Search results

Many U.S. companies fear investing in Third World countries because of the political risk associated with such ventures. Recent events in Iran, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines and others have under scored such concerns, making U.S. businesses reluctant to participate in some of the fastest growing markets in the Third World. Such political risks need not be so worrisome ‐ many U.S. business people remain unaware of how the Overseas Private Investment Corporation can substantially reduce risks by insuring companies against such uncertainties. This paper discusses the ways through which OPIC can alleviate political risk and compares OPIC’s insurance with the programs of private political risk insurers.

The World Bank established the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) in 1985 as the first truly global agency which insures foreign investments against political risks. MIGA is now in its fifth full year of operations and has been more successful than originally forecast. This paper will discuss the formation of MIGA and includes an analysis of its operations to date. When appropriate, comparisons will be made between MIGA operations and those of the U.S. investment insurance agency, OPIC, the Overseas Private Investment Company, as well as private market insurers. Selected cases of MIGA guarantees are discussed in the paper.

A widely used strategy to cope with the dangers of foreign investment by hedging against potential losses is political risk insurance. All multinational corporations are subject to political risk perils. Political risk is defined as the adverse effect on the value of a business arising out of direct or indirect actions by a foreign government. Broadly speaking, there are six different types of political risk: confiscation, expropriation and nationalization; contract repudiation and frustration; unfair regulatory environment; currency inconvertibility; contingency; and war risk. Similarly, policies available can be defined according to these six categories. In summary, political risk insurance addresses losses which occur because of politically motivated decisions.

The aims of this paper are: to explore the nature of political risk insurance (PRI) contracts as a form of regulation in the context of mining projects in developing countries; to examine how PRI providers factor corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies and practices of applicants in their initial decisions to provide PRI; to examine how CSR criteria are reflected in the terms of PRI contracts; to understand how failure to exercise good CSR practices by recipients of PRI affects insurance coverage; to shed light on how good CSR practices which minimize risk to companies and communities can be or are rewarded through PRI contracts; to identify opportunities for reform.

This article adopts a conceptual approach through analysis of the practical effects and public policy implications associated with use of PRI contracts as a regulatory mechanism to promote good CSR practices.

PRI contracts represent a form of proactive risk management used by investors. Because of the significant regulatory effect of the CSR provisions of PRI contracts provided by state‐based agencies, there is considerable potential for and value associated with greater transparency in the implementation of such contracts.

This article sheds light on the regulatory dimensions associated with the CSR provisions of PRI contracts. This represents a new contribution to the literature on CSR contracts, which until this point has focused largely on the CSR aspects of supply chain contracts.

Political risk is a complex phenomenon. This complexity has incentivized scholars to take a piecemeal approach to understanding it. Nearly all scholarship has targeted a single type of political risk (expropriation) and, within this risk, a single type of firm (MNCs) and a single type of strategic mechanism through which that risk may be mitigated (entry mode). Yet “political risk” is actually a collection of multiple distinct risks that affect the full spectrum of foreign firms, and these firms vary widely in their capabilities for resisting and evading these risks. We offer a unified theoretical model that can simultaneously analyze: the three main types of political risk (war, expropriation, and transfer restrictions); the universe of private foreign investors (direct investors, portfolio equity investors, portfolio debt investors, and commercial banks); heterogeneity in government constraints; and the three most relevant strategic capabilities (information, exit, and resistance). We leverage the variance among foreign investors to identify effective firm strategies to manage political risk. By employing a simultaneous and unified model of political risk, we also find counterintuitive insights on the way governments trade off between risks and how investors use other investors as risk shields.

Conventional wisdom suggests that war in the host country makes it unattractive for foreign firms to invest. To see if this is true for US firms on the aggregate, this paper aims to examine the veracity of a “permanent war economy” hypothesis, that foreign direct investment (FDI) may, in fact, increase in the host country not despite, but because of, war, i.e. one that lends credence to the idea that, in the USA, “defense [has] become one of constant preparation for future wars and foreign interventions rather than an exercise in response to one-off threats.”

The authors test the hypotheses using Generalized Method of Moments estimation, with Heckman Selection, on US FDI data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and war data from the Correlates of War2 Project, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/International Peace Research Institute data set, the International Crisis Behavior Project and the Center for Systemic Peace Major Episodes of Political Violence data set. The final sample consists of 351 country-year observations in 55 host countries from 1982 to 2006.

The findings indicate that overall US FDI in a host country in a given year decreases if the host country is engaged in wars with multiple countries and if the US Government is involved in the war. Most notably, the results show that US involvement in multiple host country wars is actually correlated with increased US FDI into the host country, providing empirical support for the “permanent war economy” hypothesis.

While other studies have focused on war and FDI, the authors have sought to show the impact of the involvement of arguably the most influential country, i.e. the USA, in the sovereign matters of a focal host country. By studying FDI from the USA as a function of US involvement in wars overseas, over the years with the greatest use of private military companies by the USA and the largest portion of global FDI accounted for by the USA, this work motivates a research agenda on home-host-"other” relations in the context of war and FDI, with the “other” being the supranational “elephant in the room.”

United States history is steeped in trade and trade debate, from the pivotal role of the Boston Tea Party in shaping the United States as a nation to the recent debate over the merits of U.S. ratification of the present version of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. It is no surprise, then, that the U.S. Department of Commerce is actively involved in promoting exports. In 1993, President Clinton announced a national export strategy for the United States, described as “a comprehensive plan [that] upgrades and coordinates the government's export promotion and export finance programs to help American firms compete in the global marketplace” (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1994). In particular, the strategy identifies past problems with U.S. trade promotion efforts and recommends improvements upon current ones. This includes enhancing existing trade finance programs such as the Exim Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and creating the Tied Aid Fund to help U.S. firms compete on a level playing field. As an outcrop of this initiative, the Commerce Department identified 10 foreign nations as the big emerging markets (BEMs) of the upcoming century, markets where the potential for trade growth is the greatest.