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1 – 10 of 596Fangju Jia, Dong-dong Wang and Lianshui Li
The COVID-19 epidemic is still spreading globally and will not be completely over in a short time. Wearing a mask is an effective means to combat the spread of COVID-19. However…
Abstract
Purpose
The COVID-19 epidemic is still spreading globally and will not be completely over in a short time. Wearing a mask is an effective means to combat the spread of COVID-19. However, whether the public wear a mask for epidemic prevention and control will be affected by stochastic factors such as vaccination, cultural differences and irrational emotions, which bring a high degree of uncertainty to the prevention and control of the epidemic. The purpose of this study is to explore and analyze the epidemic prevention and control strategies of the public in an uncertain environment.
Design/methodology/approach
Based on the stochastic evolutionary game model of the Moran process, the study discusses the epidemic prevention and control strategies of the public under the conditions of the dominance of stochastic factors, expected benefits and super-expected benefits.
Findings
The research shows that the strategic evolution of the public mainly depends on stochastic factors, cost-benefit and the number of the public. When the stochastic factors are dominant, the greater the perceived benefit, the lower the cost and the greater the penalty for not wearing masks, the public will choose to wear a mask. Under the dominance of expected benefits and super-expected benefits, when the number of the public is greater than a certain threshold, the mask-wearing strategy will become an evolutionary stable strategy. From the evolutionary process, the government’s punishment measures will slow down the speed of the public choosing the strategy of not wearing masks. The speed of the public evolving to the stable strategy under the dominance of super-expected benefits is faster than that under the dominance of expected benefits.
Practical implications
The study considers the impact of stochastic factors on public prevention and control strategies and provides decision-making support and theoretical guidance for the scientific prevention of the normalized public.
Originality/value
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no research has considered the impact of different stochastic interference intensities on public prevention and control strategies. Therefore, this paper can be seen as a valuable resource in this field.
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Hongdan Xu and Jiuhe Wang
Knowledge sharing is critical to creating value in platform ecosystems. However, participants refrain from sharing knowledge and even engage in free-riding behavior, thereby…
Abstract
Purpose
Knowledge sharing is critical to creating value in platform ecosystems. However, participants refrain from sharing knowledge and even engage in free-riding behavior, thereby causing the value co-destruction of the platform ecosystems. To encourage knowledge sharing among participants, it is essential to analyze the influencing factors and decision-making mechanisms of knowledge sharing in the platform ecosystems.
Design/methodology/approach
The study investigated the issue of knowledge sharing among participants in platform ecosystems, based on the stochastic differential game model. Considering the uncertain factors, the Nash non-cooperative game, Stackelberg leader-follower game, and cooperative game models were proposed. By utilizing system dynamics and numerical simulations, the key influencing factors and mechanisms of knowledge sharing were deeply explored, consequently providing game solutions to achieve the Pareto optimality of the ecosystem.
Findings
Participants' innovation capability and the marginal benefits of knowledge-sharing positively impact knowledge-sharing decisions, while the environmental knowledge decay rate has a negative influence. The platform subsidy mode enhances the knowledge-sharing effect, and the collaborative cooperation mode can realize the Pareto optimization of the system.
Practical implications
The research findings will provide theoretical support for fostering knowledge innovation and sustainable development of platform ecosystems. Managers should cultivate an innovative environment, establish fair reward mechanisms, and utilize subsidies to promote knowledge sharing, leading to higher value creation.
Originality/value
Utilizing the stochastic differential game model, the study proposed various game-theoretic frameworks to analyze participants' knowledge-sharing strategies. The integration of system dynamics and numerical simulations provides a practical approach to understanding the key influencing factors and decision-making processes.
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Yue Wang, Ming Liu, Joe Viana and Nonhlanhla Dube
Providing quality emergency supplies is crucial to mitigate and respond to emergencies. However, despite government and consumer oversight of emergency supplies’ quality, a…
Abstract
Purpose
Providing quality emergency supplies is crucial to mitigate and respond to emergencies. However, despite government and consumer oversight of emergency supplies’ quality, a troubling trend persists among some enterprises to sacrifice product quality for financial gain. This paper examines the influence of strategy selections among governments, enterprises, and consumers to enhance the quality of emergency supplies.
Design/methodology/approach
We develop a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of three stakeholders: government, enterprises, and consumers, considering factors including subsidies and penalties. After analysing three stakeholders’ strategic choices to ascertain system stability, parametric analyses were conducted.
Findings
Excessive or insufficient subsidies are not conducive to encouraging enterprises to adopt an authentic production strategy; excessive subsidies may result in consumers enduring counterfeiting. Furthermore, the government’s supervision strategy can stabilise the system quickly, suggesting that consumer reporting cannot replace government supervision. Additionally, incentivising enterprises to adopt an authentic production strategy can be achieved by increasing penalties and enhancing compensation while reducing consumer reporting, government supervision, and raw materials costs.
Originality/value
We present a preliminary exploration of how to promote the production of qualified emergency supplies in the early stages of an emergency event. The model and findings proposed in this paper can be generalised and applied to various emergency events, including epidemics and earthquakes.
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Abstract
Purpose
Emotions, understood as evolving mental states, are pivotal in shaping individuals“' decision-making, especially in ambiguous information evaluation, probability estimation of events, and causality analysis. Public–private partnership (PPP) projects represent a confluence of “economic–environmental–social” dimensions, wherein stakeholder behavior follows the sequential progression of “cognition–emotion–action.” Consequently, comprehending the effects of emotional shifts on stakeholder's decision-making processes is vital to fostering the sustainability of PPP projects.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper utilizes rank-dependent expected utility and evolutionary game theory to systematically examine the influence of emotional factors on stakeholders' behavior and decision-making processes within PPP projects. The paper integrates three emotional state functions—optimism, pessimism and rationality—into the PPP framework, highlighting the intricate interactions among the government, private sector, surrounding public and the media. Furthermore, the paper amalgamates the evolutionary pathways of environmental rights incidents with the media's role. Through equilibrium analysis and numerical simulation, the paper delves into the diverse interplay of emotions across different phases of the environmental rights incident, assessing the impact of these emotions on the evolutionary game's equilibrium results.
Findings
Emotions significantly influence the microlevel decisions of PPP stakeholders, adapting continually based on event dynamics and media influences. When the private sector demonstrates optimism and the surrounding public leans toward rationality or pessimism, the likelihood of the private sector engaging in speculative behavior escalates, while the surrounding public refrains from adopting a supervisory strategy. Conversely, when the private sector is pessimistic and the public is optimistic, the system fails to evolve a stable strategy. However, when government regulation intensifies, the private sector opts for a nonspeculative strategy, and the surrounding public adopts a supervisory strategy. Under these conditions, the system attains a relatively optimal state of equilibrium.
Originality/value
The paper develops a game model to examine the evolutionary dynamics between the surrounding public and private sectors concerning environmental rights protection in waste incineration PPP projects. It illuminates the nature of the conflicting interests among project participants, delves into the impact of emotional factors on their decision-making processes and offers crucial perspectives for the governance of such partnerships. Furthermore, this paper provides substantive recommendations for emotional oversight to enhance governance efficacy.
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Ji Kai, Ming Liu, Yue Wang and Ding Zhang
Nucleic acid testing is an effective method of accurate prevention and control and a key measure to block the spread of the epidemic. However, the fraud in nucleic acid testing…
Abstract
Purpose
Nucleic acid testing is an effective method of accurate prevention and control and a key measure to block the spread of the epidemic. However, the fraud in nucleic acid testing occurred frequently during epidemics. This paper aims to provide a viable scheme for the government to strengthen the supervision of nucleic acid testing and to provide a new condition for the punishment for the negative act of the government and the upper limit of the reward for nucleic acid testing institution of no data fraud.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper formulates an evolutionary game model between the government and nucleic acid testing institution under four different mechanisms of reward and punishment to solve the issue of nucleic acid testing supervision. The authors discuss the stability of equilibrium points under the four distinct strategies and conduct simulation experiments.
Findings
The authors find that the strategy of dynamic reward and static penalty outperforms the strategies of static reward and static penalty, dynamic reward and static penalty, static reward and dynamic penalty, dynamic reward and dynamic penalty. The results reveal the appropriate punishment for the negative act of the government can enhance the positivity of the government's supervision in the strategy of dynamic reward and static penalty, while the upper limit of the reward for nucleic acid testing institution of no data fraud cannot be too high. Otherwise, it will backfire. Another interesting and counterintuitive result is that in the strategy of dynamic reward and dynamic penalty, the upper limit of the penalty for data fraud of nucleic acid testing institution cannot be augmented recklessly. Otherwise, it will diminish the government's positivity for supervision.
Originality/value
Most of the existing evolutionary game researches related to the reward and punishment mechanism and data fraud merely highlight that increasing the intensity of reward and punishment can help improve the government's supervision initiative and can minimize data fraud of nucleic acid institution, but they fall short of the boundary conditions for the punishment and reward mechanism. Previous literature only study the supervision of nucleic acid testing qualitatively and lacks quantitative research. Moreover, they do not depict the problem scenario of testing data fraud of nucleic acid institution regulated by the government via the evolutionary game model. Thus, this study effectively bridges these gaps. This research is universal and can be extended to other industries.
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Ming-Yang Li, Zong-Hao Jiang and Lei Wang
The purpose of the study is to investigate and analyze the dynamics of the government-enterprise grain joint storage mechanism, particularly, focusing on profit-driven speculative…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of the study is to investigate and analyze the dynamics of the government-enterprise grain joint storage mechanism, particularly, focusing on profit-driven speculative behaviors exhibited by enterprises within this context. The study aims to understand the various factors influencing the behavior of stakeholders involved in grain storage, including government storage departments, agent storage enterprises and quality inspection agencies.
Design/methodology/approach
The study employs a tripartite evolutionary game model to investigate profit-driven behaviors in government-enterprise grain joint storage. It analyzes strategies of government departments, storage enterprises and quality inspection agencies, considering factors like supervision costs and speculative risks. Simulation analysis examines tripartite payoffs, initial probabilities and the impact of digital governance levels to enhance emergency grain storage effectiveness.
Findings
The study finds that leveraging digital governance tools in government-enterprise grain joint storage mechanisms can mitigate risks, enhance efficiency and ensure the security of grain storage. It highlights the significant impact of supervision costs, speculative risks and digital supervision levels on stakeholder strategies, offering guidance to improve the effectiveness of emergency grain storage systems.
Originality/value
The originality of this study lies in its integration of digital governance tools into the analysis of the government-enterprise grain joint storage mechanism, addressing profit-driven speculative behaviors. Through a tripartite evolutionary game model, it explores stakeholder strategies, emphasizing the impact of digital supervision levels on outcomes and offering insights crucial for enhancing emergency grain storage effectiveness.
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Zidan Tian, Qinghua He and Ting Wang
Currently, many studies have shown an increasing interest in owner-dynamic capabilities (ODCs). Existing studies mainly focus on the dynamic capability basis and capability…
Abstract
Purpose
Currently, many studies have shown an increasing interest in owner-dynamic capabilities (ODCs). Existing studies mainly focus on the dynamic capability basis and capability development within the owner organization, whereas they rarely analyze the capability mobilization within the network of participants in megaprojects. Therefore, this study aims to explain the interaction and evolution of the mobilization strategies of ODCs and the cooperative strategies of other participants.
Design/methodology/approach
This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the evolutionarily stable strategy of the owner, the reciprocal participants and the general participants. Results are numerically simulated with a validation case. The asymptotic stability of multiple group strategies is discussed under the replicator dynamic system.
Findings
This study suggests that resource complementarity significantly reduces the difficulty of mobilization. Moreover, these strategies are only effective with sufficient ODCs. The results indicate that reciprocal participants are more sensitive to the change in resource complementarity.
Originality/value
This study provides strategic guidance for mobilizing ODCs in megaprojects to better embrace uncertainty and stress, contributing to the dynamic capability literature with an evolutionary game approach. And new insight for the study of reciprocity preference in megaprojects is also provided.
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Blockchain technology has been recognized as a potential solution to the challenges in managing healthcare information. Its adoption in the healthcare industry has garnered the…
Abstract
Purpose
Blockchain technology has been recognized as a potential solution to the challenges in managing healthcare information. Its adoption in the healthcare industry has garnered the attention of healthcare institutions and governments. Given the significant role of subsidies in promoting technology adoption, this study applies evolutionary game theory to examine the impact of government subsidies on the adoption of blockchain technology by healthcare institutions.
Design/methodology/approach
First, the authors analyze the interests of government administration departments and healthcare institutions separately in regards to blockchain adoption. Subsequently, the authors develop the payoff matrix of both participants and construct the evolutionary game model. And then, the authors calculate the replication dynamic equations and analyze the decision evolution of both participants through the replication dynamic equations and numerical experiments.
Findings
The numerical experiments demonstrate that government subsidies are effective in encouraging healthcare institutions to adopt blockchain technology. The study also reveals the necessary amount of subsidy required to guide healthcare institutions towards adoption. Additionally, the validity of the evolutionary game model in analyzing the interaction between governments and healthcare institutions is confirmed by the results.
Originality/value
Blockchain adoption in the healthcare industry differs from other emerging technologies, as there is the potential for it to reduce revenue for healthcare institutions. This study contributes to the analysis of theoretical models for promoting blockchain in the healthcare industry through subsidies. Additionally, it demonstrates the potential of evolutionary game theory in analyzing the adoption of blockchain technology, and the interaction between governments and healthcare institutions.
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This study explores the emergence of discrimination based on observable characteristics. In many instances, agents presume differences arising from traits such as race or gender…
Abstract
Purpose
This study explores the emergence of discrimination based on observable characteristics. In many instances, agents presume differences arising from traits such as race or gender, even when these parameters are irrelevant to the situation at hand. This paper intends to reveal an emergent behavior and a persistent culture of discrimination caused by miscategorization in strategic interactions.
Design/methodology/approach
We assume that agents occasionally engage in conflicts modeled as asymmetric hawk and dove games, where boundedly rational agents may categorize their opponents based on observable traits to make effective decisions. Three categorization strategies are considered: fine-grained, regular, and coarse-grained. Subsequently, an evolutionary agent-based model is employed to examine the performance of these strategies in a dynamic environment.
Findings
The results demonstrate that fine-grained categorization provides an advantage when the cost of fighting is low, while coarse-grained categorizers exhibit more peaceful behavior, gaining an advantage when the cost of conflict is high. Our primary finding indicates the emergence of discrimination based on non-relevant traits, manifested through consistent aggressive behavior towards individuals possessing these traits.
Originality/value
This paper is the first to investigate the emergence of discrimination without assuming prior differences between groups. Previous studies have assumed either an initial population difference or a homophily-based approach. In contrast, we demonstrate that discrimination can emerge even in the absence of such assumptions. Discrimination between two groups may arise as long as there are agents who label these categories.
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– The purpose of this paper is to present a proportional-integral (PI) observer design on a linear system with stochastic noises.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to present a proportional-integral (PI) observer design on a linear system with stochastic noises.
Design/methodology/approach
The noised disturbances are modeled as independent Brownian motions for various affections, such as radiation, heat, and material fatigue. These phenomena are common in applications, such as biomolecules, nonlinear control, and biochemical networks. Under this framework, this paper proposes a new approach on a PI observer in terms of four crucial theorems, and an illustrative numerical example is given to verify the proposed design.
Findings
The results provide potential solutions for system fault tolerance and isolation.
Originality/value
This paper proposes a design, solvability, and controllability analysis on a PI observer in terms of four crucial theorems.
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