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This paper aims to investigate the relationship between board interlocks and monitoring effectiveness for listed German companies in a context of risk governance. While agency-theory and resource-dependence-theory suggest a positive association between board interlocks and monitoring effectiveness, reasons such as limited temporal resources of busy board members may suggest a negative association.

By using panel data regression, the authors examined the association between board interlocks and monitoring effectiveness, which was approximated by excessive management compensation, pay-for-performance-sensitivity and CEO turnover-performance-sensitivity. The data set comprises 3,998 directorships for 132 listed German companies covering the period 2015-2017.

The authors find that board interlocks are associated with not only a more excessive management pay and less performance-sensitive turnover but also a higher pay-for-performance-sensitivity.

The study examines the impact of multiple directorships based on a German panel data set that includes both multiple appointments of members to national supervisory boards and all other appointments to national and international executive and supervisory bodies. The authors compile three measures to operationalize monitoring effectiveness.

Studies on corporate boards examine how social ties between the CEO and independent board members affect the effectiveness of board monitoring. Much evidence suggests that social connections between the CEO and independent directors are associated with inadequate monitoring and lower firm value (Hwang and Kim, 2009; Fracassi and Tate, 2012). In this study, the authors note that social connections of the independent directors are of different nature and thus should not be treated as a homogeneous group; that is, the nature of connections among directors can be quite different from that between the CEO and directors, which is the primary focus of previous studies.

The authors classify independent directors into four mutually exclusive groups based on their social connections to the CEO and other independent board members and examine what role each type of connection plays in corporate monitoring using panel data and cross-sectional fixed effect regressions.

The authors find that Only_CEO%, the proportion of independent directors who are connected only to the CEO, is negatively associated with monitoring intensity. Specifically, firms with higher Only_CEO% have larger CEO compensation, lower likelihood of dismissing the CEO, more co-opted board and worse firm performance. In contrast, No_CEO_Ind%, the proportion of independent directors who have no connection to either the CEO or other independent directors is associated with more effective monitoring. These findings suggest that independent directors with different degrees of social connections exhibit different monitoring qualities.

When more independent directors, who are connected exclusively to the CEO, are on the board, they consistently deliver low monitoring quality. However, when more independent directors with no connections to either the CEO or any independent directors are on the board, they enhance monitoring quality. These findings can be used to construct board structures with more effective monitoring ability.

This paper extends the literature on social networks in corporate finance. The authors show that independent directors with exclusive connections to other independent directors do not have a significant effect on board monitoring, but those truly independent directors are associated with better monitoring quality. These findings suggest that different types of social connections of independent directors play a different role in board monitoring and help extend our understanding of the function of social connections of independent directors in corporate governance.

Compliance enforcement is central in issues involving cooperation and delegation of authority. In fact, many proposed mechanisms seek to enhance adherence to the contracted agreements. Generally, monitoring and sanction arrangements constitute one of the widely applied tools to ensure compliance. Notwithstanding the prevailing mixed opinions on the usefulness of such coercive measures, in public procurement, such seemingly drastic measures are also commonly applied to enhance the purchasersʼ adherence to the established procurement frameworks. This study investigated the effectiveness of the monitoring and sanction arrangements in enhancing procurement rule compliance in the Tanzania context. Using data generated from a cross-sectional survey conducted between December 2006 and May 2007, this study established that the effectiveness of such enforcement means in the public sector is situational contingent and has to take into account other context-specific factors, which tend to influence the outcome.

One group of risk governance actors that recently came into focus for empirical studies is the board of directors. In this context, the increasing number of directors that work on more than one board committee (committee overlap) as well as its effects on monitoring effectiveness has become a prevalent subject of discussion. In this context, this paper aims to investigate the current status of empirical research on how committee overlap affects monitoring effectiveness.

A meta-analytical approach is used, encompassing a total sample of 167,449 observations. The authors consider several determinants of monitoring effectiveness such as reporting quality, executive compensation, pay for performance-sensitivity, CEO turnover, audit fees, qualified audit opinion and investment/overinvestment.

The authors’ meta-analysis proves that research on the effects of committee overlap yielded highly controversial results. Although there is no correlation between overlap and monitoring effectiveness at the general level, the presence of their relationship is still confirmed in a few subcategories. The authors also verify that the legal requirements regarding board structure and committee overlap has a certain influence, particularly in the common law system.

The meta-analytical insights help to derive statements that are more comprehensive and go beyond the results of the investigated primary studies. Furthermore, the insights offer implications for firms, theory and new opportunities regarding future empirical research to address unresolved questions.

This study aims to identify the factors that lead non-financial companies listed in the UK to use an internal audit function (IAF) as a monitoring mechanism. Although the use of an IAF in the UK is voluntary, no prior research has examined the drivers for using one.

Financial and non-financial data were collected from the annual reports of 332 UK non-financial companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) Main Market. Univariate tests and multivariate logistic regression tests were used to test the research hypotheses. A theoretical framework based on both agency theory and transaction cost economics (TCE) theory was used to explain the economic factors affecting the use of an IAF.

The study provides evidence that firm size, level of internal risks, agency problem between owners and managers and existence of an effective audit committee are associated with the existence of an IAF. Thus, the need to have strong internal control and risk management systems and to reduce both internal and external agency costs drives companies to have an IAF. These results suggest the importance of IAF as an internal corporate governance tool and the effectiveness of UK governance regulations in monitoring the effectiveness of internal control systems.

Given the importance of the IAF’s corporate governance role, the study provides some policy implications. Regulators should pay more attention to the issue of maintaining an IAF, especially by large companies, the relationship between the IAF and other governance parties, especially the audit committee, and the disclosure of more relevant information about the IAF’s characteristics and practices.

This is the first study to examine the factors affecting the existence of the IAF within the UK’s distinctive regulatory approach of “comply or disclose reasons”. Furthermore, it provides a theoretical framework that explains how both the agency theory and TCE theory can interpret the adoption of internal audit.

The purpose of this paper is to present findings from face-to-face interviews undertaken with 16 care and nursing home managers employed in homes situated in two English local authorities. The research sought to explore managers’ perceptions of the role of contract monitoring in the prevention of abuse.

Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with 16 care and nursing home managers.

Though personnel employed by the local authority who conducted contract monitoring were generally thought of positively by care home managers on a personal level, their effectiveness was perceived to be limited as a result of their lack of experience and knowledge of providing care, and the methods that they were required to use.

Though the research draws upon the experiences of only 16 care and nursing home managers in two local authorities, data suggest that current contract monitoring activity is of limited utility in determining the true nature of care and the presence of abuse.

Unusually, the paper explores care and nursing home managers’ perceptions of contract monitoring processes in terms of how they perceive their effectiveness in preventing abuse.

The purpose of the paper is to synthesize and evaluate the stream of research that links large shareholders to the production of shared corporate benefits.

The methodology is to review the literature with an emphasis on the development of findings.

The presence of large shareholders is positive only if their incentives are aligned with other owners and they have the power to exert influence. The presence of large shareholders, even those whose interests are aligned with owners, does not always result in stronger governance structures.

The research is limited by the existing stream of literature and the completeness of our search process.

A synthesis and evaluative summary of the research is presented that may be used by researchers, executives, and board members.

From a research viewpoint, effective research designs should incorporate both incentive and power when assessing the monitoring role of large shareholders to aid in the validity and comparability of research results. From a practice viewpoint, managers and board members may use our summary figure to evaluate power relationships and likely reactions to strategic and tactical decisions in their firm's governance structure.

Municipal financial decisions involve the interaction of political actors (including voters, elected officials, and bureaucrats) pursuing their own interests. Although voters should determine public choices through elected officials, bureaucrats have the incentives and may have the monopoly power to dominate the process. This study investigates the relationships among municipal spending, fiscal manipulation, and financial monitoring. Fiscal illusion (as measured by revenue complexity) is employed as an empirical surrogate for bureaucratic manipulation and it is hypothesized that financial audits are an effective monitoring technique for moderating possible bureaucratic manipulation. The results of the study suggest that expenditure levels are related to political power and that fiscal illusion is significant for explaining expenditure levels, especially for cities having qualified opinions. Weak support is provided for the hypothesis that the financial audit is a monitoring technique that may constrain bureaucratic overspending. These findings have important implications for both public administration and governmental accounting and suggest the need for further research on monitorig effectiveness.

The purpose of this paper is to study the effectiveness of market discipline on banks’ risk-taking behavior based on how swiftly banks respond to market information.

A simplified incentive model provides the necessary justification for two types of market disciplines: first, monitoring by uninsured market participants, and second, risk premium in terms of interest spread required by risk-averse depositors. Panel data regression is carried out for both surviving and failed US banks for the period 1999:Q4-2007:Q3 to examine the role of market discipline, bank capital, and macroeconomic shocks.

The paper finds that banks which failed during 2007:Q4-2010:Q4 suffered from fundamental weaknesses in their asset quality relative to the surviving banks prior to the crisis.

The paper focusses on two questions: In what circumstance does market monitoring exist? And how can market incentives affect banking firms’ actions? The first question is studied in a simplified incentive model that provides justification for two types of market discipline. Given that, the effectiveness of market discipline is empirically tested, using the US banking data in the period leading up to a surge in the number of bank failures in 2007-2010. The paper's results show that failed institutions with large size were relatively less responsive to early warning signals of declining uninsured deposits and rising deposit spread.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between audit committee (AC) and a set of other corporate governance mechanisms in one of the emerging economies, United Arab of Emirates (UAE). In particular, the current study examines whether an effective AC can serve as a substitute or as a complement mechanism to board characteristics and ownership structure of Emirati listed non-financial companies.

Using substitution and complementary theories, a panel data from 48 nonfinancial companies listed on the UAE Stock Exchanges [Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange and Dubai Financial Market] during the period between 2011 and 2013 were used in the current study. A composite measure of four proxies has been used to measure the AC effectiveness, namely, AC size, independence, financial expertise and diligence. To test the hypotheses formulated for the study, a logistic regression model was used to identify the influence of a set of board characteristics and ownership structure variables on the effectiveness of the AC after controlling for firm size, auditor type, industry type and profitability.

While AC effectiveness appeared to be positively associated with board size and board independence, it is negatively associated with CEO duality. This points to a complementary governance relation. On the other hand, the negative relationship between AC effectiveness and each of institutional and government ownership suggests substitutive relations.

The main shortcoming of the current study is that it examines the influence of a certain set of corporate governance factors on the effectiveness of AC. Other corporate governance mechanisms may, however, contribute to the effectiveness of AC. The findings of the study can be used by companies’ managements and regulators in the UAE to improve the corporate governance system.

To the best of researchers’ knowledge, this study provides the first evidence about the interaction among multiple governance mechanisms required by the code of corporate governance issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy in 2009. The current paper is expected to add to the limited AC literature in Middle East and North African countries in general and Arab World in particular.