minimum and maximum thresholds are proposed for each liquid asset in this new LCR framework. An alternative liquidity approach is discussed to complement the proposal and several policy options are suggested.

As participation banks are exposed to market liquidity and market risks, more high-quality liquid instruments within a risk-sharing regulatory framework may provide the inner adjustment process through which any mismatch regarding maturity, risk, value or linkage with the real economy is corrected systematically. It offers policy implications for regulators, supervisors and international organizations.

The purpose of this paper is to set forth seven broad recommendations and 15 specific initiatives within a four-dimensional framework for the development of social capital in Islamic finance, particularly the stock market, given its role as the first best means of risk sharing.

The four-dimensional framework comprises dimensions of principle and value, trust-reinforcing regulation, investment opportunity and infrastructure, as well as reputational intermediaries.

A web of multi-pronged initiatives that are mutually reinforcing is proposed considering the multifaceted dimensions of social capital and the various possible transmission channels by which social capital can influence the financial system.

While empirical studies have demonstrated the importance of trust and ethics in financial development, the pressing issue remains how social capital, including trust and ethics, can be developed to achieve a trustworthy, ethical and efficient financial system. This paper attempts to address this concern.

This paper provides a framework for building social capital in Islamic finance.