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The relevance of regional security has increased in the wake of decolonization and the end of the Cold War. In a globalized and intertwined world, security can no longer be conceived as having the state as its sole object or subject. Regional clusters of security have become a new paradigm in international relations, and a new wave of regionalist scholarship has arisen in response. However, although this body of work has devoted considerable attention to defining the elements that constitute each regional cluster, less attention has been given ascertaining how such clusters are formed. This exploratory chapter provides an extensive review of the relevant literature and draws two conclusions. First, it suggests that, as postulated by a large portion of the regional security literature, regions of security are a natural consequence of proximity, as threats travel more easily over short distances than over longer ones. Second, it extends that argument by arguing that security also clusters at the regional level when regions are targets of extra-regional threats (regions as objects), and when they gain ‘actorness’ and operate as agents of peace and security (regions as subjects).

This study aims to analyze the impact of Arab Revolution on the Arabian Gulf security by applying on Yemeni Revolution. This can be achieved by analyzing the threat of Arab Spring Revolutions to the national security of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries after the breakout of demonstrations and protests in some of the member states. In addition to its analysis of threat of the Regional Security of the Gulf as a result of Yemeni Revolution and Civil War and Iranian intervention to support Houthis within light of regional anarchy and security competition according to the Neorealism and how the GCC Countries face such threats.

The study depended on the historical methodology to track the developments of some events related to the Gulf Security and crisis in Yemen. Moreover, it used the analytical approach to analyze the impact of Arab Revolutions and Yemeni Civil War on the Arab Gulf Security. In addition, it depended on the realistic approach to explain the security state at the national and regional level of the Arab Gulf countries within light of regional anarchy, security competition and Iranian support to Houthis “Non-State Actors” (Kenneth Waltz), as well as the offensive realism (John Mearsheimer).

The Arab Revolutions had an effect on the national security of GCC countries according to the Neorealism due to the breakout of demonstrations and protests in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Sultanate of Oman which reached to the degree of threatening the existence of the state as in Bahrain. The Gulf Regional Security is influenced by Revolution and Civil War in Yemen as a result of that Iranian support to Houthis within light of security competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, leading to the threat of the Arabian Gulf Security as Yemen is the southern gate to the GCC Countries and having joint borders with Saudi Arabia and Sultanate of Oman. Moreover, the GCC countries dealt with that threat individually, such as, performing internal reforms, or collectively through using military force, such as Bahrain and Yemen (Offensive Realism).

This study is an introduction to explain the Arab Spring Revolutions, conflict in Yemen and its threat to the Arab Gulf Security according to the Neorealism based on that the GCC countries sought to keep its existence and sovereignty in confrontation to the demonstrations and internal protests and to keep the regional security in confrontation to the threats of neighboring countries such as the Civil War in Yemen and the Iranian Support to Houthis in light of the regional anarchy.

There is an emerging consensus within the literature on failed and failing states that state failure is contagious across borders. For its part, the literature on regionalisation claims that states within the same region tend to form clusters of security – or insecurity – so that geographical proximity is closely associated with inert security relationships. This article – along with the individual contributions in the volume it introduces – seeks to bridge these two literatures, which otherwise rarely talk to each other. The approach taken throughout the volume is largely qualitative and case-oriented, yet methodologically diverse, while the articles have a shared comparative ambition. This introductory article examines the debate on failing states and contextualises the volume's contributions within that debate. It then does the same in relation to the debate on regional security, before moving on to examine the role and impact of emerging regional responses to insecurity. When we examine recent state-building initiatives, the effectiveness of external actors seems limited, while existing power holders – and the conflicts between them – are at the centre in processes for building states. This calls for studying the practice of state-building, and for rooting policies in viable practices, even when the driving actors are not inherently benign. To a considerable degree, a state's strength and functionality are relational: the state can only be understood in relation to significant other states. Within regions, hegemonic states – and the strategies pursued by other states in their efforts to cooperate with, balance, or counter the hegemon – have major implications for security. Regional cooperation emerges through concrete collaboration to address commonly perceived challenges, at times as an unintended effect of a targeted initiative. Key actors – and the networks of which they form part – are often transnational, spanning the borders of several states. The behaviour of transnational actors, how they interface with the system of states and regions and the potential for their conversion into constructive political forces remain poorly understood. As a whole, these are findings that inspire an agenda for future research at the interface between the state and the region.

For over three decades, Afghanistan has been a battleground in which many of the states of the wider neighbourhood have been involved. The importance of fostering a concerted effort for Afghan peace and stability is widely agreed upon, yet such a process remains difficult to bring about. Some analysts emphasize states and their security relationships, seeing Afghanistan as an ‘insulator’ caught between different regional state systems, each with a strong dynamic of its own. Other analysts emphasize various transnational networks and see Afghanistan as the ‘core’ of a larger conflict formation. This chapter takes as its starting point the former perspective, which has been codified by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003) as the regional security complex (RSC) approach. The chapter examines the security dynamics of each of the regions surrounding Afghanistan – South Asia, the Persian Gulf and South Asia – adopting a comparative and historical perspective, with an emphasis on the period since the late 1970s. It concludes that each of Afghanistan's three surrounding regions is characterized by deep security concerns of its own. These concerns nonetheless inform the engagement of neighbouring countries in Afghanistan, which then comes to reflect conflicts and cleavages specific to the respective regions. One central implication is that a more promising strategy for Afghanistan might be to seek a unilateral non-offensive or neutral status, rather than full security integration with its neighbours. Although such a strategy would necessitate the creation of a forum for Afghanistan's neighbours to foster understanding for the Afghan position, it represents a dramatic departure from mainstream policy proposals with their emphasis on an integrated regional approach.

This article explores the ways in which hegemony and power impact on the emergence, development and conflict management function of regional organizations. It compares the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), both of which include a strong regional power. These powers have contrasting postures: South Africa is a keen regionalist, a reluctant hegemon and a pacific power, whereas India is a keen hegemon, a reluctant regionalist and a militarist power. The presence of the hegemon has stimulated regionalism in Southern Africa but retarded regionalism in South Asia. Despite these differences, SADC and SAARC have similarly failed to manage regional conflict effectively. This has been due in large measure to the conflictual relationship between the hegemon and another powerful state in each region, Zimbabwe in the case of South Africa, and Pakistan in the case of India. Some of these dynamics are well explained by neorealist theory, but other dynamics are best explained by constructivist and liberal positions. This supports the argument by Katzenstein and Okawara (2001–2002) that in the field of international relations an eclectic analytical approach is required to comprehend complex processes that combine material, ideational, international, domestic, contemporary and historical factors.

Since the first days of its independence, Kazakhstan has been overwhelmed by security issues involving its neighbors. It also recognized a number of conventional and unconventional security threats that might undermine stability and development in the region, as well as in the republic. One of the first official documents produced by the Kazakhstan government was the Strategy of Establishment and Development of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign State, initiated by President Nursultan Nazarbayev in May 1992.³ Although specific security threats in Kazakhstan were obvious (as the direction post-Soviet security, military arrangements and the CIS had yet to be determined), three sections of this document dealt specifically with security issues, albeit in relatively vague form.⁴ In the document, President Nazarbayev highlighted the fact that the national security of Kazakhstan had a regional dimension, and that relations with CIS members and other states with interests in Central Asia were very important.⁵ He stressed particularly that his country needed a military doctrine to “prevent and defend against (external) military threat.”⁶ It took several years for this concept of national security to be clarified and conceptualized in a comprehensive document, the Law on National Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan.⁷

Border environments differ as foci for conflict discourse. While classic realist theories are used to account for mechanisms of securitized borders, socially oriented theories are often invoked to characterize relaxed borders. This distinguishing pattern regarding securitization reflects a deeply rooted focus on idealized borders, based on implicit expectations that relaxed borders are a viable option and goal for all. This orientation is prone to mistaken assumptions regarding local, national and regional interests and ultimately threatens delicately balanced states of stability. This paper aims to question this somewhat simplified categorization and posit that securitized borders are longstanding realities which warrant more complex theoretical conceptualization.

The analysis is based on documentary study and qualitative field research, mapping and evaluating Israel–Jordan cross-border interactions conducted during 2006-2014. Local civilian interactions were studied using three tools: interviews, non-participant observations and a sector-based analysis of original and secondary sources. In the course of research, many tours and observations of the border region were conducted, and key actors in Israel and Jordan were interviewed: entrepreneurs, local residents, local and national government officials, security personnel and representatives of non-governmental organizations involved in the administration and funding of normalization-promoting initiatives.

In light of internal and external security threats which challenge states and border regions in conflict environments and in normalized settings, there is increasing value in recognizing multi-level power relations (“bringing the state back in”) that design, inhibit and ultimately control the inevitability, circumstance and social–political effectivity of any cross-border interaction. Cross-border cooperation (CBC), which evolves gradually, monitored by the border regime and reflecting actual levels of inter-state political dialogue, is a slower yet safer option and a more realistic expectation for CBC, especially in regions of minimal communication between cross-border neighbors. In the backdrop of the Middle East turmoil, Israel and Jordan mark 20 years of peaceful relations, enjoying stability based on shared political and security interests, yet displaying no apparent tendency toward increased cross-border interaction. Given the stark differences in regimes and ongoing regional unrest, this securitized border fulfills local and regional needs and is far from a temporary “second-best” reality.

The analysis is based on original fieldwork and documentary study, mapping and evaluating Israel–Jordan cross-border interactions conducted during 2006-2014.

During the past two decades, both West Africa and Central Africa have suffered a large number of intertwined wars. In both regions, these ‘webs of war’ have included interstate conflicts and rivalry, as well as wars over the control of many of the involved states. Existing perspectives tend to reduce these intertwined wars to a series of parallel civil wars within each of the various states. They see states as operating at the regional level, whereas the armed opposition to those states operates only at the national level. This chapter argues that many armed, non-state groups in West Africa and Central Africa should be seen as regional actors, and thus that conventional two-level analysis does not catch the complexity of conflict in those regions. Although major violence continues in Central Africa, it has largely been contained in West Africa. This needs to be seen in relation to the level of institutionalization of security and military cooperation in the two regions. In both regions, regional organizations carried out military operations that were highly controversial among their member-states. In West Africa, a series of interventions strengthened both regional cooperation and cooperation with external partners, whereas in Central Africa this was not the case. In West Africa, peace support operations have increasingly been carried out within a regional perspective. Not so in Central Africa. The chapter concludes with an examination of efforts to build a capacity for peace support operations within the African Union, based on subregional organizations but with strong involvement by external actors.