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The choice of accounting methods is critical in measuring the performance and sustainability of a public defined benefit pension (DBP) plan, and such measurement has an impact on the effectiveness of the entire pension system. Prior literature rarely discusses the choice and rationale of the accounting assumptions for public DBP plans. This study fills the gap by investigating whether crucial plan characteristics, including operational performance, financial health, sponsor fiscal stress, and audit quality, are associated with the accounting assumptions of public DBP plans.

The sample includes 1,170 plan-years from the intersection of the Center for Retirement Research and public DBPs' annual financial reports for the years 2001–2013. This study develops regression models to examine the relationship between the characteristics of public DBP practices and DBP accounting choices.

The empirical results show that the public DBPs that have better investment performance, higher funding status, less fiscal stress, and that are audited by Big 4 accounting firms are more likely to adopt conservative accounting choices.

The study documents the impact of crucial pension plan characteristics on public DBP managers' accounting choices, which were not extensively discussed in pension literature. The findings help us understand the rationale for employing different accounting treatments in the context of public pension fund practices. In addition, the study sheds light on policy implications for the future reform of public pension regulations.

This study aims to examine whether socially responsible firms have well-funded employee pension programs and whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance is associated with management discretionary choice of pension accounting assumptions.

The current study examines the impact of CSR performance on two measures of pension funding and two pension accounting assumptions using regression analysis. This study uses a panel data of 13,099 firms-years across 1,428 US firms from 1992 to 2015.

Firms with higher CSR scores report higher pension net assets and are less likely to have underfunded pension than their counterparts. These firms also adopt more responsible (conservative) pension accounting assumptions (i.e. lower discount rate and a higher rate of compensation increase) to estimate pension benefit obligations. Results are stronger for firms that operate in the materials and industrial sectors and for the post-2000 period when underfunded pension has become more prevalent. Firms with higher CSR scores are also less likely to have a pension freeze.

This study examines the signaling role of CSR by using the signaling theory to explain how senders view the signaling process as a channel to build their reputation and the correspondent inference theory to explain how receivers process and assess the signal. It provides evidence that the signal provided by CSR score is reliable in assessing firms’ commitment to non-investing stakeholders, such as employees, providing valuable information for potential employees making career decisions and for managers considering employee pension as part of corporate strategies to attract high quality workforce. This study provides inputs for public accountants providing assurance services that CSR performance has a significant impact on management reporting choices. This study also provides evidence that CSR could be considered a private provision of public goods that internalize the negative externality of the prevalent underfunded pension phenomenon.

We examine and compare funding status, actuarial assumptions and asset investment allocations of defined benefit pension plans in the public and private sectors across time, using information as reported under GASB and FASB. We find that pension plans in both sectors are underfunded and that inferences about pension funding in the public sector would be different if pension assets' fair values were required in the computation of funding status. Actuarial assumptions of public employee plans appear to be both more optimistic and less variable than those of private sector plans. Finally, we document that public sector plans allocate invested assets somewhat differently than in the private sector, although our findings do not confirm anecdotal reports of riskier pension investment strategies relative to the private sector.

In this paper, we aim to answer two questions. First, whether firms manipulate reported earnings via pension assumptions when facing mandatory contributions. Second, whether firms alter their earnings management behavior when the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) mandates disclosure of pension asset composition and a description of investment strategy under SFAS 132R.

Our basic approach is to run linear regressions of firm-year assumed returns on the log of pension sensitivity measures, controlling for current and lagged actual returns from pension assets, fiscal year dummies and industry dummies. The larger the pension sensitivity ratios, the stronger the effects from inflated ERRs on reported earnings. We confirm the early results that the regression slopes are positive and highly significant. We construct an indicator variable DMC to capture the mandatory contributions firms face and another indicator variable D132R to capture the effect of SFAS 132R. DMC takes the value of one for fiscal years during which an acquisition takes place and zero otherwise. D132R takes the value of one for fiscal years after December 15, 2003 and zero otherwise.

Our sample covers the period from June 1992 to December 2017. Our key results are as follows. The estimated coefficient (t-statistic) on DMC is 0.308 (6.87). Firms facing mandatory contributions tend to set ERRs at an average 0.308% higher. The estimated coefficient (t-statistic) on D132R is −2.190 (−13.70). The new disclosure requirement under SFAS 132R constrains all firms to set ERRs at an average 2.190% lower. The estimate (t-statistic) on the interactive term DMA×D132R is −0.237 (−3.29). When mandatory contributions happen during the post-SFAS 132R period, firms tend to set ERRs at 0.237% lower than they would do otherwise in the pre-SFAS 132R period.

When firms face mandatory contributions, typically firm experience negative stock market returns. We examine whether managers manage earnings to mitigate such negative impact. We find that firms inflate assumed returns on pension assets to boost their reported earnings when facing mandatory contributions. We also find that managers alter earnings management behavior, in the case of mandatory contributions, following the introduction of new pension disclosure standards under SFAS 132R that become effective on December 15, 2003. Under the new SFAS 132R requirement, firms need to disclose asset allocation and describe investment strategies. This imposes restrictions on managers' discretion in making ERR assumptions, since now the composition of pension assets is a key determinant of the assumed expected rate of return on pension assets. Firms need to justify their ERRs with their asset allocations.

Examines the financial accountability implications arising from the adoption of accrual‐based accounting principles by Australia’s largest public sector employee pension fund manager, the State Authorities Superannuation Board of the Australian State of New South Wales (SASB), during its brief existence from 1988 to 1996. While the adoption of accrual‐based accounting principles increased management’s political accountability concerning the performance of SASB’s commercially‐managed asset portfolio, it reduced the level of generational accountability concerning the under‐funding of its major pension fund, the State Authorities Superannuation Scheme (the SAS). Negative political visibility associated with management’s voluntary compliance with a controversial financial reporting standard, together with government’s adoption of accrual accounting, resulted in two major changes in the SASB’s organizational structure. The impact of political visibility on the generational accountability behavior of SASB management is examined by comparing stock and flow funding trends of the SAS over time.

This study aims to examine the unexpected portion of the pension discount rate to determine if the pension discount rate is being used to manage earnings for both financially healthy and financially unhealthy firms as categorized based upon their Altman z-score for bankruptcy.

Regression analysis is conducted with the unexpected portion of the pension discount rate as the dependent variable and various metrics indicating potential firm strengths and weaknesses as the independent variables.

This study finds evidence that suggests managers for both groups of firms are using their choice of discount rate to manage bottom-line earnings. These findings highlight the patterns of various firm choice differences found between the two groups and the magnitude of the differences between the groups.

Three streams of literature are considered in this research: earnings management, defined pension plans and z-score bankruptcy. This study extends prior research by examining the unexpected portion of the pension discount rate based on the z-score determination of whether a firm is considered financially healthy or financially unhealthy. Our findings highlight the impact of various firm choice differences found between the two groups of firms.

This study aims to examine whether and how the experience of specialized external governance mechanisms mandated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 – the actuary and auditor – affect pension plan funding.

This study uses data from annual pension plan regulatory reports (Form 5500), Form 10-K filings, Form DEF 14A filings (company proxy statements) and publicly available data sources. The hand-collected data include information related to the pension plan’s actuary and auditor and various pension plan data disclosed in the company’s financial statement footnotes.

The author finds that more experienced actuaries and auditors are associated with better funded pension plans, especially when the company has higher financial risk or lower board independence. Additional analyses indicate that companies with more experienced actuaries and pension plan auditors are more likely to make higher annual pension plan contributions and hold fewer Level 3 fair value assets.

The dearth of pension plan governance research generally focuses on whether and how internal governance mechanisms affect pension plan funding. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first empirical study of the relationship between external pension plan governance mechanisms and pension plan funding.

Pension rate estimates are important because they provide information to the market, and because they are useful in estimating future cash flows or for other analytical purposes. This is especially true now, because the economic environment has deteriorated to a point that many investors perceive increased uncertainty with respect to pension plans and the effect they have on future income. In fact, several authors in the popular financial press have speculated on the impact of such fundamental changes in pension assets, liabilities, and estimates. Often, however, these articles are sensational, and do not appear to appreciate fully the complexities of pension accounting. In order to model the economic impact of pension rate declines, we develop a two‐period analytical model of pension cost, which allows us to simulate future pension expense and its associated earnings impact using a triangular distribution of rate estimates. In addition, we model the incremental cash contributions required under these estimates in order to maintain the ratio of pension assets to liabilities at 100 percent. Our results indicate that while the pension expense effect is large in both periods across firms with small, mid‐sized and large pension plans, firms with large plans show the greatest increase in pension expense. Interestingly, however, the earnings impact is the smallest for firms with large plans in both periods. In addition, all firms face significantly increased cash funding requirements in order to prevent funding ratios (plan assets scaled by pension liabilities) from deteriorating. These results suggest not only future earnings reductions from pension rate declines, but also a potentially significant cash flow impact as well.

In this paper, the impact of stock-based compensation and further the joint effects of stock-based compensation and investor sentiment on pension discount rate choice is examined.

The hypotheses is tested using fixed effects models and instrumental variable analysis where pension discount rate is the dependent variable, and stock-based compensation and investor sentiment are our variables of interest.

It was found that pension discount rate is negatively associated with managers' stock-based compensation. Further analysis indicates that managers with larger stock-based compensation tend to adjust down their pension discount rates in higher (smaller) degree, responding to high (low) investor sentiment.

The findings provide important insights into how managers use pension discount rates to engage in earnings management. Understanding these relationships has implications for interpreting pension numbers reported in the financial statements and designing pension accounting rules that minimize the possibility that managers take advantage of the complexity associated with pension accounting to influence the reported earnings and executive compensation. Moreover, the findings suggest the need for increased attention from boards of directors, auditors and regulators to reported pension liabilities and service costs, especially for firms paying higher proportion of stock-based compensation to managers and during periods of high investor sentiment.

The findings contribute to the extant literature by identifying the joint impacts of stock-based compensation and investor sentiment as incentives for pension discount rate manipulation. The empirical results of this study also have important implications for corporate governance and regulation.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate how audit quality affects the cost of equity (COE) defined benefit pension risk relation. As an antecedent to these tests, this study first uses implied COE measures and their pension intensity risk predictors to examine the relation between a defined benefit plan (DBP) firm’s implied COE and pension intensity risk. Then, using these measures, the authors provide new evidence on how audit quality affects this relation.

Using panel data over fiscal years 1999–2014, fixed effects models regress dependent variable, implied the COE on controls and proxies that measure pension intensity risk and pension intensity risk conditional on the quality of the audit.

This study documents that audit quality attenuates the positive relation between a sponsoring firm’s COE and pension risk. The authors rationalize these findings by asserting that the positive relation between a sponsoring firm’s COE and pension intensity risk reflects increased financial risk associated with higher pension obligations but the quality of the auditor attenuates this risk. This paper further documents that these findings are robust to a sponsoring firms’ level of financial distress.

A limitation of this research is that the sample is limited to DBPs companies only. Although results of the tests show similar results for controls that are used in other COE-related studies that include DBP and non-DBP firms, the generalizability of the findings may be limited to the extent that the financial characteristics of firms without defined contribution plans differ from the sample.

Results of this study suggest that while pension intensity risk has COE implications, managers may be able to mitigate these effects by managing their plans and utilizing high-quality auditors.

Using implied COE and pension intensity risk measures, this study provides new information on the favorable effect that high-quality audits have on the COE – pension risk relation.