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The implementation of the Directive 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing resulted in the enactment by the Polish Parliament of the Act of March 1, 2018, on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. One of the most important issues identified in the Act was the establishment of the Central Register of Beneficial Owners. The purpose of this paper is to critically analyze the functioning of the Register in Poland from the perspective of three years since its establishment. The text presents the most important problems faced by reporting institutions and obliged entities due to discrepancies in the interpretation of the Act’s provisions – especially in terms of the definition of a beneficial owner.

The basic research approach was a comparative content analysis method. The objects of analysis included Polish Laws, Directive of the European Parliament and the Council (EU) 2015/849 and the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The theoretical legislative assumptions contained in the Acts were compared with reports, studies and communications prepared by public and private institutions. This made it possible to draw conclusions regarding the causes of problems with the functioning of the Register in Poland.

The results of the research showed that the ambiguity of the definition of the beneficial owner leads to a number of problems on the part of reporting institutions, such as companies, foundations and associations. On the other hand, a large part of the data entered in the Register is questioned by obliged entities. The lack of personal data protection is also a problem. Consequently, this reduces the value of the Register as a tool that effectively mitigates the risk of money laundering.

The research focused only on the functioning of the Central Register of Beneficial Owners in Poland. The subject of the analysis addressed problems with the definition of beneficial owner, issues of data quality and openness and the process of verifying the Register’s data. The technical aspects of the Register operation and the financial penalties imposed by public oversight institutions were not reviewed. Also, no comparison was made with other European Union (EU) member states that have implemented Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (EU) 2015/849.

This study discusses the important issue of regulatory requirements introduced under EU regulations for private companies. Familiarization of companies, NGOs and obliged entities with the conclusions of the study can positively influence the consolidation of the correct interpretative path. In addition, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first scientific text that identifies and systematizes the most important problems of the Register’s functioning in Poland.

Anti-money laundering (AML) obligations follow a risk-based approach, making their extent subject to the degree of AML risk. Money Laundering Reporting Officers (MLROs) must constantly assess risks, for example, by conducting annual risk assessments of the company. The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether MLROs’ risk assessments are biased in form of a better-than-average (BTA) effect, meaning whether they favourably assess their own company’s risk compared to that of the average competitor. Additionally, MLROs’ general risk assessment capabilities are researched.

A survey of MLROs of German companies was conducted (n = 228). It tests for a BTA effect in participants’ risk assessments of their own company as well as for errors in risk assessments of other industries.

MLROs’ risk assessments are biased by a BTA effect across all industries. They view their own company’s risk to be below that of the average competitor. Additionally, MLROs are not able to correctly assess industries’ AML risks compared to the national risk assessment. Risks were especially underestimated for high-risk industries. Biases were partially found to be higher among MLROs from the non-financial sector.

Risk-based AML measures are likely to be at least partially ineffective, calling the risk-based approach into question. Regular trainings of MLROs need to include awareness for biases in risk assessments. A more stringent and effective supervision, especially in the non-financial sector, is called for.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper is the first to show that a BTA effect exists among MLROs.

The purpose of this paper is to assess such processing of personal data for identification purposes from the point of view of the principle of data minimisation, as set out in the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and examine whether the processing of personal data for these purposes can be considered proportionate, i.e. whether it is performed for the purposes defined and only as much as is necessary.

In this paper, the authors discuss and present the relevant legal regulation and examine the goals and implementation of such regulation in Lithuania. This paper also examines the conditions for the lawful processing of personal data and their application for the above-mentioned purposes.

This paper addresses the problem that, on the one hand, financial institutions must comply with the objectives of collecting as much personal data as possible under the AML Directive (this practice is supported by the supervisory authority, the Bank of Lithuania), and, on the other hand, they must comply with the principle of data minimisation established by the GDPR.

Financial institutions process large amounts of personal data. These data are processed for different purposes. One of the purposes of processing personal data is (or may be) related to the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. In implementing the Know Your Customer principle and the relevant legal framework derived from the EU AML Directive, financial institutions collect various data, including projected account turnovers, account holders' relatives involved in politics, etc.

Money Laundering Reporting Officers (MLROs) carry out day-to-day anti-money laundering (AML) tasks while directors ultimately remain responsible for AML compliance. Therefore, directors’ expectations of what their MLROs do should ideally coincide with what their actual tasks to minimise liability risk. This paper aims to test for gaps between MLROs and their directors in terms of knowledge, expectations and performance of AML tasks. Likewise, it is researched whether MLROs and directors communicate well with regard to MLROs’ tasks.

This paper first develops a model for analysing the dyadic relationship between MLROs and their directors, based on the audit expectation-performance gap. Second, a paired electronic survey of MLROs and directors of German companies was conducted in autumn 2020, testing for participants’ knowledge, expectations and performance of possible AML tasks (n = 136 pairs).

While there is no knowledge or performance gap among MLROs and directors, expectations among them are partially unreasonable and their communication needs to be improved. Additionally, this study suggests that MLROs of German non-financial businesses are less knowledgeable, perform AML duties more poorly, and communicate less effectively with their directors.

Training of MLROs and communication with their directors need to be improved. Especially in the non-financial sector, action is urgently required.

This paper reports the results of the first paired survey of MLROs and their directors, offering unique insights into their relationship and the status of private AML efforts.

This paper aims to analyse the virtual currency regulation especially in Finland, Sweden and Norway. Different member states had a bit differently incorporated regulation of AMLD5. Finland has gone the furthest in regulation and even issuers of virtual currency are under the Finnish regulation.

In one hand, the study approach is legal dogmatics, but in other hand it is comparative legal research. Both approaches can be found in this paper.

The EEA is going from a more fragmented regulatory landscape based on 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive to a more uniform regulatory approach provided by a legislative package that regulates crypto assets more broadly, coupled with an overhaul of the anti-money laundering rules, bringing them into a single European rulebook. Finland has taken a step further in this matter. Therefore, it would be reasonable for the AMLD5 scope to be expanded in this respect. It is a welcome development that the regulation will be unified and that investor protection will be better taken into account in the future as well.

This paper gives a picture of what kind of challenges is there in Fennoscandic in terms of money laundering regulation of virtual currencies. On the other hand, this paper brings into the discussion the rather clever solutions of Fennoscandic (especially Finland) regarding money laundering of virtual currencies.

This paper aims to critically examine the European Union’s legislative initiative to establish an Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA), which will introduce union-level supervision and provide support to national supervisors in the field of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), as well as to financial intelligence units (FIUs) in European Union (EU) member states. The paper discusses why this initiative was deemed necessary, which are the key objectives, rules and principles of AMLA and which challenges and opportunities will emerge as AMLA becomes operational.

This paper draws on reports, legislation, legal scholarship and other open-source data on the EU legislative initiative to establish a new AMLA.

AMLA will provide a comprehensive framework for EU-level AML/CFT supervision and for cooperation among FIUs. If all organisational challenges are properly addressed, the new authority will significantly enhance the EU’s ability to tackle money laundering and terrorism financing.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is one of the first to examine the mission, governance and supervision mechanisms of the EU’s AMLA, as well as the challenges and opportunities associated with its functioning.

The purpose of this paper is to provide guidelines and inputs for the implementation of policies and procedures governing transactions and business relationships with politically exposed persons (PEPs) under the anti-money laundering (AML) legal framework.

This paper reviews AML PEPs’ regime in the perspective of the European Union Directive (EU) 2015/849 of May 20, 2015; the Italian Legislative Decree no. 231 of November 21, 2007; and the “good practice” recommendations issued by the Bank of Italy. In particular, it provides an overview of EU and Italian legislation in connection with PEPs and describes “good practice” recommendations provided by the Bank of Italy to implement policies and procedures to properly perform transactions with PEPs and comply with AML legislation.

Bank of Italy’s “good practice” recommendations are an important tool for credit and financial institutions managing transactions and business relationships with high-risk counterparties such as PEPs. They shall help determine how to properly implement policies and procedures for an enhanced identification and verification of PEPs.

This paper provides useful information on how to draft policies and procedures in order to be compliant with AML legislation related to PEPs.

This paper aims to articulate the complexities posed by tax havens and offshore financial centres (OFCs) in the global fight against financial crimes such as tax avoidance and money laundering. It suggests possible measures to mitigate the effect of tax avoidance on economic development of countries, especially less developed poor countries.

Data were evaluated using examples and case studies drawn from tax havens and OFCs in newspaper reports to demonstrate how illicit proceeds of crime are spirited out of countries for safe custody in tax haven jurisdictions around the globe. The author also carried out a scoping review of the literature to delineate the correlation between tax havens, OFCs and the growth in financial crimes such as tax avoidance and money laundering.

There is a close correlation that bank secrecy laws in OFCs fuel the growth of financial crimes such as tax avoidance and money laundering around the globe. The findings also suggest that while imposition of sanctions on countries which transgress international financial regulatory regimes is an essential component in the international efforts against financial crimes, they need to be enforced on all states so that they are not seen as politicized and subsequently undermined.

It is important that states work in tandem to initiate desired regimes to address financial crimes but enunciating regimes alone cannot generate a far reaching impact unless they are enforced against all transgressing states.

The paper has practical implications for states, people, governments, oversight institutions, markets and other stakeholders because it unravels varied issues relating to tax avoidance, money laundering and policies that need to be adopted to address these challenges.

The paper draws attention to the impact of asymmetric information and data generation capacity in some countries on tax avoidance and other financial crimes and the need for international harmonization of tax and AML regimes.

The issues explored in this paper help to highlight the challenges posed by tax havens and OFCs for economic development of countries. While the paper was undertaken by the review of primary and secondary data, it offers important contributions that could potentially enhance the fight against tax avoidance.

Correct registration for the value-added tax (VAT) is a key aspect of tax compliance; it is vital in ensuring adequate tax revenue collection in all countries but particularly in developing countries such as South Africa. Non-registration hinders sufficient tax revenue collection, stifles economic growth and causes unfair competition with formal businesses. The purpose of this study is to determine whether changes in the VAT rate affect the registration decisions of businesses, ultimately impacting upon tax compliance behaviour and tax revenue collection.

An online 2 × 2 between-subjects field experiment was conducted, as part of a broader study, to consider compliance with registration requirements by small business entities in South Africa, specifically when there are changes in the VAT rate.

Although the study establishes that changes in the VAT rate tend not to have a significant impact on the registration decisions of such taxpayers, it nonetheless indicates that the magnitude of the change in the VAT rate may be influential on registration decisions, whether relating to compulsory or voluntary registration. More particularly, the greater the magnitude of the VAT rate decrease (increase), the more likely it is that taxpayers will register (deregister) for VAT purposes, indicating that the magnitude of changes in the VAT rate do have an impact on VAT registration decisions and therefore on tax compliance more generally.

Not only does the study add to the limited knowledge available on registration decisions of small businesses, but also gives valuable guidance to policymakers in terms of determining the VAT rate for the country.

Not only does the study add to the limited knowledge available on registration decisions of small businesses, but it also gives valuable guidance to policymakers in terms of determining the VAT rate for the country.

Recent research shows that financial institutions in the European Union (EU) close branches, offices and correspondent connections to jurisdictions with less transparency due to possible sanctions related to the increase in EU money laundering regulation. This tendency is called de-risking and the purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the recent regulatory approach towards money laundering in the EU limits the incentive to have operations in tax havens.

This paper follows a functional approach to law and economics.

The paper finds that recent EU money laundering regulation increase an incentive for financial institutions to limit any connection to jurisdictions known as tax havens, where transparency is at minimum. Thereby, it can be discussed whether the spillover effect from money laundering regulation in to the fight of tax avoidance could support further regulatory interference.

The recent trend of de-risking in light of money laundering regulation is scarcely covered by present research. Furthermore, there has been no linking of this de-risking tendency and the effects or relation to the use of tax havens/low tax jurisdictions.