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The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of legal institution building during the process of China's economic miracle of past three decades.

To engage with the issue, the paper builds on historical research and comparable approaches which explore the interactions of legal institution building and economic reforms in China.

Legal institution building is not only a passive factor that can make up market failures in developing countries. Studies on China case find that legal institution building in China has often been taken as a tool to realize the ruling party's political commitment of economic development.

The paper takes only one country – China as the case to explore the interactions of legal institution building and economic development. Owing to most China's peculiar characteristics, more cases should be studied in order to examine a much clearer result, which might shed lights on the current reforms of a lot of developing countries.

The argument of the paper, that legal institution building can be employed as an active tool to drive economic development if designed properly, broadens policy pools for developing countries that are in a strive to fight against poverty reduction.

The paper opens a new arena to re‐examine the role of legal building for economic development in developing countries. Also, it develops a unique perspective to explore the myth of China's economic miracle.

In January 1989, the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) started a three‐year, institution‐building project for Malawi′s three city councils. Discusses how it became apparent in Lilongwe that the project′s traditional notions of institution building were limited, and how its concern was for financial and general efficiency, while its environment – the city – was ignored. Examines how the project was, therefore, reinterpreted, and the need was seen to develop strong urban management leadership in the context of a dynamic environment. The process of managing city building, therefore, became central to the council′s institutional capacity. The justification centred on the belief that just because a council may be in financial surplus is no guarantee that it is performing the services or providing the infrastructure which people need. Therefore, institution building could not ignore the environment (the city) in which the institution operated.

Why have so many overlapping regional institutions been established in the Asia-Pacific? Is there any possibility of a convergence of these institutions into a single (or a few) “authoritative” regional institution(s)? What implications do the emerging overlapping regional institutions have for an evolving regional architecture in Asia? I argue first that the proliferation of regional institutions reflects complicated strategies taken by the countries to respond to the increased insecurity and uncertainty caused by the structural changes. Second, the countries of the region are taking a variety of national strategies through regional institutions, ranging from engagement to soft balancing and risk-hedging, to respond to these changes. Third, all the states of the region want to maintain a variety of institutional choices to respond to their uncertain futures. Fourth, what makes the institution-building so complicated lies in the fact that there are two major (and uncertain) powers to whom the regional countries have to respond through regional institutions: the United States and China. This makes the bargaining game for regional institution-building more complicated and competitive. Fifth, the amalgamation or convergence of the existing institutions into a single (or few) “authoritative” institution(s) through “institutional competition” will not take place in the foreseeable future. Sixth, the countries of the region may engage in “forum shopping.” Seventh, the roles of these institutions have been and will be quite modest. However, the regional institutions could to some extent contribute to moderating inter-state tensions and putting institutional constraints on the deviant behaviors of member countries.

The purpose of this paper is to present a comparative analysis of institutions and institutional voids in Russia, Brazil, and Poland over the decades of the 1980s through to 2015. The paper asserts that Russia and Brazil could learn much from Poland regarding formal institution building and formal institutional voids that cause problems like corruption and limit economic growth.

A comparative case study approach is utilized to assess the relative success of the three emerging market countries in transitioning to a market economy, viewed through the lens of institutional theory.

Poland’s experience in building successful formal institutions and mitigating major institutional voids can be instructive for Russia and Brazil which have shown far less success, and correspondingly less sustained economic growth.

This paper demonstrates the value of applying institutional theory to analyze the progress of emerging economies in transitioning to a market economy.

This country comparison can prove valuable to other emerging economies seeking a successful transition to a market economy.

Since institutions are the fabric of any society, the emphasis on institutions in this paper can have positive implications for society in emerging markets.

This paper is an original comparison of two BRIC countries with a smaller emerging economy, utilizing institutional theory. Factors contributing to Poland’s success are compared to Russia and Brazil to assess how those countries might be positively informed by Poland’s experience in building and strengthening sustainable formal institutions as well as avoiding institutional voids and their associated problems.

Internal consulting groups (ICGs) can offer the management of large organisations, including those in the public sector, with efficient and effective means of achieving improvement and responding to pressures such as reduced resources. Those charged with developing an ICG should follow an institution building approach. Through the ICG′s early, growth and mature stages, key principles and issues of an institutional development plan must be addressed and reasonable goals set. Top management commitment to the plan is vital to its success.

The purpose of this paper is to describe co-devolutionary processes of multinational enterprise (MNE)/emerging economy institutional relationships utilizing concepts from “old” institutional theory as well as the institutional aspects of socially constructed realities.

The authors develop a set of propositions that explore the new concept of a co-devolutionary relationship between MNEs and emerging economy institutions. Guided by prior research, the paper investigates MNE/emerging economy institutional co-devolution at the macro-(MNE home and host countries), meso-(MNE industry/host country regulative and normative institutions) and micro-(MNE and host country institutional actors) levels.

MNE/emerging economy institutional co-devolution occurs at the macro-level via negative public communications in the MNE’s home and host countries, at the meso-level via host country corruption and MNE adaptation, and at the micro-level via pressures for individual actors to cognitively “take for granted” emerging economy corruption, leading to MNE divestment and a reduction in new MNE investment.

By characterizing co-devolutionary processes within MNE/emerging economy institutional relationships, the research augments co-evolutionary theory. It also assists in developing more accurate specification and measurement methods for the organizational co-evolution construct by using institutional theory’s foundational processes to discuss MNE/emerging economy institutional co-devolution.

The research suggests the use of enhanced regulation, bilateral investment treaties and MNE/local institution partnerships to stabilize MNE/emerging economy institutional relationships, leading to more robust progress in building emerging economy institutions.

The research posits that using the concepts of institutional theory as a foundation provides useful insights into the “stickiness” of institutional instability and corruption in emerging economies and into the resulting co-devolutionary MNE/emerging economy institutional relationships.

The purpose of this paper is to present an analysis of local institution building in active labour market policies (ALMP) in Vienna (Austria). The focus of the study is the WAFF (“Wiener ArbeitnehmerInnenförderungsfonds” – Vienna employee support fund) which was created in 1995.

This case study was conducted for the Capright‐project (Resources, rights and capabilities). It is based on a documentary analysis, interviews with experts, policy makers and managers of the WAFF and the Public Employment Service.

While the national system of labour market policy is increasingly moving towards workfare, the analysis shows that the WAFF aims to implement a more inclusive approach to secure social cohesion through programmes and measures to help people to cope with economic restructuring – in particular through training and skill development but also measures to fight social exclusion. A strong reliance on Social Partnership and cooperation pervades the self‐understanding of the WAFF even though institution building was not evolving without conflicts.

The research sheds some light on social and economic developments in Vienna. Further research is needed to come to an in‐depth analysis of the effects of the WAFF's labour market policy activities, e.g. in relation to the national Public Employment Service.

The paper contributes to the research about the evolution of labour market policies in cities in the context of recent economic, political and social changes.

The aim of this article is to develop the foundations of an actor‐centred, processual approach to examining the influence of cross‐border knowledge transfer and management learning on transnational institution building in post‐socialist countries. We argue that there is a need for more research to understand how key social actors go about (re)structuring, (re)defining and sharing knowledge within new international ventures. We contend that social actors can play a significant role in creating and structuring the “transnational social space” in which the new venture takes shape, exercising strategic choice that can mediate, adapt or even reject the apparently constraining effects of technical‐economic or cultural‐institutional factors. The role of social actors is conceptualized as a socio‐political sensemaking process, a perspective that would complement the current structuralist bias in the discussion about the emergence of transnational social space in international management research literature.

This chapter focuses on South Korea’s newly found regional leadership, as the emergent middle power of East Asia, in order to advance regional integration and institution-building. Policy leadership is observed and analyzed from an international lens, linked to the literature of middle powers. The chapter first conceptualizes middle powers in connection with the issue of international leadership, since such states often play important roles in promoting cooperation. The chapter looks especially into South Korea’s foreign policy behavior toward East Asian regional processes and how it has manifested innovative and capable leadership. More specifically, the last three presidencies of Kim Dae-jung (1998–2002), Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008), and Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) are scrutinized in the hope of underscoring how their particular administrations, political leadership, and strategic approaches to foreign policy toward the region influenced South Korea’s regional leadership attempts and middle power status.

During this wave of reforms, the United States emerged as the leading nation shaping reforms in developing countries. All other economically advanced nations were preoccupied with their postwar reconstruction, while the United States was bound to fulfill its promises to free the colonies of both its enemies at that time (Germany, Japan, and Italy) and its allies (Great Britain, France, Holland, and Belgium). The United States sent technical and professional advisers to countries that requested its help to replace their colonial administrations with locally designed arrangements. The United States was also particularly well placed to advise less-developed countries, considering the successful institutional reforms and recovery it had led in postwar Germany and Japan. While conditions in underdeveloped countries – as discussed below – were very different from those in Germany and Japan, the United States saw their postwar successes as evidence that such reforms might also help less-developed nations. Finally, the advent of the Cold War that launched a global competition for spheres of influence also contributed to the fact that the United States became the leading promoter of reforms in developing countries. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Ford Foundation were the key donors funding and designing development programs abroad in this period.