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1 – 10 of over 19000The partial privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a dynamic process. The main feature of this process lies in not only gradual and sequential privatizations but also…
Abstract
Purpose
The partial privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a dynamic process. The main feature of this process lies in not only gradual and sequential privatizations but also privatized shares transfer. For partially privatized SOEs, the introduction of private sector ownership is not the end of the story because the previously introduced private owners may choose to leave the SOEs by transferring the privatized shares after privatization, a process that is called “privatized shares transfer”. This paper aims to investigate the determinants of privatized shares transfer (PST) from the perspective of large shareholders’ control rights.
Design/methodology/approach
Considering the pyramidal structure of Chinese listed companies, this paper extends existing analyses to study the impact of the ultimate controller’s control rights on privatized shares transfer. This paper also investigates the relationship between excessive control rights of the largest controlling shareholder and PST in view of the principle of equity of rights and obligations. In addition to a perspective on the holding of key positions by large shareholders, this paper further explores the impacts of the ownership of the largest controlling shareholder on privatized shares transfer.
Findings
The results capture the fact that the higher control rights of large shareholders lead to more privatized shares transfer. After exploring the impacts of excessive control rights, the results provide evidence supporting the idea that firms with excessive numbers of directors, senior managers or supervisors who also have positions in the largest controlling shareholder’s entity are more likely to transfer privatized shares owned by private owners. In addition, the largest shareholders’ ownership also plays a role in privatized shares transfer.
Originality/value
This evidence suggests that the large shareholders’ control rights should be limited to an appropriate range during the process of privatization, thereby giving private shareholders more opportunity to participate in the operation of firms, strengthen the state and enhance the competitiveness of state capital.
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The purpose of this paper is to add to the understanding of the monitoring role of multiple large shareholders (MLS) by examining their impact on the informativeness of firms'…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to add to the understanding of the monitoring role of multiple large shareholders (MLS) by examining their impact on the informativeness of firms' earnings.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper uses regression models that relate earnings to stock returns for a sample of 402 French publicly traded firms covered during 2003‐2007.
Findings
The paper shows that earnings informativeness is significantly positively related to the owner's ultimate cash flow rights. Consistent with the alignment effect, stock ownership aligns management and shareholders interests which reduces managers' incentives to manipulate accounting information. It also finds that earnings informativeness is significantly negatively related to the excess control of the ultimate controlling shareholder. This result supports the entrenchment effect and suggests that controlling shareholders have greater incentives to obscure accounting figures when expropriation is likely. Finally, control contestability of the largest controlling shareholder mitigates information asymmetry problems thereby enhancing earnings informativeness.
Research limitations/implications
The findings stress the importance of MLS in enhancing internal monitoring and mitigating agency costs. Because France is characterized by a weak legal system, highly concentrated ownership structures and excess control, the results provide valuable insights to mitigate extreme agency problems.
Originality/value
The paper adds to the literature on corporate governance and the quality of accounting information by investigating strategic interactions between various blockholders and their impact on earnings informativeness. The study complements prior studies on the monitoring role of MLS by demonstrating that both their presence and control size translate into significantly greater earnings informativeness.
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The information of pledging stocks for liquidity by controlling shareholders of publicly traded firms in Taiwan has been required to disclose since 1998. A common perception by…
Abstract
The information of pledging stocks for liquidity by controlling shareholders of publicly traded firms in Taiwan has been required to disclose since 1998. A common perception by market practitioners in Taiwan is that stock pledging by controlling shareholders is an indication of expropriation of firms. This study first examines the determinants of the tendency that controlling shareholders of firms in Taiwan pledge their stocks to financial institutions for liquidity and then evaluates how stock pledging by controlling shareholders affects their firms' accounting and financial performances. Determinants of firm attributes, market conditions, and corporate governance are identified. The tendency of stock pledging by controlling shareholders has a negative effect on accounting and financial performances. The negative effect on firm performance is reduced when the firm has a higher level of working capital. These findings indicate that stock pledging by controlling shareholders is an indication of weak corporate governance when the firm has lower liquidity. These findings may provide insights to the equity markets of the other countries in which public firms have more concentrated ownerships.
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Cynthia Afriani Utama, Sidharta Utama and Fitriany Amarullah
The purpose of this study is to investigate simultaneous relations between corporate governance (CG) practice and cash flow right, cash flow leverage (the divergence between…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to investigate simultaneous relations between corporate governance (CG) practice and cash flow right, cash flow leverage (the divergence between control right and cash flow right of controlling shareholders). The two ownership measures reflect alignment and expropriation incentives of controlling shareholders. This study also examines the effect of multiple large shareholders (MLSs) on CG practice.
Design/methodology/approach
The study uses publicly listed companies (PLCs) excluding those from the Indonesian finance sector during 2011-2013 as the samples of the study. Two-stages least squares regression models were used to test the simultaneous relations between CG practice and ownership structure variables. The study develops a CG instrument to measure CG practice based on ASEAN CG Scorecard, that comprehensively covers OECD CG principles and that can be used for panel data.
Findings
CG practice has a positive influence on cash flow right and has a marginally negative impact on cash flow leverage, while cash flow right and cash flow leverage have a marginally negative impact on CG practice. Further, the existence of large MLS complements CG practice, but as the control right of the second largest shareholders becomes closer to the largest shareholder, the complement relation becomes less important. State- or foreign-controlled PLCs practice better CG than other PLCs.
Research limitations/implications
Studies on CG/ownership structure need to treat CG and ownership structure as endogenous variables in their research design. In addition, the level of rule of law in a country should be taken into account when examining the relation between CG and ownership structure. The interrelation among CG, ownership structure, capital structure and firm performance has been studied in the context of dispersed ownership structure and strong rule of law. Thus, future study needs to examine the interrelation among these four concepts in countries with high concentrated ownership and weak rule of law.
Practical implications
To minimize the risk of expropriation, investors in the capital market need to select shares of PLCs that practice CG suitable for the ownership structure of PLCs, have high ownership by the largest shareholder and have no divergence between control and ownership right, and or have MLSs. PLCs may need to choose the level of CG mechanism in the context of their ownership structure and consider the benefits and costs implementing them.
Social implications
The study supports the “one size does not fit all” perspective on CG and, thus, it supports the recently enacted financial service authority (FSA) rule requiring PLCs to follow the “comply or explain” rule on the CG code for PLCs. The FSA needs to enforce the compliance of PLCs with CG rules and encourage PLCs to implement CG in substance, not just in form. To strengthen the positive impact of good CG practice in attracting investments in capital market, the regulator needs to improve investor protection rules and ensure strong rule of law.
Originality/value
The study is the first to examine the simultaneous relation between CG practice and both cash flow right and cash flow leverage of the largest shareholder. It is also the first that investigates the impact of MLS on CG practice. It explores the complement and substitution relation between the two concepts in reducing agency costs. In term of research design, the study develops a CG instrument that is based on OECD CG principles, that can be used for panel data and that uses public information.
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This book is a policy proposal aimed at the democratic left. It is concerned with gradual but radical reform of the socio‐economic system. An integrated policy of industrial and…
Abstract
This book is a policy proposal aimed at the democratic left. It is concerned with gradual but radical reform of the socio‐economic system. An integrated policy of industrial and economic democracy, which centres around the establishment of a new sector of employee‐controlled enterprises, is presented. The proposal would retain the mix‐ed economy, but transform it into a much better “mixture”, with increased employee‐power in all sectors. While there is much of enduring value in our liberal western way of life, gross inequalities of wealth and power persist in our society.
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Li Gao, Jinnan Song, Jiajuan Liang and Jianxiao Guo
This paper aims to explore the influence of founder shareholders’ resources on the allocation of control rights from the perspective of incomplete contract theory and…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to explore the influence of founder shareholders’ resources on the allocation of control rights from the perspective of incomplete contract theory and resource-based theory.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper analyzes newspaper materials with NVivo11on a case of battle for corporate control in Chinese top-listed company-Vanke Group.
Findings
The research shows that human capital is the key resource and the holding proportion of financial resources directly affects the allocation of control rights. At the same time, social capital is unstable and easily broken. At last, institutional environment also affects the degree between the relationship of founder shareholders’ resources and the allocation of control rights. The influence of founder-shareholder resources on the allocation of control rights follows the path of “crisis – founder-shareholder’s resources – founder’s ability - allocation of control rights.”
Research limitations/implications
This study only selects the financial capital, human capital and social capital of Shi Wang, the founder of Vanke, as the analysis object. The study can expand the types of founder shareholder resources to verify and enrich the conclusions.
Originality/value
The current theoretical research in the literature focuses on the necessity of equity and shareholder’s resources versus the control rights. Some key factors and mechanism on the relationship have not been fully clarified. The results of this paper not only extend the combination research of social network and corporate governance, but also provide enterprise founders with references for making reasonable decisions during control battle.
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Guoping Liu and Jerry Sun
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the type of ultimate controllers (i.e. private vs state) affects corporate disclosure quality and whether the relationship between…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the type of ultimate controllers (i.e. private vs state) affects corporate disclosure quality and whether the relationship between the type of ultimate controllers and corporate disclosure quality is moderated by the separation of ownership and control.
Design/methodology/approach
This study employs the data of 405 Chinese listed firms in 2005. Annual reports were reviewed to collect the data including the type of ultimate owners, cash‐flow rights, and control rights; and the ratings of corporate disclosure quality were obtained from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange website. Ordered logistic regression tested the hypotheses.
Findings
It was found that corporate disclosure quality is lower for firms ultimately controlled by individuals than for firms ultimately controlled by the state. Also, the negative effect of private ultimate ownership on corporate disclosure quality is stronger for firms with high deviation of cash‐flow rights and control rights.
Practical implications
These findings suggest that privatizing state‐owned companies may increase the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders if the privatization does not reduce the separation of cash‐flow rights from control rights. Thus, it may be necessary to strengthen the governance role of minority shareholders and constrain the divergence between cash‐flow rights and control rights of the ultimate owners when state‐owned companies are privatized.
Originality/value
This study contributes to the literature on the expropriation of minority shareholders by examining the main effect of the type of ultimate controllers and the interactive effect of ultimate ownership type and the divergence of ownership and control on corporate disclosure quality.
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Kuntara Pukthuanthong, Thomas J. Walker, Dolruedee Nuttanontra Thiengtham and Heng Du
– The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how family ownership enhances or damages firm value.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how family ownership enhances or damages firm value.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper studies a sample of Canadian companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) between 1999 and 2007 and apply multivariate regression with firm value as a dependent variable. The paper measures firm value as Tobin ' s Q and ROA based either on net income or EBITDA. The independent variables include family firm dummy and ownership percentage.
Findings
It is found that control-enhancing mechanisms which are often employed by family companies add value to companies. Furthermore, it is found that agency conflicts between ownership and management are less costly than those between majority and minority shareholders, suggesting that family ownership helps resolve the agency conflicts between ownership and management and in turn enhances firm value. Finally, it is found that family companies with founders as CEOs outperform those with descendants as CEOs.
Research limitations/implications
The paper studies Canadian family firms; as such, the sample size is not relatively large. Nonetheless, the results should be generalized as Canada is one of the largest markets in the world and have high integration with the rest of the world.
Practical implications
The results suggest investors should invest in family ownership firms.
Originality/value
The paper shows whether firm ownership increases firm value and the determinant of family firm value.
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Otuo Serebour Agyemang, Emmanuel Aboagye and Joyce Frimpong
– The purpose of this paper is to examine the rights of shareholders, particularly those of minority shareholders in the management of firms in Ghana.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the rights of shareholders, particularly those of minority shareholders in the management of firms in Ghana.
Design/methodology/approach
As a result of the largely unexplored nature of this issue in Ghana, a qualitative analysis was conducted to offer a painstaking understanding needed. The case study design is in particular relevant for exploring such phenomenon, as it evolves through the experiences of several key players.
Findings
Data indicate that minority shareholders’ influence is, in most cases, nil in every aspect of their firms. Whilst majority shareholders have an absolute right to appoint or influence the appointment of top officials of the firms, minority shareholders’ role in the selection is limited. In addition, in regards to control of corporate decision-making processes, unlike the majority shareholders, the minority shareholders do not have any influence on them. Further, in terms of relevant information, whilst the majority shareholders have absolute access to them anytime they desire, the minority shareholders only rely on annual general meetings to get hold of them, thus limiting their access to corporate information. The revelations unambiguously grant the majority shareholders of the firms absolute control rights whilst undermining the rights of the minority shareholders. This paper was concluded by itemizing the implications of our findings for management, regulators and governments.
Originality/value
It is believed that this is among the handful of studies that have been conducted using developing or emergent economy data to empirically analyse how minority shareholders wield their rights in emergent economies and to add to the mounting pool of scattered cross-country evidence.
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Jin Ho Park, Kwangwoo Park and Ronald Andrew Ratti
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership of firms on the firms’ financial constraints in 22 economies for the 1982-2009 period.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership of firms on the firms’ financial constraints in 22 economies for the 1982-2009 period.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors employ a generalized method of moments-based instrumental variables estimator to estimate empirical models.
Findings
It found that the overinvestment propensity of controlling shareholders becomes less severe with an increase in cash-flow rights. It further indicates that a higher deviation between the control rights and cash-flow rights of controlling shareholders lower their overinvestment propensity, thereby lowering the firm’s financial constraints.
Originality/value
The results suggest that a higher protective legal environment for minority shareholders blocks the entrenchment of controlling shareholders and thus benefitting the firm with slackened financing constraints in the given legal origin.
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