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There has been an increased interest in the role of the financial sector and institutional quality in the development process.

This paper addresses the relationship between corruption and financial sector development by constructing a Schumpeterian endogenous growth model, allowing for the entry of competitive firms with an explicit role for politics and banking.

Assuming that technologically advanced firms are located in developed countries and backward firms in developing countries, the model in this study suggests that low corruption are more growth enhancing in the former group of countries. Better institutions stimulate entry by reducing banking screening costs and entry is more growth enhancing in sectors closer to the technological frontier.

The model in this study is a partial equilibrium analysis and one should include a role for labour markets to address the household’s problem and enrich the model’s conclusions. Secondly, the model specification rests on the fact that the degree of corruption is correlated with the level of institutions. Even though this might be subject to some criticism, this is a common practice across the literature and so, it is clearly a matter of taste.

The main policy conclusion is that anti-corruption policy initiatives should prioritize corruption that distorts incentives with respect to productive investment that directly and negatively affects growth.

This paper addresses the relationship between corruption and financial sector development by constructing a Schumpeterian endogenous growth model, allowing for the entry of competitive firms with an explicit role for politics and banking.

The paper aims to highlight differences in bank performance based on state politics during the onset of the Covid pandemic. The response to Covid pandemic created an unusual opportunity for an investigation of how politics impacts banking due to the initial response to the pandemic being heavily impacted by political affiliation states' governors and dominant parties in state legislatures. Previous research looked at impact of elections on the federal level (both executive and legislative branches) on bank risk and performance. The response to the Covid pandemic in 2020 allows for an investigation on how political influence on the state level impacted banks performance.

The Covid pandemic was an unexpected storm that entered the United States with a vengeance in 2020, taking countless lives and ravaging the economic landscape. The response to the pandemic quickly took a political spin as republican governors showed greater reluctance to shutter business activity in hopes of slowing down the spread of the virus than their democratic counterparts. This paper examines the impact of the two Americas created along the lines of political influence as it impacted bank performance over four-quarters beginning with the fourth quarter of 2019. All US banks are split into groups based on the political affiliation of state governors and the dominant party in state legislatures to measure impact of politics on bank performance and risk.

This research finds that banks operating in states with republican governors produced greater profits and exhibited higher liquidity levels. The same results held for banks in states where both the governorship and the legislature were controlled by republicans versus banks in states where both the governor and the legislature were democratic. Interestingly, the findings present a reversal when examining banks in states led by republican governors and democratic legislatures versus banks in states with democratic governors and republican legislatures. In those instances of mixed leadership, banks in states with democratic governors tend to show greater profits, greater liquidity while demonstrating lower asset quality.

A paper published in Managerial Finance in 2018 discussed the impact of the parties in control of the White house and the legislative branch on bank performance and risk. There have been no studies, to the author’s knowledge, that look at how states' political leadership (gubernatorial and legislative) impact on bank performance. Because the response to the Covid pandemic became a politically polarized issue, the onset of the crisis allowed for measurement of how different responses by republican and democratic state leadership impacted bank performance and risk.

Although the mortgage sector of the banking industry in the USA has seen good times in the recent past, the futures are uncertain. This article considers the nature of futures studies and applies futures analysis to the mortgage sector. The history of banking, and the USA, has been a struggle between three competing public philosophies: liberalism, populism, and progressivism. But the current Bush administration's pursuit of a New American Empire presents all of us, as well as banking, with a new and largely unanticipated future, the consequences of which are ominous.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically explore under which conditions Tweets of infomediaries (i.e. ordinary users having few or no followers on Twitter) might nevertheless promote a negative sentiment toward a corporation to the point of having a negative impact on the corporation's outcomes.

The empirical study is based on a unique database that combines a sample of one year of Twitter conversations about an Italian bank and its daily business performances (i.e. number of closures and openings). The relationship between these two is analyzed using autoregressive time series models (VAR).

Findings indicate that a tweet affects a bank’s outcomes only when embedded in a larger conversation about the bank, rather than simply repetitively shared. These findings contribute to two debates within bank marketing literature. First is the debate about the role of infomediaries in banks' outcomes, as it urges to reconsider the way banks' online reputation is conceptualized and measured. Second is the debate on opportunities and threats of social media for the banking industry, as it indicates that negative sentiment expressed by the general public influences not only stock markets but also directly banks' outcomes.

This study allows managers and corporations to understand what to do when conversations of unknown individuals become threatening for the company. To influence such situations, the company should identify not only the actors that are influencers but also the communications that have been popular in the past for their brand or the brand of their competitors and monitor the conversational volume and broadness.

This study aims to estimate the regulatory compliance impact on the risk of banks operating in Pakistan. The direct and indirect regulatory compliance of conventional banks with Islamic operations in terms of risk from 2009 to 2017 are estimated.

This study used a two-step system generalized method of moment (GMM) (dynamic panel) to examine the relationship between regulatory compliance, Islamic operations and the bank risk and tested the direct and indirect impacts of regulatory compliance and Islamic operations on the said risk.

Regulatory compliance has a significant and positive relation with bank risk, whereas the Islamic bank operations have a significant and negative relationship. Thus, regulatory compliance creates pressure on banks, but the Islamic operations of conventional banks reduce this pressure in direct and indirect ways.

Per the policy of State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), banks shall pursue Islamic operations to reduce regulatory pressure and widen their scope. The results suggest that regulatory compliance creates pressure on bank risk irrespective of the type of the bank. Thus, the SBP should seek the appropriate measure for this occurrence.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this work is the very first study that has considered the unique Islamic operations of conventional banks and estimated its impact on risk. Moreover, this work examined two types of bank risk instead of employing stability and market measure. This research is also the first to implement a two-step system GMM for the methodology.