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This case is one of a pair of cases used in a merger negotiation. It is designed to be used with “British Petroleum, Ltd.” (UVA-F-1263). One-half of the class prepares only the British Petroleum (BP) case, and one-half uses this case. BP and Amoco are considering a merger, and are in the process of negotiating a merger agreement. Macroeconomic assumptions, particularly forecasting future oil prices in an uncertain environment, and assumptions about Amoco's ability to reduce exploration and production costs make Amoco's future cash flows difficult to predict.

This case is one of a pair of cases used in a merger negotiation. It is designed to be used with “Amoco Corporation” (UVA-F-1262). One-half of the class prepares only the Amoco case, and one-half uses this case. BP and Amoco are considering a merger, and are in the process of negotiating a merger agreement. Macroeconomic assumptions, particularly forecasting future oil prices in an uncertain environment, and assumptions about Amoco's ability to reduce exploration and production costs make Amoco's future cash flows difficult to predict.

Grocery store chain Winn-Dixie had rapidly expanded in an effort to become a national retailer, and by 1999 it had more than 1,000 stores. The company began manufacturing its own products, reasoning that by owning more of the supply chain, it could offer the customer less expensive options. With its new geographic focus and manufacturing facilities, Winn-Dixie attempted to secure a position as a low-cost provider with a national presence. Instead of improving the company's position in the market, however, this strategy crippled both the short- and long-term prospects for Winn-Dixie. The company paid a high premium to expand and increased its leverage without ever realizing the purposed synergies. In fact, there were dis-economies of scale because the distribution, marketing, and administrative costs had risen along with the increased revenue. The expansion and inefficient manufacturing added complexity to its distribution network, and with a greater debt load and less cash, the company was unable to reposition itself in the market when its low-cost provider strategy failed. Not only was the company unable to pursue other opportunities but it also did not have the cash to properly maintain many of its existing stores, which quickly became run down. Winn-Dixie was stuck as a general grocer with few options at a time when the industry was rapidly evolving. Following faulty strategies of expansion, supply chain changes, and increased debt, Winn-Dixie declared bankruptcy. Students will take the view that Paul “Flip” Huffard, lead consultant from Blackstone LP, had in determining the valuation and new capital structure of the company. These decisions would be critical, as they affected what each creditor class would receive and whether Winn-Dixie could emerge from bankruptcy.

Students will: 1. Assess the importance and negative financial impact of past strategic moves, and suggest possible future strategic directions and the expected benefits of such changes. 2. Learn quantitative valuation methods for a company in Chapter 11 and their effects on stakeholders. 3. Learn the elements of a plan of reorganization, including the capital structure, treatment of multiple creditor groups, and management compensation. 4. Discuss sources and uses of capital during a Chapter 11 turnaround.

Grocery store chain Winn-Dixie had rapidly expanded in an effort to become a national retailer, and by 1999 it had more than 1,000 stores. The company began manufacturing its own products, reasoning that by owning more of the supply chain, it could offer the customer less expensive options. With its new geographic focus and manufacturing facilities, Winn-Dixie attempted to secure a position as a low-cost provider with a national presence. Instead of improving the company's position in the market, however, this strategy crippled both the short- and long-term prospects for Winn-Dixie. The company paid a high premium to expand and increased its leverage without ever realizing the purposed synergies. In fact, there were dis-economies of scale because the distribution, marketing, and administrative costs had risen along with the increased revenue. The expansion and inefficient manufacturing added complexity to its distribution network, and with a greater debt load and less cash, the company was unable to reposition itself in the market when its low-cost provider strategy failed. Not only was the company unable to pursue other opportunities but it also did not have the cash to properly maintain many of its existing stores, which quickly became run down. Winn-Dixie was stuck as a general grocer with few options at a time when the industry was rapidly evolving. Following faulty strategies of expansion, supply chain changes, and increased debt, Winn-Dixie declared bankruptcy. Students will take the view that Paul “Flip” Huffard, lead consultant from Blackstone LP, had in determining the valuation and new capital structure of the company. These decisions would be critical, as they affected what each creditor class would receive and whether Winn-Dixie could emerge from bankruptcy.

Students will: 1. Assess the importance and negative financial impact of past strategic moves, and suggest possible future strategic directions and the expected benefits of such changes. 2. Learn quantitative valuation methods for a company in Chapter 11 and their effects on stakeholders. 3. Learn the elements of a plan of reorganization, including the capital structure, treatment of multiple creditor groups, and management compensation. 4. Discuss sources and uses of capital during a Chapter 11 turnaround.

This case reviews the financial performance of the Fidelity Magellan Fund up to mid-1995. In essence, the Magellan Fund has managed to “beat the market” over time under three different fund managers despite its enormous size ($51 billion at the date of the case). The tasks for the student are to assess the adequacy of this performance, evaluate its likely sources, and opine on its sustainability. The case affords the opportunity to consider the appropriateness of various possible benchmarks in a risk-return framework and to assess the reasonableness of the efficient-markets hypothesis. The case can be used in an introductory finance course to present general information about equity markets and the behavior of large, sophisticated money managers.

In recent years Lehman Brothers, one of the five largest investment banks in the United States, had grown increasingly reliant on its fixed income trading and underwriting division, which served as the primary engine for its strong profit growth. The bank had also significantly increased its leverage over the same timeframe, going from a debt-to-equity ratio of 23.7x in 2003 to 35.2x in 2007. As leverage increased, the ongoing erosion of the mortgage-backed industry began to impact Lehman significantly and its stock price plummeted. Unfortunately, public outcry over taxpayer assumption of $29 billion in potential Bear losses made repeating such a move politically untenable. The surreal scene of potential buyers traipsing into an investment bank's headquarters over the weekend to consider various merger or spin-out scenarios repeated itself once again. This time, the Fed refused to back the failing bank's liabilities, attempting instead to play last-minute suitors Bank of America, HSBC, Nomura Securities, and Barclay's off each other, jawboning them by arguing that failing to step up to save Lehman would cause devastating counterparty runs on their own capital positions. The Fed's desperate attempts to arrange its second rescue of a major U.S. investment bank in six months failed when it refused to backstop losses from Lehman's toxic mortgage holdings. Complicating matters was Lehman's reliance on short-term repo loans to finance its balance sheet. Unfortunately, such loans required constant renewal by counterparties, who had grown increasingly nervous that Lehman would lose the ability to make good on its trades. With this sentiment swirling around Wall Street, Lehman was forced to announce the largest Chapter 11 filing in U.S. history, listing assets of $639 billion and liabilities of $768 billion. The second domino had fallen. It would not be the last.

This case covers the period from the sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan to the conversion into bank holding companies by Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, including the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America. The case explains the new global paradigm for the investment banking industry, including increased regulation, fewer competitors, lower leverage, reduced proprietary trading, and-potentially-reduced profits.

Trouble was brewing for Nestle in India with a lab test finding MSG in Maggi noodles, a product brand which had been adjudged ‘most powerful’ and ‘most trusted’ in India;it was being banned in different parts of the country. Paul Bulcke, CEO of Nestle SA, arrived in New Delhi to face the heat and take necessary damage control measures. The case challenges the participants to review the events leading to a total ban on all the nine variants of Maggi noodles imposed by FSSAI, the Indian Regulator, by Nestle India. It also challenges them to suggest ways of taking care of the business in future in India as well as its effects in other countries.

In August 2007 the Mainsail II SIV-Lite was frozen by its trustee as a result of the ongoing credit crisis. The state of Maine held $20 million of Mainsail commercial paper in its Cash Pool portfolio, a short-term portfolio that puts temporary, excess state revenues to work. When word of the potential loss became public, the Treasurer came under attack. The case introduces the functions of a state Treasury department, with particular emphasis on the investment objectives and guidelines for the cash pool as well as its composition. The case reviews the events leading up to and including August 2007, the month when the credit markets first began to seize and when the financial crisis effectively began. It examines securitization, structured finance, and the Mainsail SIV-Lite structure in some detail.

In September 2015, VW had admitted to United States regulators that it had deliberately installed “defeat devices” in many of its diesel cars, which enabled the cars to cheat on federal and state emissions tests, making them able to pass the tests and hit ambitious mileage and performance targets while actually emitting up to 40 times more hazardous gases into the atmosphere than legally allowed. The discovery had prompted the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to halt final certification of VW’s 2016 diesel models, and VW itself had halted sales of its 2015 models. As fallout from the defeat devices developed, VW posted its first quarterly loss in more than 15 years, and its stock plummeted. Top executives were replaced, and VW abandoned its goal of becoming the world’s largest automaker. Stakeholders around the world had been asking since the scandal broke: “How could this have happened at Volkswagen?”

In December 2001, after a six-month process of vying for AT&T's Broadband, the president of cable operator Comcast Corporation, had just received word that Comcast's $72-billion offer had won the auction. Comcast, the cable industry's third-largest operator, would merge with industry leader AT&T Broadband to form a company with more than $20 billion in revenue and an unparalleled distribution (a presence in 22 of the nation's top 25 markets). Now the presidents of both companies began to consider their post-merger integration strategies. What was important and how should they prioritize their activities? How could they get all stakeholders to understand the rationale for the deal and its business goals and excited about the new AT&T Comcast?