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The purposes of this study are twofold. First, to theoretically examine the profit-sharing (mudarabah) contract that produces an optimal distribution of return in the presence of social learning (shuratic process) within the environment of asymmetric information. Second, to empirically investigate the optimal condition of profit-sharing ratio (PSR) and social learning for profit-sharing (mudarabah) contract in Islamic banking.

Data from one of the biggest and earliest Islamic banks in Malaysia were taken as a proxy of an Islamic bank. The data are collected from the period of 2009 to 2013, and these will be used for the simulation process by using the genetic algorithm (GA) technique.

The empirical results discovered that Islamic banks had used social learning in their daily activities, especially in the asset side. The results also showed that the trend of social learning has a positive relationship with the trend of Islamic banks’ net profit. Additionally, the results also indicated that the Islamic banks’ net profit has a positive relationship with its PSR from the profit-sharing (mudarabah) financing and securities investment.

This study is the first of its kind that investigates the implementation of the social learning process in Islamic banking operation. This study also used the latest technique from artificial intelligence system, i.e. a GA, to attain an optimal value for PSR and social learning process.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of varying motivation induced by financial incentives and common uncertainty caused by time pressure on audit judgment performance.

The experimental method is used to examine how financial incentives and time pressure affect audit performance, based on predictions by both economic and behavioral theories. The relative performance contract and the profit sharing contract are two incentive schemes considered. To achieve the incentive effect on subjects when conducting the experiment, all subjects were compensated with real cash rewards, according to their incentive contracts as randomly assigned.

As predicted, major results show that both incentive contract and time pressure affect audit judgment performance. The audit performance is generally better under the relative performance contract than under the profit sharing contract. Additionally, it is demonstrated that an increase in the level of time pressure significantly improves recall, recognition, and total efficiency under both types of incentive contracts, but impairs recall and total performance, particularly under the relative performance contract. Moreover, the reduction of recall and total performance under the relative performance contract is significantly greater than under the profit sharing contract. Nevertheless, in this case, the relative performance contract still outperforms the profit sharing contract.

The findings suggest the relative superiority of the relative performance contract in comparison with the profit sharing contract in improving auditors' judgment performance for structured tasks.

The relative performance contract would motivate junior auditors to exert more effort to increase their performance in the work environment of increased time pressure. The audit firms may incorporate relative performance evaluations into incentive schemes, to improve junior auditors' performance for structured tasks.

The paper is of value to audit firms in the design of performance‐contingent incentive contracts.

The importance of service firms cooperating with digital platforms is widely acknowledged. The authors study three contractual relationships (fixed-cost, cost-sharing, and profit-sharing) between service firms (specifically hotels) and digital platforms in a highly fragmented service supply chain to examine which of these contract types optimizes profits.

The authors extend prior models analyzing the optimal expected total profit from the travel service firm (hotel)–digital platform relationship, providing new insights into each contract type’s ability to coordinate decentralized systems and optimize profits for both parties.

This study finds that fixed cost contracts cannot coordinate the decentralized system. Cost-sharing contracts can coordinate the decentralized system but only allow one channel profit split. In contrast, profit-sharing contracts may not always perfectly coordinate the decentralized system but support alternative profit allocations. Practically, both profit-sharing and cost-sharing contracts are preferable to fixed-cost contracts.

The paper includes implications for travel service firm managers to consider when structuring contracts with digital platforms to focus on profit optimization. Profit-sharing contracts are most preferable when cost and revenue data are fully shared between parties, while cost-sharing contracts are preferable over fixed-cost contracts.

This study extends prior investigations into the utility of different contract types on the optimal profit of a travel service firm (hotel)-digital platform provider relationship. The research fills a gap in the literature concerning the contracts used in these relationship types.

Purpose – This research studies how the discipline of option-like personal equity portfolio and the market discipline of debt jointly affect executive compensation design.

Design/methodology/approach – A theoretical model is proposed based on the moral hazard problem of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) by integrating firm financial leverage, executive equity holding, and profit-sharing rule. Subsequently, a panel data set of executive compensation is analyzed to provide empirical evidence.

Findings – The discipline of option reduces the need of performance-based compensation. The discipline of debt reduces the use of incentive pay for lowly leveraged firms, but increases the use of incentive pay for highly leveraged firms. These two disciplines can be either complements or substitutes on affecting optimal contracts depending on firm leverage.

Research limitations/implications – The present study provides a starting point for further study of optimal compensation that is not only the conventional one of mainly aligning managerial interests with that of shareholders but also the one of reinforcing the joint discipline of debt and option.

Originality/value – This new perspective produces several results characterizing firms that the discipline of debt and the discipline of option can be either complements or substitutes on affecting incentive compensation design.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the optimal profit-and-loss sharing (PLS)-based contract when market frictions occur.

This paper opts for an adverse selection analysis and Monte Carlo simulation to assess the less risky contract for the principal and the agent when musharakah, mudarabah and venture capital financings are used in imperfect markets. Furthermore, this framework enables us to capture the level of market frictions that the principal can bear and the level of audit that he/she may undertake to mitigate bankruptcy.

The simulation results reveal that Musharakah is the less risky contract for the principal compared to Mudarabah and venture capital when the shock is low and high. Furthermore, our findings indicate that the increase of market frictions engender higher audit cost and profit-sharing ratios. The increase of the safety index in the case of high shock is most likely attributed to the increase of the audit parameter for all contracts to mitigate the selfish behavior of the agent. Accordingly, the principal tends to require a higher profit-sharing ratio to compensate for the severer information asymmetry.

This paper has two main limits. First, the results were not compared to real data because the latter are not available. Second, this paper is a general framework to determine the less risky contract for the principal and does not consider the firm and sectoral characteristics. However, it can be extended in various ways where stress can be put on conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent with the aim to determine the contract that aligns their interests. In addition, the examination of firm dynamics in the case of equity and debt financing can provide further arguments for economic agents regarding the value of the firm, the growth rate and the lifetime of the project when information is asymmetrically distributed.

The findings shed some light on the necessity of the Islamic finance experts to re-think of the promotion of Musharakah because it dominates the two other contracts when market frictions occur.

Although Maghrabi and Mirakhor (2015), Alanzi and Lone (2015) and Lone and Ahmad (2017) among others showed that profit and loss sharing can ensure economic growth, findings may motivate economic players to consider Musharakah financing with the aim to reach financial inclusion and social, which is in line with Shari’ah requirements and Islamic values.

Although several papers highlighted the financial contracting theory from Shari’ah perspective, they ignored the financial issues that are associated to adverse selection. This paper provides theoretical evidence regarding the selection of the less risky financing mode in case of equity financing using Monte Carlo simulation.

This paper aims to focus on the deep‐seated ideological, economic, and social roots of the notion and practice of profit sharing in French enterprise, from a historical perspective. Although this practice is legally mandated in France today, this paper seeks to identify the historical roots of such practices and to locate them in the ideological, social, and economic domains of discourse.

The authors provide a brief review of the literature on profit sharing and identify the current knowledge on the relationship between profit sharing and firm performance, in addition to the motivations for implementing profit sharing and its non‐financial consequences.

From the mid‐nineteenth century onwards, profit sharing entailed more than just a few anecdotal experiments and actually raised a number of deep‐seated ideological, economic and social questions. The French practice of profit sharing has a profoundly “social responsibility” argument at its base. De Gaulle's argument for this was embedded in a broader rhetoric of finding a third alternative between unbridled capitalism and unrestricted socialism, and one that could ameliorate the human condition.

Psychological ownership among employees can be promoted through profit sharing and employee ownership programs.

It is critical for managers to ensure the success of profit sharing schemes by providing for higher levels of employee voice and including employee involvement programs.

Whereas the ideological basis (social responsibility), had a dominant impact in France, in the evolution of such practices leading up to their legislation other countries focused more on the instrumental and utilitarian benefits.

The authors use the approach of historical analysis of profit sharing practices in France to draw cross‐national lessons for today's managers around the globe.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the shortcomings in the compliance of the full‐fledged Islamic banks with the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) disclosure guidelines related to the profit sharing investment accounts (PSIAs).

This study uses interviews and a survey.

It was found that only two out five full‐fledged Islamic banks followed BNM guidelines which are based on the idea of self‐regulation. The authors developed a checklist of disclosure items, and probed whether the sample banks would adopt these new disclosure items. As it transpired, some banks have been disclosing these items selectively, and/or recording them for internal control and management purposes. The findings show these banks do not disclose: policies, procedures, product design and structure; profit allocation basis, methodology of calculating profit attributable to investment account holders (IAHs). Nevertheless, disclosure related to Shari'ah compliance was given to a reasonable extent. It is intriguing that full‐fledged Islamic banks do not provide comprehensive disclosure related to PSIAs because such disclosure is not mandatory; while foreign full‐fledged Islamic banks provided such disclosure voluntarily.

The banking sector regulator is not sure of whether individual Islamic banks have actually complied with all of its guidelines. The shortcomings in the disclosure are due to lack of expertise, outdated information system structure, and shortage of support and highly trained staff. The authors propose that the Islamic jurists should use Istiqra – which is a comprehensive examination of contracting environment before a new definite ruling is made on the issue of accountability to the IAHs. This would involve exploratory study of how the securities regulator (not banking regulator) perceives the information risks faced by the IAHs and enforce new disclosure guidelines.

This paper proposes new disclosure guidelines which incorporate transparency, appropriateness, and timeliness to reduce information asymmetry and enhance governance disclosure.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the pricing decisions and earning potential of the software supplier and the smart device manufacturer in different software promotion strategies.

Based on game theory, the authors formulate two promotion models, that is, the supplier implements software promotion activities individually (SP model) or outsources the promotion activity to the manufacturer under profit-sharing contract (MP model) when taking different channel power structures into consideration. Besides, in order to test the robustness of the conclusions, the authors also extend the basic model to the following situations: (1) the customers have different price elasticity toward service fee and product price; (2) the revenue sharing contract is employed by the supply chain members; and (3) the manufacturer's product promotion practice is taken into consideration.

The optimal service fee (product price) of the supplier (manufacturer) under SP model is always lower (higher) than that under MP model. Surprisingly, if the supplier is the channel leader and the profit sharing ratio exceeds certain threshold, the manufacturer's profit decreases in profit sharing ratio, which remains robust in three extension models. Moreover, the supply chain's profit in supplier-led game is always lower than that in Nash game irrespective of the promotion strategy in profit sharing context. When revenue sharing contract is adopted, the result holds only when the revenue sharing ratio is relatively low.

The authors originally explore two promotion strategies of the software supplier when taking the channel power structures into considerations, which has not been explored in the literature to the best of the authors' knowledge.

A toy retailer plans to order a new product from an untested supplier for the winter holiday season. This exercise provides an opportunity for students to construct a model to determine optimal order quantity when demand is not known. Profits are calculated based on wholesale pricing, revenue-sharing, profit-sharing, and buyback contracts.

The valuation of insurance contracts using a market value (i.e., fair value) approach has recently attracted considerable interest. The authors illustrate how to determine the market value of a with‐profits insurance policy, e.g., a variable annuity or other insurance policy with a profit‐sharing provision. The method is based on finding comparables, i.e., a set of financial instruments that closely replicate the cash flows of the policy.