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This study aims to (1) validate the efficacy of contractual and relational governance in enhancing operational performance and (2) explore the influence of product complexity on the effectiveness of these governance mechanisms, thereby determining the optimal approach for varying levels of product complexity.

By utilizing a comprehensive theoretical framework encompassing transaction cost economics, social exchange theory and contingency theory, this research explores the intricate interplay between governance mechanisms, product complexity and operational performance, drawing insights from a dataset comprising 246 responses within Mainland China’s manufacturing sector. To rigorously test the proposed hypotheses, this study employed a hierarchical regression analysis.

The findings of this study are summarized as follows: (1) while both contractual governance and relational governance have a significant impact on operational performance, relational governance is found to be more effective than contractual governance in enhancing operational performance; and (2) the moderation effect of product complexity is evident, as it weakens the impact of contractual governance while simultaneously enhancing the positive influence of relational governance on operational performance.

The study uncovers a moderation effect of product complexity on the relationship between governance mechanisms and operational performance. This finding adds an original contribution to the literature by highlighting how product complexity can interact with governance strategies, providing practical insights for industries dealing with varying levels of product complexity.

A public–private partnership (PPP) is an agreement between the government and private investors to deliver long-term public services. The efficiency of PPP projects depends on PPP contracts stipulating contractual parties' corresponding responsibilities and rights to deal with relational and performance risks. Although more complex contracts provide more remedies for mitigating ex-post transaction costs, they also result in the increased ex ante transaction costs associated with contract writing. Thus, contractual complexity is a design choice that can reduce the overall contract transaction costs.

Using 365 transportation PPP projects in China from 2010 to 2019, this study applies the Poisson regression model to examine the effects of payment mechanisms, ownership by investors and equity structure on contractual complexity.

PPP contracts have control and coordination functions with unique determinants. Parties in the government-pay mechanism are more likely to negotiate coordination provisions, which results in greater contractual complexity. PPP projects with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have less contractual complexity in terms of both two functions of provisions, whereas the equity structure has no impact on contractual complexity.

These findings provide a nuanced understanding of how various contractual provisions are combined to perform control or coordination functions and make managerial recommendations to parties involved in PPP projects.

While previous studies explored the argument that allies the notion of complexity to the complex product-service offerings being procured, this paper aims to explore whether there is a corollary with exchange governance complexity. More specifically, the paper analyzes the relationship between systemic complexity and complexity of contractual and relational exchange governance in procuring complex performance (PCP) arrangements.

A multiple, longitudinal case study method is used to examine the relationship between systemic complexity and exchange governance complexity. The study deploys rich data sets by combining government and company reports with 43 semi-structured interviews.

Preliminary conclusions suggest that as a response to increasing systemic complexity, organizations respond with increasing contractual governance complexity. However, better performing PCP arrangements illustrate that the use of simplified contractual governance in form of working agreements in combination with relational governance such as inter-personal relationships may be more effective to counteract complexity.

The paper questions whether organizations should respond with increasing exchange governance complexity to counteract systemic complexity. Managers must consider the manageability and enforceability of complex contracts in combination with the formation of inter-personal relationships and simplified working agreements.

This study adds to the limited empirical understanding on the nature of long-term public-private interactions in PCP. It also contributes through a rare focus on the relationship between systemic complexity and exchange governance complexity in PCP arrangements.

This paper aims to investigate that how to mitigate the weaker party's risk perception in imbalanced supply chain relationships by framing contracts according to complexity and recurrence. The level of information technology (IT) integration is considered as the moderator influencing the effectuation of contract framing.

The authors conducted a questionnaire survey with 229 firms involved in imbalanced supply chains. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses.

The authors found contractual complexity positively influenced performance and relational risk, while contractual recurrence negatively impacted performance and relational risk. This study further reveals the positive moderating effect of IT integration in influencing contractual complexity on relational risk and performance risk and the negative impact of IT integration in influencing contractual recurrence on relational risk and performance risk.

Overall, this study posits the coordinating role of contracts in reducing the weaker party's risk perception in imbalanced supply chain relationships.

The authors concluded by illustrating how to customize contracts based on the level of IT integration to maximize their role in reducing risk perception.

This study is embedded in imbalanced supply chain relationship, aiming to solve the problem of high-risk perception held by the weaker party, which is a salient threat to the sustainability of collaboration. Contract framing is proposed as an effective approach for mitigating risk perception, which should be carefully designed based on the level of IT integration of the relationship. The authors found that contractual complexity has a positive influence on performance and relational risk, but contractual recurrence has a negative impact on performance and relational risk. This study further reveals the moderating effect of IT integration on the effectuation of contractual framing.

This paper aims to explain how contractual complexity, including contractual control, coordination and adaptation, makes a difference to the task and relationship conflict, and then, to investigate the moderating roles played by both, total interdependence and interdependence asymmetry, in altering the association between the two types of conflicts.

This study obtained data through a questionnaire survey in the Chinese construction industry and the final sample consisted of 232 responses. The data were analysed using hierarchy analysis using SPSS.

The results are as follows: first, higher contractual control and coordination reduce the level of relationship conflicts, and higher contractual coordination also reduces the level of task conflicts; second, task conflict positively affects relationship conflict; third, task conflict mediates the relationship between contractual coordination and relationship conflict; and finally, when total interdependence is higher, task conflict induces more relationship conflict. On the contrary, high interdependence asymmetry weakens the positive relationship between task and relationship conflicts.

This study highlights the importance of contracts in conflict management. The findings can guide practitioners in drafting suitable contracts to deal with task and relationship conflicts more effectively.

This study differentiates the effects of distinct components of contracts on task and relationship conflicts, and then reveals the contingent effects of interdependence on the relationship between task and relationship conflicts in inter-organisational transactions.

To build a more comprehensive understanding of factors affecting the success of service contracting, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the influences of service complexity, contract structure and contracting process on the buyer-perceived supplier performance in business-to-business (B2B) services.

A research model is developed based on transaction cost economics and the research on service contracting. The model is tested by the survey data collected. Professional focus groups on LinkedIn are used to generate the list of potential respondents. The sample consists of 177 purchasing professionals from 25 countries.

The results indicate that three major contract dimensions and follow-up management practices positively influence buyer-perceived supplier performance. Furthermore, service complexity amplifies the effects of incentives designed in the contract and the buyer’s follow-up contract management on perceived supplier performance.

The sample consists of respondents from 25 countries and provides good geographic coverage. However, the results should be generalized with caution because not all countries were represented equally.

The study suggests a framework and guidelines for purchasing managers to improve the design and management of service contracts to secure good performance from their supplier.

This paper contributes to understanding the performance-enhancing aspects of designing and monitoring service contracts in B2B contexts. It also adds to the knowledge of the role of service complexity in successful B2B service purchasing.

This paper aims to provide a comprehensive view of the role of previous cooperative relationships between partners at the different stages of development of strategic alliances: formation, design and post-formation, as well as their effect on alliance performance.

This paper is a comprehensive review of the literature.

This paper shows that the relationship between prior ties and alliance outcomes is more complex than what it seems at first sight. The impact that prior ties have on alliance performance and organizational adaptation is not always positive.

The main implication of this paper for researchers and managers is to show the need to consider the risks of repeated relationships between partners. This research could be developed by conducting a meta-analysis.

This paper provides a comprehensive view of the impact of prior ties between the partners in strategic alliance outcomes. This paper sheds light on some inconclusive results of previous research on this topic.

The purpose of this study is to ascertain and list the most effective management strategies in efficiently handling the project complexities to enhance the performance of the project.

To fulfill the aim of this study, a comprehensive literature review was conducted, and the qualitative Delphi technique in two rounds was applied. Participants of the Delphi technique consisted of 12 subject matter experts (SMEs) with cumulative experience of 250 years in working in construction projects. In the first round of the Delphi technique, SMEs were asked to provide complexity management strategies to address the complexities due to 37 complexity indicators (CIs) under 11 complexity categories. In the second round of the Delphi technique, SMEs identified the top three management strategies for each of the 37 CIs.

This study collected the outcome of the two-round Delphi technique and based on the output developed the list of strategies to manage complexities related to each indicator. For example, establishing a well-informed governance team, assigning a Project Manager (PM) when the number of projects is more than one in an organization, and assigning a PM efficient enough to communicate with higher authority effectively will help in managing complexity that arises due to faulty assessment of the influence of a project on the organization’s overall success.

This study will help practitioners in effectively managing the project complexities, and thus will reduce the monetary loss associated with project complexities.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the mediating role of contracts and trust on the generation of product innovations stemming from buyer-supplier knowledge-sharing (KS) among the members of the supply chain. Together with the individual effects of trust and contracts, their joint effect is examined in order to determine whether these are complementary or alternative mechanisms of safeguarding and control.

Drawing on a survey of 202 European machine tool firms acting as buyers and sellers, the authors propose and evaluate a structural equation model.

Results confirm that there is a positive relation between contracts and trust with respect to buyer-supplier KS, and of the latter with respect to innovation performance. They also show that firms in which both the levels of trust and contract use are high reinforce their product-innovation capability based on buyer-supplier interaction (complementarity thesis). However, results also show that, contrary to trust, contracts by themselves do not act as a stimulus for product innovation.

Establishing contracts seems to be a highly recommended action in a buyer-supplier relationship focused on increasing innovation capacity. This does not go against engendering trust in a relationship. Both trust with a degree of formalization, in different ways, help to increase the effect of sharing valuable knowledge on innovation capacity.

To the authors’ best knowledge, no prior study has delved into differentiating the use of contracts and trust as mechanisms in mediating the effect originated from knowledge-sharing on product innovation performance with two different samples formed by buying and selling firms.