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I am honored to receive the Booz Allen Hamilton/strategy+business Eminent Scholar Award in International Management. I am even more honored to follow in the footsteps of such distinguished previous recipients of the AOM-IMD (Academy of Management-International Division) Distinguished Scholar Award as: John Child, Christopher Bartlett, Sumantra Ghoshal, John Dunning, and Yves Doz. Like them, I shall reflect here on my past contributions to scholarship, and then use this work as a building block for the major part of this paper, which is on the need for new and relevant theory in the field of international management.

This study compares U.S. firm international strategies between two starkly different industries. We find that firms are more inclined to adopt global strategies in the integrated global industry than in the multidomestic industry. The global strategy does not seem to be effective unless a firm possesses substantial intangible assets. R&D-based intangible assets play a more significant role than marketing-based intangible assets in both the integrated global industry and (to a lesser extent) the multidomestic industry. Additionally, internationalization pace has a positive direct impact, and a negative interaction effect with the global strategy on firm performance in the integrated global industry.

Industrial strategy has been officially out of favour at the national level since the 1980s, although some form of tacit industrial policy has existed for many years under different governments, often partial and usually not codified in official format. The new national Industrial Strategy of 2017 sets out a much clearer intent for how the 2016 Conservative government wants to rebuild the UK industrial base through both national level activity and through local and regional strategies.

At a regional level this is not so new, since the North East has had a variety of regional development strategies and innovation strategies dating back to the 1990s, associated with the implementation of the EU Structural Funds, with the former Regional Development Agency and now with the North East Local Enterprise Partnerships. These typically involved many aspects of the new local Industrial Strategies, so what’s new and what should the region be doing?

“It should also be noted that the objective of convergence and equal distribution, including across under-performing areas, can hinder efforts to generate growth. Contrariwise, the objective of competitiveness can exacerbate regional and social inequalities, by targeting efforts on zones of excellence where projects achieve greater returns (dynamic major cities, higher levels of general education, the most advanced projects, infrastructures with the heaviest traffic, and so on). If cohesion policy and the Lisbon Strategy come into conflict, it must be borne in mind that the former, for the moment, is founded on a rather more solid legal foundation than the latter” European Commission (2005, p. 9)Adaptation of Cohesion Policy to the Enlarged Europe and the Lisbon and Gothenburg Objectives.

François Perroux was an economist of strong convictions and fruitful ideas. His belief, which was also shared by other eminent development economists of his time, that backwardness was not a fate is entirely reflected in his development pole theory, which has a prominent place within the regional development theory. This implies that his theory was highly influential, as evidenced by the fact that strategies based on development poles were implemented around the world, in both developed and developing countries. Although these strategies took different forms, largely depending on the specific contexts in which they were applied, there was a common factor in all of them, which was the importance of the direct use of large-scale investment resources to generate the hoped-for structural changes through accelerated economic growth. Looking carefully at the Italian and Brazilian cases, it should be noted that the development pole strategies had, in addition to the use of heavy investment resources already mentioned, some common characteristics, such as: the focus of attention directed toward the backward regions, specifically the Mezzogiorno region in Italy and the Amazon region in Brazil; the fight against regional disparities within both countries through structural change and the strengthening of backward regional economies as an underlying reason; and the active participation of the State in the drawing up and implementation processes of development poles. This chapter aims at comparing the development pole strategies in Italy and Brazil, highlighting similarities and differences of these experiences in triggering the long-awaited regional development.

Is a born-global strategy reflective of high performance or are there merits in a regional strategy? In studying a sample of 32 internationalizing small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), we find that many of the early internationalizing firms that formally meet the accepted “born-global criteria” are actually regional. With this concept as a starting point, this study aims to contribute to the literature on early internationalizing firms by comparing how born globals (BGs) and born regionals (BRs) differ in terms of the liability of foreignness, networking activities and performance. Our results indicate that both liability of foreignness and knowledge development in networks is more challenging for BGs than for BRs, and for this reason, BRs are likely to perform better than BGs. Hence, we identify a “born global disadvantage” stemming from a lack in the capacity of acquiring relevant foreign-market knowledge and tackling foreign-market institutions. The implications of the study highlight the need for researchers and practitioners to be more careful when using the concept of BG and to acknowledge that differences do exist between regional and global business strategies.

Distances between contexts that a multinational enterprise (MNE) is familiar with and those that it is not familiar with do not hinder the MNE from becoming global. In this sense, distance serves as a barrier between an MNE’s global intentions and its regional realizations. (Multi)regional strategies are a possible expression of an MNE’s inability to approach distances. Considering the managerially relevant distances is essential to analyze the internationalization and the resulting (multi)regional strategies. A deeper understanding of how distance works requires linking distance to micro-foundations. Besides bounded rationality, bounded reliability opens the conceptual pathway toward a deeper understanding of internationalization and (multi)regional strategies.

Why have so many overlapping regional institutions been established in the Asia-Pacific? Is there any possibility of a convergence of these institutions into a single (or a few) “authoritative” regional institution(s)? What implications do the emerging overlapping regional institutions have for an evolving regional architecture in Asia? I argue first that the proliferation of regional institutions reflects complicated strategies taken by the countries to respond to the increased insecurity and uncertainty caused by the structural changes. Second, the countries of the region are taking a variety of national strategies through regional institutions, ranging from engagement to soft balancing and risk-hedging, to respond to these changes. Third, all the states of the region want to maintain a variety of institutional choices to respond to their uncertain futures. Fourth, what makes the institution-building so complicated lies in the fact that there are two major (and uncertain) powers to whom the regional countries have to respond through regional institutions: the United States and China. This makes the bargaining game for regional institution-building more complicated and competitive. Fifth, the amalgamation or convergence of the existing institutions into a single (or few) “authoritative” institution(s) through “institutional competition” will not take place in the foreseeable future. Sixth, the countries of the region may engage in “forum shopping.” Seventh, the roles of these institutions have been and will be quite modest. However, the regional institutions could to some extent contribute to moderating inter-state tensions and putting institutional constraints on the deviant behaviors of member countries.

Purpose – This paper contributes to the discussion of the effects of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009 (GFEC) on strategies of multinational companies (MNC) in the unique regional context of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

Methodology/approach – The considerations are based on secondary data and accessible studies dealing with corporate responses to the recent economic downturn.

Findings – The author argues that the business model which guided the expansion into CEE still remains valid. The huge market potential did not disappear and the advantages stemming from a skilled workforce and favourable resource situation were not eliminated by the crisis. What markedly changed is the perception of risk of doing business in CEE. As a consequence, foreign investors follow a more cautious and selective approach in their regional strategy. Regional players will try to stay in CEE and benefit from the exit of weaker competitors. Multi-tier brand strategies and affordability initiatives will gain in importance.

Research limitations/implications – As this is a discussion paper further research is necessary to validate the propositions.

Practical implications – An external shock such as the recent crisis forces management to conduct a comprehensive review of the pillars of their strategy. This paper offers a guideline for review of a regional strategy.

Originality/value of paper – The paper provides a comprehensive review of the business model for CEE in the light of the recent global crisis and highlights probable strategic responses of foreign MNCs.

Surging global natural disasters provide incentive for risk-reducing policies and strategies. In this light, the African Union (AU) engaged a multi-stakeholder policy formulation process between 2002 and 2006, to develop a continent-wide disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategy. Drawing from secondary data, this chapter assesses the process and applies qualitative analysis instruments to critically assess the AU’s disaster policy. Linkages to the 2005 international Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) are also highlighted. The analysis reveals that Africa’s policy formulation process was belated for over a decade, with respect to international expectations. The formulation process was however largely African owned and led, culminating in a strategy document that reflected African contextual reality at the time, and aligned well with HFA fundamental goals. The applied multi-stakeholder approach enhanced a spirit of participation across levels and was central to the largely successful policy formulation process. However, targeted policy outcomes were not explicit, and poorly formulated indicators marred short- and long-term policy evaluation. Based on these results, we conclude that the African-wide DRR policy formulation processes were belated but participatory, systematic and very successful. Belated policy formulation reflects an initial inertia on the African continent, justified by past negative policy experiences and the desire to succeed. A replication of this policy formulation approach in Africa is recommended, albeit exercising more caution on policy timing, the elaboration of better monitoring and evaluation instruments and criteria. Participation should further embrace modern, risk-free (anti-COVID-19-friendly) information and communication technologies.