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Farmers' risk attitudes and risk perceptions play an essential role in shaping risk management strategies to address risks and uncertainties. Contract farming is considered as one of the feasible approaches to tackle farmers' concerns. However, risk perspectives under various categories have not been included in studies on farmers' preferences for contract farming in the literature, especially in Vietnam. This study aims to determine factors affecting farmers' choices of different contract farming practices.

The explanatory factor analysis (EFA) and multinomial logit model (MNL) were applied to explore the impacts of risk perspectives on farmers' preferences for contract farming. Data have been collected from 211 rice farmers in An Giang Province, “the rice bowl” of the Mekong Delta, Vietnam.

The study found that farm size, cooperatives, extension, market access and trust have significantly impacted on contract participation while a delay payment was a barrier for farmers' motivation to opt for the contract. Farmers' contract choices were also influenced by their risk attitudes and perceptions under different risk dimensions. The financial, policy and human risk-averse behavior predisposed farmers to single out the full contract while the policy and human risk-loving and production, market and finance risk-averse respondents were in favor of the marketing contract. Moreover, the findings indicated that the more farmers concerned about risk of weather and market, the more choices for the full contract, whereas the risk perceptions of weather and policy encouraged farmers to use the limited contract. By contrast, farmers who perceived the impacts of risk of diseases/pests and human were likely to adopt the marketing contract.

This study just focuses on collecting data from farmers’ perspective. Future studies involving stakeholders such as enterprises and policy makers are strongly recommended so as to design suitable contracts and enforce contract schemes effectively in Vietnam.

The findings also contribute to the literature on different types of contracts and the multidimensional aspect of risk for rice production in Vietnam.

Three years after the introduction of exchange‐traded options on the American scene, a call options market was made with ten popular common stocks in Singapore in early 1977. Only calls were traded and no puts were introduced. After six months of trading actively, volume dwindled, and the market was withdrawn in early 1980. Three currency options markets introduced in 1987 continues to thrive at the time of this study. The reason for the demise of the call options market is mainly the significant mispricing of the contracts as most contracts were systematically above the theoretical fair prices. Low volatility in the spot market after the calls were introduced, availability of alternative speculative instrument for traders, high transaction costs and the lack of knowledge about the complexity of options trades are suggested as reasons for the failure of the market. As a new options market has been introduced again in March, 1993, it is worthwhile to learn from the past.

The purpose of this paper is to quantify the benefits to farmers from using alternative marketing arrangements (AMAs) in the USA. The authors first estimate a behavioral model explaining farmers' joint decisions on which commodities to produce and which marketing channels to use when selling their outputs. The authors then use the estimated model to quantify the benefits to farmers from using AMAs.

The authors use the discrete choice random utility maximization model to examine farmers' choices on production regimes, where a regime is defined as a possible combination of all the individual commodity/marketing arrangement channels that the farmer can choose to use. The farmer is assumed to compare the utilities he gets from each of the possible production regimes and then selects the production regime that yields the highest utility to him. The benefit of having access to a particular AMA is measured as the negative of the welfare loss associated with forcing the farmer to abandon that particular AMA.

The results indicate that AMAs yield an economically significant amount of benefits to farmers who rely on them to market their outputs. At the national level, the benefit of using production contracts to hog farmers is valued at $336.4 million. The benefits of using marketing contracts are valued at $374.2, $156.6 and $92.1 million for corn, soybeans and wheat producers.

The paper is the first study that uses the farm-level data to study the welfare effects of marketing contracts in the grain sector. The results show that considering a multi-enterprises farm, farmers' welfare loss might be smaller when the hog production contract is no longer existed.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of GLOBALGAP standards certification on farmer's preference for marketing contract choices including written contracts, oral contracts and spot contracts, as well as to establish the impact of marketing contracts on net returns from snap bean production in Kenya.

In this study, we use a data collected from 446 Snap bean farmers in Kenya. Using a two-step selection Bourguignon Frontier and Gurgand (BFG) model and Propensity Score Matching (PSM), we analysed determinants of Global Gap Certification and other farming characteristics that influence smallholder farmers preference for marketing contracts and net returns from snap beans venture.

Results indicate that attending GLOBALGAP training, GLOBALGAP subsidy support, membership to GLOBALGAP farmer's groups, and selling beans to GLOBALGAP certified GLOBALGAP buyers would significantly influence better returns underwritten marketing contracts. Producing snap beans underwritten marketing contracts would get farmer's net returns of between 1.8 and 8% while producing under oral and spot market contracts would earn farmer net returns of between 0.2 and 0.08 %.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this study is the first to examine the influence of GLOBALGAP standards certification on marketing contract choices and net returns from snap bean production, while accounting for selectivity biasness.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of marketing contract choices including written contracts, oral contracts and no contracts, as well as to examine the impact of marketing contracts on net returns from apple production in China.

A two-stage selection correction approach (Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (BFG)) for the multinomial logit model is employed to estimate the impact of marketing contracts on net returns from apple production. On the basis of the BFG estimation, the authors also use an endogenous switching regression model and a propensity score matching technique to estimate the causal effects of marketing contract choices on net returns from apple production.

The results reveal significant selectivity correction terms in the choices of both written contracts and no contracts and insignificant selectivity correction terms in the choice of oral contract, indicating that accounting for selection bias is a prerequisite for unbiased and consistent estimation. The findings also indicate written contracts increase apple farmers’ net returns, while oral contracts exert the opposite effect.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine the impact of marketing contract choices on net returns from apple production, accounting for selectivity effects.

In the hybrid electricity market consisting of renewable and conventional energy, the generation output of renewable power is uncertain because of its intermittency, and the power market demand is also fluctuant. Meanwhile, there is fierce competition among power producers in the power supply market and retailers in the demand market after deregulation, which increases the difficulty of renewable energy power grid-connection. To promote grid-connection of renewable energy power in the hybrid electricity market, the authors construct different contract decision-making models in the “many-to-many” hybrid power supply chain to explore the pricing strategy of renewable energy power grid-connecting.

Considering the dual-uncertainty of renewable energy power output and electricity market demand, the authors construct different decision-making models of wholesale price contract and revenue-sharing contract to compare and optimize grid-connecting pricing, respectively, to maximize the profits of different participants in the hybrid power supply chain. Besides, the authors set different parameters in the models to explore the influence of competition intensity, government subsidies, etc. on power pricing. Then, a numerical simulation is carried out, they verify the existence of the equilibrium solutions satisfying the supply chain coordination, compare the differences of pricing contracts and further analyze the variation characteristics of optimal contract parameters and their interaction relations.

Revenue-sharing contract can increase the quantity of green power grid-connection and realize benefits Pareto improvement of all parties in hybrid power supply chain. The competition intensity both of power supply and demand market will have an impact on the sharing ratio, and the increase of competition intensity results in a reduction of power supply chain coordination pressure. The power contract price, spot price and selling price have all been reduced with the increase of the sharing ratio, and the price of renewable power is more sensitive to the ratio change. The sharing ratio shows a downward trend with the increase of government green power subsidies.

On the basis of expanding the definition of hybrid power market and the theory of newsvendor model, considering the dual-uncertainty of green power generation output and electricity market demand, this paper builds and compares different contract decision-making models to study the grid-connection pricing strategy of renewable energy power. And as an extension of supply chain structure types and management, the authors build a “many-to-many” power supply chain structure model and analyze the impact of competition intensity among power enterprises and the government subsidy on the power grid-connecting pricing.

The purpose of this paper is to use prediction markets to forecast an agricultural event: United States Department of Agriculture's number of cattle on feed (COF). Prediction markets are increasingly popular forecast tools due to their flexibility and proven accuracy to forecast a diverse array of events.

During spring 2008, a market was constructed comprised of student traders in which they bought and sold contracts whose value was contingent on the number of COF to be reported on April 18, 2008. During a nine‐week period, students were presented three types of contracts to forecast the number of COF. To estimate forecasts a uniform price sealed bid auction mechanism was used.

The results showed that prediction markets forecasted 11.5 million head on feed, which was about 1.6 percent lower than the actual number of COF (11.684 million). The prediction market also fared slightly worse than analysts' predictions, which on average suggested there would be about 11.795 million head (an over‐estimate of about 1 percent).

The contribution of this study was not to provide conclusive evidence on the efficacy of using prediction markets to forecast COF, but rather to present an empirical example that will spark interest among agricultural economists on the promises and pitfalls of a research method that has been relatively underutilized in the agricultural economics literature.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate contract farming in China, using vegetable production as a case. Specifically, the authors analyze farmers' contract decisions for different types of contracts, their contract compliance behaviors, and their profitability affected by the contracts both analytically and empirically.

The authors assume growers with alternative risk preferences make the contract decisions to maximize their expected utilities, under exogenous market price risks and contract terms determined by the processor or wholesaler. Both fixed price and floating price contracts are analyzed. Two surveys of 185 and 85 farm households, respectively, are obtained in Shandong province in 2010, and econometric analyses with both Logit and least square regressions are conducted.

The results indicate that the determining factors for contract farming are related to farmers' risk attitude, gender, yield, farm size and labor availability. However, contrary to the common belief that contracts are a risk management tool for risk averse farmers, the risk lovers tend to use contract farming instead of risk averters. Female household heads and farms with more labors tend not to use contracts, but larger farms with more acreage are more likely to contract. These suggest Chinese farmers' primary motivation of contracting is not market price risk management, but rather seeking better offers and marketing transaction cost reduction.

The authors believe that this is the first econometric study to analyze contract farming allowing different types of contracts in China. The scenarios include cases without contracts, with fixed price contracts, and with floating price contracts, where the contract price changes to reflect the market price, a very unique yet popular situation in China. Each of the cases is also considered under the situation whether default is possible.

Distribution has been a major element of retailers′ marketing strategy in recent years as companies strive to control costs but at the same time seek competitive advantage through improving service to stores and gaining greater control of stock in the supply chain. In an interview survey of distribution directors from major multiple groups, all companies were reviewing their distribution strategy and many had made major changes to their distribution system. Centralisation of stock in strategically located RDCs and the use of third party contractors were main features of retail companies′ strategy. Contractors were much more aggressive in marketing their services to retailers than hitherto. This is partly related to the competitive and turbulent nature of the industry. In a survey of marketing directors/managers of distribution companies, it was clear that firms were trying to raise their profile in the market as they “went public” and/or because they were moving into new industry sectors away from their “core” specialist areas.