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Focuses on the changing nature of retail competition and the way it affects local consumer choice in the UK grocery sector. Integrates relevant literature on the economic aspects of competition with work on the changing corporate geographies of retailers. Links vertical market power (relative to suppliers) and multiple retailers’ ability to compete horizontally (relative to other retailers) in a given trading locality, and argues that this interaction has fundamentally altered the nature of competition. The increase in retail power that has resulted has served to redefine local consumer choice. Smaller retailers are disadvantaged by this shift because it has directly affected the store and product choices of consumer groups depending on their relative mobility. Argues for empirical work to ground and validate these assertions.

This paper considers carbon abatement in a competitive supply chain that is composed of a manufacturer and two retailers under vertical shareholding. The authors emphasize the equilibrium decision problem of stakeholders under vertical shareholding and different power structures.

A game-theoretic approach was used to probe the influence of power structure and retailer competition on manufacturers' carbon abatement under vertical shareholding. The carbon abatement decisions, environmental imp4cacts (EIs) and social welfare (SW) of different scenarios under vertical shareholding are obtained.

The findings show that manufacturers are preferable to carbon abatement and capture optimal profits when shareholding is above a threshold under the retailer power equilibrium, but they may exert a worse negative impact on the environment. The dominant position of the held retailer is not always favorable to capturing the optimal SW and mitigating EIs. In addition, under the combined effect of competition level and shareholding, retailer power equilibrium scenarios are more favorable to improving SW and reducing EIs.

This paper inspects the combined influence of retailer competition and power structure on manufacturers' carbon abatement. Distinguishing from previous literature, the authors also consider the impact of vertical shareholding and consumer preferences. In addition, the authors analyze the SW and EIs in different scenarios.

The paper proposes a two-level closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) dynamic competitive model based on different competitive cooperation situations, and explores the impact of competitive cooperation methods on the pricing strategies, recycling and remanufacturing strategies and competitive model selection strategies of supply chain firms.

This paper establishes a CLSC game consisting of a manufacturer and two retailers. Firstly, five CLSC models are established in both horizontal and vertical dimensions, each of which competes with one another. Secondly, the recycling and remanufacturing pricing strategies are analyzed under different competition or cooperation models. Finally, the results are verified through numerical analysis.

The overall profitability of the CLSC is highest when the manufacturer–retailer partnership alliance is in place. The relationship between retailers and manufacturers is also found to be the best way to achieve overall optimization of the CLSC.

The paper investigates the relationship between the competitive partnership and the total profit of the CLSC, taking into account how to optimize the overall benefit, and focusing on how to optimize the individual interests of each participating enterprise. The results can provide basis and guidance for managers' pricing decision and competition cooperation.

The objective of this paper is to survey the recent developments in economic theories of buyer power and using the theories as a guide to discuss how antitrust cases involving buyer power can be analysed. An important conclusion that emerges from this survey is that the competition effects of buyer power are quite different depending on whether it is monopsony power against powerless suppliers or countervailing buyer power against large suppliers with market power. A proposed framework of antitrust analysis is presented, and issues related to market definitions and determination of buyer power are discussed.

The purpose of this study is to examine the entry probability and performance of private labels at an organic food retailer. For a growing sector with unique market structure and category characteristics, it examines how competitive factors affect the attractiveness of a product category for private label entry by an organic food retailer and how the manufacturer brand assortment that the retailer stocks affects private label share.

This study analyses store level cross‐category data from an independent organic retailer and field data on retail competition.

The findings show that organic private label stock‐keeping units are more likely to be present in categories with supermarket competition. They also show that concentration of shares amongst manufacturer brands (as measured by the Herfindahl index) negatively affect the probability that the retailer will enter a category with a private label stock‐keeping unit (SKU) but positively affects the share of that private label SKU.

Although the results arise from a fairly small sample of around 30 categories, the focal retailer offers a unique opportunity to examine several private label decisions at the store level. Future work could examine in greater depth the competitive interaction between supermarkets and organic retailers and the effects of such competition on their assortment decisions.

By extending private label research beyond the conventional supermarket industry, this study conducts a pioneering test of the effects of competition between retail formats on the likelihood of private label entry.

This study aims to examine the strategic implications and managerial outcomes of the concurrent use of cooperation and competition in vertical channel relationships.

This study employs a structured questionnaire to gather data regarding vertical channel relationships in China.

Whereas the academic literature has emphasized cooperation between channel members because of the interdependence between them, in reality, retailers may accept competition as just another part of doing business with suppliers.

The outcome variables used may not be comprehensive. In particular, the authors choose the flexibility of channel resources to stand for private benefits and joint benefits to represent common benefits, and though these variables certainly represent the intended benefits of the ambidextrous strategy, it remains to be seen whether other benefits may emerge for the exchange parties in vertical relationships.

Using an ambidextrous strategy does not damage relationship quality, though it certainly does not enhance it. This view is based on the notion that an ambidextrous strategy at least does not harm either common or private benefits. Therefore, exchange parties using the ambidextrous strategy should not experience a relationship that is worse than that which results when they use cooperation or competition alone. The results of the current study indicate that this view reflects reality more accurately.

The value of the current study centers on the application of a conceptual framework regarding ambidextrous strategy to vertical channel relationships in a developing economy.

Most firms in the fashion industry frequently design and promote new products, which leads to a two-period phenomenon in product sales. This study aims to examine the optimal advertising efforts of each channel member and the subsidy strategies of the manufacturer with retail competition in a two-period supply chain.

By utilizing the game theory, this study developed a cooperative advertising model that considers the element of retailer competition in a two-period supply chain.

The main results of this study are as follows. An increase in the subsidy rate of one retailer’s advertising cost will lead to a decrease in the share of the other. When a manufacturer’s marginal profit from one retailer is considerably larger than that from the other, the manufacturer will share more advertising cost with the former. This study demonstrates that a bilateral participation contract can achieve supply chain coordination and increases the likelihood of retailers to participate in this contract when competition effect is small.

First, product price is not a decision variable in this model. This concern can be studied in future work. Second, the one-manufacturer and two-retailer supply chain can be expanded to competitive manufacturers.

This study provides some decision references for the manufacturer and retailer on advertising strategies. The manufacturer can also gain insights into cooperative advertising strategy when facing a competitive retail environment.

Most previous studies related to cooperative advertising focused on a single-period supply chain. This study investigates cooperative advertising strategy with retail competition in two-period sales and explores the potential coordinating power of a bilateral participation contract.

The main purpose of this paper is to provide an analytical conceptual framework to help business marketers to identify the effect of consumer's online purchase cost on a firm's performance in a dual‐channel competitive market.

A structural model using game theory is developed to search the optimal strategies for both online and traditional channel retailers.

Our model results show that consumer's online purchase cost consistently has a valuable impact on a firm's profit, and consumer's online purchase cost shows a much more valuable impact on firm's profit when the traditional retail transaction cost and the product web‐fit change. We also find that consumer's online purchase cost has a greater impact on the firm's profit in a Stackelberg competition than in a Bertrand competition.

The present study holds the assumption that all information is known to the online retailers and the traditional retailers. However, information could be incomplete and asymmetric. It is recommended that future research explores the value of consumer's online purchase cost under information asymmetry.

Our paper provides a comprehensive model framework for business managers who currently use or plan to use internet channel to sell their products.

Our research model fills a conceptual and practical gap with a structured analysis of the current state of knowledge about consumer's online purchase cost. The paper provides practical and solid advice and examples demonstrating the application of the different types of optimal marketing strategies for business managers.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of price adjustment speed on the stability of Bertrand–Nash equilibrium in the context of a dual-channel supply chain competition.

The paper considers a dual-channel supply chain comprising a manufacturer, a traditional retailer and an online retailer. A two-dimensional discrete dynamical system is used to examine the Bertrand competition between the retailers. The retailers are assumed to follow bounded rational expectations. Local stability of Bertrand–Nash equilibrium is investigated with respect to the price adjustment speed.

As the price adjustment speed increases, the stability of Bertrand–Nash equilibrium is lost, leading to complex chaotic dynamics. The results showed that chaotic dynamics deteriorates the profit of the retailers. The authors also found that the chaos can be controlled using an adaptive adjustment mechanism and the retailers enjoy higher profit when the chaos is controlled.

This study helps retail managers to choose an appropriate price adjustment speed to maximize profit.

The heterogeneity of the retailers is not considered in the studies involving dynamics of retailer competition. This paper contributes to the literature by considering the operational difference between a traditional retailer and an online retailer, i.e. price adjustment speed. In addition, the study establishes a link between price adjustment speed and profit.

The purpose of this study is to provide a unique competitive advantage to businesses in providing a wide range of products to prospective customers. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no study to discuss the impact of customer-centric retailing on total supply chain profit under price competition between organized and unorganized retailers.

This paper considers a supply chain comprising of organized and unorganized retailers and a single manufacturer. This paper proposes three mathematical models considering a customer-centric approach in a competitive environment. Stackelberg game is used to examine how members of the chain interact, and Nash equilibrium was used to find optimal strategies for players under different customer-centric approaches.

The results show that the total supply chain profit is higher when both organized and unorganized retailers use a customer-centric approach independently instead of collaborating process. The result, in addition, establishes that when the dissatisfying cost exceeds a certain threshold (1.5), the total profit is higher for the organized customer-centric effort model compared to the other two models.

The main contribution of the study is to examine the effect of customer-centric retailing, considering dissatisfying costs on supply chains profit and individual decision-making under price competition between organized retailers and unorganized retailers. The authors developed different mathematical models in the different customer-centric approach.