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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the income structure of Islamic banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and to explore the effect of the diversification of banks' earning on risks that may harm these latter.

Using data from 2002‐2008 for 42 Islamic banks, this article provides descriptive and analytical analysis and multiple regression equations.

This article reveals that greater reliance on the income share of the profit‐loss‐sharing products is associated with higher risk and higher insolvency risk for both listed Islamic banks and non‐listed Islamic banks. However, no effect has been observed between the operation income of non‐profit‐losses‐sharing products and risk levels. That is why listed banks prefer to invest less in non‐profit‐loss‐sharing products than in profit‐loss‐sharing products.

Financial regulators in emerging Islamic financial market should help Islamic banks to find equilibrium between the expansion of the Islamic financial market and respect for the raison d'être of Islamic finance: the profit and loss sharing mechanisms.

To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first article that empirically tests why Islamic banks prefer to invest less in profit‐loss‐sharing products. Also, this article contributes to studying the relationship between Islamic finance and risk.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze marketability constructed from market share and concentration and to test its effect on the profitability and the mediation effects of profit‒loss sharing under stewardship theory.

This research employs data of financial statements published by ten sharia commercial banks listed in the Indonesia Financial Services Authority during the period 2011–2016. The data are analyzed into path analysis model using multiple mediators.

The result reveals that sharia banks’ marketability in Indonesia tends to be low. Based on the test of significance through Partial Least Square, it is found that marketability has a positive effect on the level of profitability, indicating that market share and concentration of sharia banks positively lead the change on the level of Return on Asset and Return on Equity. This paper further identifies the mediation effects emerged through mudharabah and musharakah. The results point out that mudharabah has a partial effect and musharakah has a competitive effect on the relationship between market share and profitability.

This paper can be a decision-maker for Central Bank and Financial Services Authority for encouraging sharia banks to enhance the power market through the mode of finances with profit‒loss sharing.

The growth of sharia banks is currently becoming highlight of the literature of sharia banks. This paper provides insights into stewardship theory that sharia banking management provides the concept of the alignment of interest.

The purpose of this study is to understand the profit-sharing structure at equilibrium of the two-tier mudharaba contract in a pure Islamic banking system and then in a dual banking system.

This paper aims to better understand the profit-sharing structure at the equilibrium of the two-tier mudharaba. It first assumes a purely Islamic banking system and then introduces a risk-free asset to simulate trade-off opportunities in a dual banking system.

First, by using a model inspired from a neoclassical framework and assuming that the Islamic banks are the only channel for financing the economy, the results suggest that the profit-sharing structure built up by the three parties, the bank, the depositor and the entrepreneur, at the time of signing the Mudharaba contract has to be drawn up in the way that, at the ex post, the remuneration of each necessary production factor, capital and labor, should equal its marginal productivity. Second, the authors relax the hypothesis of a purely Islamic financial system and introduced a risk-free asset in favor of the depositor. Thereby, the authors are able to apprehend the financial balance of the two-tier mudharaba contract by simulating the trade-offs that can occur in a dual banking system. The findings suggest that the profit-sharing structure is not the same whether we are at the level of bank assets (bank–entrepreneur relationship) or liabilities (bank–depositor relationship). For the asset side, an increase (respectively decrease) in the expected profit of the mudharaba implies a decrease (respectively increase) in the share of the bank, whereas an increase (respectively decrease) in the return of the risk-free asset and/or the risk underlying the project implies an increase (respectively decrease) of the bank’s share in the expected profit.

Theoretical work that has studied the determinants of the ratio of profit sharing between capitalists and entrepreneurs in the context of mudharaba has omitted that this contract should be assessed at both asset and liability sides of the bank. To overcome this theoretical gap, this paper aims to better understand the structure of profit sharing at the equilibrium of the two-tier mudharaba, while taking into account the contractual specificities between the different stakeholders.

This paper aims to explain a new system of accounting for partnership financing that applies in Rastin profit and loss sharing banking. In this system, the interest rate is not used in calculations and accounting, and instead, the “time value” of capital based on the amount and duration of the partnership is used.

Rastin Partnership Accounting principles have been founded on off-balance-sheet items and on the basis of the institutions’ obligations to the depositors and receivers of financial resources, and they are in compliance with the nature of the financial intermediary activity (a partnership of depositor in the yields of the fund receiver via the bank).

The distribution of profit among stakeholders (including workforce and capital owners) is accomplished according to the share of each beneficiary in the created value added. In this regard, Euler’s theorem, as the best mathematical-economic innovation for distribution of income is applied.

This system is novel, and it is required to be more elaborated for further practical development and adjustment.

In this accounting system, the return of the partnership is distributed among sharers based on the amount and duration of their partnership. The penalty for delay in payment is calculated from the amount of the incurred loss due to negligence or blameworthy of the undertaker and not upon a penalty interest rate.

Interest rate as an essential factor in conventional accounting is not usable in Islamic banking and other similar institutions that work based on partnership, such as mutual funds and saving and loan associations. The proposed system removes this shortage and is fairer than the conventional accounting.

Approach of this accounting system is fully different from the conventional accounting because of intrinsic characteristics of the intermediary role of financial partnership institutions and Islamic banks.

The purposes of this study are twofold. First, to theoretically examine the profit-sharing (mudarabah) contract that produces an optimal distribution of return in the presence of social learning (shuratic process) within the environment of asymmetric information. Second, to empirically investigate the optimal condition of profit-sharing ratio (PSR) and social learning for profit-sharing (mudarabah) contract in Islamic banking.

Data from one of the biggest and earliest Islamic banks in Malaysia were taken as a proxy of an Islamic bank. The data are collected from the period of 2009 to 2013, and these will be used for the simulation process by using the genetic algorithm (GA) technique.

The empirical results discovered that Islamic banks had used social learning in their daily activities, especially in the asset side. The results also showed that the trend of social learning has a positive relationship with the trend of Islamic banks’ net profit. Additionally, the results also indicated that the Islamic banks’ net profit has a positive relationship with its PSR from the profit-sharing (mudarabah) financing and securities investment.

This study is the first of its kind that investigates the implementation of the social learning process in Islamic banking operation. This study also used the latest technique from artificial intelligence system, i.e. a GA, to attain an optimal value for PSR and social learning process.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the use of the social welfare concepts of Takaful and Tabarru’ (donations) as tools to guarantee deposits in the Islamic banking industry, and the effect of such practice on the concept of risk sharing in Islamic finance.

The study critically analyzes the Mudaraba contract used by Islamic banks to mobilize funds, the use of Profit Equalization Reserves and Investment Risk Reserves, the use of other income smoothing techniques and the insurance of Islamic banks’ by regulatory agencies in some countries based on the Takaful and Tabarru’ concepts.

This paper shows that Islamic banks are increasingly using the concepts of Takaful and Tabarru’, which are intended originally for social welfare, as tools to justify the move to more guaranteed-in-substance type of deposits, and hence, more risk shifting rather than risk sharing in the Mudaraba contract. This use, is argued, moves Islamic banking towards more market-oriented, but less Shariaa-compliant in substance.

This papers examined the behaviour of Islamic financial institutions and Islamic scholars based on the available literature. No empirical analysis was conducted.

This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the substance of Islamic banking transactions and the risk shifting inherent in such transactions. Furthermore, it is the first study that examines the extent of utilizing different social welfare concepts to legalize – from Shariaa perspective – Islamic banking transactions.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the optimal profit-and-loss sharing (PLS)-based contract when market frictions occur.

This paper opts for an adverse selection analysis and Monte Carlo simulation to assess the less risky contract for the principal and the agent when musharakah, mudarabah and venture capital financings are used in imperfect markets. Furthermore, this framework enables us to capture the level of market frictions that the principal can bear and the level of audit that he/she may undertake to mitigate bankruptcy.

The simulation results reveal that Musharakah is the less risky contract for the principal compared to Mudarabah and venture capital when the shock is low and high. Furthermore, our findings indicate that the increase of market frictions engender higher audit cost and profit-sharing ratios. The increase of the safety index in the case of high shock is most likely attributed to the increase of the audit parameter for all contracts to mitigate the selfish behavior of the agent. Accordingly, the principal tends to require a higher profit-sharing ratio to compensate for the severer information asymmetry.

This paper has two main limits. First, the results were not compared to real data because the latter are not available. Second, this paper is a general framework to determine the less risky contract for the principal and does not consider the firm and sectoral characteristics. However, it can be extended in various ways where stress can be put on conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent with the aim to determine the contract that aligns their interests. In addition, the examination of firm dynamics in the case of equity and debt financing can provide further arguments for economic agents regarding the value of the firm, the growth rate and the lifetime of the project when information is asymmetrically distributed.

The findings shed some light on the necessity of the Islamic finance experts to re-think of the promotion of Musharakah because it dominates the two other contracts when market frictions occur.

Although Maghrabi and Mirakhor (2015), Alanzi and Lone (2015) and Lone and Ahmad (2017) among others showed that profit and loss sharing can ensure economic growth, findings may motivate economic players to consider Musharakah financing with the aim to reach financial inclusion and social, which is in line with Shari’ah requirements and Islamic values.

Although several papers highlighted the financial contracting theory from Shari’ah perspective, they ignored the financial issues that are associated to adverse selection. This paper provides theoretical evidence regarding the selection of the less risky financing mode in case of equity financing using Monte Carlo simulation.

The purpose of this paper is to assess whether Islamic banks are transparent regarding profit (and loss) sharing to investment account holders. Another objective is to appraise whether Islamic banks' performance affects management incentives to distribute profit (and loss) to investment account holders.

To investigate the research issue, the authors conducted an empirical study. Data of 25 global operating Islamic banks have been collected and analyzed for the period 2006-2010. The authors also developed a mathematical model based on the generalized least-squares principle.

The research results showed that enhancing transparency will prevent Islamic banks from shadowing their profit allocation practices and place investment account holders in a better position to manage their invested funds. The study also showed that bettering Islamic banks’performance will induce them to manager profit-sharing investment account holders’ funds under bonafides.

The main limitation is data availability. The maximum number of Islamic banks that disclose financial data covering the period of 2006-2010 limited the scope of the study to 25 banks.

The findings are very valuable for designing policies and standards as well as for the enforcement of these standards to improve transparency in Islamic banking.

The study outcome is vital to many parties involved in the Islamic banking field and can be taken as a strong foundation to make appropriate actions that would help grow and sustain Islamic banking development globally.

In this paper we analyze investment behavior under profit‐and‐ loss sharing contracts in an environment of asymmetric information. Under certain restrictive assumptions, PLS contracts are characterized with over investment, where the equilibrium level of investment exceeds the first best (full information) level. A zakat tax on profit is shown to restore efficiency.

Islamic banks use Mudarabah contract to replace the interest-bearing deposits with profit-sharing investment accounts. The purpose of this paper is to explore the challenges and problems associated with the employment of Mudarabah contract by Islamic banks.

The study critically analyzes the Mudarabah contract used by Islamic banks. It reviews the evolution of the contract from its traditional type to more complicated types such as compound, unrestricted, commingled and continuous Mudarabah. The paper investigates the problems that have emerged from implementing such types in current business settings.

The paper proves that implementing the Mudarabah contract by banks imposes several problems among which are the following: difficulty in the determination of total profit resulting from Mudarabah and in allocating this profit to the multiple parties involved in Mudarabah; usage of reserves to cater against future losses may undermine the concept of Mudarabah profit-loss sharing and lead to earnings management; corporate governance is also a major problem in Mudarabah contract, as the depositors are exposed to risks but have no governance rights; and Mudarabah may also lessen the fair presentation of financial reporting.

The paper examines the evolving Mudarabah contract and its implementation challenges, based on available literature (no empirical analysis was conducted).

The implications are significant for the future development of Islamic contracts and Islamic accounting treatments.

Many studies explored the Mudarabah contract from a Shariah or law perspective. However, this paper investigates the Mudarabah contract with a focus on the implication on accounting and financial reporting because of the lack of studies in this area. Furthermore, it demonstrates the persistent flaws in the Mudarabah contract, and it proposes a new model for mobilizing funds, i.e. mutual fund.