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The purpose of this paper is to define and characterise the precise nature of these cultural systems and their resulting impact on the respective art and artists of each territory, by ascertaining the impact on those systems of their respective government and governance.

This paper is based on three approaches to art market modelling. All three are based on political ideologies. The first, which typifies the art markets of Western Europe and the USA, is predicated on a Pluralist and Neo-Liberal ideology. The others correspond to the systems of government in China, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan.

It has been shown in this paper that political systems and their accompanying ideology, born of cultural preferences, have impacted on the art markets of China, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. It has been demonstrated that all four markets are employing variants of the international norm.

The art that is exported from East Asia will only be accepted by East Asian national markets when East Asian art markets exercise a majority influence on emerging and transitional markets. It is not the intention of this paper to pursue this thought beyond the possibility that it may occur.

The ineluctable conclusion is, therefore, that the global art market is moving towards a bipolar affair.

This paper also suggests the disengagement of East Asian and Chinese “culture” and art from a global (western) norm and production and consumption of national culture in East Asia by East Asians.

The paper looks (for the first time) at the direct (and subliminal) influence of political systems on art markets and the consequential effects of political ideology on the art markets of East Asia and China. The paper arrives at a series of precise definitions for the way that these art markets operate.

The purpose of this study is to examine the welfare effects of product standards (which fall under Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs)) on an exporting country when the country by its own choice prefers to follow the null standard for the domestic market, which is not possible due to high set up cost at two different standards. The model has used a theoretical framework to analyze the effects and has derived some important results. If the standard is not linked with a true negative externality, the exporting country, given the assumptions of the model will always prefer to be discriminated by “tariff” and the importing country will prefer to protect its market by “tariff” rather than going for NTB. The typical assumptions taken here resemble the trade between developed and developing countries when the developed country imposes some minimum standard on a product but becomes relatively “costly” for the developing country to comply with. As the importing country is not free to set tariffs, it will use NTB as a minimum standard (as it is welfare-improving than free trade). However, the minimum standard also affects the exporting country's local producers and consumers. So NTB leads to a worse situation for both countries and definitely worst for the exporting country. Using a game theoretic framework, the study shows that the imposition of standards which does not address any real externality can be an optimum response for an importing country leading to a loss in the global welfare compared to a free trade situation.

The development of the current European economic area maritime cabotage market occurred when, at a policy level, the European Union forced the opening of its member-states cabotage markets to Community shipowners and extended this openness, in 1997, to the european free trade area countries. A two-tier cabotage market emerged, where a European economic area legislative framework co-exists with the legislative acts of each member-state. With such a unique background, this paper aims to investigate both the European economic area member-states and the rest of the world cabotage regimes and identify a list of reasons and policy measures used to implement cabotage policies.

By means of a desk research methodological approach, this paper analyses, from a geographical perspective, different countries’ cabotage policies and classifies them, and identifies in a systematically way a set of reasons and policy instruments that support each of chosen policies approach.

The outcome indicates that only a few countries promote free liberalised cabotage services and that most countries favour protectionist cabotage policies, whose governments can control the number of foreign vessels participating in these trades. Cabotage regimes have been categorised and the reasons behind both policies and respective policy instruments have been identified.

Quite often, researchers only focus on the cabotage policies of the European economic area countries, the USA, Australia, Japan and South Korea. This paper value rests on its ability to incorporate cabotage policies from other African, Asian and Latin American countries and to update existing information on the subject. Overall, this paper paves the way to broaden the cabotage knowledge.

We formally investigate the effects of an inspection system influencing safety of foreign and domestic food products in the domestic market. Consumers purchase domestic and imported food and value safety. Potential protectionism à la Fisher and Serra (2000) can arise: inspection frequency imposed on foreign producers set by a domestic social planner would be higher than the corresponding policy set by a global social planner treating all producers as domestic. The domestic social planner tends to impose most if not all of the inspection on foreign producers, which improves food safety for consumers and limits the production loss for domestic producers. Despite this protectionist component, inspections address a potential consumption externality such as health hazard in the domestic country when unsafe food can enter the country undetected. We then calibrate the analytical framework to the U.S. shrimp market incorporating key stylized facts of this market. Identifying protectionist inspection requires much information on inspection, safety, damages, and costs. We also investigate how to finance the inspection policy from a social planner perspective. Financing instruments differ between the domestic and international welfare-maximizing objectives.

By implementing various forms of preference policies, countries around the world intervene in their economies for their own political and economic purposes. Likewise, twenty-five states in the U.S. have implemented in-state preference policies (NASPO, 2012) to protect and support their own vendors from out-of-state competition to achieve similar purposes. The purpose of this paper is to show the connection between protectionist public policy instruments noted in the international trade literature and the in-state preference policies within the United States. This paper argues that the reasons and the rationales for adopting these preference policies in international trade and the states' contexts are similar. Given the similarity in policy outcomes, the paper further argues that the international trade literature provides an overarching explanation to help understand what states could expect in applying in-state preference policies.

When an industry faces strong competition, it can adjust or seek protection through government trade policy. A look at the causes, course, and consequences of such competitive shifts in the steel and consumer electronics industries shows why the battle over protectionism has heated up recently.

This chapter aims to critically analyse the implications that the national protectionist policies have on the global supply and value chains and the relocation of production. The analysis is based on the assumptions that the global economy is facing the possibility of decoupling of many trade connections, and this trend favours de-globalisation processes that have long been promoted by populism, nationalism and economic protectionism. It is concluded that global supply, production and value chains although being economically efficient are no longer any more secure under national protectionist policies, and therefore, the relocation of production processes is mainly due to the increase in the level of income and wages of the developing countries that are the destination and which reduce the advantages to relocate.

The aim of this paper is to determine the criteria for a solid impact evaluation in social entrepreneurship. The solid impact evaluation method is needed for building the bridge between two separate discourses of social entrepreneurship: the discourses of protectionists of social entrepreneurship, who believe without empirical proof that social enterprises are effective and the opponents or doubters in social entrepreneurship, who need empirical proof of the effectiveness of social enterprises.

The criteria for a solid impact evaluation discourse of social entrepreneurship are determined and its impact evaluation is analysed based on literature.

A solid social impact evaluation method should be able to analyse: the social impact of the organisation and not only the financial allocation and outcome; differences in the impact of two organisations which are operating in the same field; and the selection of target group and analysis of all the impacts of the activities.

The list of criteria for a solid impact evaluation might not be complete as it is based on literature review only. As there is a considerable gap between the discourse of protectionists and opponents of social entrepreneurship, additional analyses are required to analyse the discourse of practitioners of social entrepreneurship.

The current study could be used for practitioners as well as for politicians while preparation for the negotiations with the representatives with other sectors as it brings out some of the common topics that are misunderstood by different parties.

This paper takes the first step toward a construction of a solid impact evaluation model. Evaluating the social impact of social enterprises with a solid model could bring closer the discourses of social enterprises used by protectionists and opponents of social entrepreneurship.

Uses parametric Granger causality techniques to test whether trade acted as an engine of growth during the period 1971(2)‐1994(2) in Australia. The causality tests were performed on time‐series data that were filtered after unit root and cointegration testing. During the study period there was a dramatic shift from a protectionist to a more liberal trading regime in Australia. Superexogeneity tests were applied to the conditional growth and the marginal trade policy models derived by the application of general to specific methodology. The superexogeneity tests examined whether the shift from a protectionist to a more liberal trading regime in the mid‐1980s undermined the structure of Australian trade growth dynamics as foreshadowed in the Lucas critique. Reviews the macropolicy implications of the trade policy regime shift.