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The paper aims to highlight differences in bank performance based on state politics during the onset of the Covid pandemic. The response to Covid pandemic created an unusual opportunity for an investigation of how politics impacts banking due to the initial response to the pandemic being heavily impacted by political affiliation states' governors and dominant parties in state legislatures. Previous research looked at impact of elections on the federal level (both executive and legislative branches) on bank risk and performance. The response to the Covid pandemic in 2020 allows for an investigation on how political influence on the state level impacted banks performance.

The Covid pandemic was an unexpected storm that entered the United States with a vengeance in 2020, taking countless lives and ravaging the economic landscape. The response to the pandemic quickly took a political spin as republican governors showed greater reluctance to shutter business activity in hopes of slowing down the spread of the virus than their democratic counterparts. This paper examines the impact of the two Americas created along the lines of political influence as it impacted bank performance over four-quarters beginning with the fourth quarter of 2019. All US banks are split into groups based on the political affiliation of state governors and the dominant party in state legislatures to measure impact of politics on bank performance and risk.

This research finds that banks operating in states with republican governors produced greater profits and exhibited higher liquidity levels. The same results held for banks in states where both the governorship and the legislature were controlled by republicans versus banks in states where both the governor and the legislature were democratic. Interestingly, the findings present a reversal when examining banks in states led by republican governors and democratic legislatures versus banks in states with democratic governors and republican legislatures. In those instances of mixed leadership, banks in states with democratic governors tend to show greater profits, greater liquidity while demonstrating lower asset quality.

A paper published in Managerial Finance in 2018 discussed the impact of the parties in control of the White house and the legislative branch on bank performance and risk. There have been no studies, to the author’s knowledge, that look at how states' political leadership (gubernatorial and legislative) impact on bank performance. Because the response to the Covid pandemic became a politically polarized issue, the onset of the crisis allowed for measurement of how different responses by republican and democratic state leadership impacted bank performance and risk.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

This study aims to investigate the relationship between political instability and the performance of Islamic banks in emerging countries.

For a data sample of 93 Islamic banks in 20 emerging countries during the period from 2011 to 2016, the authors identify indicators that matter most for the activities of Islamic banks.

The study finds that a stable government and law and order are positively correlated with the health of Islamic financial institutions. On the other hand, corruption and military involvement in politics can create an unstable environment for businesses, leading to uncertainty and risk. The study also reveals that Islamic banks operating in regions or communities with lower risk of socio-economic conditions tend to exhibit higher levels of profitability.

Overall, the study provides valuable insights into the impact of political instability on Islamic banks in emerging countries.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the potential impact of political party control on bank profitability and risk. This study extends previous work by looking at overall political power with respect to party control of the House, Senate, and the Presidency.

This paper employs regression analysis using several different dependent measures of risk and return. The independent variables include dummies to represent political power and control.

The results indicate that political control does impact both bank returns and risk. More specifically, concentration of power in either party results in higher profits. However, risk and returns typically increase during periods of democratic control.

To date, no research addresses the impact of political control and party affiliation on bank risk and return. Given the importance of banks to the overall economy and financial system, this research should provide policymakers and regulators with a different perspective on bank risk and return.

Business groups often contain banks or near banks that can protect group firms from economic shocks. A group bank subordinate to other group firms can become an “organ bank” that selflessly bails out distressed group firms and anticipates a government bailout. A group bank subordinating other group firms can extend loans to suppress their risk taking to default risk, preserving risk-averse low-productivity zombie firms. Actual business groups can fall between these polar cases. Subordinated group banks magnify risk taking; subordinating group banks suppress risk taking; yet both distortions promote business group firms’ survival. Limiting intragroup income and risk shifting, severing banks from business groups, articulating Business Group Law, or dismantling business groups may mitigate both distortions but also limits business groups’ internal markets, which are thought to be important where external markets work poorly.

This paper provides a perspective on the field of nonmarket strategy. It does not attempt to survey the literature but instead focuses on the substantive content of research in the field. The paper discusses the origins of the field and the roles of nonmarket strategy. The political economy framework is used and contrasted with the current form of the resource-based theory. The paper argues that research should focus on the firm level and argues that the strategy of self-regulation can be useful in reducing the likelihood of challenges from private and public politics. The political economy perspective is illustrated using three examples: (1) public politics: Uber, (2) private politics: Rainforest Action Network and Citigroup, and (3) integrated strategy and private and public politics: The Fast Food Campaign. The paper concludes with a discussion of research issues in theory, empirics, and normative assessment.