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This chapter explores the question of the relationship between bureaucracy and politics in Latin America. The objective is exploring the role that politics plays in guaranteeing a professional and autonomous bureaucracy structure.

The chapter first examines an institutional explanation for bureaucratic performance. I will scrutinize the institutional arrangements that might preclude the existence of a professional bureaucracy. The chapter then “brings the state back in,” under the assumption that the explanation for performance of bureaucracy might have been related to long-lasting conditions of “Stateness.” The bureaucracy is analyzed in a more historical perspective and relates the former with specific societal and partisan coalitions at the time of state consolidation. These historical decisions seem to have determined a pattern of clientelistic utilization of the State apparatus in some countries but not in others. The partial evidence presented in this section suggests the importance of “state strength” to understand bureaucratic performance.

The purpose of this paper is to find the relationship between local direct elections and the change in social spending, controlling for GDP per capita, revenues and wide-range socio-welfare indicators at the regional level.

This research uses a model of time-series cross-sectional panel data set for 33 provinces in Indonesia from 2001 to 2012.

The main finding of this research is that the political budget cycle does exist in Indonesia. Incumbents responded to the direct elections more sensitively rather than to other variables in the model. The most important variables that are significant in the model are not only direct election but also inter-governmental grants. Interestingly, the local economy (as measured by GDP per capita) does not clearly exhibit a meaningful impact.

Although the importance of decentralisation in Indonesia is actually at the regency level, obtaining the data is really challenging. Therefore the exercise on this paper is currently limited only for the provincial level.

This finding conveys the message that there is large room for improvement in inter-governmental transfer formulation, more importantly to the regions where they still entail significant budget support from central government. In addition, transfers during specific periods such as elections need to be modified to avoid the misappropriation of local budget and to mitigate the adverse impact of PBC. The formulation of inter-governmental transfers is pivotal in reducing over-dependence to the central government funding and to ensure the effectiveness of budget devolved at the local level.

To the author’s understanding, the paper is the first to discuss the presence of the political budget cycle on social protection programs in Indonesia. The expected contribution of the current work is twofold: Firstly, the author used a recent data set hosted by the World Bank (INDO-DAPOER). Secondly, the findings are relevant to the discussion within the sphere of development studies and political science.

When it comes to small island developing states (SIDS), the literature is burgeoning with articles on resilience and climate change or resilience as an aftermath to some type of natural disaster. As a singular topic, economic resilience or political resilience has not been as widely discussed. Baldacchino (2014), however, took a close look at sovereign small island states and how they have been able to, among other things, secure their independence following long periods of colonization and exhibit good economic indicators that were and are comparative to those of much larger developing countries (Anklesaria Aiyar, 2008; Armstrong & Read, 1998; Easterly & Kraay, 2000). In his essay, Baldacchino discusses economic development of small island states using a heavy dose of commercialization of resources as the backdrop for sustainable economic development.

This chapter will take a look at what The Bahamas has implemented in the wake of major external shocks that have all but crippled other small economies. The strategies implemented have not only been a stabilizing force but have placed the country well on the road to economic recovery. It is to be noted that while implementation of some of these strategies were not easy or received well by certain factions in the country, politics aside, government officials from across the divide came together to prove once and for all that regardless of individual politics, the strength of the country's economic and political pillars was the best show of resilience as the world looked toward the future.

The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the impact of conservatism on political liberty and liberal democracy in contemporary society. It applies Weber's description of capitalism as the “most fateful” social force in modern society to analyzing conservatism in relation to political liberty and liberal democracy. The paper posits and finds that conservatism primarily (with secondary variations) negatively impacts political liberty and so modern liberal democracy. Alternatively, it argues and shows that conservatism almost invariably generates political repression and elimination or subversion of liberal democracy and society. It concludes that conservatism, especially in America, becomes from the “most fateful” to the “most fatal” social force on the account of its adverse impact on political liberty and democracy.

The paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of conservatism and its essentially destructive effects on political liberties and liberal democracy in contemporary society.

The paper finds that conservatism, especially in America, becomes from the “most fateful” to the “most fatal” social force on the account of its adverse impact on political liberty and democracy.

The paper posits and finds that conservatism primarily (with secondary variations) negatively impacts political liberty and so modern liberal democracy. Alternatively, it argues and shows that conservatism almost invariably generates political repression and elimination or subversion of liberal democracy and society.

Chieftaincies constructed of personal power networks emerge recurrently within states and their business corporations, political parties, mafias, insurgencies and artistic cliques. Modern states were built by incorporating chieftaincies as internal organs. Nevertheless, ‘neopatrimonialism’, ‘political machines’, ‘oligarchy’, caudillismo and warlordism – the various names that designate different facets of chieftaincy – represent neither aberrant nor atavistic phenomena. They refer to an immensely adaptable strategy of manipulation in arenas where formal institutional controls prove impractical or undesirable.

There is hardly any other field of knowledge where there is more conflict or controversy between ideas and solutions proposed by theoreticians and statesmen than in politics. To date, adequate methodological tools have not been developed which enable the truth or validity of the liberal or conservative approaches to be tested. A new research programme using a simultaneous equilibrium versus disequilibrium approach is proposed which has full application in politics as well as in economics and the social sciences. This research programme shows the organic relationship between society, state, economy, money and form of government, and thus leads to a methodological unification of all the social sciences, to a new principia politica.

The economic science is again in a crisis and a new solution prolegomena to any future study in economics, finance and other social sciences has just been published by the International Institute of Social Economics in care of the MCB University Press in England. The roots of the major financial and economic problems of our time lie in an open conflict between theory and practice. In the 1930s and before the conflict was between classical theory and given realities. In the 1990s the conflict appears between the now prevailing modern, Keynesian theory and the actual realities. In addition during the twentieth century a great argument developed between the two schools of thought, argument which is not yet settled. In one sentence, the prolegomena tried and was successful to solve the conflict between theory and practice and the big doctrinal dispute of the twentieth century. It was a struggle of research and observation over half a century between 1947 and 1997.

Analyzing how the post-Soviet transition interacts with the crisis of market finance exhibits a new “greed-based economic system” in the making. Asset grabbing is at its core and hinders capital accumulation. All the various privatization schemes have triggered off asset grabbing, asset stripping, and asset tunneling. A global contagion of such behavior has spread the power and cohesion of managers/shareholders (oligarchs) worldwide. Financial asset grabbing is less straightforward, though much widespread, and operates in financial markets through new financial products, securitization, firms buying their own shares, hedge funds, stock price manipulation, short selling, and the distribution of stock options.Shadow banking, and more generally a global informal economy, results from grabbing strategies in financial markets that breach the formal rules of capitalism. In alleviating and circumventing the rules, the oligarchy paves the way for economic malpractices and crime, calling capitalist laws into question.In such context, systemic greed underlies unconstrained maximization of relative wealth, for which asset grabbing is a rational means, in a winner-take-all economy. At the present stage of our research, a greed-based economy cannot yet be theoretically defined as a transition either to a new phase of capitalism or to another different system.

Complexity in various contexts in the current global scene is studied in terms of its feedbacks and feedforwards, revealing how our understanding of it and our implementation of that understanding may be fruitfully simplified.