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The purpose of this paper is to use the game theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling to support the analysis of different retail marketing strategies, in particular, using payoff matrices for modelling the likely outcomes from different retail marketing strategies.

Theoretical research was utilised to develop a practical approach for applying game theory to retail marketing strategies via payoff matrices combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling.

Game theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling can provide a formal approach to understanding consumer decision making in a retail environment, which can support the development of retail marketing strategies.

Game theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling can support the modelling of the interaction between retail marketing actions and consumer responses in a practical formal probabilistic manner, which can inform marketing strategies used by retail companies in a practical manner.

Game theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling can provide a formalised mechanism for examining how consumers may respond to different retail marketing strategies.

The originality of this research is the practical application of game theory to retail marketing, in particular the use of payoff matrices combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling to examine likely consumer behaviour in response to different retail marketing approaches.

The purpose of this paper is to summarize ways in which game theory has been or could be utilized within the humanitarian sector and to identify future research opportunities in this field. Game theory is a tool for modeling systems in which multiple decision makers act according to their own objectives and where individual choices affect system outcomes. Humanitarian logistics systems are often characterized by the presence of many such decision makers.

The authors synthesize literature from operations research, humanitarian logistics, and the political and management sciences that describes either game theory models or settings in which game theory has the potential to contribute practical insights. Papers are categorized based on the types of decision makers highlighted and the facets of humanitarian operations described.

The review of literature indicates that applications of game theory to humanitarian supply chain systems are limited to date but that many components of humanitarian operations can benefit from such study.

The literature on game theory in humanitarian supply chains is still emerging. The findings imply opportunities for researchers to advance both theoretical and practical understanding in this area.

Current research provides some managerial insights to humanitarian practitioners, but future practice-driven research could increase the impact of game theory models in the humanitarian sector.

This work reviews past research contributions in the area of game theory and humanitarian operations and recommends areas for future research.

Commentators have claimed that business schools encourage unethical behavior by using economic theory as a basis for education. We examine claims that exposure to agency theory acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy, reducing ethical behavior among business students. We experimentally test whether economics coursework or a manipulated competitive vs. cooperative frame affects measured ethical behavior in simulated decision settings. We measure ethical behavior using established tasks. We also measure ethical recognition to test whether agency theory reduces recognition of ethical issues. Exposure to agency theory in either prior classwork or the experiment increased wealth-increasing unethical behavior. We found no effect on unethical behavior that does not affect wealth. We found no effect of exposure to agency theory on ethical recognition. Usual laboratory experiment limitations apply. Future research can examine why agency theory reduces ethical behavior. Educators ought to consider unintended consequences of the language and assumptions of theories that underlie education. Students may assume descriptions of how people behave as prescriptions for how people ought to behave. This study contributes to the literature on economic education and ethics. We found no prior experimental studies of the effect of economics education on ethical behavior.

Culture is a central concept broadly studied in social anthropology and sociology. It has been gaining increasing attention in economics, appearing in research on labor market discrimination, identity, gender, and social preferences. Most experimental economics research on culture studies cross-national or cross-ethnic differences in economic behavior. In contrast, we explain laboratory behavior using two cultural dimensions adopted from a prominent general cultural framework in contemporary social anthropology: group commitment and grid control. Groupness measures the extent to which individual identity is incorporated into group or collective identity; gridness measures the extent to which social and political prescriptions intrinsically influence individual behavior. Grid-group characteristics are measured for each individual using selected items from the World Values Survey. We hypothesize that these attributes allow us to systematically predict behavior in a way that discriminates among multiple forms of social preferences using a simple, parsimonious deductive model. The theoretical predictions are further tested in the economics laboratory by applying them to the dictator, ultimatum, and trust games. We find that these predictions are confirmed overall for most experimental games, although the strength of empirical support varies across games. We conclude that grid-group cultural theory is a viable predictor of people’s economic behavior, then discuss potential limitations of the current approach and ways to improve it.

One important assumption in the conventional cooperative game theory is that payoffs are assumed to be deterministic. In terms of the players’ cognitive ability of the realistic world, this is a very strict assumption. The classical game theory can find no way out when a particular game circumstance involves uncertainty, such as limited knowledge, small sample, and inadequate information, the payoff values of the game can only be described with interval grey numbers. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

In this study the concept of N-person grey games is proposed in which payoffs are represented with interval grey numbers opposed to the classical game theory. A straight forward solution methodology is submitted compatible to grey numbers. Then, a currency war between anonymous countries is handled and modeled as an N-Person grey game. A generic currency war scenario is developed to follow the proposed solution procedure thoroughly.

Based on the outcomes of this work, the authors can say that N-person grey game is an expansion of the classical N-person game under uncertain grey information and can be applied in more complex and uncertain environments, such as those seen in complicated currency warfare.

This study combines the grey system theory with the classic N-person game theory and sets up the N-person grey game with grey payoff functions. Based on the grey number operating methods, the grey linear programming algorithm is established to calculate and distribute benefits to the players. In this respect this study has the feature of being the pioneer in the N-person grey game area.

The current paper is a brief review of the emerging field of quantum-like modelling in game theory. This paper aims to explore several quantum games, which are superior compared to their classical counterparts, which means either they give rise to superior Nash equilibria or they make the game fairer. For example, quantum Prisoners Dilemma generates Pareto superior outcomes as compared to defection outcome in the famous classical case. Again, a quantum-like version of cards game can make the game fairer, increasing the chance of winning of players who are disadvantaged in the classical case. This paper explores all the virtues of simple quantum games, also highlighting some findings of the authors as regards Prisoners Dilemma game.

As this is a general review paper, the authors have not demonstrated any specific mathematical method, rather explored the well-known quantum probability framework, used for designing quantum games. They have a short appendix which explores basic structure of Hilbert space representation of human decision-making.

Along with the review of the extant literature, the authors have also highlighted some new findings for quantum Prisoners Dilemma game. Specifically, they have shown in the earlier studies (which are referred to here) that a pure quantum entanglement set up is not needed for designing better games, even a weaker condition, which is classical entanglement is sufficient for producing Pareto improved outcomes.

Theoretical research, with findings and implications for future game designs, it has been argued that it is not always needed to have true quantum entanglement for superior Nash Equilibria.

The main purpose here is to raise awareness mainly in the social science community about the possible applications of quantum-like game theory paradigm. The findings related to Prisoners Dilemma game are, however, original.

Kostova, Roth and Dacin called in 2008 for the advancement of a theoretical conception of the multinational corporation (MNC) that takes into account both power relationships among actors and the structure of its internal institutional field. While micro-political scholars of MNCs have started to answer the former part of the call regarding power, the second part has not been thoroughly addressed yet. Furthermore, the agentic aspects typical of power games and the structural aspects characterizing institutional fields have not been fully combined in a multi-level perspective of MNCs so far. Leaning on Bourdieu, we suggest an answer to the pending call. We theorize the MNC as a playing field of power emerging around the issue of finding a meta-rate of conversion of the actors’ capitals constituted in national fields. We conceive such issue field in a dynamic state due to the constant entry and exit of new players (e.g. through mergers, acquisitions or divestitures). This results in the need to continuously test the validity of exchange rates. The role of the metainstitutional field level of the MNC as a global category is also discussed.

Modern “game theory”, unlike the Talmudic game method, is a highly advanced analytical tool, both in sophistication as well as in application. Nevertheless, the game as such, whether of chance or strategy, has been practised from time immemorial, including by the ancient Hebrews. It is demonstrated that within the Talmudic dialectics, the game method was often utilised to solve intricate questions, theoretical as well as practical.