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The purpose of this paper is to explore how military strategic knowledge managers consider and respond to digitalization of operational processes in their revision of military knowledge management technologies. The research question is: which strategic considerations and professional concerns impact decisions about how far digitalization should be incorporated into Army planning doctrine?

The paper presents material from a qualitative research study which observed the process of revising Danish Army Field Manual III. The empirical data include 12 in-depth interviews as well as documents related to the revision process. Data were analysed using a thematic approach.

The paper identifies and discusses strategic dilemmas arising from incorporating digitalization into planning doctrine. Two major areas of concern are addressed. The first involves considerations about the extent of digitalization, including concerns about risk and issues of timing regarding choices of specific digital solutions. The second involves potential limits of digitalization in relation to military notions of the role and identity of the commander. The article suggests that digitalization may impact on professional roles and identities and that strategic knowledge management developers need to be cognizant of this.

The paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, the paper draws attention to the notions of risk and timing in relation to strategic decisions on how far knowledge management technologies should make use of possibilities brought about by digitalization. Second, the paper provides insight into how digitalization may profoundly alter professional roles and identities.

Nobody concerned with political economy can neglect the history of economic doctrines. Structural changes in the economy and society influence economic thinking and, conversely, innovative thought structures and attitudes have almost always forced economic institutions and modes of behaviour to adjust. We learn from the history of economic doctrines how a particular theory emerged and whether, and in which environment, it could take root. We can see how a school evolves out of a common methodological perception and similar techniques of analysis, and how it has to establish itself. The interaction between unresolved problems on the one hand, and the search for better solutions or explanations on the other, leads to a change in paradigma and to the formation of new lines of reasoning. As long as the real world is subject to progress and change scientific search for explanation must out of necessity continue.

This paper aims to encourage thinking beyond the limits of obsolete and superficial “warfare marketing” by exploring potentially useful lessons from modern military intelligence and strategy for marketing intelligence and planning.

Key contemporary trends and approaches to strategy are identified in the literature, and used as the basis for discussion of the possibility of productive knowledge transfer between the two fields.

Comparisons of the conventional (linear, rationalistic, analytical) planning approach with unconventional modern approaches (flexible, technological, voluntary and context‐based) suggest some advanced implications for the planning of marketing strategy.

The rethinking of some underlying strategic assumptions is suggested, and the implications discussed within each of the four areas of a proposed framework: marketing doctrine and structures, intelligence and effectiveness, soft resources, and the process of strategic planning.

Presents a more balanced and up to date view of the parallels between strategy and planning in the modern military context and in contemporary marketing practice, with particular respect to the complementary roles of intelligence/technology and human/societal aspects.

France's defeat by Germany in 1940 is one of the most shocking events in the annals of military history. Explanations for France's defeat have traditionally focused on battlefield mistakes, an unmotivated population, and even bad luck. Yet, the seeds of France's failure were sown long before her 1940 surrender. The purpose of this paper is to examine the presence of groupthink in the French General Staff during the interwar years with its deleterious effect on France's military preparedness.

Groupthink is used to understand the reasons behind France's decisive defeat at the start of World War II. Historians of the period and primary and secondary works were consulted and analyzed.

Multiple examples of the main eight groupthink symptoms were identified from the documentary evidence. Groupthink present in the French General Staff had an adverse impact on the France's preparations. Groupthink led to the downplaying of important information, the failure to question vital assumptions about German capabilities, and the misapplication of new military technology. This led to inflexibility and the inability to respond to innovative German technology and operational doctrine.

Groupthink is useful in explaining complex historical events – events which often have been attributed to poor leadership, corrupt or incapable politicians, or simply luck. The application of social science theory and methods to well‐documented events, whether “historical” or otherwise has the potential to enrich the understanding of these events and the ways in which they may be studied.

This study also contributes to evidence on groupthink and the application of theory in social science and management to the study of well‐documented historical events.

This article reports on an international assessment to identify and discuss environmental issues that may affect the US Army’s transformation efforts. Many factors, such as new kinds of weapons, increasing demands on natural resources, urbanization and globalization, are making the planning of environmental viability for life support more important in the future. The article highlights eight environmental security developments and potential military requirements to address them.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the needs of the supply-chain (SC) network when coping with permanent and temporary demands, this paper analyzes the Swedish emergency preparedness SC network. This network comprises planning procedures and resources, as well as numerous organizations and other participants in civil society that take part in the system to cope with threats and ongoing crises. Planning constitutes a critical infrastructure because the system must develop the ability to shift SC functions from permanent to temporary networks in ongoing crises and war.

A research study is performed based on data gathered by three qualitative methods concerning the SC network of emergency preparedness planning.

This study demonstrates the relevance of a wide empirical field challenging several theoretical perspectives of the SC network in preparedness planning and the shift to ongoing crises. Further research targeting key capabilities is needed to further improve understanding of the challenges for developed countries in managing potential threats and crises.

Actors taking part in the preparedness system have found it challenging to coordinate. Due, in part, to the lack of a common threat profile, key capabilities remain outside preparedness planning, e.g., military, commercial and voluntary actors as well as unclear and inconsistent regulations. Thus, building the SC network demonstrates the need to target the military, the voluntary and commercial sectors and their ability to develop the networks in preparedness planning. In a reformed system, all actors must strengthen civil defense in an all-hazard approach, which in planning encompasses the entire threat scale, demonstrating key functions and the ability to shift to temporary networks responding to ongoing crises, including war.

Each of the four objectives can be applied within the military training environment. Military training often requires that soldiers achieve specific levels of performance or proficiency in each phase of training. For example, training courses impose entrance and graduation criteria, and awards are given for excellence in military performance. Frequently, training devices, training media, and training evaluators or observers also directly support the need to diagnose performance strengths and weaknesses. Training measures may be used as indices of performance, and to indicate the need for additional or remedial training.