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Distributed photovoltaic (DPV) projects generally have output risks, and the production effort of the supplier is often private information, so the buyer needs to design the optimal procurement contract to maximise its procurement utility.

Based on the principal-agent theory, we design optimal procurement contracts for DPV projects with fixed payments and incentive factors under three situations, i.e. symmetry information, asymmetry information without monitoring and asymmetry information with monitoring. We obtain the optimal production effort and expected utility of the supplier, the expected output and expected utility of the buyer and analyse the value of the information and monitoring.

The results show that under asymmetric information without monitoring, risk-averse suppliers need to take some risk due to output risk, which reduces the optimal production effort of the supplier and the expected output and expected utility of the buyer. Therefore, when the monitoring cost is below a certain threshold value, the buyer can introduce a procurement contract with monitoring to address the asymmetry information. In addition, under asymmetric information without monitoring, the buyer should choose a supplier with a low-risk aversion.

Considering the output risk of DPV projects, we study the optimal procurement contract design for the buyer under asymmetric information. The results provide some theoretical basis and management insights for the buyer to design optimal procurement contracts in different situations.

In this study, a dynamic contracting model is developed between a venture capitalist (VC) and an entrepreneur (EN) to explore the influence of asymmetric beliefs regarding output-relevant parameters, agency conflicts and complementarity on the VC's posterior beliefs through the EN's unobservable effort choices to influence the optimal dynamic contract.

The authors construct the contracting model by incorporating the VC's effort, which is ignored in most studies. Using backward induction and a discrete-time approximation approach, the authors solve the continuous-time contract design problem, which evolves into a nonlinear ordinary differential equation (ODE).

The optimal equity share that the VC provides to the EN decreases over time. In accordance with the empirical evidence, the EN's optimistic beliefs regarding the project's profitability positively affect its equity share. However, the interactions between the optimal equity share, project risk and both partners' degrees of risk aversion are not monotonic. Moreover, the authors find that the optimal equity share increases with the degree of complementarity, which indicates that the EN is willing to cooperate with the VC. This study’s results also show that the optimal equity shares at each time are interdependent if the VC is risk-averse and independent if the VC is risk-neutral.

In conclusion, the authors highlight two potential directions for future research. First, the authors only considered a single VC, whereas in practice, a risk project may be carried out by multiple VCs, and it is interesting to discuss how the degree of complementarity affects the number of VCs that ENs contract. Second, the authors may introduce jumps and consider more general multivariate stochastic volatility models for output dynamics and analyze the characteristics of the optimal contracts. Third, further research can deal with other forms of discretionary output functions concerning complementarity, such as Cobb–Douglas and constant elasticity of substitution (See Varian, 1992).

The results of this study have several implications. First, it offers a novel approach to designing dynamic contracts that are specific and easy to operate. To improve the complicated venture investment situation and abate conflict between contractual parties, this study plays a good reference role. Second, the synergy effect proposed in this study provides a theoretical explanation for the executive compensation puzzle in economics, in which managers are often “rewarded for luck” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Wu et al., 2018). This result indicates a realistic perspective on financing and establishing cooperative relationships, which enhances the efficiency of venture investment. Third, from an empirical standpoint, one can apply this framework to study research and development (R&D) problems.

First, the authors introduce asymmetric beliefs and Bayesian learning to study the dynamic contract design problem and discuss their effects on equity share. Second, the authors incorporate the VC's effort into the contracting problem, and analyze the synergistic effect of effort complementarity on the optimal dynamic contract.

The purpose of this article is to determine the optimal use of collateral in order to maximize the borrower's wealth by reducing the interest rate payments. This analysis is to shed light on the fundamental question whether good or bad borrowers pledge more collateral.

The analysis bases on a simple firm value model similar to Merton's but with the additional feature that the borrower can bring in collateral. This article not only presents the case with perfect information between borrowers and lenders but also regards the consequences arising from asymmetric information.

A bad borrower, who is characterized by higher bankruptcy costs, riskier projects, and a lower contribution to the project value, typically pledges more collateral than a good borrower. These relationships base on the existence of perfect information between borrowers and lenders. If asymmetric information in terms of the project's riskiness or the contribution of the borrower to the project is present, these relationships invert and good borrowers tend to pledge more collateral. As a result, the allocation of information between a borrower and a lender is crucial for the optimal choice of collateral.

This research underlines the potential for firms to add firm value by pledging collateral because collateral reduces interest rates and therefore results in more attractive terms of the loan. On the other hand, further empirical research can be done to verify our theoretical finding that under perfect information bad borrowers pledge more collateral, while under asymmetric information primarily good borrowers use collateral.

This paper introduces a new motive for the use of collateral and explains – in contrast to many other theoretical models – why bad borrowers tend to pledge more collateral.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze and solve the problem of moral hazard in firms because of asymmetry information between firms and workers and to contract upon the workers' shiftless actions.

Based on principle‐agent theory and human resource management practice, an optimal dynamic wage contract model is designed. By applying simulation technology, the dynamic wage contract model is compared to the general static wage contract model and the affects made by the optimal dynamic wage contract to workers and firms are analyzed.

According to the consequences of simulation, the dynamic wage contract has better characteristics and is more practical than the static one. In the dynamic wage contract, the current action of a worker has a persistent effect on the future outcome. It is proved that the dynamic wage contract is optimal to the firm. The optimal dynamic wage contract is renegation‐proofness. It not only can incentive workers to work hard and help the firm achieve Pareto efficiency, but also can smooth the firm's incentive costs and reduce the risk born by workers.

The paper provides some reasonable conclusions for the human resource management in firms.

With the rapid development of e-commerce, multi-sourcing with supply contracts and spot buying has become more and more popular in reality. The main purpose of the paper is to explore a loss-averse buyer's optimal procurement policy in a multi-sourcing under e-commerce surroundings.

The study introduces the loss aversion utility function to characterize the loss aversion effect and derives a loss-averse buyer's optimal procurement policy in a multi-sourcing with a wholesale price contract and spot market.

A loss-averse buyer could order no items in a wholesale price contract and only needs to replenish commodities from spot market under certain conditions. In addition, the study shows that spot capacity has important influences on a loss-averse buyer's optimal ordering decision in the wholesale price contract.

This is the first paper to study the loss aversion effect on a buyer's procurement decision in a multi-sourcing. The results present important managerial insights for a loss-averse buyer to devise optimal ordering policies in a multi-sourcing under e-commerce surroundings.

This paper aims to study a strategic decision of banks in Thailand to signal their types to the market and derive the optimal credit derivatives contract to guarantee their loans and credibly signal their quality under different economic determinants, namely, the maximum credit risk investment constraint, opportunity cost and opaqueness of the credit derivative market.

Contract theory is deployed to derive the expected payoff of different bank types under different economic and financial constraints. Hence, different bank types offer derivatives contracts to signal their loan quality and resell their loans in the secondary loan markets of Thailand.

The optimal derivatives contract is constructed on a basis of asymmetric information when banks have more private information concerning quality of their loans. A digital credit default swap is an optimal derivatives contract to send credible signal when banks are restricted to the maximum investment constraint. Moreover, profit of banks is reduced, as the optimal derivatives contract is more costly when banks are subjected to positive opportunity cost and opacity of the credit derivatives market. These results depict impact of changes of the maximum credit risk investment constraint on Thai credit derivatives market.

The optimal credit derivatives design that signifies bank types and facilitates loan purchase agreement has not been studied in Thai secondary loan markets before. In addition, this study provides insights of banks' strategic decisions to signal their types and transfer risk to risk buyers in Thai markets.

This paper aims to develop a coordination mechanism that can be applied to achieve the channel coordination and information sharing simultaneously in the fresh agri-food supply chain with uncertain demand. It seeks to elucidate how the producer can use an option contract to transfer the risk caused by uncertain demand, impel the retailer to share demand information and improve the performance of supply chain.

An option contract model based on the basic model of fresh agri-food supply chain is introduced to compare the production, profit, risk and information sharing condition of the supply chain in different cases. In addition, a case study focusing on the sale of autumn peaches produced by a local producer is investigated, which provides evidence of the applicability of the authors’ approach.

The optimal option contract can help the supply chain achieve channel coordination and reach Pareto improvement. In the meantime, such a contract will encourage the retailer to share market demand information with producer spontaneously and help maintain the strategic cooperation between two parties.

This paper considers a single-producer, single-retailer system and both of them are risk neutral.

Presented results can be used as suggestions for improving the contract design of fresh agri-food supply chain in China and can also provide references for other countries with similar experiences as China in fresh agri-food production.

This research introduces the option contract into fresh agri-food supply chain and takes information sharing and the risk caused by uncertain demand into consideration.

The purpose of this study is to propose a model of competition between a formal lender (bank) and an informal lender (moneylender) with informational asymmetry between these two lenders. Further, the authors introduce capacity constraint on the lending capacity of the moneylender and assume that borrowers differ in risk and wealth.

The solution concept of Nash equilibrium has been used to derive the optimal strategies of the lenders.

The equilibrium strategies in most of the results depend on the difference between the expected returns from risky and safe projects where the risky project has higher expected returns. The credit market is segmented in terms of risk and wealth levels. Rationing of poor safe borrowers from the credit market is inevitable when the moneylender's capacity is sufficiently small, suggesting a low-income trap for them. Further, when moneylender has capacity constraint of some form, a zero-profit outcome is never a Nash equilibrium outcome.

There is a possibility of collusion between the lenders. However, the authors do not derive all possible outcomes under capacity constraint

When the informal lender has limited capacity, competition between formal and informal lenders may not alleviate credit rationing, instead aggravate the problem. Thus, the government should devise policies to ensure credit availability to resource poor households

While the literature models strategic interaction between lenders under the assumption of zero-profit (Bertrand Paradox) condition, this study shows that zero profit is not the only outcome under such a set-up. Also, in presence of capacity constraint of the moneylender, a zero-profit outcome is never a Nash equilibrium outcome for the lenders. There is an optimal contract at which the lenders differentiate in terms of repayment and collateral and earn positive profits under certain conditions.

The purpose of the study is to investigate the financing channels and carbon emission abatement preferences of supply chain members, and further examine the optimal contract design of the retailer.

This paper develops a low-carbon supply chain composed of one retailer and one manufacturer, in which the retailer provides trade credit to the manufacturer. Considering the cap-and-trade regulation, the manufacturer with uncertain yield makes decision on whether to invest in emission abatement. There are bank loan and trade credit to finance production for the manufacturer and green credit to finance emission abatement investment. Meanwhile, the retailer may provide the manufacturer with three kinds of contracts to improve emission abatement efficiency, namely, revenue sharing, cost sharing or both sharing.

The results show that the retailer prefers to offer financing service at lower interest rate, but trade (and green) credit financing is always optimal for manufacturer and supply chain. The investment in emission abatement is value-added to all players. The sharing contracts offered by the retailer at lower sharing ratios can realize Pareto improvement of the system regardless of the financing scheme. However, comparing with the revenue or cost sharing contract, the existence of optimal sharing ratios makes the both sharing contract more favorable to the retailer.

The findings provide guidance for the emission-dependent manufacturer in financing and emission abatement decisions, as well as recommendations for the retailer to offer loan service and sharing contract.

This paper integrates green credit into bank loan or trade credit to analyze the financing decision of the manufacturer with uncertain yield and further considers the influence of three kinds of sharing contracts introduced by the retailer on improving operational performance.

In the paper, the authors study the simultaneous influence of incentive compatibility and individual rationality (IR) on a multi-echelon supply chain (SC) under uncertainty. The authors study the impact of contract sequence on coordination strategies of a serial three-echelon SC consisting of a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer in an uncertain environment.

The authors develop a game-theoretic framework of a serial decentralized three-echelon SC. Under a decentralized setting, the supplier and the manufacturer can choose from two contract types namely, wholesale price (WP) and linear two-part tariff (LTT) and it leads to four different cases of contract sequence.

The study show that SC coordination is possible when both the supplier and the manufacturer choose LTT contract. This study not only identifies the influence of contract sequence on profit distribution among SC agents, but also establishes cut-off policies for all SC agents for each contract sequence. This study also examine the influence of chosen contract sequence on optimal profit distribution among SC agents.

Three-echelon SC coordination under uncertain environment depends upon the contract sequence chosen by SC agents.

This study results will be helpful to managers of various SCs to take operational decisions under uncertain situations.

The main contribution of this study is that it explores the possibility of coordination by supply contracts for three-echelon SC in a fuzzy environment.