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Different external supply scenarios faced by the retailers will affect their choice of strategy when supply is disrupted and becomes far less than demand, urgently. This study focuses on analyzing both demand and supply side response strategies to meet customer demand and reduce the impact of the shortage during supply disruptions.

According to the quantity of products that the external market can provide, the external supply scenarios were divided into sufficient-type external supply and learning-type external supply. A two-echelon perishable goods supply chain was analyzed, and three kinds of contingency strategy models for downstream retailers were investigated. First, in the sufficient external supply scenario, the optimal price and transshipment quantity to maximize retailer's profits is discussed. Second, in the scenario of learning-type external supply, this study analyzes the optimal decision in three mechanisms of the hybrid strategy and their application: price priority mechanism, quantity priority mechanism and price–quantity balance mechanism. Furthermore, the influence of penalty cost and supply on the priority orders of different mechanisms was studied.

Results show that comparing the two pure strategies (pricing strategy and transshipment strategy)it was noted that the hybrid strategy produces the best results in sufficient-type external supply scenario. In the learning-type external supply scenario, a numerical study has shown the existence of three areas in case of penalty cost and supplier's capacity, and each areas has different priority orders of the three mechanisms. Under the situation of learning external supply, the retailer's optimal strategy is affected by parameters such as penalty cost and supply volume.

The main innovation of the work lies in the following: First; the external supply situation was divided into sufficiency type and learning type, which improves the external situation faced by retailers after the outbreak of emergencies, helps retailers understand the external situation, conforms to the actual situation and has certain practical application value. Second; in the context of learning external supply, there are three coping strategies for retailers, including: Price priority mechanism, Quantity priority mechanism and Pricing and transshipment balance mechanism. This will help retailers make strategic choices, make more scientific management decisions and improve the supply chain emergency management theory. Third; the demand side response was managed through the change of external supply during supply side recovery period and supply disruption. The proposed model enables managing and analyzing supply disruption efficiently and effectively via handling uncertainty by considering all aspects of decision-making process. The proposed model can be applied in various fields such as vegetable and fruit, fresh food, etc.

This study highlights the impact of mental accounts on a user's decision-making regarding payment schemes and aims to determine the pricing strategy for the first-enjoy-after-pay service offered by the two-sided media platforms.

This study establishes a game-theoretic model and utilizes backward induction to derive the equilibrium price by maximizing the monopolist's profit.

The findings indicate that the conditions for a two-sided media platform to offer the first-enjoy-after-pay service depend on the trade-off between pleasure attenuation and pain buffering and the effect of time discounts. Moreover, the authors found that the time discount is a critical factor in determining pricing strategies under various payment schemes offered by the platform.

This work adopts a uniform pricing strategy for users who opt for either immediate or post-payment schemes. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this approach has limitations in terms of offering discriminatory pricing for those who choose both payment schemes.

This analytical work provides valuable insights for two-sided media platforms to optimize their payment scheme strategies and pricing considering the influence of a user's mental account.

In a two-sided media platform, the authors provide applicable conditions for the platform to offer first-enjoy-after-pay service considering the effect of mental accounts. Further, the authors show the optimal pricing strategy under different payment schemes provided by the platform.

Pay-what-you-want (PWYW) is a pricing strategy implemented in a variety of settings like supermarkets and museums, in which consumers determine the price they are willing to pay for a product or service based on their perceived utility. The authors propose an analytical model to investigate the impact of PWYW delivery pricing on the online food delivery (OFD) platforms.

Using a game-theoretic model, the authors characterize the equilibrium as a function of the platform's average delivery cost and the consumer's social preferences parameters like fairness and reciprocity. The authors derive the parametric conditions under which PWYW generates higher profits for the platform compared to the traditional pay-as-asked delivery pricing.

For the PWYW strategy to be profitable, the average delivery cost to the platform should be low. Therefore, OFD platform managers should focus on reducing delivery costs. The authors also identify the feasible region in which the platform managers need to maintain the consumer's social preferences.

Under PWYW, the authors recommend that the platform managers impose a minimum delivery fee which consumers can use as a benchmark to minimize zero delivery fee payments and consumers' free-riding tendencies simultaneously. This allows OFD platforms to extract online orders from highly price-conscious consumers.

This is one of the first studies to explore the innovative application of PWYW to a particular segment of delivery pricing in OFD platforms. The authors establish that the overall consumer surplus and social welfare are higher under the PWYW strategy, forming a solid ground for its implementation in OFD platforms.

Motivated by the real-world practice that the boom of the online selling induces a higher product return as well, selecting which online channel mode indicates who takes ownership over the product and thus bears the loss of the product return. This paper aims to seek the optimal online channel modes for the two members in a platform supply chain in the presence of product returns.

This study aims to develop a platform supply chain that consists of one platform company and one supplier. Along with an offline distribution channel, the supplier can choose two alternative online selling modes (i.e. the reselling and agency modes) to sell its product through the online marketplace. This paper applies Stackelberg game to derive the equilibrium with different business scenarios and selects the optimal online channel modes for two parties, respectively. Moreover, this paper extends to a different supply chain with a reverse channel leadership and a different product return policy for testing the robustness.

Several interesting and important results are derived in this paper. Firstly, it is found that the relative pricing are largely relied on the costs of two channels. Secondly, the platform supply chain may benefit from a pure channel rather than the dual-channel when this channel enjoys a relatively low cost and/or a sufficiently high consumer preference. Then, the platform and the supplier act contradictorily when selecting their optimal online channel modes. To be specific, the platform motivates to choose the online reselling mode when both the commission rate and the slotting fee are relatively low, whereas the supplier is likely to select the online agency mode under this circumstance. Finally, a win-win situation in regards to the optimal online channel mode for two parties is achievable with numerical experiments.

Based on the analytical studies, the results derived in the authors’ work can provide managerial insights to assist the supplier and the platform company in determining the operational decision and selecting the optimal online channel mode to deal with consumer returns. In addition, appropriate commission rate along with slotting fee will make both parties achieve a win-win situation in determining their optimal online channel mode.

To the authors’ best knowledge, this paper makes the first move to determine the optimal online channel mode in the content of consumer returns and study how it is affected by different product return policies.

The purpose of this study is threefold: firstly, to compare Pakistani and French consumers’ perceptions of well-being; secondly, to investigate how consumers in both countries relate to food; and thirdly, to assess whether they associate food with well-being.

Thirty participants (15 French and 15 Pakistani) between the ages of 24 and 35 were interviewed, using convenience and snow bowling sampling. Data triangulation was performed by combining three qualitative techniques, word association, photo-elicitation-based interviewing and open-ended questions to explore consumer perceptions of well-being, food and food well-being.

The study’s findings suggest that well-being is a broad concept in which food is an ingredient. Food and well-being share common elements, and food well-being can be defined as an individual’s psychological, physical, social and societal relationship with food ascribed by affordability and food literacy.

Pleasure, sharing and respect emerged as dimensions of food well-being that can be applied to transfigure consumer behaviour and reduce over-consumption, food waste and hunger. The dimensions of well-being and food were explored for both countries to understand their cultural nuances and determine the influence of food on well-being. This comparative analysis will help researchers understand consumers’ preferences for food in various aspects from two regions. This study can potentially contribute to scale development in food and well-being, which can help researchers measure the effects of food and well-being in different sectors of the economy, particularly in health care. The most aspiring aspect of the current research is the insights unveiled during interactions with research participants, which will help develop consumer baseline feelings.

The paper attempts to discuss the impact of reference price effect on pricing decisions.

With the growth of the Internet and e-commerce, more and more customers purchase products in through online channels and choose products by comparing different prices and services, and the reference price effect has an impact on pricing decisions. To investigate the impact of consumers' reference price effect on the dual-channel supply chain, the authors establish a basic model consisting of a single dominant manufacturer and a single downstream retailer, and analyze the optional decisions under different situations and discuss the influence of reference price effect. Finally, a number case verifies the validity and rationality of the proposed model.

The results show that (1) the reference price effect has varying effects on the price, channel demand and income of manufacturers and retailers in the channel depending on the role of customers' channel preferences. (2) The manufacturer's online channel demand and profits always increase with the reference pricing effect, whereas the retailer's offline demand and profits always decline. (3) When the proportion of consumers preferring offline is higher, the manufacturer's network price and wholesale price increase with the reference price effect, while the retailer's retail price decreases with the reference price effect; when the proportion of consumers preferring offline is lower, the opposite is true, and the centralized decision results are consistent with the decentralized decision results.

This paper can clarify the impact of consumer reference price effects on the operation of dual-channel supply chains, and help inform pricing decisions of manufacturers and retailers in dual-channel supply chains.

The proposed approach can well analyze the impact of consumer reference price effect and give channel their optional decisions.

This paper explores how the manufacturer’s strategic choice (acquisition or investment) impacts product quality in a supply chain comprising two complementary suppliers and a common manufacturer.

The manufacturer faces six strategic choices to improve product quality: acquiring or investing in the high-capable supplier, the low-capable supplier, or both. As the Stackelberg leader, the manufacturer determines which strategy is adopted, while suppliers are separately responsible for components’ quality and wholesale prices. The authors use game theory and calculate the model with Mathematica.

The authors develop analytical models to analyze how acquisition costs, investment proportions, component importance and quality improvement coefficients influence decision-makers. The results show that the highest quality may not benefit the manufacturer. Investing in or acquiring a low-capable supplier is better than a high-capable supplier under certain conditions. If the gaps between two suppliers’ quality improvement coefficients and the importance of two components are dramatic, the manufacturer should choose an investment strategy.

This study contributes to the complementary supply chain management by comparing two kinds of strategies-acquisition and investment, with a high-capable supplier and a low-capable supplier.

In most economies, there are rules from the market regulators or government to sell at an equal wholesale price (EWP). But when one upstream channel is facing a negative demand disruption and another positive, EWP can create extra pressure on the disadvantageous supply chain partner, which faces negative disruption. The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of EWP and the scope of the discriminatory wholesale price (DWP) during disruptions.

For the study, the authors used a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, online retailer (OR) and traditional brick-and-mortar (BM) retailer. Stackelberg game is used to model the interaction between the upstream and downstream channel partners, and the horizontal Nash game to analyse the interaction within downstream channel partners. For modelling asymmetric disruption, the authors took instances from the lock-down and post-lock-down periods of the COVID-19 pandemic, where consumers flow from BM retailer to OR store.

By analysing the disruption period, the authors found that this asymmetric disruption is detrimental to the BM channel, favourable to OR and has no impact on the manufacturer. But with DWP, the authors found that the profit of the BM channel and manufacturer can be increased during disruption. Though the profit of the OR decreased, it was found to be higher than in the pre-disruption period. Under DWP, the consumer surplus increased during disruption, making it favourable for the customers also. Thus, DWP can aid in creating a win-win strategy for all the supply chain partners during asymmetric disruption. Later as an extension to the study, the authors analysed the impact of the consumer transfer factor and found that it plays a crucial role in the optimal decisions of the channel partner during DWP.

Very scant literature analyses the intersection of DWP and disruptions. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study, for the first time uses DWP as a tool to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruptions. The study findings will assist the government, market regulators and manufacturers in revamping the wholesale pricing policies and strategies to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruption.

The rapid development of the Internet has led to an increasingly significant role for E-commerce business. This study examines how the green supply chain (GSC) operates on the E-commerce online channel (resell mode and agency mode) and the traditional offline channel with information sharing under demand uncertainty.

This study builds a multistage game model that considers the manufacturer selling green products through different channels. On the traditional offline channel, the competing retailers decide whether to share demand signals. Regarding the resale mode of E-commerce online channel, just E-tailer 1 determines whether to share information and decides the retail price. In the agency mode, the manufacturer decides the retail price directly, and E-tailer 2 sets the platform rate.

This study reveals that information accuracy is conducive to information value and profits on both channels. Interestingly, the platform fee rate in agency mode will inhibit the effect of a positive demand signal. Information sharing will cause double marginal effects, and price competition behavior will mitigate such effects. Additionally, when the platform fee rate is low, the manufacturer will select the E-commerce online channel for operation, but the retailers' profit is the highest in the traditional channel.

This research explores the interplay between different channel structures and information sharing in a GSC, considering price competition and demand uncertainty. Besides, we also considered what behaviors and factors will amplify or transfer the effect of double marginalization.

This study aims to propose a risk-induced game theoretic forecasting model to predict average daily rate (ADR) under COVID-19, using an advanced recurrent neural network.

Using three data sets from upper-midscale hotels in three locations (i.e. urban, interstate and suburb), from January 1, 2018, to August 31, 2020, three long-term, short-term memory (LSTM) models were evaluated against five traditional forecasting models.

The models proposed in this study outperform traditional methods, such that the simplest LSTM model is more accurate than most of the benchmark models in two of the three tested hotels. In particular, the results show that traditional methods are inefficient in hotels with rapid fluctuations of demand and ADR, as observed during the pandemic. In contrast, LSTM models perform more accurately for these hotels.

This study is limited by its use of American data and data from midscale hotels as well as only predicting ADR.

This study produced a reliable, accurate forecasting model considering risk and competitor behavior.

This paper extends the application of game theory principles to ADR forecasting and combines it with the concept of risk for forecasting during uncertain times.

This study is the first study, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, to use actual hotel data from the COVID-19 pandemic to determine an appropriate neural network forecasting method for times of uncertainty. The application of Shapley value and operational risk obtained a game-theoretic property-level model, which fits best.