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The purpose of this paper is to investigate how subtle religious representations affect prosocial behavior. The authors study the impact of religious representations on prosocial behavior in terms of cooperation in a one‐shot/three‐person public goods game.

The authors used the scrambled sentence task to prime participants with religious words before they were asked to make a one‐shot/three‐person public goods game decision.

Both in the raw data and when controlling for factors such as age, gender and religious beliefs, the authors found that priming of religious representations increased cooperation in the experiment, that is, increased contributions to the public good. The authors found no significant interaction effects between priming and self‐reported measures of religiosity, suggesting that the priming effect was present among both self‐reported religious and nonreligious participants. Self‐reported measures of religiosity were not correlated with cooperation in this study.

The paper adds to the growing body of experimental economics literature that has studied self‐reported measures of religiosity alongside behavior in different economic games. This study contributes to the literature by examining the effect of subtle influences of religion on cooperation. Also, in contrast to previous economic literature, the paper examines the direct impact of religion as an independent variable on cooperation.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the supernatural punishment theory. The theory postulates that religion increases cooperation because religious people fear the retributions that may follow if they do not follow the rules and norms provided by the religion.

The paper reports results for a public goods experiment conducted in India, Mexico, and Sweden. By asking participants whether they are religious or not, one can study whether religiosity has an effect on voluntary cooperation in the public goods game.

No significant behavioral differences were found between religious and nonreligious participants in the experiment.

This paper differs from the previous limited experimental literature, studying religiosity and cooperation, in the sense that it uses a public goods game rather than a prisoner's dilemma game. The public goods game is more interesting since many real life problems are multilateral rather than bilateral. Further, the study was conducted in three different countries: India, Mexico, and Sweden; with three different types of potentialy religious people: Hindus, Catholics, and Protestants.

The Balinese have been successful for centuries in sustaining cooperation among the members of local communities in order to provide public goods through individual contributions. The purpose of this paper is to review and highlight the Balinese mechanism's remarkable features.

The paper surveyed the experimental literature on public goods and highlighted those features of the Balinese tradition that have been proven to be both effective in the experimental laboratory and successful in deterring free‐riding on the field.

The most prominent features discussed are decentralization, democratic decision making, the use of two currencies, supervision, and the possibility of imposing severe sanctions for free‐riding.

The paper's findings not only can help to preserve the high level of cooperation among inhabitants in Bali threatened by migration flows and the increasingly intense reliance on the market mechanism, but they also provide general insights both for theoreticians and practitioners on how to create successful communities. In addition, the literature review sheds light on several features of public‐good games that have not been satisfactorily explored yet by experimental economists.

The novelty of the paper's approach lies in looking at the Balinese tradition through the glasses of mechanism design theory and aligning the related findings of experimental economics in order to understand its success and problems.

Due to the non-rivalrous and non-excludable characteristics of properties classified as being part of the cultural heritage of a city, owners of these properties face a lower incentive to maintain them. Many studies have advocated the participation of the local community in the maintenance of such “public” properties because community demands and tastes are better reflected through direct participation than through government intervention. One of the main factors that may determine whether or not such participation would be forthcoming is whether the community identifies with elements that the cultural heritage building represents. The purpose of this paper is to examine the cultural effects of the Chinese community with regard to the preservation of the heritage buildings that reflect the community’s early presence in George Town, Penang.

An experimental method was used to invoke feelings of social identity through historical and cultural photos about these buildings associated with the community. The authors attempted to create an emotional attachment to the cultural and historical values in a laboratory.

The authors found that information increased the participants’ positive feelings toward their historical and cultural backgrounds. This positive emotion might explain why the subjects appeared more willing to contribute to the public pool to maintain these buildings. The findings suggest that the incorporating cultural and historical information about heritage buildings may encourage more pro-social behaviors.

Although community participation and discussions can help to align the conservation objectives of diverse stakeholders, the divergence between individual and collective interests may cause individuals to shirk from their commitment, given the public nature of the goods. Therefore, investigating whether a factor that aligns diverse interests or the nature of the game can influence behavior is important to the development of strategies used in the provision of public good.

Although the impact of social identity on social dilemma has been widely studied, the empirical proof and its application to preservation of cultural heritage has not been studied. As far as the authors know, this is the first paper that experimentally proves the importance of social identity and its role in provision of social goods.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on conditional cooperation and investigate whether the difference in contributions between Partners and Strangers designs in linear public goods experiments can be explained by differences in beliefs.

The author conducted linear public goods experiments by using Partners and Strangers designs with belief eliciting their group member’s contributions.

The author shows that the difference in the magnitude of the responsiveness of contribution to belief (i.e. the marginal contribution to belief) creates different contribution levels in Partners and Strangers designs.

The presented results imply that having a strategic motive increases contributions by increasing the magnitude of the responsiveness of contribution to belief rather than by raising belief level.

The main claim of this paper is that “marginal contribution to belief” rather than “belief level” causes the difference in contribution levels between Partners and Strangers. This is the first proven evidence of a difference in belief between Partners and Strangers.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of income inequality on cooperative propensities, and thus the ability of individuals to resolve collective action dilemmas.

The paper presents a meta-study of 32 developing country lab experiments correlating cooperative behaviour with prevailing Gini coefficients. Furthermore, the paper conducts standard dictator- and public goods game (PGG) experiments with culturally and demographically similar subject pools in two West African countries characterized by high and persistent variation in national income inequality.

The meta-study findings of a significant negative relationship between income inequality and contribution levels in the PGG are corroborated by the own laboratory experimental findings that participants in more unequal Nigeria are significantly less altruistic and exhibit significantly lower propensities to cooperate than their more egalitarian Ghanaian counterparts. Moreover, the latter findings are robust when controlling for personal income levels.

The findings have nontrivial implications for collective action theorists and practitioners seeking to elicit tacit cooperation in developing countries.

The major contributions of this paper are the novel meta-analysis and the first attempt to examine the influence of personal income levels on cooperative behaviour in societies characterized by differential levels of income inequality.

The COVID-19 epidemic is still spreading globally and will not be completely over in a short time. Wearing a mask is an effective means to combat the spread of COVID-19. However, whether the public wear a mask for epidemic prevention and control will be affected by stochastic factors such as vaccination, cultural differences and irrational emotions, which bring a high degree of uncertainty to the prevention and control of the epidemic. The purpose of this study is to explore and analyze the epidemic prevention and control strategies of the public in an uncertain environment.

Based on the stochastic evolutionary game model of the Moran process, the study discusses the epidemic prevention and control strategies of the public under the conditions of the dominance of stochastic factors, expected benefits and super-expected benefits.

The research shows that the strategic evolution of the public mainly depends on stochastic factors, cost-benefit and the number of the public. When the stochastic factors are dominant, the greater the perceived benefit, the lower the cost and the greater the penalty for not wearing masks, the public will choose to wear a mask. Under the dominance of expected benefits and super-expected benefits, when the number of the public is greater than a certain threshold, the mask-wearing strategy will become an evolutionary stable strategy. From the evolutionary process, the government’s punishment measures will slow down the speed of the public choosing the strategy of not wearing masks. The speed of the public evolving to the stable strategy under the dominance of super-expected benefits is faster than that under the dominance of expected benefits.

The study considers the impact of stochastic factors on public prevention and control strategies and provides decision-making support and theoretical guidance for the scientific prevention of the normalized public.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no research has considered the impact of different stochastic interference intensities on public prevention and control strategies. Therefore, this paper can be seen as a valuable resource in this field.

The paper emphasises the general relevance of social norms and social associations for cooperative behaviour in less or non‐social economic contexts, focusing in particular on economic laboratory experiments, and to illustrate the underlying psychological driving forces.

The argument focuses on the interplay between social norms, their psychological enforcement mechanism (cognitive dissonance) and context effects. Drawing on findings from both (social) psychology and experimental economics, it emphasises the relevance of social norms for cooperative behaviour also in less or non‐social environments as often created in economic laboratory experiments. Moreover, the conditions for cognitive dissonance effects to occur are summarised and the corresponding behavioural effects are both highlighted and exemplified by means of various examples including the analysis of a specific data set.

The discussion strongly suggests that the influence of common cooperative social norms is difficult to “anonymise away” in laboratory experiments or other less socially focused decision environments. Moreover, it provides a possible explanation for the occurrence of a variety of behavioural patterns often found in such settings, such as initially high but decreasing willingness to cooperate in social dilemmas.

Emphasising the far reach of social aspects in economic decision making, the discussion may help in the design of institutions as it illustrates a widespread source of non‐economic individual incentives.

The argument addresses the idiosyncrasies of individual cooperative behaviour in situations where economic incentives should hinder such behaviour. Adding to earlier arguments which explain such cooperation, for example, by reference to fairness concerns or inequity aversion, the present discussion emphasises in particular the specific psychological driving forces behind such behaviour. In doing so, it establishes a clear link to the research on cognitive dissonance in psychology.

Tax evasion is an economic crime that nearly all world countries suffer from. Its consequences are countless, including poor public spending on infrastructure projects and social welfare programs, low economic growth and development, institutional mistrust and fiscal deficits. For developing countries in particular, targeting development programs and infrastructural investments requires an efficient tax collection policy to generate sufficient funds for such purposes. This makes the tax evasion problem a critical one and countering it extremely policy relevant. Based on evidence that shows how the understanding of taxpayers' behavior is an essential factor in fighting evasion, this paper aims to test different factors that might incentivize citizens using a behavioral and experimental approach, in non-Western educated industrialized rich democracies (non-WEIRD) countries, to comply more.

This paper uses a survey experiment to examine the impact of different behavioral primes on tax compliance behavior. Specifically, it observes subjects' compliance behavior in two contexts: voice and empathy. A total of 273 students from a big public university in Egypt were randomly selected to participate in this study.

In the “Voice” treatment, the explanatory variable (VOICE) was found statistically significant, thus confirming the hypothesis that democracy, through having a voice in the decision-making process, affects compliance positively. As for the “Empathy” treatment, the explanatory variable (EMPATHY) was also found significant. This confirms the second hypothesis that triggering feelings of empathy, through highlighting the good cause behind public spending that uses taxpayers' money, affects compliance behavior positively.

Despite the fact that the experimental methodology is a methodology with high internal validity, examining the impact of a specific intervention on behavior, a replication of the experiment in other contexts might be useful in increasing the external validity of the findings. Specifically, conducting this experiment on a nonstudent sample might lead to even more powerful results by increasing the ecological validity of the results.

This study advocates a more behaviorally informed public policy. Specifically, Egyptian policymakers are recommended to adopt behavioral nudges as a complement to existing policies. The authors believe the findings, if confirmed by repeated experiments (lab, lab-in-the-field and rational choice theories on both student and non-student samples) in a number of Arab countries, might also help in offering cost-effective nudges for the Arab world policymakers, where culture and the political context are to a great extent similar.

The findings of the study have a number of social implications. Higher tax compliance will enable higher levels of public spending on a number of social targets such as education, health and welfare programs.

While the study builds on recent research examining how to incentivize tax compliance, it simultaneously seeks to make three contributions. First, the study design aims to apply recent advances in behavioral sciences (impact of voice and empathy) in a policy area that has not seen much use of such interventions in the Egyptian context (i.e. tax compliance). Second, the study is policy relevant in the sense that it aims to increase the effectiveness of existing government policies by complementing them with behavioral primes. Third, there is nearly no literature found applying this topic in a non-WEIRD country such as Egypt.

The purpose of this study is to analyse whether, and if so, how, personal background and intellectual assets determine individual cooperation.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether, and if so, how, social and human capital determine cooperation.

The empirical results show that variations in human and social capital offer a substantial explanation for the likelihood of cooperative behaviour in people involved in social dilemma situations.

Testing the model in an international setting with non-student subjects (managers, policymakers) would allow us to explore the consequences of cross-national differences in various forms of capital.

Successful implementation of strategic change requires leaders who are able to effectively communicate and motivate employees. The study highlights what factors makes some leaders more cooperative and, hence, potentially more successful in supervising corporate change than others.

For sustainable growth, countries need leaders who are willing and able to collaborate not only with other international leaders but also within their public administration. This paper offers explanations why some political leaders more than others are able to successfully collaborate with their political opponents.

The added value of mainstream economics to understand key elements of international business is limited due to their stringent behavioural assumptions. The research is original in that it shows that individuals make decisions not like rational machines but like real human beings.