Search results

This study aims to develop and validate two scales: quiet quitting (QQ), measuring individual-level work disengagement, low organisational commitment and not going above and beyond in work, and quiet firing (QF), measuring employee perceptions of the degree to which their managers devalue them and when organisations intentionally create a situation to make them quit.

The scale development process involved item generation through literature search, review and interviews with working executives. The scales were then tested online by 264 participants from India.

In the quantitative analysis, the QQ and QF scales have good psychometric properties when tested with factor analysis, reliability analysis and Cronbach’s alpha. Furthermore, the convergent, discriminant and predictive validity of outcome constructs also showed significance.

This study found that the QQ and QF scales are highly reliable and exhibit good psychometric properties. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is one of the first studies to empirically develop and test the QQ and QF constructs and offer implications for organisations and managers.

The present study assesses the commercial bank profit efficiency and its relationship to banking sector competition in a rapidly growing emerging economy, India from 2009 to 2019 using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).

Lerner indices, conventional and efficiency-adjusted, quantify competition. Two SFA models are employed to calculate alternative profit efficiency (inefficiency) scores: the two-step time-decay approach proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992) and the recently developed single-step pairwise difference estimator (PDE) by Belotti and Ilardi (2018). In the first step of the BC92 framework, profit inefficiency is calculated, and in the second step, Tobit and Fractional Regression Model (FRM) are utilized to evaluate profit inefficiency correlates. PDE concurrently solves the frontier and inefficiency equations using the maximum likelihood process.

The results suggest that foreign banks are less profit efficient than domestic equivalents, supporting the “home-field advantage” hypothesis in India. Further, increasing competition drives bank managers to make riskier lending and investment choices, decreasing bank profit efficiency. However, this effect varies depending on bank ownership and size.

Literature on the competition bank efficiency link is conspicuously scant, with a focus on technical and cost efficiency. Less is known regarding the influence of competition on bank profit efficiency. The article is one of the first to examine commercial bank profit efficiency and its relationship to banking sector competition. Additionally, the study work represents one of the first applications of the FRM presented by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and the PDE provided by Belotti and Ilardi (2018).

The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between company reputation and dividend policy.

In this study, sample of 98,809 firm-year observations from 22 countries covering 2005–2016 were used.

Firm reputation concerns are associated with higher propensities to pay dividends and payout ratios. Further, this positive effect is more pronounced for firms with high free cash flows, high information asymmetry and low institutional monitoring. The results are robust to an instrumental variable approach, propensity score matching and the Heckman two-stage correction approach while addressing endogeneity concerns.

These findings have significant implications for various stakeholders, such as existing and potential investors, managers, policymakers and regulators, by providing insights into the relationship between corporate reputation and firm dividend payout decisions. Corporate reputation is highlighted as crucial for accessing finance, emphasizing the role of national regulators and policymakers in facilitating firms' efforts to improve their reputation. The study highlights the dynamics of corporate reputation and dividend payout, calling for proactive engagement from regulators and policymakers. Crafting policies conducive to reputation-building can enhance firms' financial prospects, indicating the need for strategic interventions at managerial, regulatory and policy levels. Understanding the influence of economic context is crucial for firms to tailor reputation management strategies and optimize funding opportunities in different economic environments.

Overall, results suggest that reputation serves as a disciplining mechanism, where firms will pay dividends to maintain their reputations.

The purpose of this study is to examine the association between the combined roles of chief executive officer (CEO)-chairman titles (CEO duality) and investment efficiency, defined as a lower deviation from expected investment for targeted S-curve firms used to propel an innovation-driven economy. This study also aims to investigate the moderating effect of financial reporting quality on this association.

This paper focuses on the ten targeted S-curve industries – under the definition of the Thailand 4.0 model – listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) from 2000 to 2019. Data related to CEO/chairman titles and investment supports were manually collected from the annual reports, the SET market analysis and reporting tool database and the company websites. Financial data used to estimate investment behaviors and discretionary accruals were extracted from 1999. The study analyzes unbalanced panel data using fixed-effects regressions. Additional tests embrace replacing the sample with nontargeted firms, partitioning into granted and nongranted firms, adding CEOs’ demographic moderators, using alternative variable measures and analyzing for lagged independent variables.

The main findings show that CEO duality reduces overinvestment but worsens underinvestment in targeted firms. Financial reporting quality (FRQ) appears to strengthen CEO duality in mitigating extreme spending but has no impact on the association between CEO duality and underinvestment. Additional results, for example, conclude that CEO duality has no association with both over- and underinvesting at nontargeted firms, but its effect becomes positively significant on overinvestment when financial reporting quality is high. The negative association between CEO duality and overinvestment is found only in government-granted and targeted firms. FRQ encourages CEO duality in lowering overinvestment among targeted firms without grants. CEOs’ female and serviced early years appear to elevate those main findings.

These findings assist innovative corporations in choosing a proper leadership structure to cope with investment inefficiency. The research gives the government and regulatory bodies an insight into the qualifications of the leadership structure and financial information that helps them put forward effective policies.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is among the first to establish the association between CEO duality and investment efficiency for innovation-driven firms in a transforming economy. The study fills the gap in the literature on management, accounting and finance by unveiling the interplay between dual leadership and financial reporting in affecting the efficiency of investments.

The study evaluates the influence of human capital efficiency (HCE) and market power on bank performance.

The study employs two measures of bank performance: profitability and stability. Unbalanced panel data of 35 banks operating in Kenya for 2005–2020 collected from published financial statements is utilized. The study employs the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) method in the analysis and the two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) for robustness check.

The study affirms an inverted U-shaped relationship between market power and bank performance. The effect of market power on bank profitability is enhanced when a bank has highly efficient human capital. Further, HCE significantly impacts bank stability for banks with low HCE. Interestingly, a further increase in HCE narrows the net interest margins for banks with high HCE, conferring welfare benefits to customers as interest rate spreads shrink.

This study provides important insights into the role of human capital in bank performance. First, banks ought to invest in promoting HCE through training and development. As regulators root for bank consolidation, attention to HCE is imperative for fostering profitability and stability.

The study fills an essential gap in the literature by evaluating the effect of firm-level market power on bank performance in an emerging market. We adopt a novel stochastic frontier estimator to generate the Lerner index. Further, this is the first study known to the authors to evaluate the effect of market power on bank performance in the context of human capital efficiency variations.

While the determinants of voluntary political spending disclosure have been extensively studied in the literature, there remains a lack of clear evidence regarding the specific impacts of managerial ability and political risk on such disclosure. Thus, the purpose of this study is to shed light on whether and how managerial ability and political risk influence firms’ political spending disclosure.

This study uses a sample of 2,242 firm-year observations of S&P 500 companies between 2013 and 2021.

This study finds that firms with high-ability managers generally disclose more information about political spending. This positive relationship between managerial ability and political spending disclosure holds even after conducting additional tests to address potential endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, this study finds that firms operating in high-risk political environments also exhibit a greater propensity to disclose information regarding their political spending. The results remain robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and political risk.

This study suggests that when designing policy to motivate firms to disclose political spending information, policy makers need to be aware of the critical role of managerial ability and idiosyncratic political risk the firm faces. In addition, this study offers insights to shareholders, advocacy groups, regulators and academics interested in understanding the determinants of political spending disclosure.

This study is among the first to provide empirical evidence that political spending disclosure can be explained by managerial ability and political risk. In addition, this study complements the literature on the consequences of managerial ability and political risk. Focusing on voluntary political spending disclosure, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the factors shaping the overall corporate information environment.

This paper examines the effect of firms’ takeover susceptibility on the manipulation of financial statements through classification shifting.

The paper applies ordinary least squares regression (OLS) with fixed effects analyses to a sample of United States listed firms over the period 1992–2014. We use takeover index as a proxy for takeover susceptibility of firms, with high values representing higher takeover susceptibility and lower values representing lower takeover susceptibility.

The study finds that firms engage in classification shifting through core expenses, suggesting that takeover threats reduce the incentive to manage earnings through classification shifting. We also find that takeover susceptibility improves the monitoring mechanism for firms with low profitability because these firms have greater incentives to engage in classification shifting. Finally, we find that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act strengthens the monitoring mechanism influenced by takeover threats. Overall, the results provide evidence of the important role of takeover susceptibility in mitigating classification shifting. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests.

The results emphasise the disciplinary role of the legal environment around corporate takeovers. The study suggests that policymakers and regulators should be cognisant of antitakeover laws which may increase agency conflicts between managers and shareholders and promote managerial self-seeking behaviours such as classification shifting.

The paper highlights the important role of takeover threats as an external governance mechanism to mitigate classification shifting which is detrimental to investors’ value. From prior literature, this study is the first to provide evidence of the effect of takeover threats on classification shifting.

Drawing on upper echelons theory, the authors study how the career horizon of a CEO promotes green innovation through the incentive mechanism. Meanwhile, from the perspective of speed and amount of value realization, the authors also identify two sets of shift parameters that reduce or increase incentive gap between short-career-horizon CEOs and long-career-horizon CEOs. Specifically considering the digital trend in China and the heterogeneity of firms and industries, this study aims to examine the moderating effects of firm digitalization, industrial digital transformation, slack resources and polluting firms.

In the context of China’s transitional economy, this study uses all A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2021, resulting in a total of 4,286 companies with 29,310 company-year observations.

The results support the hypothesis that CEO career horizon significantly facilitates green innovation at the firm level. The positive effect is attenuated by both firm digitalization and industrial digital transformation, but is amplified by slack resources and by the polluting firms. After a series of robustness tests, the research conclusions remain valid.

To extend the upper echelons perspective of existing research into CEO−green innovation, the authors make important contributions in four ways. First, this study contributes to green innovation literature by adding an unexplored yet increasingly important managerial determinant. Second, it advances research on the role of the CEO in green innovation by revealing a new theoretical mechanism. Third, it deepens the understanding of CEO career horizon by exploring its influence on innovations in the context of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Fourth, it identifies boundary conditions that motivate CEOs in distinguishable ways, to provide a nuanced understanding of the relationship between CEO career horizon and green innovation.

Explore the effects of competition policy on an important competitive dimension of digital platforms, namely quality.

The deterrence effect of competition policy should induce firms to compete on merits, with lower prices and higher quality for consumers. Deterrence, or the inducement not to infringe competition law, may depend on the harshness of penalties and/or the likelihood of conviction. We use competition policy indicators that are associated with these deterrence dimensions, allowing for non-linearities and interactions of the indicators. We use a unique data survey of digital gig platform users, that covers at least two dozen platforms and more than 50 countries. Quality is measured using multidimensional indicators of the level of satisfaction of platform users with different platform services. We control for platform user and country characteristics, including other regulatory indicators such as labor laws, to recover different effects.

Results suggest that competition policy is relevant for differences in product quality across platforms and countries. Important non-linearities are uncovered, where substantive rules of competition policy interact with competition authority power. The effects depend on either level of the indicators, suggesting that deterrence effects depend upon a combination of both law in the books and competition policy practice.

The estimates suggest a need to balance both dimension of deterrence, namely, strictness and effectiveness to expand the effects of competition policy on competition.

This is the first paper that explores the effect of competition policy on non-price or non-margin competition dimension. It is the first to study the effect on a sample of digital platforms. It contributes to the literature of deterrence effects of competition policy.

Prior evidence that financial reporting quality (FRQ) of publicly listed firms improves investment efficiency in developed markets leaves unaddressed questions of whether this relationship holds in emerging and frontier markets and what channels influence this relationship. This study aims to test the role of financial constraints faced by firms and managerial risk-taking on the association of FRQ and investment efficiency in 13,231 publicly listed firms in 24 emerging and frontier markets.

Available accounting data from 1998 to 2022 are collected for all listed firms across 41 industries in 24 countries. Causal relationships are tested using fixed-effect regression analysis, several additional tests and robustness checks are applied using alternative proxies and concerns for endogeneity are addressed using two-stage least square and system generalised method of moments analysis.

Findings show that FRQ of firms in emerging and frontier markets positively affects investment efficiency, the affirmative impact of FRQ on investment efficiency is higher when firms are facing more financial constraints and when managerial risk-taking is lower and financial constraints and risk-taking have a more pronounced impact on the link between FRQ and investment efficiency in the under-investment scenario.

These findings contribute to the growing body of evidence, shedding light on the meticulous interplay between FRQ and investment efficiency in frontier and emerging markets. Specifically, the increased financial constraints encountered by firms and a more conservative approach to managerial risk-taking emerge as crucial factors complementing this relationship.