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The research is aimed at investigating how relational mechanisms and formal contracts affect alliance success under constructive and destructive conflict.

While relational mechanisms and formal contracts are widely used in strategic alliances to manage a variety of issues among partners, recent research has indicated that effects of these governance mechanisms may change in distinct contexts. Adopting the lens of new institutional economics, this study provides insights on the comparative and interactive effects of relational mechanisms and formal contracts on alliance success, and the differential contingency effects of two types of inter-partner conflict, i.e. constructive and destructive conflict, on the above relationships. The authors use hierarchical multivariate regression analyses through a survey dataset of 392 alliance firms in China with the approach of two key informants.

The empirical results confirm that relational mechanisms have a stronger positive effect on alliance success than formal contracts and these two governance mechanisms complement each other in driving alliance success. When facing a high level of constructive conflict, partner firms rely to a greater extent on relational mechanisms than on formal contracts to achieve alliance success. When a high level of destructive conflict exists, partner firms depend more heavily on formal contracts than on relational mechanisms to achieve alliance success. Moreover, the complementary effect of the two governance mechanisms is much stronger when partner firms face high constructive conflict than when they face high destructive conflict.

This study discloses the comparative and interactive effects of relational mechanisms and formal contracts on alliance success in distinct contexts by identifying the moderating roles of constructive and destructive conflict.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse how the use of governance mechanisms in buyer-supplier relationships in the supply chain (SC) are related to the maturity of relationships and the generation of relational rents.

Several studies have analysed interorganisational governance in SCs. However, to the best of the knowledge, no study has focussed on the use of different types of governance mechanisms through maturity stages in buyer-supplier relationships and as a consequence, its relational rents. The aim of this paper is to analyse how the use of governance mechanisms in buyer-supplier relationships in the SC are related to the maturity of relationships and the generation of relational rents. To achieve this goal, this paper carried out multiple case studies.

The results show that changes in the use of formal and informal governance mechanisms contribute to the generation of relational rents and relationship continuity. This paper identified that a reduction in power asymmetry by the buyer may allow for the greater use of informal governance mechanisms and greater relational rents. Moreover, the paper highlights that a relationship might advance or regress throughout the maturity stages, according to the commitment of the buyer to maintain the relationship with the supplier.

The study has the limitation of having chosen polar case studies in the organic sector in Brazil to illustrate the theoretical discussion and propose a model to be tested via further research. This study considered institutional factors in the analysis that might not affect dyadic relationships in other sectors and countries.

As a managerial contribution, the results indicate that when the buyer uses both kinds of mechanisms complementarily and encourages the utilisation of informal mechanisms, relationships become more resilient to adverse events.

The study also contributes towards valuing the role of organic farmers and encourages the government and business community to reflect on the challenges and opportunities in the sector.

Based on four propositions created by evaluating both the empirical data and previous literature, this paper proposes a buyer-supplier relationship maturity model rather than an overall SC maturity model. This paper also elaborated on the arguments of Dyer et al. (2018), proposing a causal explanation of how a relationship might advance or regress throughout the maturity stages, according to the commitment of the buyer to maintain the relationship with the supplier using governance mechanisms. This change in maturity stages, in turn, affects relational rents for the dyad.

This paper aims to analyze the influence of governance mechanisms in the generation of relational rents for supplier in short food supply chains (SFSCs).

This study used data from a survey of 181 organic producers in SFSCs, using partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) with the aid of the SmartPLS® 3 software for the analysis.

The results show the relationship between formal and informal governance mechanisms and relational rents. The predominance of informal mechanisms enabled a higher explanatory power than that provided by formal governance mechanisms. Further, the authors found that the complementary use of governance mechanisms has a stronger impact on generating relational rents. However, contextual factors such as relationship time, power asymmetry and uncertainty in demand have not shown any influence on governance mechanisms for generating relational rents.

The result sheds new light on the relevance of governance mechanisms to foster relational rents to suppliers in SFSCs. It also shows that contextual factors that affect relationships in traditional supply chains do not play a relevant role in SFSCs due to their specific characteristics.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the relationship between knowledge transfer characteristics in alliance and alliance governance mechanisms, the influence of alliance governance mechanisms on knowledge transfer consequences and investigate the role of environmental uncertainty in knowledge transfer of alliance.

Survey data were collected mainly in high-tech industries of China, the firms in which often establish alliance for the purpose of learning and knowledge transfer often takes place in that alliance. Finally, 293 usable samples were included in subsequent analysis. Multiple regression analysis was used to examine the hypotheses.

The extent of relational (/formal) governance mechanism used in alliance has a stronger positive relationship with the extent of tacit (/explicit) knowledge transfer in alliance than with the extent of explicit (/tacit) knowledge transfer in alliance between them; environmental uncertainty impairs relational governance mechanisms and enhances formal governance mechanisms used in alliance; both relational and formal governance mechanisms could facilitate knowledge transfer in alliance; environmental uncertainty hinders knowledge transfer and negatively moderates the relationship between alliance governance mechanisms and knowledge transfer.

This paper finds the relationship between knowledge transfer in alliance and alliance governance mechanisms, and the role of environmental uncertainty, providing managers with direct implications about how to manage alliance with different knowledge transfer characteristics for the purpose of facilitating knowledge transfer in alliance; provides managers more details about the dark side of the environmental uncertainty in knowledge transfer, also reminds public policy-makers paying enough attention for the improvement of institutional environment to deal with uncertainty.

The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of relational mechanisms and market contracts on cross‐enterprise knowledge trading in supply chain and to examine the role of market contracts. Relational mechanism is categorized into indirect and direct relational mechanism in this paper. Cross‐enterprise knowledge trading is categorized into explicit and tacit knowledge trading. The indirect relational mechanism is mainly expressed by knowledge brokers, while the direct relational mechanism consists of shared goals and trust.

Multiple regression analysis was performed on questionnaire data from 256 Chinese manufacturing enterprises in supply chain in order to assess the relationships between relational mechanisms, market contracts and cross‐enterprise knowledge trading.

The results show that knowledge brokers and market contracts have significant and positive effects on explicit knowledge trading, but the effects on tacit knowledge trading are not significant. Shared goals and trust have significant and positive effects not only on explicit knowledge trading but also on tacit knowledge trading, while trust has a stronger positive effect on tacit knowledge trading than explicit knowledge trading. Finally, the moderating effects of market contracts are proven in the relationships between relational mechanisms and knowledge trading, excluding the relationship between knowledge brokers and tacit knowledge trading.

Previous studies about the cross‐enterprise knowledge trading in supply chain focused on theoretical research which did not match with reality, especially in China, where the relational mechanism in trading activities is strong. Based on relational exchange theory and transaction cost theory, a conceptual model for the effects of relational mechanisms and market contracts on cross‐enterprise knowledge trading in supply chain is proposed in this paper, and then empirically tested using the data collected from 256 Chinese manufacturing enterprises in supply chain with multiple regression models. The findings provide a theoretical basis for knowledge trading participants selecting an appropriate governance mechanism to promote knowledge trading, and these also guide the knowledge trading among members of supply chain in practice.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the direct and interaction effects of relational governance and two control mechanisms, output control and process control in the context of international exchange relationships. Cross-border exchange relationships receive growing attention in the literature. Yet extant research has mainly examined single governance mechanisms. Among the few studies that investigate the interaction effects of relational governance and control mechanisms, some believe that the two mechanisms have conflicting effects, whereas others argue that they are complementary in nature.

Based on a sample of 184 Chinese export ventures, the empirical paper adopts the hierarchical moderated multiple regression approach.

The authors find that relational governance contributes positively to export performance, while output control leads negatively to export performance. The findings further suggest that output control complements relational governance to enhance export performance when combined. However, process control and relational governance substitute each other and reduce effectiveness when used simultaneously.

The study sheds new light on the ongoing debate about whether control mechanisms substitute or complement relational governance.

The study is novel in addressing the issue of how relational governance interacts differently with two control mechanisms in the international exchange relationships.

As outsourcing continues to grow, supplier management becomes critical to the success of manufacturing firms. Transaction cost economics (TCE) suggests that firms should choose supplier governance mechanisms to ensure fulfillment of contractual obligations and safeguard against opportunism for their outsourcing activities. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to examine how buying organizations govern supplier contracts to improve manufacturing competitiveness and financial performance. The relative effectiveness of two primary governance mechanisms, contractual governance (CG), and relational governance, are examined.

Expanding upon previous studies, this study delineates three relational governance mechanisms (negotiation efficiency (NE), problem solving relations, and information sharing (IS)) that are conceptually, statistically and pragmatically different. Based on the TCE literature, a conceptual model is developed to decipher the relationships between pre-contract conditions (supplier asset specificity and environmental uncertainty (EU)), governance mechanisms, performance ambiguity (PA), and performance. Using the data collected from 987 firms, the statistical results present several important findings that would advance current theory and practice in outsourcing.

The authors find empirical support for the effects of contractual and relational governance in improving manufacturing and financial performance. The governance of supplier contracts clearly facilitates manufacturers’ ability to leverage their resources to improve performance. The relative effectiveness of these two governance mechanisms is related to the levels of EU and supplier asset specificity. Relational governance displays greater influence on performance than CG does. However, CG appears to be complementary to relational governance.

The interplays between supplier asset specificity and EU should be examined in the future. The relationships among NE, IS, and problem solving should also be examined to facilitate the development of relational governance.

Managers should be aware of the situational performance of governance mechanisms. Moreover, it is important to realize how differently each of the three relational governance mechanisms and CG contribute to performance.

This study extends the academic discussion of supplier governance by investigating the alignment of governance mechanisms (relational governance and CG) with pre-contract conditions to reduce PA and, thereby, enhance manufacturing performance. Under the theoretical framework of TCE, the direct and indirect effects of pre-contract conditions and governance variables are fully examined and discussed. Moreover, relational governance involves multiple mechanisms that are conceptually and pragmatically different, and future studies should not treat it as one single construct.

Inter-organisational governance is an important enabler for information processing, particularly in relationships undergoing digital transformation (DT) where partners depend on each other for information in decision-making. Based on information processing theory (IPT), the authors theoretically and empirically investigate how governance mechanisms address information asymmetry (uncertainty and equivocality) arising in capturing, sharing and interpreting information generated by digital technologies.

IPT is applied to four cases of public–private relationships in the Dutch infrastructure sector that aim to enhance the quantity and quality of information-based decision-making by implementing digital technologies. The investigated relationships are characterised by differing degrees and types of information uncertainty and equivocality. The authors build on rich data sets including archival data, observations, contract documents and interviews.

Addressing information uncertainty requires invoking contractual control and coordination. Contract clauses should be precise and incentive schemes functional in terms of information requirements. Information equivocality is best addressed by using relational governance. Identifying information requirements and reducing information uncertainty are a prerequisite for the transformation activities that organisations perform to reduce information equivocality.

The study offers insights into the roles of both governance mechanisms in managing information asymmetry in public–private relationships. The study uncovers key activities for gathering, sharing and transforming information when using digital technologies.

This study draws on IPT to study public–private relationships undergoing DT. The study links contractual control and coordination as well as relational governance mechanisms to information-processing activities that organisations deploy to reduce information uncertainty and equivocality.

Contemporary supply chain exchanges are governed by both contractual and relational governance mechanisms. However, the decision about when to use these mechanisms is likely driven by key relationship characteristics as well as the context in which they are needed. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the influence of dependence and information sharing on the governance decision within the context of inter-organizational conflict, and assess the degree to which contractual and relational governance approaches lead to more satisfying outcomes.

This research builds on both transaction cost and conflict resolution arguments to build hypotheses. To test the hypotheses, survey data were collected from supply chain professionals regarding specific episodes of conflict and analyzed using an ordinary least squares regression.

The results show a strong reluctance for the use of relational governance mechanisms to resolve conflict when the relationship is characterized by strong joint dependency or information sharing asymmetries. A strong dependence asymmetry and high degree of joint information sharing are associated with greater use of contractual and relational governance approaches, respectively. Finally, the authors find that contractual mechanisms do not necessarily lead to a dissatisfactory outcome for the manager involved.

This research investigates not only the use of contractual and relational governance mechanisms in inter-firm conflict resolution, but also the relationship specific factors that influence a firm’s decision to leverage either type of governance mechanism.

This paper aims to clarify ambiguous results from previous research on the relationship between contextual factors, trust and supply chain governance (SCG).

This study carried out a systematic literature review in 11 databases, with articles published until 2018. Afterward, this study conducted a thematic analysis in 60 articles to address the contextual factors, governance structures and trust approaches raised in previous research.

The thematic analysis revealed that seven contextual factors influence the choice of contractual and relational mechanisms in supply chains: relationship history, environmental uncertainty, perceived risk, perceived justice, asset specificity, power asymmetry and interdependence. The findings explained the ambiguous results of past research by proposing that contractual and relational governance are complementary and that the presence of trust (affective and competence-based) moderates the relationship between contextual factors and SCG.

This research advances the SCG literature by proposing trust (affective and competence-based) as a moderating variable that fosters governance mechanisms in supply chain relationships.