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We examine the market valuation of targets with multiple large shareholders (MLS) and single large shareholder (SLS) structures, in an international sample of M&A announcement in 19 countries outside North America. We find that the presence and power of MLS in these firms are negatively associated with abnormal returns and first-bid-to-merger-completion returns, suggesting that MLS mitigate agency problems in the target, and hence their acquisition is perceived as “a loss of good governance.” The negative association between MLS targets and returns is stronger in widely held firms suggesting that MLS indeed curb expropriation of minority shareholders. By contrast, when the second largest shareholder in the MLS structure of the target is a family, we find positive cumulative abnormal returns at the merger announcement, suggesting exacerbated agency problems in these firms that should benefit from the “acquisition of good governance.” Our evidence is robust to a battery of tests and to addressing potential endogeneity.

This study aims to examine whether a firm's demand for high-quality auditors is influenced by multiple large shareholders (MLS). As one type of ownership structure, MLS have gained popularity in China recently and have different types of large shareholders, including large institutional shareholder, large foreign shareholder and large state shareholder. The authors also examine whether different types of MLS have heterogeneous impacts on appointing high-quality auditors.

With a sample of 27,131 firm-year observations from Chinese public companies from 2003 to 2018, the authors use multivariate regressions to examine the effect of MLS on auditor choice. Heckman two-stage analysis, a firm fixed effects model, propensity score matching and difference-in-differences test are used as robustness checks.

This paper finds that the presence and power of MLS increase the likelihood of appointing high-quality auditors. With regard to the types of MLS, large institutional shareholders and foreign shareholders have significant positive effects on appointing high-quality auditors, while the presence of state-owned large shareholders has no effect on auditor choice. Further analyses reveal that the positive effect of MLS on high-quality auditor choice is more pronounced in firms with severe agency problems and information asymmetry. Taken together, these results suggest that MLS play a monitoring role by demanding high-quality auditors.

This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of auditor choice. While prior studies primarily focus on the impact of concentrated ownership structure, corporate governance and the pressure from stakeholders on auditor choice, this paper complements the literature by providing evidence from the heterogeneous effects of different types MLS. This paper also extends the literature on the consequences of MLS from the perspective of auditor choice.

The aim of this paper is to examine whether multiple large shareholders and their interactions affect bank profitability in the MENA region.

To achieve this goal, we used a sample of conventional banks in the MENA region observed during the period 2004–2015. We performed the System Generalized Method of Moment as the empirical approach.

Empirical results indicate that under the dispersion hypothesis, multiple large shareholders (MLS) tend to reduce bank profitability for both return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). However, under the alignment of interests’ hypothesis, coalition between the first and the second largest shareholder increases bank profitability only for ROA. We also find that an additional large shareholder, beyond the two largest, reduces bank return equity.

To the best of our knowledge, to date, there is no study that investigates the effect of MLS and the bank profitability in the MENA region. Indeed, this study shows the importance of considering ownership composition among large shareholders in banking studies.

The purpose of this paper is to add to the understanding of the monitoring role of multiple large shareholders (MLS) by examining their impact on the informativeness of firms' earnings.

The paper uses regression models that relate earnings to stock returns for a sample of 402 French publicly traded firms covered during 2003‐2007.

The paper shows that earnings informativeness is significantly positively related to the owner's ultimate cash flow rights. Consistent with the alignment effect, stock ownership aligns management and shareholders interests which reduces managers' incentives to manipulate accounting information. It also finds that earnings informativeness is significantly negatively related to the excess control of the ultimate controlling shareholder. This result supports the entrenchment effect and suggests that controlling shareholders have greater incentives to obscure accounting figures when expropriation is likely. Finally, control contestability of the largest controlling shareholder mitigates information asymmetry problems thereby enhancing earnings informativeness.

The findings stress the importance of MLS in enhancing internal monitoring and mitigating agency costs. Because France is characterized by a weak legal system, highly concentrated ownership structures and excess control, the results provide valuable insights to mitigate extreme agency problems.

The paper adds to the literature on corporate governance and the quality of accounting information by investigating strategic interactions between various blockholders and their impact on earnings informativeness. The study complements prior studies on the monitoring role of MLS by demonstrating that both their presence and control size translate into significantly greater earnings informativeness.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of multiple large ownership structure (MLS) and audit committee activity (ACA) on audit pricing for a sample of UK listed companies.

One way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and cross sectional multiple regression analysis of a sample of UK listed companies showed statistically significant differences in the audit fees, firm size and audit committee activities of these firms when they are categorised based on the number of MLS.

The study finds a significant negative relationship between audit fees and number of MLS, but a surprising positive relationship with ACA. The findings confirm the beneficial effects of more active institutional investors’ monitoring, but also show that increasing monitoring by audit committees is associated with increase in audit fees.

The results reported in this research are based on cross sectional data. It is likely that the result may be different if the issue is examined over a relatively longer period.

The study showed that monitoring intensity of the large shareholders can be captured through their number and not simply through their shareholding. It also confirms the suggestion in previous studies that audit committees’ members protect themselves from depletion in human capital, litigation and reputational risk by buying more audit related services from their auditors.

The study empirically examined the impact of multiple large ownership structure on audit pricing and thereby extends the practical and theoretical understanding on the monitoring roles of large shareholders as well as the audit committees.

In public firms, the largest shareholder can make decisions on cash dividends in favor of its own interests at the expense of other investors. While the second largest shareholder can actively participate in corporate governance and protect the interests of investors, its impact has not been fully understood. This research investigates how shareholding ratio and ownership type of the second largest shareholder moderate the relationship between controlling shareholder's shareholding ratio and cash dividends.

The authors conducted econometrics analysis based on a panel data of China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017.

The authors find that the controlling shareholder's shareholding ratio has a significant negative impact on cash dividends. However, this influence is conditional on the shareholding ratio of the second largest shareholder. The negative impact is weakened when the second largest shareholder holds a large proportion of shares or when the shareholding gap between the second largest and the controlling shareholder is small.

This research extends the existing literature by highlighting the nuanced moderating effect of the second largest shareholder on the relationship between the controlling shareholder and cash dividends, thus making a unique contribution to the understanding of corporate governances in the emerging financial market in China.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the ownership structure and the investment in research and development (R&D) for a sample of listed Spanish companies.

Following the agency theory and the socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective, the authors propose that R&D investment is affected by ownership structure, specifically by the identity of the controlling owner (family firms and firms with an institutional investor) and the level of contestability by other shareholders. In order to test these hypotheses, the authors build an original database identifying, at a 10% threshold, the ultimate shareholders of a sample of 96 Spanish firms listed during 2008–2018 (1,002 obs).

The results show that there is no significant relationship between the ownership concentration and the R&D investment. Only when the authors consider the nature of the main shareholder, the authors find that in family firms there is an inverted U relationship between ownership and R&D, so that at low levels of ownership, the R&D increases, while at high levels of ownership (that we compute around 54%) the R&D decreases. Also, when the main shareholder is an institutional investor, the greater its ownership, the higher the R&D investment. Finally, the authors test that, contrary to what mainstream suggests, contestability in family firms is higher when ownership in the hands of other family shareholders increases.

The work uses an original database to test a nonlinear relationship between ownership and R&D investment in family firms. Also, the study addresses a topic hardly ever discussed in the literature about R&D as it is the role of the contestability by other controlling shareholders.

El objetivo del presente trabajo es analizar la relación existente entre la estructura de propiedad y la innovación corporativa para una muestra de empresas cotizadas españolas.

Utilizando los planteamientos de la teoría de la agencia y de la perspectiva de la riqueza socioemocional proponemos que la I+D empresarial está relacionada con la estructura de propiedad, específicamente con la naturaleza del accionista de control (empresas familiares y empresas con un inversor institucional como principal accionista) y con el grado de contestabilidad por parte de otros accionistas significativos. A fin de testar nuestras hipótesis, construimos ad hoc una base de datos de propiedad original en la que identificamos, al umbral del 10% de propiedad, a los accionistas últimos de una muestra de 96 empresas cotizadas españolas para el periodo 2008–2018 (1.002 obs).

Nuestros resultados muestran que no existe relación significativa entre la concentración de propiedad y la inversión en I + D. Solo cuando consideramos la naturaleza del principal accionista encontramos que en las empresas familiares la relación entre la propiedad de la familia y la innovación corporativa adopta una forma de U invertida, tal que a bajos niveles de propiedad la I + D crece, mientras que a altos niveles de propiedad (que computamos en torno al 54% de propiedad) la inversión en I + D decrece. Asimismo, en las empresas con un inversor institucional como principal accionista, cuanto mayor es la propiedad de este inversor institucional, mayor es la I + D de la empresa. Finalmente testamos que, en contra de la corriente dominante, en las empresas familiares la propiedad en manos de otras familias incrementa el grado de contestabilidad a la familia controladora respecto a su inversión en I + D.

El trabajo utiliza una base de datos de propiedad original para testar una relación no lineal entre concentración de propiedad e innovación corporativa en las empresas familiares. Asimismo, el estudio aborda un tema apenas analizado en la literatura de I + D como es el papel de la contestabilidad al accionista de control.

The purpose of this study is to investigate simultaneous relations between corporate governance (CG) practice and cash flow right, cash flow leverage (the divergence between control right and cash flow right of controlling shareholders). The two ownership measures reflect alignment and expropriation incentives of controlling shareholders. This study also examines the effect of multiple large shareholders (MLSs) on CG practice.

The study uses publicly listed companies (PLCs) excluding those from the Indonesian finance sector during 2011-2013 as the samples of the study. Two-stages least squares regression models were used to test the simultaneous relations between CG practice and ownership structure variables. The study develops a CG instrument to measure CG practice based on ASEAN CG Scorecard, that comprehensively covers OECD CG principles and that can be used for panel data.

CG practice has a positive influence on cash flow right and has a marginally negative impact on cash flow leverage, while cash flow right and cash flow leverage have a marginally negative impact on CG practice. Further, the existence of large MLS complements CG practice, but as the control right of the second largest shareholders becomes closer to the largest shareholder, the complement relation becomes less important. State- or foreign-controlled PLCs practice better CG than other PLCs.

Studies on CG/ownership structure need to treat CG and ownership structure as endogenous variables in their research design. In addition, the level of rule of law in a country should be taken into account when examining the relation between CG and ownership structure. The interrelation among CG, ownership structure, capital structure and firm performance has been studied in the context of dispersed ownership structure and strong rule of law. Thus, future study needs to examine the interrelation among these four concepts in countries with high concentrated ownership and weak rule of law.

To minimize the risk of expropriation, investors in the capital market need to select shares of PLCs that practice CG suitable for the ownership structure of PLCs, have high ownership by the largest shareholder and have no divergence between control and ownership right, and or have MLSs. PLCs may need to choose the level of CG mechanism in the context of their ownership structure and consider the benefits and costs implementing them.

The study supports the “one size does not fit all” perspective on CG and, thus, it supports the recently enacted financial service authority (FSA) rule requiring PLCs to follow the “comply or explain” rule on the CG code for PLCs. The FSA needs to enforce the compliance of PLCs with CG rules and encourage PLCs to implement CG in substance, not just in form. To strengthen the positive impact of good CG practice in attracting investments in capital market, the regulator needs to improve investor protection rules and ensure strong rule of law.

The study is the first to examine the simultaneous relation between CG practice and both cash flow right and cash flow leverage of the largest shareholder. It is also the first that investigates the impact of MLS on CG practice. It explores the complement and substitution relation between the two concepts in reducing agency costs. In term of research design, the study develops a CG instrument that is based on OECD CG principles, that can be used for panel data and that uses public information.

Resource-based view (RBV) theory (Barney, 1991; Barney and Mackey, 2016; Nagano, 2020) states that a firm’s tangible and intangible resources can represent a sustainable competitive advantage (SCA), a long-term competitive advantage that is extremely difficult to duplicate by another firm, when it meets four criteria (i.e. not imitable, are rare, valuable and not substitutable). In the context of this case, we believe there are three sources of SCA to be discussed using RBV – the major league soccer (MLS) team player roster, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies to exploit this roster and the league’s single-entity structure: • MLS players: it has been widely acknowledged that a firm’s human resource talent, which includes professional soccer players (Omondi-Ochieng, 2019), can be a source of SCA. For example, from an RBV perspective, a player on the Los Angeles Galaxy roster: > cannot play for any other team in any other league at the same time (not imitable and are rare), > would already be a competitive player, as he is acquired to play in the highest professional league in the country (valuable) and > it would be almost impossible to find a clone player matching his exact talent characteristic (not substitutable) anywhere else. Of course, the roster mix of players must be managed by a capable coach who is able to exploit these resources and win championships (Szymanski et al., 2019). Therefore, it is the strategic human resource or talent management strategies of the professional soccer team roster that will enable a team to have the potential for an SCA (Maqueira et al., 2019). • Technology: technology can also be considered a source of SCA. However, this has been a source of contention. The argument is that technology is accessible to any firm that can afford to purchase it. Logically, any MLS team (or for that matter any professional soccer team) can acquire or build an AI system. For many observers, the only obvious constraint is financial resources. As we discuss in other parts of the case study, there is a fan-based assumption that what transpired in major league baseball (MLB) may repeat in the MLS. The movie Moneyball promoted the use of sabermetrics in baseball when making talent selection (as opposed to relying exclusively on scouts), which has now evolved into the norm of using technology-centered sports analytics across all MLB teams. In short, where is the advantage when every team uses technology for talent management? However, if that is the case, why are the MLB teams continuing to use AI and now the National Basketball Association (NBA), National Football League (NFL) and National Hockey League are following suit? We believe RBV theorists have already provided early insights: > “the exploitation of physical technology in a firm often involves the use of socially complex firm resources. Several firms may all possess the same physical technology, but only one of these firms may possess the social relations, cultural traditions, etc., to fully exploit this technology to implementing strategies…. and obtain a sustained competitive advantage from exploiting their physical technology more completely than other firms” (Barney, 1991, p. 110). • MLS League Single-Entity Structure: In contrast to other professional soccer leagues, the MLS has one distinct in-built edge – its ownership structure as a single entity, that is as one legal organization. All of the MLS teams are owned by the MLS, but with franchise operators. The centralization of operations provides the MLS with formidable economies of scale such as when investing in AI technologies for teams. Additionally, this ownership structure accords it leverage in negotiations for its inputs such as for player contracts. The MLS is the single employer of all its players, fully paying all salaries except those of the three marquees “designated players.” Collectively, this edge offers the MLS unparalleled fluidity and speed as a league when implementing changes, securing stakeholder buy-ins and adjusting for tailwinds. The “socially complex firm resources” is the unique talent composition of the professional soccer team and most critically its single entity structure. While every team can theoretically purchase an AI technology talent management system, its application entails use across 30 teams with a very different, complex and unique set of player talents. The MLS single-entity structure though is the resource that supplies the stability required for this human-machine (technology) symbioses to be fully accepted by stakeholders such as players and implemented with precision and speed across the entire league. So, there exists the potential for each MLS team (and the MLS as a league) to acquire SCA even when using “generic” AI technology, as long as other complex firm factors come into play.

This case relied on information that was widely reported within media, press interviews by MLS officials, announcements by various organizations, journal articles and publicly available information on MLS. All of the names and positions, in this case, are actual persons.

MLS started as a story of dreaming large and of quixotic adventure. Back in 1990, the founders of the MLS “sold” the league in exchange for the biggest prize in world soccer – the rights to host the 1994 Fédération Internationale de Football Association World Cup before they even wrote up the business plan. Today, the MLS is the highest-level professional men’s soccer league competition in the USA. That is a major achievement in just over 25-years, as the US hosts a large professional sports market. However, MLS has been unable to attract higher broadcasting value for its matches and break into the highest tier of international professional soccer. The key reason is that MLS matches are not deemed high quality content by broadcasters. To achieve higher quality matches requires many inputs such as soccer specific stadiums, growing the fan base, attracting key investors, league integrity and strong governance, all of which MLS has successfully achieved since its inception. However, attracting high quality playing talent is a critical input the MLS does not have because the league has repeatedly cautioned that it cannot afford them yet to ensure long-term financial sustainability. In fact, to guarantee this trade-off, the MLS is one of the only professional soccer leagues with an annual salary cap. So, the question is: how does MLS increase the quality of its matches (content) using relatively low cost (low quality) talent and still be able to demand higher broadcast revenues? One strategy is for the MLS to use AI playing technology to extract higher quality playing performance from its existing talent like other sports leagues have demonstrated, such as the NFL and NBA. To implement such a radical technology-centric strategy with its players requires the MLS to navigate associated issues such as human-machine symbioses, risking fan acceptance and even altering brand valuation.

The case is written and designed for a graduate-level (MBA) class or an upper-level undergraduate class in areas such as contemporary issues in management, human resource management, talent management, strategic management, sports management and sports marketing. The case is suitable for courses that discuss strategy, talent management, human resource management and brand strategy.