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This chapter explores how the Korean electoral management bodies (EMBs) and the election administration ensure the autonomy of administrative management from political parties and the interior ministry. In particular, the analysis focuses on the role of recognition, rights independence, and professionalism in securing the election administrations in the EMBs. Recent studies have found that the contents of the independent variable, dependent variable, and other parameters influencing fair and autonomous election management system do not differ significantly. Therefore, the institutional independence of the EMBs is not intended to guarantee fairness and impartiality in Korea either. Since 1987, the authoritarian regime collapsed and democracy began to grow in Korea. Also, the role of the EMBs granted by the constitution started to be considered.

Actively recognizing the role and expanding the rights of the Korean National Election Commission (NEC) has become a decisive factor in the formation of the autonomous and neutral election management system. The scale, manpower and budget of organizations, and personnel have increased. The role of the EMBs has also expanded proportionally. The Korean NEC has enormous authority, such as investigative power and enforcement power that the EMBs of other countries do not have. After all, recognizing the role of bureaucracy and government employees will become a very important factor in ensuring the independence of the EMBs in developing countries. Furthermore, it will be a driving force to develop democracy in developing countries.

Why is South Carolina resisting compliance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993? In a case study with implications for other states challenging the implementation of the motor voter law, the author frames his analysis on the basic of a conflict between nation-centered and state-centered views of American federalism. He argues that: (1) the lingering influence of a traditional political culture (for South Carolina), (2) states' rights tendencies associated with the devolution of more authority to the states in domestic policy, (3) Republican Party hegemony for strengthening the role of states in the federal system, and (4) the general objection of subnational officials to unfunded federal mandates converge to propel South Carolina and several other states (9 of 10 led by Republican governors) to seek judicial relief under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution from what they see as the national government exploiting its authority at the expense of states.

The Rajapaksa regime over the 2005–2022 period promoted a national-popular project based on a militarised Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism promoting a market-driven rentier economy. It illustrated a form of patrimonial capitalism undermining public accountability and the efficacy of the state bureaucracy. This popular-national project was dependent on strengthening ties with China while distancing relations with India and the Global North (USA and the EU). The ways in which the external relations were coordinated reinforced discrimination against Tamil and Muslim communities, while disregarding their demands for justice and reparations. The increasing integration of the economy with financial markets, driven by the Central Bank, amplified the commercialisation of the state, restraining public revenues and state oversight. Meanwhile, the militarisation of the state involved the commercialisation of the military, opaque military budgets and violent repression of protests. The Rajapaksa regime, which enabled a minority-privileged (leisure) class to culturally flourish in regulated safe spaces, also instigated multiple protests from below demanding democracy as well as justice.

Thailand continuously has had administrative reforms in spite of periods of military regime and democratic government. This chapter describes the leadership of administration reforms coming from issue experts and senior civil service officers described as a ‘jazz-banded’ leadership model of different actors. Political parties pick up reform packages consistent with their policy platforms, while the military looks for ready-to-deliver policy packages. The author discusses the example of education and health care reforms and the role of the Office of Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC). In Thailand, resistance usually occurred during the implantation stage rather than at the formulation stage. The chapter discusses that OPDC initiatives were implemented with bonuses of up to 12-month salary for some senior officers and department heads. In health care, success came from concerted efforts of health care experts who transcend their ideas from one generation to another and who kept convincing politicians running the Ministry of Public Health. However, in other instances, budget allocations may bump up against financial procedures that are detailed and tight due to anti-corruption practices. In education reforms, teachers were placed at different school districts that lacked commitment. In the decentralization of reforms, resistance comes from line ministries wanting to secure their authority, although local authorities are very active. Resistance often requires negotiation of many parties; rarely do politicians step in to overcome and assist.

This paper examines the decline of the largest working parliamentary democracy in India overtime, but accelerating since 2014 as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Center (as the federal government is commonly known).

It is eclectic. Original constitution, along with commentaries, are studied. News outlets, government pronouncements, journal articles, and other media outlets — electronic and print — are also sourced.

The findings show how three important features in democracy — elections and their outcomes, control of information, and suppression of dissent are widely used to undermine constitutional democracy.

Democracy can be undermined without altering the Constitution itself. It also explains the irony of Modi’s popularity, given the undemocratic practices. As he may continue in office for some time to come, commanding a log-rolling majority, the need of the hour is a united, constructive and effective opposition to ensure a healthy working democracy.

Since South Korea gained a substantial degree of political and economic development, the South Korean government has tried to eradicate corruption by introducing institutional frameworks in addition to a number of new laws and institutions. As a matter of fact, the Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index score of South Korea is improving over time, but it still far behind other leading countries. The purpose of this chapter is to review the South Korean government's efforts at curbing corruption. This chapter first reviews the development of major anti-corruption infrastructure such as the anti-corruption legislation and the South Korean government's independent agency for anti-corruption, followed by discussion of the development of major anti-corruption measures, the international evaluation on corruption, and the role of civil society in curbing corruption. After that, there is a discussion of policy implications and the conclusion.