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Money laundering activities were allegedly rampant and poorly regulated in the South African financial markets and financial institutions prior to 1998. In other words, prior to the enactment of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 as amended (POCA), there was no statute that expressly and adequately provided for the regulation of money laundering in South Africa. Consequently, the POCA was enacted to curb organised criminal activities such as money laundering in South Africa. Thereafter, the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 as amended (FICA) was enacted in a bid to, inter alia, enhance financial regulation and the combating of money laundering in the South African financial institutions and financial markets.

The paper provides an overview analysis of the current legislation regulating money laundering in South Africa. In this regard, prohibited offences and measures that are used to curb money laundering under each relevant statute are discussed. The paper further discusses the regulation and use of customer due diligence measures to combat money laundering activities in South Africa. Accordingly, the regulation of customer due diligence under the FICA and the Banks Act 94 of 1990 as amended (Banks Act) is provided.

It is hoped that policymakers and other relevant persons will use the recommendations provided in the paper to enhance the curbing of money laundering in South Africa.

The paper does not provide empirical research.

The paper is useful to all policymakers, lawyers, law students, regulatory bodies, especially, in South Africa.

The paper seeks to curb money laundering in the economy and society at large, especially in the South African financial markets.

The paper is original research on the South African anti-money laundering regime.

This paper aims to explain how companies can benefit from their human rights due diligence process to identify opportunities for sustainable development goals (SDGs) activities in an operationalisation of political corporate social responsibility (PCSR).

Combining PCSR, SDGs and business and human rights (BHR) literature, the paper develops an extension of the risk-based due diligence process described by the BHR literature, helping companies identify societal needs to which they may contribute in accordance with PCSR through engaging in the SDGs.

Companies can benefit from resources they already invest in due diligence to identify their adverse human rights impacts, by drawing on the insights gained on broader needs, including human rights, to which they may contribute. This can help them develop appropriate interventions to address local needs and advance their moral legitimacy through assisting in SDG-relevant fulfilment of human rights.

The paper provides theory-based guidance on how companies can assess their capacity for contributing societal value through human rights-oriented SDG interventions. Future empirical research may explore how companies apply the extended due diligence process to assess needs and determine relevant actions.

The paper offers a principle-based analytical approach for integrating the “do no harm” imperative of BHR theory with PCSR’s call for business assistance in the delivery of public goods and the SDGs’ call for business action to “do good’.

This paper enables enhanced business implementation of the SDGs in line with PCSR and human rights theory, especially the emergent field of business and human rights.

This study gives theory-based guidance for companies for SDG contributions based on innovative combination of literatures.

To describe and to discuss the implications of the US Department of the Treasury's PATRIOT Act regulations requiring “covered financial institutions” (including broker‐dealers, banks, and mutual funds) to maintain risk‐based procedures to ensure that: correspondent accounts held on behalf of specified non‐US financial institutions; and private banking accounts, are subject to due diligence procedures to ensure that those accounts, and the financial institutions holding those accounts, are not being used for money laundering purposes.

Summarizes and analyzes the adopted rules.

Since the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, regulation relating to anti‐money laundering has been among the highest profile – and highest priority – activity of securities and financial institution regulation. Consequently, anti‐money laundering rules and regulations have become a major aspect of compliance programs at financial institutions such as banks and broker‐dealers. The rules that are the subject of this article are noteworthy in part because they continue the trend of widening the universe of “financial institutions” that are now subject to substantial anti‐money laundering regulation. The rules described in this article add substantially to the complexity of anti‐money laundering regulation at financial institutions for a number of reasons, including: firstly, placing new, broad‐based requirements on financial institutions; secondly, requiring those financial institutions to make judgments regarding both the level of risk posed by certain accounts and the appropriate diligence that may be necessary for each such account; and thirdly, interpretive and implementation challenges.

A summary and analysis of new anti‐money laundering regulation, which comes at a time when US regulators are placing substantial emphasis on anti‐money laundering.

The purpose of this study is to examine the South African banks’ customer due diligence (CDD) practices in the fintech era to mitigate money laundering (ML) risks and ensure financial stability. Financial technologies have brought substantial transformations to the financial services sector. However, such technologies have exposed the sector to emerging risks that threaten the integrity and stability of the financial system globally. Before any bank–customer relationship is established, proper customer background checks must be conducted. These background checks enable financial institutions to validate information provided and ensure customers are properly risk profiled. Failure to risk profile customers could result in financial institutions being used as conduits for ML. Undoubtedly, CDD procedures are pivotal to overall anti-money laundering efforts and curbing financing terrorism in a regulatory framework.

A qualitative research approach was adopted to address the research questions of the study. Given the confidentiality associated with the financial services sector, data triangulation was used in blending mainly secondary and primary data sources. Secondary data sources used in the study were published reports available in the public domain that were corroborated with subject matter experts’ interviews.

Based on the findings of this study, it is concluded that in South Africa, technological solutions have been incorporated into CDD functions, which is now risk-based (enhanced due diligence). Also, legally, South Africa has incorporated the biometrics, integration with Department of Home Affairs and Companies and Intellectual Property Commission databases, customer consent to third-party sources with the Financial Intelligence Centre Act and the Protection of Personal Information Act.

The shift towards digital banking in South Africa results in increased data and dynamic risk profiling. This study advocates a policy shift requiring a risk-based approach to mitigating emerging ML risks (in particular digital laundering), especially in the wake of South Africa’s recent greylisting by the Financial Action Task Force.

This paper aims to review some of the current challenges that international money laundering schemes are posing in the Chinese banking sector. Anti-money laundering (AML) systems in China are relatively new, and customer due diligence checks and other AML systems are underdeveloped in some areas.

The paper considers a particular case example of a multi-company organization that has known links to China. This company has been the target of both European and US investigations for suspected embezzlement and money laundering, and yet is still in operation.

The paper considers the complexities of this organization and how a seemly innocent link to a used clothing charity can fund an international organization spanning several countries. The paper offers a list of basic indicators of risk that could be applied to a risk-based system used within the Chinese banking context by using this group as an example.

The paper uses empirical and academic studies from other authors working in this region and supports many of the findings of the need to develop stronger risk-based, as opposed to rules-based, systems for managing AML risk assessment. Previous work by the author and suggestions from other authors are both used to suggest a basic framework for AML risk assessment. The paper concludes by reiterating the fact that China, like all other countries, is now operating in an international banking context, in much the same way that international organized crime is also operating at a global level.

To educate on AML legal requirements and issues relative to foreign correspondent accounts, and give practical advice on relatively low-burdensome measures firms can take to help them achieve compliance in this challenging area.

Summarizes AML requirements relevant to foreign correspondent accounts, discusses two related FINRA settlements involving the alleged failure to obtain and verify beneficial ownership information, reviews ongoing regulatory and legislative initiatives (including a FinCEN initiative to require firms to identify beneficial owners and verify their identities), and suggests certain due diligence procedures firms can use to screen foreign correspondent accounts.

One of the fundamental risks that firms face when dealing with foreign correspondent accounts is not knowing their customers' customers. While the current regulatory framework does not, in most cases, explicitly require firms to obtain beneficial ownership information, the practical reality seems to be that obtaining and verifying such information, where possible, could pay substantial dividends in terms of risk assessment and avoidance.

In some cases, a variety of cost-effective screening measures can be sufficient for a firm to identify concrete risks so that it may take steps to reduce its own regulatory exposure. Firms should not discount the simple for the elaborate, and should take advantage of the several, cost-effective AML tools and resources that are readily available.

Practical guidance for AML officers and other compliance and legal professionals by an experienced financial institutions lawyer.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the current legal framework on money laundering control in the insurance sector. Essentially, this examination is premised on the interrogation of whether it is still appropriate for Mauritius to apply such stringent, opaque and unyielding Anti-Money Laundering/Combating Financing of Terrorism norms and rules on general insurance when developed nations such as the UK and Singapore have done away with them for a more effective combat against money laundering. It would also be assessed why the financial services commission (FSC) is not able to draw inspiration from its British and Singaporean counterparts in fighting money laundering more effectively.

This paper uses the doctrinal legal research methodology which is colloquially described as “black-letter law” approach. It is backed up by a contextual legal analysis that is based on an analysis of relevant legal provisions. It relies ground experience from the insurance industry through the experience of the authors. A comparative approach is used with Singapore and the UK as case studies given that there are significant commonalities to the Mauritian jurisdiction as well as useful differences.

It is observed that a move towards a de-regulation of the legal framework on money laundering in the insurance sector with a more relaxed approach is more effective for the Mauritian insurance sector. Evidence is drawn from the Singaporean and British models. A re-structuring of the FSC of Mauritius is also warranted for such an approach to be adopted.

This paper is among the first academic contribution that proposes a de-regulation and the adoption of a relaxed approach of and by the Mauritian Insurance Industry for a more effective combat against money laundering. It serves as a legal foundational basis for further research in this direction.

This study aims to provide the main contents of the revision of the 2023 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and suggest implications for the Korean government and multinational enterprises.

Following the brief history of the revision of OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, this study reviews and evaluates major substantive and procedural revisions of the 2023 OECD Guidelines, and then suggests countermeasures for Korean government and businesses.

The most significant substantive change of the 2023 revision is that expectations for environmental due diligence and disclosure obligations, including climate change and biodiversity, for multinational enterprises have been expanded and strengthened. Regarding procedural changes, the biggest change is the introduction of a basis rule for the National Contact Points for Responsible Business Conduct (NCPs for RBC) to judge each issue and a rule that the final statement must include follow-up details and deadlines, which is expected to strengthen the effectiveness of the NCP dispute resolution mechanism.

This study is the first academic paper to introduce major substantive and procedural revisions to the 2023 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in Korea. This study also provides implications for the Korean government and companies following the 2023 revised OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises as follows. First, the Korean government must establish a public–private partnership to closely communicate to prevent Korean companies from being harmed by failing to meet strengthening international Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) standards. In addition, Korean government should actively participate in ESG-related international forums, including the OECD, and strive to reflect the needs and interests of Korean companies. Second, the Korean NCP should strengthen its activities to prevent potential damage by expanding education and promotions for Korean businesses on related overseas legislative trends and NCP dispute case studies so that Korean companies can effectively deal with the strengthened ESG standards. Third, Korean multinational enterprises should preemptively establish an advanced ESG management system to seize new opportunities in the global supply chain previously concentrated in China and India in the process of reorganizing global supply chains according to the trend of strengthening ESG standards and the US value alliance strategy.

The purpose of this paper is to assist investment company managers in proactively navigating the risky and ever‐changing market and regulatory environment and to provide an outline for a flexible and robust risk‐based compliance management methodology.

The paper makes recommendations on: becoming familiar with best practices in internal controls and regulatory trends, reassessing compliance management goals and objectives, identifying risk scenarios and related compliance events, designing control systems, updating compliance policies and procedures, and conducting periodic reviews of compliance management systems.

The paper reveals that compliance risks have attained a new level of visibility. To minimize potential hazards, current and evolving risks must be identified, documented and effectively managed by investment firms, regulators and legislators.

The paper provides practical advice by a compliance management systems provider and a consultant specializing in compliance and risk‐based due diligence consulting.

To highlight pertinent points in the frequently-asked questions (FAQs) issued on April 3, 2018 by the US Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network concerning its Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions (“CDD Rule”), which were published on May 11, 2016 and became effective on May 11, 2018.

Discusses clarification and guidance in the FAQs concerning beneficial ownership requirements for administrative and internal accounts, claims for exclusion from the definition of legal entity customer, information requirements for pooled investment vehicles, the requirement for beneficial ownership information from foreign publicly-traded companies, information requirements for existing customers, certification of beneficial ownership information when existing accounts are renewed, requirements for refreshing existing beneficial ownership information, retention of beneficial ownership records, aggregation for currency transaction reporting, and requirements to understand the nature and purpose of a customer relationship.

Covered financial institutions and industry associations have sought clarification and guidance on a range of topics, several of which have been addressed in the FAQs.

Expert guidance from lawyers focused on regulatory, compliance and transactional issues for financial institutions.