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The purpose of this paper is to examine whether audit committee members of the board prove to be better monitors if they are also on the compensation committee, as they would be more attuned to compensation related earnings management incentives.

The paper uses archival data on a sample of nonfinancial S&P 500 firms representing 1,032 firm years over the period 2003‐2005, and discretionary accruals as a proxy for financial reporting quality.

Firms with overlapping audit and compensation committees have higher financial reporting quality than those without such overlap. In addition, there is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between overlapping magnitude and financial reporting quality, suggesting that there are costs as well as benefits to overlapping committees.

The findings on this paper have implications for recent policy deliberations on the composition of board committees in general and audit committees in particular, as they clarify the benefits of overlapping committee members.

Understanding the costs and benefits of the board committee structure is particularly important as boards typically operate through the use of committees. This paper contributes to this area by considering the effect of overlapping memberships on two of the most active and important board committees – the compensation and audit committees – on the monitoring effectiveness of the audit committee.

This study aims to examine whether, and which type of, busy audit committee (AC) directors affect the quality and quantity of forward-looking disclosure (FLD).

The authors use content analysis to measure the quality and quantity of FLD. The authors use a sample of Omani financial institutions listed on the Muscat Securities Market for the period 2014–2018.

The authors find that overlapped AC chairs and total overlapped AC directors negatively (positively) affect disclosure quantity (quality). The authors also find that overlapped AC directors with financial expertise and those with multiple directorships positively affect disclosure quantity and quality.

This study offers new insights to policymakers (and managers) as it informs them about the benefits of overlapping AC directorship. It suggests that corporate governance codes should not limit overlapped AC direcotorship.

One group of risk governance actors that recently came into focus for empirical studies is the board of directors. In this context, the increasing number of directors that work on more than one board committee (committee overlap) as well as its effects on monitoring effectiveness has become a prevalent subject of discussion. In this context, this paper aims to investigate the current status of empirical research on how committee overlap affects monitoring effectiveness.

A meta-analytical approach is used, encompassing a total sample of 167,449 observations. The authors consider several determinants of monitoring effectiveness such as reporting quality, executive compensation, pay for performance-sensitivity, CEO turnover, audit fees, qualified audit opinion and investment/overinvestment.

The authors’ meta-analysis proves that research on the effects of committee overlap yielded highly controversial results. Although there is no correlation between overlap and monitoring effectiveness at the general level, the presence of their relationship is still confirmed in a few subcategories. The authors also verify that the legal requirements regarding board structure and committee overlap has a certain influence, particularly in the common law system.

The meta-analytical insights help to derive statements that are more comprehensive and go beyond the results of the investigated primary studies. Furthermore, the insights offer implications for firms, theory and new opportunities regarding future empirical research to address unresolved questions.

This study examines the contemporaneous changes in the reporting regime in Nigeria by investigating the effect of regulatory changes on audit fees as well as the moderating effect of overlapping directorship and financial reporting quality.

This study utilises a longitudinal sample of 409 firm-year observations, from 2008 to 2013, of nonfinancial companies listed on the Nigerian stock exchange. The study uses the general method of moments (GMM) to control for endogeneity concerns.

The results reveal that, without the moderating effect of overlapping directorship and financial reporting quality, the relationship between regulatory changes and audit fees is positive but weak, which suggests that regulatory changes drive cost. Similarly, the interaction of overlapping directorship did not reverse the positive relationship, which suggests the perceived risk associated with overlapping directorship. However, the improvement in financial reporting quality reverses the relationship, as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient on the interacted terms.

This study provides useful insights about committee membership overlap to regulatory authorities concerning the weakness of the monitoring ability of such committees.

The results of this study contribute to the growing literature on regulatory reform, audit fees and corporate governance. Specifically, the study provides empirical evidence on the effect of committee overlap on audit fees, which, to the best of the researchers' knowledge, has received no empirical attention in the Nigerian context.

The authors empirically examine the impact of the stand-alone risk committee on corporate risk-taking and firm value.

The authors argue that the existence of a stand-alone risk committee enhances the quality of corporate governance, which reduces corporate risk-taking and strengthens the firm value that might improve investor protection.

The authors find corporate risk-taking decline significantly for firms that have a stand-alone risk committee compared with firms that have a joint audit and risk committee. The authors also find that the presence of a stand-alone risk committee is positively associated with firm value.

The evidence is consistent with the proposition that firms with a stand-alone risk committee can effectively evaluate potential risks and implement a proper risk management system.

This is the first paper that investigates the association between the existence of a stand-alone risk committee and firm risk-taking in a multi-industry setting. Also, our research extends the association between a stand-alone risk committee and firm value.

The authors analyze the association between the functional background of the compensation committee chair and CEO compensation. The analysis is motivated by the continuing debate about the reasonableness of executive pay patterns and the growing emphasis on the role of compensation committees.

The authors define three expert categories—accounting, finance, and generalist—and collect data on the compensation committee (CC) chairs of the S&P 500 firms from 2008 to 2018. The authors run an ordinary least square model and regress CEO total and cash compensation on the three expert categories.

The authors find that firms in which the CC chair has expertise in accounting, finance, and general business favor performance measures that are more aligned with accounting, finance, and general business, respectively. There is little evidence that CC chairs who are CEOs of other firms endorse more generous pay for the host CEO; the authors find some evidence that CC chairs tenure relative to the host CEO's is negatively associated with the level of the CEO's pay.

This study suggests that firms and regulators should consider the background of the compensation committee chair to understand the variations in top executive.

Companies desiring to link executive compensation to particular areas of strategy must also consider matching the functional background of the compensation committee chair with the target strategy areas. From regulatory standpoint, requiring compensation committees to operate independent of inside directors can reduce attempts by inside directors to skim the process, but a failure to also consider the impact of compensation committees' discretion over the pay-setting process can distort the executives' pay-performance relation.

This is the first study to examine the effects of the functional background of the compensation committee chair on CEO compensation.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between board interlocks and monitoring effectiveness for listed German companies in a context of risk governance. While agency-theory and resource-dependence-theory suggest a positive association between board interlocks and monitoring effectiveness, reasons such as limited temporal resources of busy board members may suggest a negative association.

By using panel data regression, the authors examined the association between board interlocks and monitoring effectiveness, which was approximated by excessive management compensation, pay-for-performance-sensitivity and CEO turnover-performance-sensitivity. The data set comprises 3,998 directorships for 132 listed German companies covering the period 2015-2017.

The authors find that board interlocks are associated with not only a more excessive management pay and less performance-sensitive turnover but also a higher pay-for-performance-sensitivity.

The study examines the impact of multiple directorships based on a German panel data set that includes both multiple appointments of members to national supervisory boards and all other appointments to national and international executive and supervisory bodies. The authors compile three measures to operationalize monitoring effectiveness.

This paper aims to examine the question of whether external auditors incorporate equity holdings by overlapping audit committee members as a priced governance factor and tests whether this attribute, as a mechanism for ensuring good governance, affects the propensity for external auditors to issue modified audit opinions.

Overlapping membership in this context refers to the arrangement where at least one audit committee member also sits on the compensation committee. Both ordinarily least square and logistic regression are used to capture the impact of overlapping committee members and equity holding of those overlapping committee members.

Using archival data from Australian Stock Exchange listed companies, the authors find support for the beneficial effect of having overlapping audit committee members with equity holdings. The authors also find that auditor propensity to issue modified audit opinions is lower for firms with equity holdings by overlapping audit committee members.

The finding has practical implication to the investors and regulators as overlapping audit committee members with equity holdings may provide especially effective oversight by monitoring opportunistic accounting policy choices for maximizing compensation pay. To the extent that this occurs, audit risk will decrease, requiring less audit effort and lower audit fees than would otherwise be necessary. Similarly, such oversight is likely to make financial reporting more credible and will reduce the possibility of receiving modified audit opinions by reporting organizations.

Both audit and compensation committees are equally important in modern organizations. While both of the committee have distinctive responsibilities, questions remain on the desirability of overlapping audit committee. Also, this is the first study to the authors’ knowledge that incorporates overlapping membership on audit and compensation committee as an important component of auditor risk perception which regards in pricing the audit fees.

Recent studies document that approximately two-thirds of sample firms have at least one audit committee member serving on their compensation committee (Liao and Hsu, 2013). Prior studies on overlap membership document that presence of audit committee members on compensation committee affects the reporting quality. Since auditors’ audit risk is affected by reporting quality. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the auditors perceive the overlap of audit and compensation committee members when pricing audit fees.

The author use a sample from 2007 to 2012 and run an OLS regression.

The author find a negative association between overlap membership and audit fees. The results are robust after controlling for selection bias, alternate measurement of overlap membership, and an alternate pre- and post-overlap membership test. Additional tests show that the negative relationship between overlap membership and audit fees is explained by lower audit risk and not by lower brand premium of non-Big4 auditors and that the benefit of overlapping membership increases when the audit committee size is large.

The findings suggest that firms with large audit committee can improve their reporting and lower their audit fees by having audit committee members on compensation committee.

The findings contribute to the literature on the consequences of overlap membership and on the ongoing debate about the extent that common membership enhances audit committee monitoring. It also adds to the limited literature on audit committee and audit pricing.

This study aims to examine the association between the effectiveness of risk committee (RC) and firms’ performance in Malaysian context. It also explores whether political connection has an impact on the relationship.

This study, using a principle components analysis, derives a factor score for RC attributes to proxy the effectiveness of RC. It also uses both accounting and market performance to measure the company performance.

Using a sample of financial firms from 2004 to 2018, this study finds that both accounting and market performance are higher for firms with an effective RC. It also finds that the effectiveness of RC in monitoring and management of risks is more pronounced for politically connected firms (PCFs). In further tests, the paper finds that RC attributes (i.e. RC independence, qualification and gender) are positively and significantly associated with accounting performance, while those of RC existence and overlap are positively and significantly related to market performance. The study also finds that RC size (RC diligence) has a positive (negative) impact on financial firms accounting and market performance. The further analysis also shows that PCFs with a separate as well as larger RCs experience both higher accounting and market performance. This study’s results are robust for concerns of endogeneity.

The findings of this study resolve the ongoing debates surrounding political connection by suggesting financial firms not to have politically connected board members as doing so may deteriorate their performance. This study’s results are also useful for investors, regulators and policymakers.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study, for the first time, introduces on the interaction term between the effectiveness of RCs and political connection to empirically explore how an effective RC may reduce the potential risk of political ties. As such, this study adds to the literature and sheds light on an aspect of risk (i.e. risk stems from establishing close link with the government) that is growing in importance.