Groupthink and France's defeat in the 1940 campaign

Abstract

Purpose

France's defeat by Germany in 1940 is one of the most shocking events in the annals of military history. Explanations for France's defeat have traditionally focused on battlefield mistakes, an unmotivated population, and even bad luck. Yet, the seeds of France's failure were sown long before her 1940 surrender. The purpose of this paper is to examine the presence of groupthink in the French General Staff during the interwar years with its deleterious effect on France's military preparedness.

Design/methodology/approach

Groupthink is used to understand the reasons behind France's decisive defeat at the start of World War II. Historians of the period and primary and secondary works were consulted and analyzed.

Findings

Multiple examples of the main eight groupthink symptoms were identified from the documentary evidence. Groupthink present in the French General Staff had an adverse impact on the France's preparations. Groupthink led to the downplaying of important information, the failure to question vital assumptions about German capabilities, and the misapplication of new military technology. This led to inflexibility and the inability to respond to innovative German technology and operational doctrine.

Research limitations/implications

Groupthink is useful in explaining complex historical events – events which often have been attributed to poor leadership, corrupt or incapable politicians, or simply luck. The application of social science theory and methods to well‐documented events, whether “historical” or otherwise has the potential to enrich the understanding of these events and the ways in which they may be studied.

Originality/value

This study also contributes to evidence on groupthink and the application of theory in social science and management to the study of well‐documented historical events.

Citation

Ahlstrom, D. and Wang, L.C. (2009), "Groupthink and France's defeat in the 1940 campaign", Journal of Management History, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 159-177. https://doi.org/10.1108/17511340910943804