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The purpose of this paper is to improve the behaviors coordination mechanism, to maintain the system's long time‐scale and stable competitive capability, when the agents in the system focus on cooperating with each other.

Effort level for every agent, whose dynamics can be described as a stochastic partial differential equation, and the incentive of effort as the control of the corresponding agent, are introduced to describe agents' behavior abstracted. The cooperative stochastic differential game model is constructed: first, the optimal resolve trajectory mapping with profit maximization of the system are obtained, then the transitory imputation coupled with effort initial state of the system by introducing dynamic Shapley value imputation method. Based on the results obtained, the profit distribution strategies and the equilibration incentive compensation mechanism are given, due to the evolution law of the payoff and the state variable.

It is concluded that: the transitory compensation to agent for efforts and incentive, which can be changed with the system state at current and in history and in future changed, would guarantee the realization of the Shapley value imputation throughout the game horizon.

In this paper, the interactivity between agents in the system is considered first. The dynamical Shapley imputation mechanism and the transitory compensatory mechanism are provided to make the imputation more stable and feasible.

This paper aims to solve the problem of public resource allocation among vulnerable groups by proposing a new method called uncertain α-coordination value based on uncertain cooperative game.

First, explicit forms of uncertain Shapley value with Chouqet integral form and uncertain centre-of-gravity of imputation-set (CIS) value are defined separately on the basis of uncertainty theory and cooperative game. Then, a convex combination of the two values above called the uncertain α-coordination value is used as the best solution. This study proves that the proposed methods meet the basic properties of cooperative game.

The uncertain α-coordination value is used to solve a public medical resource allocation problem in fuzzy coalitions and uncertain payoffs. Compared with other methods, the α-coordination value can solve such problem effectively because it balances the worries of vulnerable group’s further development and group fairness.

In this paper, an extension of classical cooperative game called uncertain cooperative game is proposed, in which players choose any level of participation in a game and relate uncertainty with the value of the game. A new function called uncertain α-Coordination value is proposed to allocate public resources amongst vulnerable groups in an uncertain environment, a topic that has not been explored yet. The definitions of uncertain Shapley value with Choquet integral form and uncertain CIS value are proposed separately to establish uncertain α-Coordination value.

Maximum-flow of an uncertain multi-owner network has become very important recently. This study aims to evaluate the maximum flow on a cooperated logistic system in the presence of uncertainties, raised by travel time, capacity, cost and failures.

To consider different uncertainties and to promote network efficiency, the proposed model is enriched with a cooperative game methodology and a reliability method. A scenario-based method covers optimistic, pessimistic and most likely estimates time, cost and capacity of each route as well as applies a prior failure pattern for breakdown of any resource.

A linear optimization model, which is enriched with target reliability estimation, is presented. Results on a water distribution network indicate more revenue performance for players. Carrying out sensitivity analysis shows the importance of the model parameters.

Modeling maximum-flow problem in the presence of many sources of uncertainty with the aim of a cooperative game is the main contribution of the present study. Also, a novel method based on the reliability theory is applied to close the chasm on evaluating the real maximum flow in a shared decentralized network which suffers from risky conditions on arcs and nodes.

This study considers a project scheduling model to assess the project risks and the impacts on project sustainability when subcontractors collaborate under uncertainty. Moreover, some allocation methods are applied for fair allocating utility of the project and supper-additivity, stability and satisfaction level of each coalition. Finally, sustainability concept is considered in risk assessment in all coalitions.

The proposed mathematical programming model evaluates project risks when the subcontractors cooperate with each other by sharing their limited resources. Then, some cooperative game theory methods are applied for fair allocation of net present value, of the cooperation and finally sustainability aspects (economic, social and environmental) are investigated in risk assessment for each possible coalition.

The results of the proposed model indicate that the subcontractors can increase their profit by 10 per cent ($14,028,450 thousand) and save the equilibrium between sustainability aspects especially in grand coalition. It means that subcontractors do not have incentive to leave the coalition and the supper-additive property is feasible. Furthermore, risk assessment shows that project risks have less impact on subcontractor profits when they cooperate with each other.

Sustainability aspects may be investigated in project management in previous studies, but the authors study sustainability indicators when subcontractors form a coalition and share their resources in response to the risks of availability to resources and delay in completing the project under uncertainty.

Throughout the 1990s, the supply of new condominiums in Tokyo significantly increased while prices persistently fell. This article investigates whether the market power of condominium developers is a factor in explaining the outcome in this market and whether there is a relationship between production cost trend and the degree of market power that the developers were able to exercise. In order to respond to these questions, we construct and structurally estimate a dynamic durable goods oligopoly model of the condominium market – one incorporating time-variant costs and a secondary market – using a nested GMM procedure. We find that the data provide no evidence that firms in the primary market have substantial market power in this industry. Moreover, the counterfactual experiment provides evidence that inflationary and deflationary expectations on production cost trends have asymmetric effects to the market power of condominium producers. The increase in their markup when cost inflation is anticipated is significantly higher than the decrease in the markup when the same magnitude of cost deflation is anticipated.

The objective of this chapter is to discuss how different techniques in Regional Science and Peace Science and the emerging techniques in Management Science can be used in analysing Disaster Management and Global pandemic with special reference to developing countries. It is necessary for me to first discuss the subjects of Disaster Management, Regional Science, Peace Science and Management Science. The objective of this chapter is to emphasise that the studies of Disaster Management should be more integrated with socioeconomic and geographical factors. The greatest disaster facing the world is the possibility of war, particularly nuclear war, and the preparation of the means of destruction through military spending.

The purpose of this article is to contribute to our stock of knowledge about who uses networks, how they are used, and what contribution the networks make to advancing the scientific enterprise. Between 1985 and 1990, the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) ACCESS data facility at the University of Wisconsin‐Madison provided social scientists in the United States and elsewhere with access through the electronic networks to complex and dynamic statistical data; the 1984 SIPP is a longitudinal panel survey designed to examine economic well‐being in the United States. This article describes the conceptual framework and design of SIPP ACCESS; examines how network users communicated with the SIPP ACCESS project staff about the SIPP data; and evaluates one outcome derived from the communications, the improvement of the quality of the SIPP data. The direct and indirect benefits to social scientists of electronic networks are discussed. The author concludes with a series of policy recommendations that link the assessment of our inadequate knowledge base for evaluating how electronic networks advance the scientific enterprise and the SIPP ACCESS research network experience to the policy initiatives of the High Performance Computing Act of 1991 (P.L. 102–194) and the related extensive recommendations embodied in Grand Challenges 1993 High Performance Computing and Communications (The FY 1993 U.S. Research and Development Program).

The purpose of this paper is to investigate impacts of policy instruments for market penetration of renewable technologies in South Africa. Based on the current debates about renewable energy policies and the comparative advantage of the country in terms of coal resources the author set up a framework focusing on renewable energy price subsidies, carbon tax and renewable energy portfolio standard.

Using a simulation model through a linear programming approach the paper assesses impacts of those policies on fossil fuel and renewable energy sectors via business‐as‐usual and policy option scenarios. The business‐as‐usual assumes that there are not policy instruments mobilized to promote adoption and diffusion of clean technologies instead of a policy scenario where such policies are included.

The results of the analysis show that when the coal‐based resources are integrated in the simulation process, only carbon tax and renewable energy price‐based subsidies promote a transition towards a sustainable energy production, therefore reduce the associated environmental damage.

Moreover, the paper also shows that in the case of carbon tax and renewable price subsidies, emission prices should be adequately scrutinized in order to guarantee a positive economic surplus.

When understood as an inevitable inconsistency of individual plans, disequilibrium is not only a necessary condition for the existence, and hence understanding, of the market process as we know it, it is also the glue connecting three other “Austrian” themes. In equilibrium heterogeneity of resources would have no strategic significance, specific and private knowledge would be much less problematic, and no profits net of contractual rent payments would be earned. In the real world of disequilibrium firm differences are not a mystery, rent is not an indication of inefficiency or monopoly power, and there is room to analyze, admire, reward, and consult about successful business strategy. Rent appropriation comes from ownership of valuable resources. And a successful strategy, one that earns enhanced rents, is one that acquires ownership of valuable and value-creating resources. Such a strategy is dependent for its success on superior vision (or luck), something which cannot exist in equilibrium.

One of the fundamental tasks in optimal insurance design is mitigating the moral hazard effects inherent in insurance mechanisms. Empirically, relatively little is known about how individual-level time preferences affect selection of insurance options. We use several waves of the Health and Retirement Survey to explore the relationship between revealed time preferences at the individual level and the selection of insurance options for both the under-age-65 population and the Medicare-eligible population. Our results suggest that time preferences are not likely to be fixed across the life cycle, and that they appear to be important predictors of health insurance decisions.