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The purpose of this study is to propose a decentralized multi-party cross-trading scheme based on a certificate transaction mechanism for the transaction of excess consumption certificates (ECCs) of renewable energy. The aim is to address the problems associated with the existing centralized transaction mode and to promote the development of the green electricity industry.

The proposed scheme involves calculating the quotation difference for the same type of certificate transaction based on the quotations of all users of both buyers and sellers. The transaction volume is then determined based on the order of quotation difference from large to small, and the total interests of cooperation are calculated. The nucleolus method is adopted to allocate the total interests to each member of the alliance and calculate the final transaction price. The blockchain technology is used for the transaction to achieve accurate traceability and efficient supervision, and a corresponding smart contract is designed and simulated in the Ethereum consortium chain.

The results of the simulation show the rationality and effectiveness of the proposed scheme. The decentralized multi-party cross-trading scheme can overcome the problems associated with the existing centralized transaction mode, such as low transaction efficiency, difficulty in obtaining the optimal transaction strategy and efficient supervision. The proposed scheme can promote the development of the green electricity industry by stimulating users' demand potential for green electricity.

The proposed scheme is original in its use of a certificate transaction mechanism to facilitate the trading of ECCs of renewable energy. The scheme adopts a decentralized multi-party cross-trading approach that overcomes the problems associated with the existing centralized transaction mode. The use of the nucleolus method for the allocation of total interests to each member of the alliance is also original. Finally, the use of blockchain technology for accurate traceability and efficient supervision of the transaction is an original contribution to the field.

Tooling is a common component of an industrial product’s manufacture. Specific tooling is devised to serve the fabrication of a particular product, while generic tooling can be used in the manufacture of multiple products. In the latter case, companies are confronted with the problem of fairly allocating the indirect costs of the tooling. This article studies how to allocate costs of generic tooling to single production orders.

Ten allocation methods (AMs) are described that are in principle suited to the distribution of generic tooling costs to production orders. Since the presented methods have for the most part been discussed in differing contexts, we apply them to a specified generic tooling problem for comparison. Evaluation of the various methods is based on 16 criteria. Reasoning is supported by a computational Monte Carlo simulation. Furthermore, we suggest using the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) to elaborate one final proposition concerning the most preferable allocation scheme.

The article reports the single allocation rules’ performances for different allocation scenarios. The described characteristics refer to fairness, efficiency, and simplicity as well as to empty-core performance. Using AHP analysis allows for the aggregation of the rules’ criteria ratings. Thus, especially suitable allocation schemes for the problem at hand are identified.

An allocation is required for budgeting reasons and also for the definition of projects’ bottom-up sales prices. Selecting the “right” AM is important, as a suboptimal AM can result in unfair allocation vectors, which will act as incentives to stop using the common resource, potentially leading to higher total costs.

Research on the comparison of AMs is typically performed for certain purposes, such as enterprise networks, horizontal cooperative purchasing scenarios, or municipal service units. This article will augment the research evaluating AMs by introducing a novel set of evaluation criteria and by providing an in-depth comparison of AMs suited for the allocation of generic tooling costs.

In the context of sharing economy and online shopping, establishing a stable urban joint distribution alliance (JDA) is extremely necessary for the entire logistics service market. The purpose of this paper is to rationally allocate the profits and determine the most stable allocation scheme for the urban JDA as well as provide a direction for cooperation between express enterprises and lead managers to pay more attention to the comprehensive performance.

Cooperative game-based methodologies including the proportion method, the core theory, nucleolus and Shapley value have been employed. Four criteria consisting of enterprise operation, customer satisfaction, environmental sustainability and information technology have been incorporated into Shapley value for improvement.

This paper reveals that express enterprises in logistics service market can achieve more benefit from JDA than those who operate separately. Among proposed profit allocation schemes, improved Shapley value scheme shows more rationality by considering partners’ asymmetric contribution. Besides, a stable alliance can be always ensured with partners’ lower propensity to disrupt and relatively balanced negotiation power under improved Shapley value scheme.

This paper makes a few attempts to contribute to the literature on the improvement of Shapley value and applies the concept of “propensity to disrupt” into the field of logistics. Besides, this paper provides various profit allocation schemes and incorporates influencing factors into Shapley value for an improvement thus helping policy-makers make better-informed decisions on urban distribution. Additionally, a case study based on urban express enterprises in Southwest China has been conducted to verify the proposed profit allocation schemes.

University, industry and government relationships, known under the Triple Helix, have been studied under various aspects. The West African region and countries have been analysed with mutual information and transmission power, two information theory-based indicators. The purpose of this paper is to portray the landscape of West African Triple Helix innovation systems using three main game theory indicators (core, Shapley value and nucleolus) with the objective to measure the synergy within the selected innovation systems.

The collaboration between university, industry and government is modelled as a three-person coalitional game. Bibliographical data of selected countries were collected from Web of Science and organised according to collaboration patterns between the three actors. The characteristic functions of the games were computed, the cores plotted, the Shapley values and the nucleoli computed.

Either university or government has more power to create and lead to synergy; government shows solidarity towards university and industry in most of countries; and they are joined in their efforts by industry in two countries. The core exists in all the countries meaning that all the selected innovation systems present synergy; however, the extent is limited and varies over countries.

Innovation includes all research products; however, this study focuses on publications only.

Synergy within a Triple Helix innovation system is studied up to now with information theory indicators. The paper portrays the landscape of West African Triple Helix innovation systems using three main game theory indicators: the core, the Shapley value and the nucleolus and gives a new way to study university, industry and government relationships.

The purpose of this paper is to estimate the locational marginal price (LMP) at each distributed generation (DG) bus based on DG unit contribution in loss reduction. This LMP value can be used by distribution company (DISCO) to control private DG owners and operate network optimally in terms of active power loss.

This paper proposes proportional nucleolus game theory (PNGT)-based iterative method to compute LMP at each DG unit. In this algorithm, PNGT has been used to identify the share of each DG unit in loss reduction. New mathematical modeling has been incorporated in the proposed algorithm to compute incentives being given to each DG owner.

The findings of this paper are that the LMP and reactive power price values for each DG unit were computed by the proposed method for the first time. Network can be operated with less loss and zero DISCO’s extra benefit, which is essential in deregulated environment. Fair competition has been maintained among private DG owners using the proposed method.

PNGT has been used for the first time for computation of LMP in distribution system based on loss reduction. Incentives to each DG unit has have been computed based on financial savings of DISCO due to loss reduction. Share of active and reactive power generation of each DG unit on change in active power loss of network due to that DG unit has been computed with new mathematical modeling. The proposed method provides LMP value to each DG unit in such a way that the network will be operated with less loss.

Over the past two decades, in developed countries a trend towards the liberalization and restructuring of the gas market has been observed. Today, restructuring is an ongoing process. In this study, a restructured natural gas market has been considered in which several regional distribution companies have ownership of the network and are competing against each other to gain more benefits. The main purpose of this study is to achieve efficiency and economic rationality in such a market through horizontal cooperation.

A restructured natural gas distribution network is modeled as a cooperative game to estimate the potential cost savings for various collaboration scenarios. In addition, the cost savings’ allocation among collaborating companies is evaluated using the cooperative game theory.

The results reveal validity and efficiency of the solution of the proposed model and capabilities of the cooperative game theory for reduction in gas distribution costs and improvement in the service level.

This study is limited to natural gas in one region of Yazd City in Iran. Moreover, one segment of the natural gas network (i.e. distribution network) is modeled. Moreover, long-term cooperation between companies relies on fair distribution of cooperation benefits to the participants.

For the purpose of comparison and to get an insight into properties of the cost savings game, the real case study of one region of Yazd city in Iran is implemented.

This study contributes to the competitive models in the restructured gas market, particularly, in gas distribution network. The main contribution is to provide potential benefits for the participants via the horizontal cooperation.

The purpose of this paper is to explore an indigenous innovation phenomenon – entitled the Shanzhai phenomenon – which has emerged in the Chinese mobile phone industry, and to understand its value creation network and operational mechanism, as well as to recognize its policy implications in regional and industrial developments.

Although the Shanzhai phenomenon emerged from the end of 2008, detailed understanding of its systems and operational mechanism is still very limited, partly because of its secrecy and dynamics in the value chain operations. Based on characteristics of the Shaizhai phenomenon, the paper focuses on three levels of the phenomenon – regional historical, regional industrial specific, and typical Shanzhai mobile phone project levels – to pursue a comprehensive understanding of the Shanzhai system and its emerging environments. At the regional and industrial level, the combined approaches of interview and secondary data collection is adopted. At the Shanzhai project level, a case study approach is conducted by focusing on the project and its whole value chain, from the idea creation towards detailed product design, production and integration, as well as its distribution.

Chinese government has called for indigenous innovation to upgrade Chinese manufacturing capability and value creation as well as appropriation. Based on the fast growth of the Chinese indigenous mobile phone industry in the last two years, the Shanzhai manufacturing system is recognized as a new positive alternative way for Chinese manufacturing companies to achieve this aim. Behind the Shanzhai phenomenon, there is a strong globally specialized and collaborated network enabling the down‐stream Chinese small‐ and medium‐sized mobile phone companies to very quickly respond to customers' demands or lead the demands. This new type of alternative innovation system is transforming unaffordable luxury goods into affordable for normal consumers. Because of its mass volume and involvement, however, government policies to harness the energy and development direction become essential.

This research is just a very early stage of preliminary observation. From the methodology perspective, it provides background information about Shanzhai phenomenon and an in‐depth case study about a Shanzhai project. Comprehensive understandings of the Shanzhai phenomenon in terms of its behaviours, systems constructs and patterns, trajectories in the future and implications for policies will be achieved only at a much later date.

ShanZhai manufacturing might be one possible alternative innovative paradigm in some sectors of China.

This is the first academic research paper to offer relatively comprehensive and systematic observations about the emerging ShanZhai manufacturing system in the largest developing country.

This paper examines the profit distribution of engineering projects in the integrated project delivery (IPD) mode. IPD is a new delivery method that can ameliorate many of the disadvantages of traditional delivery methods and improve project results. In the implementation of IPD, the profit distribution is key for ensuring the success of IPD projects.

This paper described a new method for characterizing profit distribution in the IPD mode. The payment function and Shapley value of the cooperative fuzzy game of fuzzy alliance were defined by considering the Choquet integral of the fuzzy measure. The participation of each player was considered, and the influence of participation on the profit distribution was discussed. Lastly, changes in the profit distribution of core participants under different alliance combinations were studied.

A case from a report of The American Institute of Architects (AIA) was used to verify the fuzzy alliance model. There was a significant correlation between the degree of participation of the owner, architect and builder and the profit distribution among these three participants.

The theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, this paper selects a case with only three key participants in order to simplify the research. When there are many core participants, how to establish the alliance in the IPD mode and how to establish the corresponding profit distribution model, further work is certainly required to disentangle these complexities in models. Second, in this case, BIM technology has little impact on the income of the whole project. Therefore, this paper does not consider the impact of BIM technology on the marginal effect of the IPD project. Third, the contract type in the case is a custom tri-party based on IFOA. There is no classified discussion of the impact of different contracts on the profit distribute in the paper.

Based on the in-depth study of cooperative game with alliance structure, this paper promotes the classic cooperative game with alliance structure. The authors define the payoff function of fuzzy cooperative games by Choquet integral of fuzzy measure, and introduce the idea into the field of IPD. It aims at extending the solution to a cooperative game without a core. It can be obtained through a simple calculation. In the IPD alliance, the fuzziness and uncertainty of the participation degree of each participant will affect the profit of the whole project. The authors find that the higher the participation rate of players, the more profit each participant has. The greater the influence weight of the designer on the alliance, the lower the influence weight of the contractor on the alliance, the lower the participation of the contractor and the designer, and the lower the income distribution value of the three core participants. It shows a monotonous decline status.

For any construction enterprise, it can make more profits if it joins the grand alliance. In the IPD alliance, each participant can maximize their own interests, which can also promote the enthusiasm of construction enterprises to participate in the alliance and increase the application of IPD mode in AEC industry. This research method provides a new fast, effective, and more realistic solution method for cooperative countermeasures. It can be further extended to other cooperative game fields and advance a new research perspective and solution for the distribution of cooperative interests.

The contribution of this paper is the development of a fuzzy alliance model that provides a tool for measuring the profit distribution in IPD. This is the first quantitative model to connect the degree of participation with the profit distribution in IPD using fuzzy alliance.

The purpose of this paper is to improve the behaviors coordination mechanism, to maintain the system's long time‐scale and stable competitive capability, when the agents in the system focus on cooperating with each other.

Effort level for every agent, whose dynamics can be described as a stochastic partial differential equation, and the incentive of effort as the control of the corresponding agent, are introduced to describe agents' behavior abstracted. The cooperative stochastic differential game model is constructed: first, the optimal resolve trajectory mapping with profit maximization of the system are obtained, then the transitory imputation coupled with effort initial state of the system by introducing dynamic Shapley value imputation method. Based on the results obtained, the profit distribution strategies and the equilibration incentive compensation mechanism are given, due to the evolution law of the payoff and the state variable.

It is concluded that: the transitory compensation to agent for efforts and incentive, which can be changed with the system state at current and in history and in future changed, would guarantee the realization of the Shapley value imputation throughout the game horizon.

In this paper, the interactivity between agents in the system is considered first. The dynamical Shapley imputation mechanism and the transitory compensatory mechanism are provided to make the imputation more stable and feasible.

A plethora of publications have reported several cytotoxic effects associated with chronic consumption of thermoxidized palm oil. This research aims to investigate the effects of garlic and Aloe vera on liver function and hepatic cytoarchitecture in rats fed thermoxidized palm oil diet.

Thirty-five male albino Wistar rats weighing 150-180 g were used for this study. They were randomly assigned into five groups (n = 7): control, thermoxidized palm oil diet fed (TPO), TPO plus garlic juice (TPO + G), TPO plus Aloe gel (TPO + A) and TPO plus garlic/Aloe gel (TPO + G + A). The TPO diet was prepared by mixing 15 g of cooled thermoxidized palm oil with 85 g of rat feed. The juice and gel were orally administered at doses of 2.00 ml/kg and 19.12 ml/kg, respectively. After 3 months of feeding and administration, the animals were sacrificed using standard methods and blood collected via cardiac puncture for analysis.

Serum alanine aminotransferase (ALT), aspartate aminotransferase (AST) and alkaline phosphatase were significantly increased (p < 0.001) in the TPO group compared to the control. This increase was reduced (p < 0.001) in all the treated groups compared to TPO, with the greatest decrease (p < 0.001) seen in TPO + A. Total bilirubin was increased (p < 0.001) in the TPO group compared to the control, whereas there was a significant decrease (p < 0.001) in all the treated groups. Serum proteins and plasma fibrinogen were lowered (p < 0.001) in the TPO group compared to the control but increased progressively in all the treated groups. TPO induced prominent histopathological derangements of the liver tissues. However, there were marked improvements following treatment with garlic and Aloe vera.

The results obtained in this study have revealed that chronic consumption of thermoxidized palm oil is hazardous to health by inducing hepatotoxicity, as seen in increased ALT, AST and total and unconjugated bilirubin and decreased total protein. However, these debilitating effects were seen to be greatly ameliorated following garlic juice and Aloe vera gel administration. If these results are to be extrapolated to humans, then the chronic consumption of thermoxidized palm oil diet should be seriously discouraged.