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The purpose of this paper is to examine the interaction between competition and corporate payout policy and more specifically to answer the question that whether competition mitigates the principal–principal agency conflicts and influences firms to distribute dividends to shareholders in Chinese corporations.

This research models measures of competition with scaled measures of dividends and analyzes a sample of 16,730 firm-year observations from Chinese-listed manufacturing firms for the period spanning 2003 to 2016. Further, this research uses the Tobit model (a censored regression) to empirically test the proposed hypotheses.

This research finds that intense competition not only mitigates agency problems and forces firms to disgorge cash but also increases a firm’s likelihood to pay dividends and weakens the negative association between agency conflicts and dividends.

The results show an important policy implication for the industry. As the principal–principal agency conflict restrains the dividends, the regulatory authorities could encourage a competitive environment and a more diverse ownership structure to induce a higher dividend rate and protect the minority shareholders. In addition, this study also has implications for other emerging markets characterized by concentrated ownership and principal–principal agency problems.

This study adds to the literature related to the disciplinary role of competition and identifies competition as a significant determinant of corporate payout policy. Furthermore, this research extends earlier research on corporate payout decisions that besides firm-level corporate governance and country-level legal system, industry-level competition also influences corporate payout decisions, significantly.

This study examined the attainment and the benefits of financial flexibility in the presence of concentrated ownership in the Caribbean.

This study used qualitative methodology via the use of case studies.

Results revealed that liquidity may be considered the most important form of financial flexibility for firms in transitioning economies, due to constrained capital markets. Blockholder firms also focus on liquidity out of a concern for recovering their substantial investment. This study suggested that in addition to an emphasis on liquidity, blockholder owners emphasise professionalism in managing the firm. This professionalism, accompanied by a genuine separation of ownership and control, may be critical in minimising the possibility of misappropriation of surplus liquidity. The study showed that blockholder owned firms may not recognise maximum capital investment benefits because of the use of sub-optimal capital budgeting techniques reflecting their liquidity preference, or pay maximum dividends, opting instead to use dividends as a governance tool. However, the ability to separate ownership from the management of the operations may counteract this, leading to an increased focus on net present value (NPV) maximising projects, and a dividend policy aimed at preserving future financial flexibility.

This study highlights the value of qualitative studies in finance research, by providing a deeper insight into the management of firm financial flexibility, under blockholder ownership. It emphasises the importance of considering liquidity as a critical form of financial flexibility. Furthermore, the study shows that two significant factors in controlling principal–principal (PP) conflict may be the ability to separate ownership from control and the appointment of a professional management team.

This research introduces the variable of PP agency in the study of financial flexibility.

This paper explores the contextual factors involved in the development and application of paradigmatic theories in general, and the application and development of Agency Theory in the Chinese context in particular.

Referring to four templates for the design of conceptual papers as outlined by Jaakkola (2020), i.e. theory synthesis, theory adaptation, typology and model – we adopt an approach combining theory/literature synthesis and model establishment. Based on a thorough analysis and discussion of the literature on the topics of “context effect “, “interface between theory and context”, “special characteristics of Chinese context” and “invalid application of Agency Theory in a Chinese context”, we use Agency Theory as the lens to discuss the importance of context in applying and developing paradigmatic theory specifically. We start from the contextualization of Agency Theory and then explore approaches to theorizing the Chinese context by developing a conflict coefficient model.

First, the application validity of paradigmatic theories is not sustainable; contextual factors are critical in applying and developing not only propositional but also paradigmatic theories, such as Agency Theory. Second, the Chinese context requires special attention when applying paradigmatic theories originating from Western countries. Third, the traditional application logic of Agency Theory is invalid in the Chinese context due to the coexistence of principal-agent conflicts (PAC) and principal–principal conflicts (PPC), and changeable dominance status of two conflicts according to the contexts. Based on these observations, a model of contextualization theory of PAC and PPC (i.e. conflict coefficient model) is developed from a dynamic perspective, which connects the separated situation states and allows the identification and measurement of the relative severity of the two types of agency conflicts.

Practitioners can also use this model to identify and measure the relative strength of the two conflicts and determine the direction of control and improvement. Moreover, analysis of Chinese context and agency problems of Chinese firms also has great practical significance considering the increased importance of the Chinese market and the increasingly important role played by Chinese firms in the international economy in general, and in specific host countries in particular.

First, in general, this study expands Whetten's (2009) study of the interface between theory and context. It specifically discusses approaches to considering contextual factors in the development and application of the relatively overlooked paradigmatic theories, using traditional and widely used Agency Theory as a lens. Our study suggests that typical Agency Theory, developed based on Western-centric assumptions, does not completely hold in the context of Chinese business practices because of different cultural, legal and governance realities. Second, it improves and extends the application of Agency Theory by proposing the new perspective that PAC and PPC coexist in specific contexts and positing that the relative severity of two types of agency conflicts depends on the context variables. Third, it puts forward a conflict coefficient model offering a more comprehensive, intuitive and quantifiable method for comparing the extent of the two conflicts in different scenarios, providing a reference for empirical studies of corporate governance.

The characteristics of businesses change with the change in ownership structure of the business. This study examines the change in ownership structure of the firm after the departure of lone founders, and its influence on dividend payout decisions of the firm.

The authors employed 4,302 firm-year observations of non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period 2007–2021. To test the hypotheses, the authors employed ordinary least squares regression, and additionally, generalized method of moments estimation and fixed effect analysis were applied to check for the robustness of results.

Using the lens of agency theory and social identity theory, the authors report that the presence of lone founder (family owners) is negatively (positively) associated with dividend payout, however, transition of lone-founder ownership to family-owned and family-managed firm leads to more dividend payout, whereas its transition to family-owned and non-family-managed firm results in lesser dividend payments.

This study provides novel insight into the strategic behavior of lone founders and extend the limited family business heterogeneity literature by examining the effects of ownership transition and its influence on firm's dividend payout decisions.

This review paper aims to compare the various dimensions in the finance literature pertaining to the Anglo-Saxon Model (Stockholder Model) prevalent in the USA and the UK with the German Model (Stakeholder Model) of corporate governance prevalent in Germany and continental Europe. The present study identifies different strands of research on the various dimensions of these models, along with aspects of governance in emerging economies and the phenomenon of the convergence of these governance mechanisms.

The literature review on corporate governance models has been carried out on the themes of internal and external governance mechanisms. The review considers agency theory along with principal–principal (PP) conflicts as the fundamental blocks explaining the need for governance structures.

The traditional models of governance, along with the incorporation of PP conflicts, will result in a hybrid model inculcating the best of both the traditional models. However, convergence in the true sense may not be possible owing to fundamental differences pertaining to cultural, economic, legal and socio-economic aspects of the firm.

This paper proposes a framework incorporating the interplay of managerial talent and controlling shareholders to understand the governance system that may be applicable for firms in emerging economies.

The purpose of this study was to explore the motives (especially the agency motives) for corporate diversification from the perspective of corporate executives who make such strategic decisions and manage the diversified firms daily.

A qualitative research approach was adopted, and 12 chief executive officers (CEOs) of diversified firms in Nigeria were interviewed for their perspectives on the motives for corporate diversification.

Stewardship motives – diversification to use excess capacities in assets and resources to exploit opportunities in the market and defend against adverse environmental developments – were the most cited reasons for diversification. The relevant agency problem related to corporate diversification motive in Nigeria is the principal–principal (majority shareholder-minority shareholder) one. CEOs with substantial holdings in their firms indicated that they use diversification to reduce their investment risk and retain control of their portfolio.

The findings suggest that in corporate environments such as Nigeria that feature blockholding prominently, the corporate strategy-related agency problem that policymakers should pay greater attention to is the principal–principal conflict rather than the traditional agent–principal problem that has influenced corporate governance over the years. There is also a need to revise the dominant view that diversification is a value-destroying strategy motivated by the self-seeking behavior of managers who have little or no shares in the companies they manage.

The few studies on motives for corporate diversification that incorporated the perspectives of corporate executives did not address the agency motives of diversification. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that has done so.

Since joint venture experience obtained from inward FDI may create a positive or negative impact on ownership mode choice, it is difficult to predict its direct impact. The purpose of this paper is to combine the organizational learning and agency perspectives to find whether CEO power can moderate the effect of inward joint venture experience.

Using a sample of 337 foreign entries conducted by 77 Chinese firms during 1998-2008, this study has tested some interaction effects of inward joint venture experience and CEO power measures.

The author finds that inward joint venture experience interacts with CEO ownership and CEO duality, respectively, to have a negative impact on the selection of high-equity mode.

This study contributes to entry mode literature by finding that inward (but not merely outward) FDI experience can influence entry mode choices and by combining agency theory and the organizational learning perspective to solve the theoretical conflicts created by the two opposite effects of a FDI experience.

This study aims to facilitate the development of a better understanding of how controlling shareholders respond to the mandatory system of corporate governance rating (CGR) for all firms listed on Taiwanese stock markets and the incentives of controllers to apply corporate governance best practices.

Using CGR data for all Taiwanese listed firms from 2014 to 2020, this study examines whether controlling shareholders determine a firm’s CGR.

Single-family-controlled firms have the lowest CGRs, and management-controlled firms have the highest ratings. Blockholder-controlled firms are more likely to have top 20% ratings than single-family-controlled firms and bottom 20% ratings than single-family and management-controlled firms. All three categories of firms have unfavorable (favorable) ratings because of substitute governance effects (signaling effects).

Management-controlled firms, in which agency problems refer to principal-agent conflicts, are more likely to have good ratings than single-family controlled firms, in which agency problems refer to principal-principal conflicts. Blockholder-controlled firms have extreme ratings, suggesting that multiple large shareholders develop corporate governance practices consistent with their best interests to increase firm value or expropriate wealth. Low cash flow rights and high control-ownership divergence lead firms to adopt additional governance arrangement(s) to make shareholders trust firms with capital and signal to shareholders that they can trust them with their capital.

The purpose of our study is to investigate the effects of politically-connected boards (PCBs) on over-(under-)investment in labor. We also examine the impacts of the supervisory board (SB)’s optimal tenure on the association between PCBs and over-investment in labor.

We constructed the proxy for PCBs using a dummy variable set to 1 (one) if a firm has politically-connected boards and zero (0) otherwise. For the robustness check, we used the number of politically-connected members on the boards as the proxy for PCBs.

We find that the presence of PCBs reduces over-investment in labor. Consistent with our prediction, we found no significant association between PCBs and under-investment in labor. We also find that the SB with optimal tenure strengthens the negative association between PCBs and over-investment in labor. In our channel analysis, we find that the presence of PCB mitigates over-investment in labor through a higher dividend payout ratio.

Due to the unavailability of data in firms’ annual reports regarding the number of poorly-skilled and highly skilled employees, we were not able to examine the effect of low-skilled and high-skilled employees on over-investment in labor. Also, we were not able to examine over-(under-)investment in labor by drawing a distinction between general (generalist) and firm-specific human capital (specialist) as suggested by Sevcenko, Wu, and Kacperczyk (2022). Generally, it is more difficult for managers to hire highly-skilled employees, specialists in particular, thereby driving the choice of either over- or under-investing in the labor forces. In addition, in the firms’ annual reports, there is no information regarding temporary employees. Therefore, if and when such data become available, this would provide another avenue for future research.

Our study offers several practical implications and insights to stakeholders (e.g. insiders or management, shareholders, investors, analysts and creditors) in the following ways. First, our study highlights significant differences between capital investment and labor investment. For instance, labor investment is considered an expense rather than an asset (Wyatt, 2008) because, although such investment is human capital and is not recognized on the firm’s balance sheet (Boon et al., 2017). In addition, labor investment is characterized by: its flexibility which enables firms to make frequent adjustments (Hamermesh, 1995; Dixit & Pindyck, 2012; Aksin et al., 2015), its non-homogeneity since every employee is unique (Luo et al., 2020), its direct impact on morale and productivity of a firm (Azadegan et al., 2013; Mishina et al., 2004; Tatikonda et al., 2013), and its financial outlay which affects the ongoing cash flows of a firm (Sualihu et al., 2021; Khedmati et al., 2020; Merz & Yashiv, 2007). Second, our findings reveal that the presence of PCBs could help to reduce over-investment in labor. However, if managers of a firm choose to under-invest in labor in order to obtain better profit in the short-term through cost saving, they should be aware of the potential consequences of facing a financial loss when a new business opportunity suddenly arises which requires a larger labor force. Third, our findings help stakeholders to re-focus on the labor investment. This is crucial due to the fact that labor investment is often neglected by those stakeholders because the expenditure of labor investment is not recognized on the firm’s balance sheet as an asset. Instead, it is written off as an expense in the firm’s income statement. Fourth, our findings also provide insightful information to stakeholders, suggesting that an SB with optimal tenure is more committed to a firm, and this factor plays an important role in strengthening the negative association between PCBs and over-investment in labor.

First, our findings provide a valuable understanding of the effects of PCBs on over-(under-)investment in labor. Stakeholders could use information disclosed in the financial statements of a publicly-listed firm to determine the extent of the firm’s investment in labor and PCBs, and compare this information with similar firms in the same industry sector. Second, our findings give a better understanding of the association between investment in labor and political connections , which are human and social capital that could determine the long-term survival and success of a firm. Third, for shareholders, the appointment of board members with political connections is an important strategic decision to build political capital, which is likely to have a long-term impact on the financial performance of a firm; therefore, it requires thoughtful consultation with firm insiders.

Our findings highlight the role of PCBs in reducing over-investment in labor. These findings are significant because both investment in labor and political connections as human and social capital can play an important role in determining the long-term survival and success of a firm.

The effects of ownership concentration on firm performance usually considers two conflicting perspectives: monitoring and expropriation hypotheses. Past studies have produced mix findings. This study aims to shed light on this relationship by focusing on a specific measure of firm performance, firm growth. The moderating effect of industry growth in the aforementioned relationship is also considered, which advances knowledge on the role of moderators.

This study resorts to data from a sample of 21,476 Portuguese firms, which is examined using hierarchical linear modelling. This approach is adequate because the data has a hierarchical structure: the firms are nested within industries.

The results show that equity ownership concentration has a positive effect on firms’ growth and that industry growth amplifies this relationship. Ownership concentration can spur effective monitoring, thereby alleviating principal–agent conflicts of interest and speeding up decision-making, enabling timely competitive actions that promote growth.

The research conceives ownership structure in two groups. However, equity ownership concentration often acquires more complex shapes. In addition, the data used is from a single country.

The results show that firms pursuing growing strategies and operating in growing industries benefit from equity concentration.

Different from past studies, this study focuses on firm growth performance and considers the moderating effect of industry growth.