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Economic sanctions imposed by the EU and United States on Russia have brought significant changes into Russian foreign economic policy, in particular leading to deepening cooperation with Asian countries and China in particular. The present contribution aims to shed light on the influence of sanctions on Russian multinational enterprises (MNEs) internationalization toward China using the example of energy and information and communication technology (ICT) industries.

The chapter builds on case study analysis. The choice of sectors allows us to highlight the recent strategic trends in the internationalization of oil and gas industry, dominated by state-owned multinationals, and in ICT by privately owned companies.

Our results provide empirical data for understanding the influence of sanctions on MNEs from the country being under the sanctions. In the case of Russian oil and gas industry and ICTs, research indicates that the shift toward China was not initiated primarily by the sanctions. In both cases, expansion to Asian markets was correlated with business interests in the Chinese market. However, changes in geopolitical and macroeconomic business environment accelerated Russian MNE’s pivot to China, for the purposes of attracting capital and reaching new markets in context of deteriorating relations with western partners. The cases demonstrate a moderating role of the industry in the context of sanctions, helping compensate for the slowdown of economic relations with traditional partners.

The novelty of the chapter is to delineate the consequences of sanctions on MNEs from the country being under sanctions. In this way, it illustrates the role of geopolitical environment in intensifying internationalization of Russian MNEs toward China.

The chapter considers the significance of the oil and gas industry for the Russian economy. The authors analyze the current state of the oil and gas industry, their specific weight in the structure of Russian GDP, and tax revenues from this industry to the Russian budget that was estimated. We give scenario analysis that considers the problems that the Russian economy may face because of the sanctions, the price fluctuations at the commodity market, and the crisis phenomena in the world economy. The chapter points out that localization of technology production and development of technologies for offshore oil and gas production in the Arctic zone may become an incentive to further ensure import substitution for Russia. At present, the experience of Arctic defense enterprises in the production of equipment for oil and gas production and processing is becoming increasingly popular. The chapter elaborates the most significant examples of the creation of new industries in the Arctic zone, the prospects of seismic exploration on the Arctic shelf, and that localization of production capacities and service bases will allow obtaining a multiplicative incentive for a qualitatively new industrial and infrastructure development of the northern territories. Also, we provide an assessment of the development of liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry, which makes economically attractive use of natural gas on a regional level as LNG opens the way to fuel high-power needs and to long-distance transport.

Iran’s potential to expand its natural gas exports has received a great deal of attention since Hassan Rouhani’s election in 2013. Rouhani’s presidency centered around adopting a foreign policy approach to actively promote a constructive engagement and dialogue with the West, as well as seriously pursuing diplomatic and prudent interactions with Iran’s immediate neighbors and beyond on an equal footing with a view toward advancing mutual accommodation, respect, and shared interests. This chapter’s central argument is that Iran’s ability to export natural gas to Europe depends largely upon maintaining stable and strong trade ties with Turkey. The cooperation between these two countries, despite competition and occasional frictions, could arguably foster a balance of power at middle-power level countries that will be necessary for an enduring stability in the region.

Russia's size – both in terms of population and geography, spanning 11 time zones, 89 oblasts (states or regions) and autonomous republics and its privatization program, encompassing some 100,000 small-scale enterprises, 25,000 medium to large firms, and 300 or so of its largest firms, made its privatization program the largest sale/transfer of assets conducted among the transition economies, with the possible exception of China. Comparisons by many of the program's critics, and there are many, to Poland, Hungary, or the Czech republic are invidious, especially the latter two countries whose populations are similar to just that of greater Moscow.

The chapter discusses global trends in the world oil and gas sector and their impact on the Russian hydrocarbon market. The key short-term risks for the Russian Federation are the following: the high dependence of the industry on the equipment of foreign suppliers and oilfield service companies. Possible threats associated with these factors may materialise against the backdrop of the geopolitical crisis of early 2022. Long-term trends include a global green transition with a peak in hydrocarbon consumption in 2030–2040 and a phase-out of oil and gas as a primary energy source. Simultaneously, the given industry is going to face gradual metamorphosis in terms of the types of wells being developed, which might require more science-intensive and high-tech approaches.

The US fossil fuel industry is vulnerable to opposition from other sectors of the ruling class. Non-fossil fuel capitalists might conclude that climate breakdown jeopardizes their interests. State actors such as judges, regulators, and politicians may come to the same conclusion. However, these other elite actors are unlikely to take concerted collective action against fossil fuels in the absence of growing disruption by grassroots activists. Drawing from the history of the Obama, Trump, and Biden presidencies, I analyze the forces determining government climate policies and private-sector investments. I focus on how the climate and Indigenous movements have begun to force changes in the behavior of certain ruling-class interests. Of particular importance is these movements' progress in two areas: eroding the financial sector's willingness to fund and insure fossil fuels, and influencing judges and regulators to take actions that further undermine investors' confidence in fossil fuels. Our future hinges largely on whether the movements can build on these victories while expanding their base within labor unions and other strategically positioned sectors.