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The partial privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a dynamic process. The main feature of this process lies in not only gradual and sequential privatizations but also privatized shares transfer. For partially privatized SOEs, the introduction of private sector ownership is not the end of the story because the previously introduced private owners may choose to leave the SOEs by transferring the privatized shares after privatization, a process that is called “privatized shares transfer”. This paper aims to investigate the determinants of privatized shares transfer (PST) from the perspective of large shareholders’ control rights.

Considering the pyramidal structure of Chinese listed companies, this paper extends existing analyses to study the impact of the ultimate controller’s control rights on privatized shares transfer. This paper also investigates the relationship between excessive control rights of the largest controlling shareholder and PST in view of the principle of equity of rights and obligations. In addition to a perspective on the holding of key positions by large shareholders, this paper further explores the impacts of the ownership of the largest controlling shareholder on privatized shares transfer.

The results capture the fact that the higher control rights of large shareholders lead to more privatized shares transfer. After exploring the impacts of excessive control rights, the results provide evidence supporting the idea that firms with excessive numbers of directors, senior managers or supervisors who also have positions in the largest controlling shareholder’s entity are more likely to transfer privatized shares owned by private owners. In addition, the largest shareholders’ ownership also plays a role in privatized shares transfer.

This evidence suggests that the large shareholders’ control rights should be limited to an appropriate range during the process of privatization, thereby giving private shareholders more opportunity to participate in the operation of firms, strengthen the state and enhance the competitiveness of state capital.

Russia's size – both in terms of population and geography, spanning 11 time zones, 89 oblasts (states or regions) and autonomous republics and its privatization program, encompassing some 100,000 small-scale enterprises, 25,000 medium to large firms, and 300 or so of its largest firms, made its privatization program the largest sale/transfer of assets conducted among the transition economies, with the possible exception of China. Comparisons by many of the program's critics, and there are many, to Poland, Hungary, or the Czech republic are invidious, especially the latter two countries whose populations are similar to just that of greater Moscow.

This chapter analyzes the early post-transition privatization and enterprise reform efforts of three major countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia (subsequently the Czech Republic), and the Soviet Union (subsequently Russia). For each, it discusses the prevailing ideologies of key decision makers and their external advisors prior to and during the transition process, the initial conditions faced by reformers and advisors, the policy frameworks that evolved, the results achieved, the mistakes made, and the opportunities missed. The ultimate conclusion is that while privatization could have and probably should have been done better, it nonetheless had to be done. The Czech Republic and Russia, and others in the region, are better off after the flawed privatizations they carried out than they would have been had they avoided or delayed divestiture. Poland, which did quite well at first in the absence of mass and rapid privatization, now finds itself burdened with a number of expensive and unproductive state firms. This chapter shows how and why these outcomes came about, and discusses the role of external advisors in the process.

The distribution of state property to the private sector has always been and will continue to be intensely political. Relinquishing hiring, production, investment, and other enterprise decisions constitute a significant loss of potential rents to those who exercise control rights in state-owned enterprises. Additionally, the large transfer of wealth that privatization on a large-scale entails, combined with the potential for unemployment, loss of access to enterprise-based social services (which were substantial in state-socialist economies) threatens to undermine public support for privatization and reform in general.

The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of organizational change and privatization on the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) using the data from Iranian firms during the period 1998-2006, and to test whether privatization leads to improved performance.

The performance of these firms before and after privatization was examined. Pooled regression models were employed to assess the effect of privatization on performance indicators.

The results show that privatization has not had a positive effect on the profitability of the firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange; rather, the effect has been negative. Moreover, the results reveal that privatization of these firms has had no effect on their sales effectiveness and efficiency; instead, the debts and risks of these firms has increased. Further, ownership reform is needed to remedy the situation.

The paper focuses on the effect of privatization on firm performance. Future research can consider the effects of privatization on other aspects such as efficiency and productivity.

The implications of the study are discussed in relation to the organizational changes that occur in the transition from public to private ownership. This study shows that improved performance of privatized firms cannot be taken for granted merely by ownership change. In other words, privatization must be accompanied by other economic adjustments such as adjustment of the capital market and the national banking system as well as formulation of corporate rules and regulations.

Privatization and organizational change of Iranian firms is an important issue and this paper is the first to provide a new approach regarding the effect of privatization of SOEs on their performance.

Despite the vast literature on privatization, the relationship between change of ownership and performance is not clear. The purpose of this paper is to understand why divergences are found between the empirical results of papers analyzed.

The author applies a meta-analysis to a sample of 60 empirical studies that analyze the performance of privatized companies. The author checks whether different results on performance can be explained by the method of privatization and the level of development of the country of privatized companies.

The findings indicate that companies privatized by public offerings obtain a better performance than companies privatized using other methods, such as private sale or voucher privatization, and do not support the common-place assumption that privatization in developing countries does not improve financial performance.

The study contributes to the literature on privatization because it adds new empirical evidence about the privatization programs and it first applies a meta-analysis to a sample about privatization on state-owned companies. The author discusses theoretical and managerial implications and offers suggestions for future research on privatization.

This paper analyzes the cash flow and corporate finance structure of large‐size Russian enterprises required by law to privatize. The legal framework and governmental regulatory structure of Russia's mass privatization program are presented, and particular emphasis is placed on tracing the flow of cash (versus Russian privatization vouchers) between enterprises, investors and the government. Most Russian firms raise no cash during the initial privatization process and, accordingly, have substantial difficulties in obtaining funds to continue operations and to finance their growth and expansion. The authors believe that undue emphasis on the use of privatization vouchers has placed many newly privatized firms in conditions of extreme financial distress. Examples of the initial financial structure of three Western corporate finance transactions — spin‐offs, leveraged buy‐outs (LBOs) and Chapter 11 reorganizations — are compared to the initial endowment of liquid resources in Russian firms undergoing privatization.

The paper examines the overall results achieved in the area of privatization in Serbia, as the largest part of the Serbian-Montenegrin economy. The privatization process in Serbia during the 1990s is described in some detail, including the various pieces of privatization legislation (adopted in 1989–1990, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1997), and the overall results achieved, which have been extremely poor: by late 2000, less than 40% of the country’s Gross Material Product was produced by the private sector. The main problems of corporate governance are also discussed in some detail, having in mind the specific situation in Serbia characterized by the maintenance of the ambiguous system of “social property.” The most recent privatization phase started after the political changes in late 2000, and marked a fundamental change in the approach, away from sales at privileged terms to insiders implemented throughout the 1990s, towards commercial sales to strategic owners, at tenders and auctions. The main achievements and shortcomings of the new strategy are discussed.

The purpose of this paper is to study the variance of post‐privatization performance outcomes by three institutional arrangements taken place in the process of ownership transfer in Taiwan.

The logistic regression models were used for the study to link the likelihood of performance improvements after privatization with a set of explanatory variables.

The findings from the research suggest an indispensable role of supportive policy measures, including market openness, post‐privatization involvement of government and corporate reforms prior to privatization, in the performance effects of privatization.

Both the sample size and time frame available for a quantitative analysis are constrained by the progress of Taiwan's privatization. A questionnaire survey, as part of a more integrated model, is suggested to follow this study and probe into organizational or strategic changes after privatization.

The study shows that performance improvement of privatized firms cannot be taken for granted merely by ownership change; instead, the performance gains of privatization could be realized only in concert with other institutional arrangements, including market openness, the modest and short‐term bureaucratic control after privatization, and corporate health prior to privatization.

The study aims to add to the body of literature by identifying sources of performance changes in privatized firms, based on Taiwan's experience in privatization. Taiwan represents an interesting example of a country in the process of catching up in terms of economic development, as well as one whose institutional environment stands between western and transition countries. As such, the use of Taiwan's data may lead to an assessment of the generalizability of conclusions drawn from prior research conducted in both kinds of countries.