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Frequent renegotiations within public-private partnership (PPP) have been recognised and affect project efficiency. Literature has focussed on diverse issues associated with renegotiation within PPP, especially in Latin America and Europe. However, a systematic summary what they have already provided appears lacking. Thus, the paper aims to conduct a critical review of publications concerning PPP renegotiation and explore the status quo, future interests and gaps in research.

This study carried out a four-phase literature review research framework to identify the quality PPP-renegotiation articles published from 2003 to 2020. Assessing the full articles for eligibility by providing a structured summary including: background; objectives; data sources; study appraisal; results; limitations; conclusions and implications of key findings. After that, filtering papers associated with PPP renegotiation in terms of the structured summary, and a total of 60 research papers were selected in the database of web of science and Scopus for review.

Methods adopted by researchers, research topics and theoretical foundations of PPP renegotiation research in different disciplines were identified through content analysis. Amongst the popular research topics identified were renegotiation factors, the outcomes with renegotiations, the framework to deal with renegotiations and contract design dealing with renegotiation based on rigid or flexible contracts.

This study contributes to the current body of PPP knowledge by revealing the research trend in the past 20 years. It also points out the directions that the renegotiations of PPP research may go towards in the future. Moreover, this study is very valuable in understanding how governments and concessionaires effectively handle renegotiations.

With the continuous improvement of public–private partnership (PPP) projects, the participants' value creation goals are not only limited to achieving the basic performance objectives but also to realising value added. However, the effect of traditional contract management on realising the value creation objectives of PPP projects is limited. According to the view of multifunctional contract, joint-contract functions that integrate contract control and flexibility are likely to be effective in enhancing the value creation of PPP projects. This study aims to explore the effects of joint-contract functions on PPP project value creation and relevant influencing mechanism by investigating the mediating effect of in-role behaviour and extra-role behaviour.

After collecting 258 valid questionnaires from PPP professionals in China, this study used structural equation modelling to validate the hypotheses.

Contract control and flexibility can improve PPP project value creation. Specifically, contract control improves the achievement of the basic contract objectives of PPP projects, whereas contract flexibility enhances the achievement of the value-added of PPP projects. Moreover, only in-role behaviour mediates the effect of contract control on value creation. In addition, the mediating effect of extra-role behaviour on the impact of contract flexibility on value creation is stronger than that of in-role behaviour. The mediating effect of in- and extra-role behaviour is mainly reflected in the realisation of basic and value-added performance, respectively.

The findings of this study can help realise value creation in three ways. Firstly, new perspectives for PPP project value creation should be proposed by combining the improvement of contract objectives and the realisation of the participants' implicit demands. Secondly, the effects of different contract functions on value creation should be analysed instead of a single dimension of contractual governance. Thirdly, the mediating effects of different types of cooperation behaviour that may influence the relationship between contractual governance and value creation should be evaluated.

This study verifies the impacts of different contract functions on PPP project value creation. In addition, cooperative behaviour is embedded as a mediating variable, and the mediated transmission path from contract function to cooperative behaviour and further to PPP project value creation is systematically analysed.

A public–private partnership (PPP) is an agreement between the government and private investors to deliver long-term public services. The efficiency of PPP projects depends on PPP contracts stipulating contractual parties' corresponding responsibilities and rights to deal with relational and performance risks. Although more complex contracts provide more remedies for mitigating ex-post transaction costs, they also result in the increased ex ante transaction costs associated with contract writing. Thus, contractual complexity is a design choice that can reduce the overall contract transaction costs.

Using 365 transportation PPP projects in China from 2010 to 2019, this study applies the Poisson regression model to examine the effects of payment mechanisms, ownership by investors and equity structure on contractual complexity.

PPP contracts have control and coordination functions with unique determinants. Parties in the government-pay mechanism are more likely to negotiate coordination provisions, which results in greater contractual complexity. PPP projects with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have less contractual complexity in terms of both two functions of provisions, whereas the equity structure has no impact on contractual complexity.

These findings provide a nuanced understanding of how various contractual provisions are combined to perform control or coordination functions and make managerial recommendations to parties involved in PPP projects.

The risks and uncertainties of public–private partnership (PPP) projects threaten their sustainability. Contract flexibility, which is based on the theory of incomplete contract and transaction cost, may be a viable solution to this issue. The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between contract flexibility and the sustainability performance of PPP projects. The multiple mediating roles of justice perception and cooperation efficiency are assessed, thereby allowing the pathways and conditions to be understood more comprehensively for improving the sustainability performance of PPP projects.

Nine hypotheses in the proposed research model are tested via structural equation modeling using data acquired from 218 Chinese PPP professionals.

Results show that contract flexibility positively affects PPP project sustainability performance. Justice perception and cooperation efficiency play direct and sequential mediating roles in this effect.

This study validates that contract flexibility positively impacts the sustainability performance of PPP projects, where justice perception and cooperation efficiency serve direct and sequential mediating roles. The findings of this study contribute to an improved understanding of the effect of contract flexibility on the sustainability performance of PPP projects. Furthermore, they provide important theoretical and practical insights into contract management as well as beneficial information and valuable initiatives for improving the sustainability of PPP projects.

The role of conventional contracts in achieving sustainability goals in public–private partnership (PPP) projects has been questioned. From the multifunctional perspective of contract theory, joint-contract functions that combine contractual control, coordination and adaptation may be a potential approach for improving PPP project sustainability performance. This research intends to investigate the link between the joint-contract functions and PPP project sustainability performance, and their underlying mechanism, by analyzing the mediating role of relationship quality and moderating roles of environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty.

Based on 170 valid survey data collected from the Chinese PPP professionals, partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) was adopted to test the hypothesis.

The results reveal that joint-contract functions are positively associated with the PPP project sustainability performance. This relationship is strengthened by environmental and behavioral uncertainty. Moreover, the relationship between the joint-contract functions and PPP project sustainability performance is mediated by relationship quality.

This research extends contract governance theory and sustainability research in PPP projects. The research implications are as follows: (1) joint-contract functions are a second-order construct consisting of three first-order dimensions: control, coordination and adaptation and are positively associated with PPP project sustainability performance; (2) joint-contract functions enhance the sustainable benefits of PPP projects during environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty; (3) informal relationships are a critical bridge connecting formal institutions with the sustainability performance of PPP projects.

In general, these findings guide project participants who aim to achieve sustainable outcomes in PPP projects. (1) Project participants should consider the process of contract design and sign contracts that focus on joint-contract functions. (2) Project participants should investigate the degree of uncertainty of a PPP project before designing contracts, and design the contracts with corresponding complexity. (3) Project participants should work to enhance PPP sustainable benefits by improving the relationship between partners, such as encouraging mutual trust and joint problem-solving.

This research verifies the relationship between joint-contract functions and PPP project sustainability performance, and the boundary and intermediary conditions between them.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a public–private partnership (PPP) framework for newcomers from developing countries with the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

For this purpose, through the meta-analysis review of literature and applied qualitative content analysis to the international PPP best practices, the authors identified key relevant PPP processes, terminologies and vocabulary that can assist new entrants in establishing their PPP infrastructure.

The outcome was a generic best practice framework for PPP implementation that consisted of five phases which further consisted of groups of functions and sub-groups of functions. These phases are establish the PPP framework, PPP implementation, contract design, bid management and PPP contract management.

This framework is expected to benefit the upper management of local government departments and the federal ministries to understand the full process for local PPPs and to help them make informed decision for what to develop as PPPs and how to develop them.

This systematic approach to the development of PPPs in the UAE is expected to increase the number of PPP tenders, as there will be more awareness on what PPPs stand for, how they balance risks, improve efficiency and effectiveness of projects, improve facilities and services, etc.

This framework is the first to lay the foundations for a standardised PPP practice in the UAE for practitioners.

The purpose of this study is to develop penalty measures against concessionaires’ defaults as a mechanism for protecting the interests of parties (public and private) in public–private partnership (PPP) contracts for enhancing project delivery.

The research methodology is a mixed qualitative and quantitative approach. This study commenced with an in-depth literature review, which provided the basis for identification of penalty measures in construction contract management. The qualitative assessment was based on semi-structured face-to-face interviews, which were aimed at identifying the underlying pattern of the penalty measures, and the quantitative assessment was based on a structured questionnaire. In both cases, respondents were stakeholders’ organizations that had been involved in PPP contracts in the southwestern region of Nigeria. These include industrial practitioners from government-based organizations (ministries, agencies, corporations/parastatals, etc.), private developers/concessionaires, law firms, banks, etc. The sample size was selected using a respondent-driven sampling approach, as the comprehensive lists of the participants in PPP contracts are not readily available in the Nigerian construction industry. Responses from the interview were analysed using interpretative phenomenal analysis via ATLAS.ti7. The quantitative data were analysed using percentile for flexibility between “most” and “more” preferred mechanisms.

This study developed mechanisms that defined the rights of the public party to redress underperformance of PPP contracts consequent to the defaults of the private party. “Step-in-right” and “termination of the contracts” were preferred against specific cases of “delayed execution”, “abandonment of the project”, “bankruptcy of the concessionaire” and “non-compliance with design and specifications”. With respect to “shortfall in performance against established dates”, the results converged on “monetary fine” and diverged on “step-in-right” and “termination of the contracts”.

The study contributes to literature on mechanisms for enforcing PPP project performance. Besides, defining rights and obligations of the parties in specific events of underperformance of the concessionaires in PPP contracts is a significant step towards the development of standard conditions of contract for managing PPP projects in which the model is being newly adopted.

Project management studies on PPP were extended by defining the liabilities that are consequent to the defaults of the private party and the mechanisms for their enforcement.