Search results

The motivation behind Section 953(b) of Dodd–Frank Act was the increasing pay inequality and supposed CEOs' rent extraction. It required public companies to disclose CEO-to-employee pay ratios. Using the ratios reported by S&P 1500 firms in 2017–18, this paper examines whether companies led by women and minority CEOs have lower ratios than those led by white male CEOs.

This paper uses multivariate regression along with a matched sample analysis to examine whether female and minority CEOs have higher CEO-to-employee pay ratios compared to male and white CEOs, controlling for other determinants of pay ratios.

Results indicate that CEO-to-employee pay ratios are 22–28% higher for female CEOs compared to their male counterparts, controlling for other determinants of pay ratios. There is, however, no statistically significant difference between the pay ratios of minority vs white male CEOs. Minority female CEOs have lower CEO-to-employee pay ratios than white female CEOs. Consistent with literature, larger and more profitable firms have higher CEO-to-employee pay ratios.

While prior studies on determinants of CEO-to-employee pay ratios have used either industry-level or self-reported data for a small subset of firms (resulting in selection bias), this paper uses firm-level data that are available for all S&P 1500 firms due to new disclosure requirements due to the Dodd–Frank Act Section 953(b). Moreover, this is the first paper to test whether gender or ethnicity of a CEO affects within-firm pay inequality.

Purpose – This study explores the probability of expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders in the form of CEO compensation under an imperfect governance institution by using a novel Chinese dataset over 2001–2010.

Design/methodology/approach – We use a direct method to gauge controlling shareholders’ tunneling and expropriation of minority shareholders, and we present a simple model to link corporate governance and the degree of entrenchment by the largest shareholder. We use both Logit and Probit models to predict the likelihood of tunneling and use two-stage least square (2SLS) regression to address the endogeneity issues.

Findings – There are significant deterioration effects between controlling shareholder's tunneling and firm performance. Firms with more tunneling activities typically have larger controlling ownership, greater evidence of state control, less balance of power among large shareholders, and weaker board characteristics.

Research limitations/implications – The positive relationship between controlling shareholders’ tunneling and executive compensation implies that the controlling shareholder might divert personal benefits from the public firms at the expense of minority shareholders.

Originality/value – We focus on the effects of corporate governance restructuring on executive compensation and controlling shareholders’ tunneling in the Chinese context, and we also investigate whether these effects are stronger with the involvement of state ownership. We empirically address the issues between executive compensation and expropriation of minority shareholders.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on comparing the influence of majority and minority shareholders on executive compensation under conditions of CEO duality, examining majority and minority shareholder influences by measuring their investment and return activity. The paper seeks to uncover how CEO duality changes the impact the two categories of shareholders have on executive compensation, especially in an emerging nation.

In total, 30 corporations out of the 70 corporations listed on the BM&F Bovespa (a Brazilian stock market) were used for the paper. Quarterly data were collected on the companies from the Datastream database. The paper conducted a moderated regression analysis on the data to determine the conditional effects of majority and minority holders’ investment and returns on executive compensation.

There are incentives for executives meeting majority shareholder objectives, but minority shareholders’ influences act as a disincentive for executives. Only the influence of blockholders by their returns is affected by the separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman. The effect is such that firms with a separation of the roles have their executives rewarded in line with increments to the returns made to blockholders, but firms that have the roles merged pay a high wage that is inconsistent with managerial performance. Finally, the majority of variation in executive pay levels can be attributed to individual company traits.

The paper’s sample is biased to firm which had publicly available data on the total compensation payable to their top executives.

Advocates of minority shareholder rights may need to exercise patience with the implementation of more formalised governance structure, as they are not providing protection for minority shareholders within the period studied.

The paper provides empirical evidence within the Brazilian context of minority shareholder effects on executive compensation and the effect of CEO duality on the relationship.

To examine the board of directors’ performance and if higher performance helps protect minority shareholders in an emerging capital market. Additionally, we determine if the different types of company ownership moderate the level of protection to minority shareholders.

The study develops a measure of board performance with their compensation. And it tests its association with the dividend payout decision of 300 of the largest Malaysian public listed companies (referred to as PLCs) over the period 2008 to 2014.

The results find that higher board productivity in terms of return on capital employed is associated with higher dividend payout. Additionally, the study finds that the board performance measure interacts with race, ethnicity and gender of the board of directors and CEO duality to affect the dividend payout decision of Malaysian PLCs.

It is a single-country study of large Malaysian PLCs. And it uses only the governance mechanisms that have been shown in emerging capital markets to have the most significant effect on affecting the relationship between board performance and dividend payout.

The findings show the importance of inclusivity and diversity in governing State-controlled firms in an emerging capital market.

The findings suggest improving corporate boards’ performance, protecting minority shareholders and contributing to the corporate governance literature. Notably, the study highlights boardroom diversity’s importance to enhance the boards of State-controlled firms’ performance.

The purpose of this study is to analyse the level and structure of executive compensation of family and non-family businesses and if minority shareholders are expropriated by family businesses in the Australian context using excessive pay. Studies on compensation practices of family businesses are limited to the European and North American contexts. This study, for the first time, considers the Australian context, which is unique with its transparent compensation disclosures, and a principle-based corporate governance framework to examine the level of compensation as well as the association between pay and performance.

A set of family and matched non-family firms for the period 2004–2014 are examined in a panel data setting. Robust models are estimated to examine the association between compensation and a set of economic, governance and ownership factors.

This study finds evidence that family businesses in general pay lower levels of compensation than non-family businesses. An investigation of the role of economic factors on compensation of family and non-family businesses shows evidence that supports the optimal contracting theory. Further examination of governance factors on compensation levels and pay–performance sensitivities shows there is a limited role for managerial power approach in explaining the executive compensation practices of family businesses in Australia. These findings infer that family businesses, given their interest in non-financial goals, do not pay excessive compensation to their executives to expropriate minority shareholders.

These findings have implications for theory relating to executive compensation and human resource management in all types of businesses, including family firms. These findings offer support for the theory of optimal contracting. Empirical analysis shows no evidence of entrenchment effect or managerial power in family businesses in Australia. In terms of theory-building, there is role for socioemotional wealth model in addition to optimal contracting theory and managerial power approach.

The findings of this study also have implications for practice. Compensation practices may be designed in such a way that executives and firms pursue broader social goals such as the sustainable development goals or more generally non-financial objectives. Businesses may not necessarily use only financial outcomes when assessing appropriate level of pay of executives. Often, the financial outcomes may involve wealth transfers between different stakeholders and may not necessarily lead to improving the societal well-being. In terms of human resource management, the findings of this study emphasise the need for explicit consideration of socioemotional wealth of all family-related and non-related employees when designing recruitment, training, reward and recognition policies.

This study highlights the role non-financial factors play in executive pay setting processes in family businesses in a highly transparent and principle-based governance framework. Family businesses in Australia are not motivated by monetary considerations, and that their interest in non-financial objectives leads to less emphasis on the link between compensation and performance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between gray directors (non-executive non-independent directors) and executive compensation among companies listed in India’s National Stock Exchange (NSE). The paper also examines the possible interplay of relationships between controlling shareholder duality (controlling shareholder being the CEO), ownership category and executive compensation.

A sample of 438 firms listed in the NSE of India was studied using data spanning five financial years, 2012–2013 to 2016–2017.

Empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive association between the proportion of gray directors on the board and executive compensation. The sensitivity of executive compensation to gray directors is found to be higher among family controlled firms. This research has also found that CEOs who belong to controlling shareholder groups received higher pay than professional CEOs. The authors conjecture that these results suggest cronyism and may contribute to lower levels of corporate governance practices in the country.

The hybrid board structure, which India has adopted with the desire to bring the best of Anglo Saxon and Japanese board philosophies, has paradoxically led to self-serving boards. Exploration of alternative thinking to bring about changes in the regulatory framework is, therefore, necessary.

Serious problems are identified with the philosophy behind board composition mandated by Listing Requirements for Indian firms with empirical evidence showing how the existing rules generate cronyism and unfairness to minority shareholders.

In this paper, the authors examine how religious and political factors affect a firm's corporate governance diversity policies.

The authors develop five basic empirical models. Model 1 examines how religious beliefs and political affiliation determine whether a firm will establish diversity incentive in its senior executives' performance assessment. Model 2 investigates how the diversity goal, religious beliefs and political affiliation separately affect the level of actual diversity achieved. Model 3 examines how the diversity goal and environmental factors interact to affect the level of actual diversity achieved. Model 4 and Model 5 examine whether the diversity incentive in senior executives' compensation plan and the environmental factors (religious belief and political affiliation) help to reduce the compensation differentials between male and female executives.

The authors find that firms located in more liberal counties with more Mainline Protestants and less Republican voters in the United States are more likely to include workforce diversity as a criterion in evaluating their senior executives. The authors also provide evidence that firms with diversity goals have more female directors, more female senior executives and more minority directors. However, they find no evidence that the compensation differentials between male and female executives are smaller in these firms. Finally, they find that external environment affects the effectiveness of the implementation of the diversity goals.

In line withthis branch of research, the authors expand the literate on the link between corporate culture and corporate decision-making by investigating the non-financial performance measures. Besides the corporate decision-making in investment, financial reporting and social responsibilities as documented in prior studies, the authors argue that the religious beliefs and political affiliations could also affect the development and implementation of corporate non-financial performance goals in executive incentive contracts.

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the influence of chief executive officer (CEO) reputation on top management team (TMT) compensation, proposing corporate governance characteristics as a moderator of the relationships between the power of top managers to extract rents and the importance of external signals. The study aims to expand the domain of executive compensation literature by including the role of CEO reputation in the context of non-Anglo-Saxon corporate governance systems.

The paper opted for a panel methodology for the period 2004-2009, including 534 observations from Spanish listed companies. Data were obtained from several sources. Compensation and governance information was obtained from the Spanish Stock Exchange National Commission; data regarding CEO reputation were obtained from Spanish Corporate Reputation Monitor, and, finally, financial statement was obtained from the OSIRIS database.

The paper provides empirical insights on the CEO reputation diffusion on TMT compensation, showing different scenarios depending on effectiveness of corporate governance. CEO reputation diffusion on TMT pay is strengthened or weakened by the organizational governance effectiveness. General evidence supports the notion that in countries characterized by an incomplete corporate governance system, boards – and also indirectly the structure of ownership – act as a catalyst for external signs of legitimacy, rather than for the organization's and stakeholders’ interests.

Because of the difficulty in pooling information for a long period from three different sources of data, the number of observations is not very large. Therefore, researchers are encouraged to test the proposed propositions further using other context of corporate governance.

The paper includes implications for the development of effective governance mechanisms which promote an adequate link between the CEO reputation and the TMT compensation, avoiding rent extractions.

The paper contributes to new international evidences regarding relations between top managers’ reputations and compensation. Specifically, it allows reinforcement of the importance of institutional arguments in the understanding of the effectiveness of governance mechanisms in large listed companies.

There has been concern expressed in the financial press and focus established in the accounting literature over rising levels of executive compensation. Individuals on the compensation committee, a sub-committee of the board of directors, collectively determine executive compensation and are responsible for maintaining the pay-for-performance standard, a concept that warrants further attention. This study examines the process of exaggeration of a group decision over individual beliefs and the impact of leadership upon a committee's outcome when making compensation awards. In an experiment with 98 subjects role-playing as compensation committee members, results show that in a committee of individuals where a coterie and a majority belief is present, group polarization occurs and the compensation results are exaggerated as compared to individual beliefs. The findings also suggest, though, that the appointment of a leader as chair of the committee, either in the majority or minority view, has a moderating effect on the group outcome. These results highlight and add to the literature the potential for agency costs in the group decision process that may be found in the executive compensation-setting environment.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of ownership concentration on CEO compensation and firm performance relationship in New Zealand.

The paper applies regression analysis to data from New Zealand listed companies from 2001 to 2005.

The study finds a non‐linear effect of ownership concentration on CEO compensation‐firm performance relationship, that is CEO compensation is negatively (positively) related to firm performance in firms with high (low) concentrated ownership structure respectively.

Results provide evidence for the proposition that ownership concentration at a high level in New Zealand does not constrain excessive management power, but exacerbates agency problems associated with executive pay. A highly concentrated ownership structure provides potential explanation for the misalignment between CEO compensation and firm performance in New Zealand. The positive effect of a low ownership concentration level on CEO compensation‐firm performance relationship suggests that monitoring the efficiency of large shareholders works better at a low ownership concentration level.

By exploring the non‐linear interaction between two governance mechanisms – CEO compensation and ownership concentration – the findings of the study make contributions to the current compensation and ownership literature mainly in two ways: although the non‐linearity between ownership concentration and firm value has attracted extensive research interest, little attention is given to the non‐linear effect of large shareholding on the CEO compensation contract in prior studies; and, in the context of a developed country with a small financial market, there are low regulatory “drag” and virtual absence of a litigation threat to organisations, as in New Zealand. This study suggests concentrated ownership as an underlying explanation for the misalignment between CEO compensation and firm performance.