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The study aims to explore how the monitoring and resource provision function of board of directors impact the association between ownership concentration and small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) initial public offering (IPO) underpricing in the context of an emerging economy like India.

The sample comprises 390 SME IPOs listed on Bombay Stock Exchange SME platform and National Stock Exchange EMERGE (EMERGE is the NSE new initiative for SMEs to raise the funds from investors) in India. To test the moderating impact of the board monitoring role and resource provision role, the study employs hierarchical moderated regression subject to the fulfillment of assumptions.

The findings divulge that ownership concentration significantly reduces underpricing, hinting towards the operationalization of alignment of interest hypothesis. With regards to moderating relationship, the study found that while board resource providing role negatively moderates the relationship between ownership concentration and SME IPO underpricing, board monitoring function fails to cast any significant impact on the relationship between ownership concentration and SME IPO underpricing.

The present study ignores larger firms listed on the main platform which have complex decision-making than smaller firms. Besides, it is confined to only a single country, i.e. India. Extending the study to other countries with similar institutional characteristics would have validated the findings. Furthermore, the moderating impact of other organizational factors like firm age, lifecycle of firm and change in technology would form an interesting avenue for future research.

The findings of the study have practical implications for managers in designing the adequate board structure that significantly reduces underpricing. It thus further advices the issuers on focusing more on strengthening the resource provision role of board of directors for achieving higher rewards. The findings are helpful to policymakers in framing such policies that enhance the resource-oriented role of board of directors and resource accessibility for SMEs. Furthermore, the results advise the investors to be relatively assured about the SMEs whose board exercises its resource provision role emphatically. Accordingly, findings are helpful to investors in making investment decisions in alternative market settings characterized by the concentrated ownership structure.

The study furthers the debate on the importance of two prominent roles played by board as a moderating variable in the underexplored context of IPO underpricing of small and medium-sized firms in India.

This study aims to determine the effect of bank ownership on the credit risk of Indonesian Islamic local banks (ILBs).

This study uses the system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation technique with a sample of 155 Islamic local banks in Indonesia from 2012 to 2019.

The results show that commissioner board (D.COW) ownership has a negative effect on credit risk. This indicates that an increase in the number of shares of Islamic local banks owned by the commissioner board reduces credit risk. On the other hand, government ownership (D.GOW), the Sharia supervisory board (D.SOW) and the director board (D.DOW) do not affect credit risk.

The government, Sharia supervisory board and director board need opportunities to easily own more Islamic local bank shares. Therefore, the provisions regarding the share ownership rights of the government, Sharia supervisory board and director board need to be improved to increase their role in reducing credit risk.

Previous researchers have not studied the effect of government ownership, the commissioner board, the Sharia supervisory board and the ownership of directors on credit risk at the ILB in Indonesia.

The main purpose of the study is to examine the influence of family directors on the firm performance of public listed companies (PLCs) in Malaysia. This study provides empirical evidence on the agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority interests in the concentrated ownership setting.

Samples of the study are 112 PLCs in year 2006. Two measures of firm performance are used: return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. Managerial ownership refers to the percentage shareholdings of executive directors with direct and indirect holdings. It was further categorized into family ownership and non-family ownership.

In relation to ROA, managerial ownership is found positively significant. The results also show that the positive relationship between managerial ownership is contributed by the managerial-non-family ownership. In relation to Tobin’s Q, the results show a U-shape with turning point at 31.38% for managerial ownership and 28.29% for the managerial-family ownership. The results found significant and positive relationships between managerial ownership and both measures of firm performance which indicates that managerial ownership and family ownership yield greater efficiency.

The study highlights the effects of corporate governance on ROA and Tobin’s Q are somewhat different. It provides some evidence on the need to use appropriate measure of firm performance. The significant relationship supports the argument of Chami (1999), Fama and Jensen (1983), and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and empirical evidence of Lee (2004) that family ownership enhances monitoring activities.

Differentiating the types of managerial ownership into family and non-family categories enriches our knowledge about who actually contributes to the improved performance.

This paper aims to examine whether board governance mechanisms and ownership structure play a role in foreign investors’ decisions when buying shares in Saudi listed companies

Foreign investment in the Saudi capital market started in 2015 and reached a peak in 2019, with corporate governance regulations having been updated in 2017. The authors tested the proposed relationships using hand collected data for all Saudi non-financial firms in 2019.

This study found that it does not play a role in attracting foreign investment in the Saudi capital market. Foreign investors also seem to avoid firms with concentrated ownership that either have high government or director ownership; however, accounting and market variables show significant impact on foreign investors' decisions. The outcomes of this study provide empirical evidence that current foreign investors in the Saudi stock market do not place enough merit on board governance and their investment decisions tend to depend on share performance. Thus, the results show that the current governance changes and capital market regulations in Saudi Arabia may not have been sufficient to stimulate the inflow of institutional foreign investment to the country to date, but rather they have attracted individual retail foreign investors.

This empirical study is one of only a small number of studies to investigate the impact of internal corporate governance on foreign ownership in developing countries and the first in the Saudi context. In fact, most previous governance research in Saudi Arabia focused on how board governance and ownership structure influences firm performance. A review of the prior studies found that only Badawi et al. (2019) examined the determinants of foreign ownership among Saudi listed firms. Thus, the present investigation extends that study by examining the role of board governance in attracting foreign investors.

The purpose of this paper is to control for the interrelationships between corporate governance mechanisms. Managerial ownership, external block holders' ownership, board independence, leadership structure and the size of the board, are perceived as the set of ownership and board characteristics embraced to interact in a system of corporate dynamics, which mitigate agency costs.

By using an extensive sample of Greek listed firms and by applying a simultaneous equations framework in order to control the potential endogeneity, the paper's findings indicate interdependence among these mechanisms.

More specifically, companies whose CEO is also the chairman of the board tend to have fewer outside directors and lower block holder ownership. The paper also provides evidence that independent boards are more likely to be employed by firms with higher external block holder shareholdings and whose board size is negatively correlated with managerial ownership and board independence.

The aim of this study is to examine the interrelationships among ownership structure and board characteristics in a small open economy, such as the Greek economy.

The extant literature reports mixed and inconclusive findings concerning the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. To provide incremental insight, this paper aims to investigate whether the bi-directional relationships among managerial ownership, board independence and firm performance are determined.

This paper uses a data set consisting of 9,302 firm-year observations of Australian listed companies during 2005-2015 and a three-stage least squares simultaneous equation model to test the bi-directional relationships.

The results indicate that both managerial ownership and board independence inversely affect firm performance and vice versa. In addition, board independence is negatively correlated with managerial ownership and vice versa.

The convergence-of-interests hypothesis can be achieved by manipulating managerial ownership through making contingent payments. Board independence, as a voluntary regime in Australia, can provide additional flexibility to corporate decision makers.

This study provides additional evidence by using the convergence-of-interests hypothesis vis-à-vis the entrenchment hypothesis to examine the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, and tests the association of board independence and firm performance using the explanation of agency theory vis-à-vis stewardship theory.

This paper aims to explore the relationship of promoter ownership and board structure with firm performance for Indian companies.

Corporate governance structures of 391 Indian companies out of CRISIL NSE Index (CNX) 500 companies listed on national stock exchange (NSE) have been studied for their impact on performance of companies. Panel data regression methodology has been used on data for five financial years from 2010 to 2014 for the selected companies. Performance measures considered are market-based measure (Tobin’s Q) and accounting-based measure (return on assets [ROA]).

The empirical findings indicate that market-based measure (Tobin’s Q) is more impacted by corporate governance than accounting-based measure. There is significant positive association between promoter ownership and firm performance. It is also indicated that the relationship between promoter ownership and firm performance is different at different levels of promoter ownership. Board size is found to be positively related to ROA; however, board independence is not found to be related to any of the performance measures.

Limitations of the study are in terms of data methodology and possible omission of some variables. It is felt that endogeneity and reverse causality might be better addressed using simultaneous equation methodology.

The paper adds to the emerging body of literature on corporate governance performance relationship in Indian context using a reasonably wider and newer data set.

In order to deepen our knowledge of governance of family firms, the purpose of this paper is to focus our attention on the relation between family owners who are members of the board of directors and firm performance. Also, this study sheds more light on how the generation in charge of the family firm affects that relationship, as generational involvement may be a unique predictor of governance behavior in these firms.

The authors applied a cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression model to test the hypotheses on a sample of 313 non-listed Spanish family SMEs. The authors suggest the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the percentage of ownership by family members of the board of directors and firm performance, and specifically, the authors propose an S-shaped effect that implies two breakpoints.

The authors find not only that an inverted U-shaped relationship exists, but also an S-shaped relationship between family board members’ ownership and firm performance in family SMEs. Nevertheless, the results are different in comparing first-, second- and later-generation family firms.

This is one of the few empirical studies that examine the relationship between family board ownership and firm performance in the context of non-listed family SMEs. The authors consider that the influences of family directors on the board of directors as well as the concentration of family ownership on the board of directors are worth studying in non-listed family SMEs. Moreover, previous studies have focused mainly on large listed family firms but not on unlisted ones.

This study aims to examine the effects of corporate ownership (government-linked investment companies, GLICs), linearity of GLICs, board ownership and linearity of board ownership on company performance.

Using panel data from companies that are listed on the Malaysian Stock Exchange during the period of 2000 to 2009, this study uses weighted least square models.

The results show that GLICs ownership is positively and significantly related to company performance, while board ownership is negatively and significantly related to company performance. These findings suggest that GLICs ownership improves company performance, while board ownership destroys company performance. The results also show that while GLICs ownership has an inverted U-shaped relationship with company performance, board ownership has a U-shaped relationship with company performance.

The theoretical implication of this study is that agency problem decreases in companies with low and high levels of board ownership concentration, while it increases in companies with middle level of board ownership concentration. Furthermore, agency cost decreases in companies with a certain level of GLICs ownership concentration as the government’s New Economic Model (NEM) expects. However, agency cost increases in companies after a certain level of GLICs ownership concentration.

In practical perspectives, this study provides evidence to policy makers that the government’s proposal to reduce GLICs’ investments in Malaysia and diversify them aboard as mentioned in NEM is supported because the decrease in GLICs stakes in certain level may increase company performance. On the other hand, if the policy of the government is to increase GLICs stakes, the company performance may decrease after a certain level of ownership concentration. This study also provides evidence that investors can invest in companies with low and high board ownership concentration. Furthermore, the NEM policy gives investors an opportunity to invest in the companies with GLICs. Reducing GLICs stakes in the Malaysian market and putting them in the international markets, as mentioned in the Malaysian Government’s NEM policy, will create more opportunities for international investors to invest their fund in the Malaysian market. Thus, the emerging markets exist. In addition, the NEM policy also encourages institutional ownerships like domestic and foreign to increase their stakes instead of GLICs in the Malaysian market.

So far, most of the previous studies on GLICs and board ownerships in the Malaysian setting focused on the relationship of the ownership structure with company performance. However, no study has been done to examine the linearity effects of GLICs and board ownerships on company performance. The study is very important to perform to provide the policy makers and investors with clear guidance before their decisions.