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1 – 10 of over 18000The principal–agent literature often draws criticism for its ahistorical, acontextual and static nature, particularly when theories such as the agency or the stewardship theory…
Abstract
Purpose
The principal–agent literature often draws criticism for its ahistorical, acontextual and static nature, particularly when theories such as the agency or the stewardship theory are being used. This is because the field of economics tends to develop universalistic models and theories, excluding history, context and change, which renders them unusable for practitioners whose behavior is (partially) guided by the complex and differing environments in which they find themselves. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this criticism by investigating how (and if) history, context and change influence the principal–agent relationship.
Design/methodology/approach
Instead of using the typical economic methodologies to study the principal–agent relationship, this paper makes use of the methodologies of the field of history to investigate how history, context and change affect principal–agent relationships in three cases in the early modern Southern Netherlands (the Dukes of Arenberg, the Roosewalle farm and Abbot De Loose of the Abbey of Ename). This methodology is especially suited, as it results in historical narratives that incorporate all of these three elements.
Findings
The main finding is that the cases show how history, context and change clearly affect the principal–agent relationship. These aspects are intricately intertwined, as earlier choices and context can cause a change in the principal–agent relationship, this creates a new presence (with an altered history) and sometimes even a new context. This results in a highly dynamic relationship that can evolve in very short periods, mostly in a path-dependent manner.
Research limitations/implications
The paper advocates by example for a shift in principal–agent research, emphasizing the necessity of considering history, context and change. This study demonstrates that these factors greatly affect the nature of the principal–agent relationship. In doing so, it may provide practitioners with better insights, as real-world principal–agent relationships are indeed impacted by these three factors.
Originality/value
By using historical methods, this study shows for the first time how context, change and history indeed influence principal–agent relationships. The findings of this paper encourage the development of theories and theoretical frameworks that more closely resemble reality, rather than being universalistic.
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Principal-agency theory was adapted from business and economics to explain the behavior of various government actors. Yet the idea of an agent and a principal is only depicted in…
Abstract
Principal-agency theory was adapted from business and economics to explain the behavior of various government actors. Yet the idea of an agent and a principal is only depicted in a limited fashion when discussed in light of the realm of business and economics. Legal studies has grappled with the idea of agency well before political science or economics. I lay out the basic principles of both agency law and Congressional principal-agent theory. I then establish the groundwork for drawing important connections between agency law and principal-agency theory. I also analyze and attempt to ameliorate differences between these two theoretical approaches.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical historical analysis of the business (mis)behaviors and influencing factors that discourage enduring cooperation between…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical historical analysis of the business (mis)behaviors and influencing factors that discourage enduring cooperation between principals and agents, to introduce strategies that embrace the social values, economic motivation and institutional designs historically adopted to curtail dishonest acts in international business and to inform an improved principal–agent theory that reflects principal–agent reciprocity as shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, strategic and ideological forces
Design/methodology/approach
The critical historical research method is used to analyze Chinese compradors and the foreign companies they served in pre-1949 China.
Findings
Business practitioners can extend orthodox principal–agent theory by scrutinizing the complex interactions between local agents and foreign companies. Instead of agents pursuing their economic interests exclusively, as posited by principal–agent theory, they also may pursue principal-shared interests (as suggested by stewardship theory) because of social norms and cultural values that can affect business-related choices and the social bonds built between principals and agents.
Research limitations/implications
The behaviors of compradors and foreign companies in pre-1949 China suggest international business practices for shaping social bonds between principals and agents and foreign principals’ creative efforts to enhance shared interests with local agents.
Practical implications
Understanding principal–agent theory’s limitations can help international management scholars and practitioners mitigate transaction partners’ dishonest acts.
Originality/value
A critical historical analysis of intermediary businesspeople’s (mis)behavior in pre-1949 (1840–1949) China can inform the generalizability of principal–agent theory and contemporary business strategies for minimizing agents’ dishonest acts.
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Robert W. Smith and Mark Bertozzi
Principal agent theory has its roots in the economic theory of the firm, decision theory, sociology, organizational theory, and more recently political science. However, there are…
Abstract
Principal agent theory has its roots in the economic theory of the firm, decision theory, sociology, organizational theory, and more recently political science. However, there are only limited applications of the theory in the arena of public budgeting. This paper considers principal agent theory as an alternative method for explaining budgetary outcomes through an examination of interactive relationships not adequately captured by traditional hierarchical-based models of public budgeting. Because implicit and explicit contractual relationships pervade the entire budget making process, principal agent theory can make a major contribution toward developing more inclusive and accurate models of most stages of public budgeting.
Sajad Fayezi, Andrew O'Loughlin and Ambika Zutshi
The paper aims to explain how agency theory can be used to inform our understanding of the dynamics surrounding supply chain behaviours and relationships.
Abstract
Purpose
The paper aims to explain how agency theory can be used to inform our understanding of the dynamics surrounding supply chain behaviours and relationships.
Design/methodology/approach
A structured review of the literature using a three‐stage refinement process is used. The articles were sourced through online databases and keyword classifications, such as “agency theory”, “principal‐agent relationships” and “supply chain management”. The search initially identified over 86 articles. After further screening these were reduced to 19 for final assessment and comparison.
Findings
Despite agency theory's prevailing descriptive and predictive qualities there is scarcity in its application to the SCM discipline. The authors posit that agency theory provides valuable insights for relationship engineering within supply chains where social, political, legal and behavioural dynamics dominate.
Practical implications
It is a critical task for managers to understand and mitigate abnormal behaviours across the supply chain. Agency theory serves this need by providing them with a useful tool to respond to transaction cost dilemmas through contractual and non‐contractual remedies.
Originality/value
This is one of the first studies that examines the current state of agency theory application in the SCM literature and suggests potential avenues for future research.
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David W. Parker, Uwe Dressel, Delroy Chevers and Luca Zeppetella
Agency theory suggests that divergences will occur when a principal, e.g. client, and agent e.g. a project manager, interests are different in the execution of a project. The…
Abstract
Purpose
Agency theory suggests that divergences will occur when a principal, e.g. client, and agent e.g. a project manager, interests are different in the execution of a project. The purpose of this paper is to explore if the agency theory can explain the subtleties integral to the behaviours and relationships between players delivering a public-private-partnership (PPP) in the context of an international development (ID) project. The intra-/interpersonal dynamics include governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private commercial service providers. The authors develop a conceptual framework and provide evidence from a case study of the testing of a Road Safety Toolkit in Kenya to explore several propositions.
Design/methodology/approach
Extant literature identified application of the agency theory, and the development of a conceptual framework. A case study describing an ID project was used to validate the propositions prior to the expansion of a research instrument for data collection in the field.
Findings
Through the lens of the agency theory and the limitations imposed by exploring a series of propositions, several insightful conclusions have been derived from the case. ID projects have particular nuisances that make them unique when compared to the majority of commercial applications. An added dimension and level of complexity is a consequence of the PPP incorporating government, NGOs and private corporations. The case exemplified the need for PPP ID projects to build on partner networks to influence and disseminate outcomes. Some agency problems were far less prominent than would normally be seen in a commercial project.
Research limitations/implications
The methodologies presented in this paper need to be adapted and practiced in different kinds of ID projects in order to get confirmatory analytical results. The limitations imposed by the use of the single case, whilst drawing insightful conclusions, would necessitate greater testing in the field.
Practical implications
Although the problems of the agency theory are well researched in the operations management literature, there is limited application to ID projects and no previous research within the context of a PPP. Therefore, this work is important for greater understanding of the specific issues associated with project delivery of an ID.
Social implications
Conflicting goals between principals and agents are common for organisations, which in turn affect inter-relationships on an international footing. The agency theory has had little attention in the project management field, yet is fundamental to relationships and communication.
Originality/value
There has been little research that explores the agency theory in the context of a PPP involving governments, NGOs and private commercial service providers, executed as an ID project. This work, therefore, exhibits new and novel findings.
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Juri Matinheikki, Katri Kauppi, Alistair Brandon–Jones and Erik M. van Raaij
Contemporary supply chain relationships inherently rely on delegation of work between organizations and, thus, are subject to agency problems for which a wide range of governance…
Abstract
Purpose
Contemporary supply chain relationships inherently rely on delegation of work between organizations and, thus, are subject to agency problems for which a wide range of governance mechanisms exist. This review of agency theory (AT), across four distinct fields, explains the connection between governance mechanisms and supply chain relationship types.
Design/methodology/approach
The study uses a systematic literature review (SLR) of articles using AT in a supply chain context from the operations and supply chain management, general management, marketing, and economics fields.
Findings
The authors categorize the governance mechanisms identified to create a typology of agency relationships in supply chains.
Research limitations/implications
The developed typology provides parsimonious theory on different forms of supply chain agency relationships and takes a step towards a “supply chain-oriented agency theory” explaining and predicting relationship types and governance in supply chains. Furthermore, a future research agenda calls for more accurate measuring of agency costs, to examine residual gains alongside residual losses, to take a dual-sided perspective of agency relations and to adopt AT to examine more complex supply networks.
Practical implications
The review provides a menu of governance mechanisms and describes situations under which these mechanisms could be deployed to guide managers when developing their supply chain relationships.
Originality/value
The first review to combine and elaborate views from four major disciplines using AT as a lens to supply chain relationships. Expanding the traditional set of governance mechanisms provides academics and practitioners with a bigger “menu” of options to consider.
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Lays out a framework for analysing ethics in organizations. Relying on methodological individualism, introduces five building blocks for the framework: self‐interest, individual…
Abstract
Lays out a framework for analysing ethics in organizations. Relying on methodological individualism, introduces five building blocks for the framework: self‐interest, individual rationality, sequential rationality, incentive compatibility, and reputation. Uncritical use of the self‐interest model may induce framing effects, blinding less cautious users to important ethical dimensions. Illustrates the richness and “ethical flavour” of an appropriately considered self‐interest model through focusing one of the individual agent’s real interests in a broad sense, through the use of the time factor in the building blocks, and through suggesting how the individual agent can interpret the value systems in her surroundings.
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Several explanations for the Royal African Company’s failure around the turn of the eighteenth century have been suggested. The paper argues that these reasons can be integrated…
Abstract
Several explanations for the Royal African Company’s failure around the turn of the eighteenth century have been suggested. The paper argues that these reasons can be integrated into a more comprehensive account of the company’s failure through the introduction of a modified version of principal-agent theory. Instead of focusing on abstract, dyadic relationships, the paper proposes a model that accounts for the meaningful character of principal agent interactions and for the complex networks and multiple role identities of actors within those networks that comprised principal-agent relations within the company. On the basis of this model the failure of the company can be seen as a result of contradictions between its dual role as both agent and principal. The symbolic importance of inefficient trading practices helps to explain why the company was unable to pursue alternative strategies or otherwise benefit from its monopoly.
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Bjørn Andersen, Bjørnar Henriksen and Ingrid Spjelkavik
The purpose of this paper is to explore the range of benchmarking applications that can be used in a principal‐agent relationship setting often found in the public sector.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to explore the range of benchmarking applications that can be used in a principal‐agent relationship setting often found in the public sector.
Design/methodology/approach
Collection and critical analysis of secondary data from relevant publications addressing applications of benchmarking in the public sector. Extraction of knowledge from several research projects where the authors have been involved in studying and developing benchmarking approaches for different public sector organizations. Induction of new theory about the use of benchmarking in principal‐agent relationships in the public sector, grounded through empirical evidence from case studies.
Findings
A number of new approaches to benchmarking in the public sector have been identified and described, some of which are already used in real life cases, others which need further development before being implemented. All of these can introduce benefits to both principals and agents involved in such benchmarking efforts.
Research limitations/implications
The paper explores benchmarking applications that are almost exclusively relevant in a public sector setting, although some of them might be adapted to certain private sector conditions.
Originality/value
Whereas most work on benchmarking in the public sector tend to view only improvement‐oriented, voluntary benchmarking as relevant and useful, this paper demonstrates how many different imposed benchmarking schemes with other purposes can be useful.
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