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The purpose of the study is to examine how operating efficiencies from incentive alignment compensate for rent extraction in family firms. The author asks whether ownership (1) improves operating efficiencies to increase firm value, (2) positively affects related-party transactions (RPTs), or (3) destroys firm value. Finally, the author assesses whether the incentive effect dominates the entrenchment effect.

This study employs a panel of 333 listed family firms (and 185 nonfamily firms) and handles endogeneity using a dynamic panel system GMM and panel VAR.

Ownership decreases discretionary expenses and increases asset utilization to add firm value. The efficiency gains generate more value in family firms, especially majority-held ones, than in nonmajority ones. However, ownership is also related to increased RPTs (especially dubious loans/guarantees), reducing firm value. RPTs destroy value more severely in the family (or group) firms than in nonfamily (nongroup) firms. It could be why ownership's positive impact on value is lower in family firms than in nonfamily firms. Overall, the incentive effect dominates the entrenchment effect and is robust to controlling private benefits of control in the dynamic ownership-value model.

(1) A family firm's ownership may not be optimal. (2) The firm's long-term commitment as a dynasty limits the scale of expropriation yet sustains impetus for long-term value creation. The paradox partly explains why large family holdings and firm-specific investments endure over generations. (3) This way, large ownership substitutes weak investor protection in India despite tunneling as skin in the game provides necessary investor confidence. (4) Future studies can examine whether extraction varies with family generations and how family characteristics affect the incentive effects.

(1) Concentrated ownership may not be a wrong policy choice in emerging markets to draw firm-specific investments. (2) Investors, auditors, or creditors must pay closer attention to loans/guarantees. (3) More vigorous enforcement, auditor scrutiny, and board oversight are needed.

Family firms are not necessarily a bad organization type that destroys investor wealth. They can be valuably efficient due to their ownership and wealth concentration, and frugality. They matter in the economic growth of a developing market like India.

(1) Extends ownership-performance research to family firms and shows that although ownership facilitates tunneling, the incentive effect dominates; (2) family ownership is not impacted by firm value; (3) family ownership levels reduce discretionary expenses and increase asset utilization to create added value, especially in majority-held family firms; (4) RPTs and loans/guarantees increase with ownership; (5) value erosion from RPTs is higher in family (group) firms than in other firms.

This study provides new insights into the relationship between the heterogeneity of institutional investors (IIs) and corporate tax avoidance (CTA). It also investigates whether family ownership moderates this relationship.

Based on a sample of 200 French-listed firms from 2008 to 2017, we use the generalized method of moment (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to address endogeneity and omitted variable concerns.

The results show that passive IIs are associated with an increase in the level of tax avoidance. However, active ones significantly decrease the levels of tax avoidance practices. Moreover, we show that institutional activism is not sufficient to control managerial actions, particularly in the context of controlled family businesses. The results suggest that families may expropriate the rights of minority shareholders through a controlling coalition with passive IIs.

This study has several practical implications. First, the results are useful for policymakers who should constrain passive IIs to provide only one service (asset management). Second, this study may sensitize family owners to the need to cooperate with active IIs that are effective in monitoring the firm. In particular, families should be willing to sacrifice some of their socioemotional wealth to promote a balanced ownership structure, which is important for responsible and effective corporate governance.

This paper extends previous research by investigating the heterogeneity of IIs in terms of horizon, ownership and control. In addition, this paper sheds a new light on how family firms behave regarding tax avoidance practices in the presence of active and passive IIs.

In public firms, the largest shareholder can make decisions on cash dividends in favor of its own interests at the expense of other investors. While the second largest shareholder can actively participate in corporate governance and protect the interests of investors, its impact has not been fully understood. This research investigates how shareholding ratio and ownership type of the second largest shareholder moderate the relationship between controlling shareholder's shareholding ratio and cash dividends.

The authors conducted econometrics analysis based on a panel data of China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017.

The authors find that the controlling shareholder's shareholding ratio has a significant negative impact on cash dividends. However, this influence is conditional on the shareholding ratio of the second largest shareholder. The negative impact is weakened when the second largest shareholder holds a large proportion of shares or when the shareholding gap between the second largest and the controlling shareholder is small.

This research extends the existing literature by highlighting the nuanced moderating effect of the second largest shareholder on the relationship between the controlling shareholder and cash dividends, thus making a unique contribution to the understanding of corporate governances in the emerging financial market in China.

The purpose of this research is to reveal the impact of public legal protection on the efficiency of internal corporate governance in banks. In addition, this research proposes a new corporate governance index that could be employed by the banking sector to evaluate the performance of their internal corporate governance mechanisms.

Orbis database, annual reports and direct questionnaire are used to collect corporate governance data of 127 banks from 14 countries during 2020. The Mann–Whitney U-test is employed to compare the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms based on three subsamples of countries having different legal protection levels (weak, middle and strong).

This research suggests a new corporate governance index for banks based on seven constructs and 62 variables. This new non-parametric index could be used by bankers to improve the monitoring process and enhance the overall performance of banking. The results of this research show that the existence of a strong public legal protection environment within a specific country enhances the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms in the banking sector and thus, leads to improve the protection of shareholders, depositors and other relevant stakeholders. However, in countries that are characterized by weak legal protection level, the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms is very low and there are possibilities of entrenchment, expropriation and extraction of private benefits. These findings could be interpreted within the prediction of agency, moral hazard, asymmetric information, political and entrenchment theories.

This research paper provides information that bankers and other relevant stakeholders in the banking sector working in MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) and European countries. A strong public legal protection level could improve the efficiency of internal corporate governance mechanisms within banks.

This study aims to comprehensively examine the relationship between financial reporting quality (FRQ) and investment efficiency (IE). The central thrust of this research endeavor is to empirically analyze the impact of FRQ on diverse facets of investment, including overinvestment, underinvestment and overall IE.

Using a sample of 13,902 firm-year observations from publicly listed US companies, this study uses the generalized method of moment (GMM) in conjunction with three distinct measures for FRQ under three different investment settings, considering firm liquidity and industry performance.

This study offers interesting insights into the intricate relationship between FRQ and IE. The results indicate a strong positive relation between the two constructs. In particular, the research reveals a negative link between FRQ and underinvestment, and an inverse relationship between FRQ and overinvestment. These findings suggest that FRQ is one of the key drivers of IE and that by enhancing FRQ, businesses can better optimize their investments.

This study highlights the significant implication of the effect of FRQ on IE, as it enables businesses to optimize their investments by improving their decision-making processes and better risk assessment of associated projects, resulting in more efficient capital allocation. A higher degree of FRQ increases investors’ confidence in a company’s financial statements, resulting in higher liquidity. It can benefit regulators to set higher standards and promote transparency.

The study examines the relationship between FRQ and IE. The study finds a strong positive relation between FRQ and IE, with FRQ being a key driver of IE. The paper’s original contribution lies in its comprehensive examination of the complex relationship between FRQ and IE, using robust analytical techniques by applying GMM and taking into consideration firms liquidity and industry performance.

This study aims to review major themes and findings of research into financial management of family business and to suggest new directions for future research.

This is a perspective article beginning with literature review to summarize prior research and to identify main findings and issues. The paper then develops themes, questions and opportunities for future research.

This paper presents a summary of principal research streams in the financial management of family business. Prior research has found significant differences in financial performance, in financial policies and in ownership and governance structures and behavior. These research findings vary by industry, by country and by stage of economic development. While extensions of these streams will add additional richness to the author’s understanding of finance in family business, recent innovations in the role and organization of the firm and in access to key resources suggest promising new research paths. There are also important lessons from financial practices in family business that have broader applicability.

This is a perspective article suggesting that many financial and governance issues central to family business have broader applicability to nonfamily business. Substantial value can be added by applying these learnings to a broader corporate finance context. Innovations in financing, governance and organizational design are transforming financial management in family business. In addition, changes in markets and industries create new opportunities for financing family business and for new strategic opportunities.

The study examines the effects of corporate governance and countrywide institutions and risk factors on corporate liquidity.

Using firm-level data, the authors analyze the effect of corporate governance and various economic, regulatory and social institutions on the liquidity of firms operating in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The authors use fixed-effects, firm-specific and country-level controls, disaggregated analysis, sensitivity and endogeneity analysis to test the robustness of the estimates.

The corporate governance characteristics of firms influence in diverse ways their liquidity decisions. The independence and diversity of the board and institutional ownership are especially strong predictors. The effect also depends on the size of the firm and the degree of economic development and exhibits time sensitivity and nonlinearity. Enforcement institutions and risk factors play a strong role.

The analysis contributes to the literature by using a large sample of countries and firms over a larger period, distinguishing between poorer and richer countries and using sensitivity and endogeneity analysis. The analysis considers explicitly the role of regulatory and enforcement conditions, social structures and religious beliefs.

Executive decisions regarding capital financing are an important management aspect, especially during financing constraints and growth opportunities. The current study examines the impact of managerial skills of a company on capital financing decisions. Furthermore, it analyzed this nexus in financing constraints and growth opportunity situations.

The authors use the GMM (generalized method of moments) estimation approach on a dataset of 20,651 firm-year observations of Chinese A-share companies from 2010 to 2019.

The authors’ findings are compatible with management signaling and reputation enhancement theories, since they show that managerial skill is connected with more substantial debt financing. Managers with high management skills are likely to have more debt financing as they can foresee the economic future of their companies and tactfully convey private information, lowering information inequality and enhancing their reputation. Furthermore, the authors also show that firms with restricted financial resources and growth opportunities make this relationship stronger. Capital structure and managerial skill findings are unaffected by alternative specifications, omitted factors, industry group bias and endogeneity.

This study sheds fresh light on the essential manager personality trait of managing ability and how it influences complicated corporate decision-making, particularly in the tough environment due to financing constraints and competitive growth. The authors argue that high-ability managers are compelled to use debt financing not only to lessen information asymmetry but also to guarantee that the market finds their superior ability. This work contributes significantly to the managerial ability literature and the capital structure literature supporting signaling theory.

This study examines the influence of investor protection on stock price crash risk (SPCR) in Asian economies.

This study used yearly data from 432 nonfinancial companies publicly listed firms in six countries (i.e., China, India, Pakistan, Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore) from 2007 to 2020 to investigate the relationship between investor protection and the risk of stock price crashes. The hypothesis was tested using a generalized least square panel regression.

The results suggest that investor protection significantly affects SPCR in Asian economies. Furthermore, the findings show that the stocks of firms whose investors received the best protection were less prone to crash in developed Asian economies. However, in developing Asian economies, the stocks of firms whose investors received the best protection were more prone to crashes.

It provides awareness and understanding of how the level of investor protection affects SPCR, which could be useful for decision-makers and professionals across a spectrum of financial and non-financial institutions, such as portfolio managers and traders in commercial banks, investment banks and mutual funds. This knowledge enables informed decision-making and the formulation of effective policies to manage stock market volatility.

This study appears to be the first of its kind to focus on the link between investor protection and SPCR within the specific context of developed and developing Asian economies.

This paper aims to investigate the risk of corruption in several countries based on the cultural dimensions of Hofstede and institutional quality (IQ).

Data was collected from the Corruption Perception Index, Hofstede index and Worldwide Governance Indicators in 92 countries. Structural equation modeling based on partial least squares was used to test the proposed model.

The findings support the fraud triangle theory, which states that high transparency of individualist cultural attitudes and institutional control mechanisms reduces the opportunities for fraud to occur. From this research, it is also concluded that culture is a factor that tends to be constant and difficult to change.

Research limitations include: First, it is limited to the number of samples, where the number of samples depends on the availability of data. However, only 92 countries intersect and have complete information. Second, this study only uses individualism from the Hofstede cultural dimension to see the risk of corruption.

The result of this study implicates the policymakers in government agencies to increase IQ to reduce the risk of corruption.

This is a preliminary study that discusses national culture (NC) and corruption, as well as the effect of the mediating variable, namely, the IQ. By including IQ, the authors hope that the impact of the effects of NC on corruption risk can be clarified.