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This chapter examines the UK and the Nigerian approach to reducing emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the environment as a result of gas flaring utilising the market-based regulation. Determining how different jurisdictions fare in the quest to reduce GHG emissions associated with the oil and gas industry is essential because: policy makers have realised the advantages of market-based regulation over the command-and-control regulation; and in the light of various pledges different countries have made in different forum to reduce the emission of GHGs, particularly in the wake of the recently held Paris climate change conference.

Library-based approach is used, providing conceptual and theoretical understanding of climate change, GHG emissions and various market-based regulatory tools utilised in the United Kingdom and Nigeria in regulating emission associated with operations in the oil and gas industry.

The study reveals the significance of environmental regulations that encourage region integration and flexibility in the implementation of environmental policies. Moreover, it finds that the Paris Agreement re-affirms the utilisation of market-based regulations and indicates a future for investment in the oil and gas industry.

The study revealed that there are lacunas in regulations and strategies for the implementation of environmental regulations which need to be addressed in order to achieve zero or a significant decrease in gas flaring.

This study provided an ample opportunity to theoretically examine market-based regulatory tools utilised in the oil and gas industry in a developed country in relation to a developing country.

Williamson's systematic treatment of transaction costs in explaining governance structures has rarely been applied to the field of environmental economics. The aim of this chapter is to address this oversight by analysing how transaction cost economics can help choose among environmental policy tools.

We apply the analytical framework of discrete structural alternatives – market, hybrid forms and hierarchy – to the choice of environmental policy instruments. Environmental-related transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with categories of policy instruments, which differ in their cost and competence, so as to effect a discriminating – mainly transaction costs economizing – result.

First, we suggest defining the transaction as the trading of property rights to the use of natural resources. Second, the characteristics of the transaction are described as mainly measurement costs. Third, we determine the conditions under which a particular ‘governance structure’ that is a policy instrument is chosen.

A major contribution of our analysis is to question the relevance of many economists’ prescription in favour of incentive-based instruments. Indeed, in some plausible circumstances a command-and-control instrument may be more efficient by economizing on transaction costs.

Environmental economics has employed the seminal contribution of Ronald H. Coase (1960) intensively but has remained relatively unaffected by the contributions of perhaps his most influential follower, Oliver E. Williamson. Our chapter is a first step towards an operationalization à la Williamson of Coase's (1992, p. 778) ‘fundamental insights’ in the environmental realm.

Can market-based regulation based on consumer pressure and ‘independent monitoring’ serve as the basis for transnational corporation regulation? In an increasingly integrated global economy, many scholars and policy makers fear that mobile capital may force a ‘race to the bottom’; can independent non-governmental organizations and ethical consumers provide a counterweight to cost-cutting pressures? This paper compares three of the best known examples of transnational monitoring – the Sullivan Principles in South Africa, the Rugmark social labeling program in India, and the Commission for the Verification of Codes of Conduct's monitoring experiences in the apparel industry of Guatemala – to consider some common features of transnational monitoring.

This chapter presents a conceptual framework to understand the role of multinational enterprises in the process of environmental standard setting in the global economy. Inside the multinational, we discuss the impact of path-dependency and irreversibility on environmental investment, and the importance of the integrated network structure of the multinational in enabling the transfer of standards within the firm. Outside the firm, we discuss the impact of regulation and market forces, and particularly the role of NGOs, in triggering change in firm behavior both at home and abroad. We conclude by considering the impact of supranational institutions on the environmental behavior of multinationals.

We examine the translation of the concept of privacy in the advent of digital communication technologies. We analyze emerging notions of informational privacy in public discourse and policymaking in the United States. Our analysis shows category change to be a dynamic process that is only in part about cognitive processes of similarity. Instead, conceptions of privacy were tied to institutional orders of worth. Those orders offered theories, analogies, and vocabularies that could be deployed to extrapolate the concept of privacy into new domains, make sense of new technologies, and to shape policy agendas.

The concept of light-handed regulation, including light-handed approaches to the regulation of airport services, is discussed. The rationale for the economic regulation of airport services and the traditional approaches used for economic regulation of airport charges are summarized. The evolution of international practice of light-handed regulation is outlined, including the experience with minimal regulation across monopoly industries in New Zealand and the acceptance of “negotiated settlements” in utility industries in North America. General reasons for moving to light-handed regulation of airports include the disadvantages of the price cap approach in practice and the benefits of facilitating greater negotiation between airports and users. Comparisons are made between alternative approaches to light-handed regulation of airport services, including price and quality of service monitoring, information disclosure regulation and negotiate-arbitrate regulation, approaches that have been applied to airport services in Australia and New Zealand. The role and nature of the incentives under each approach are discussed. The chapter concludes that whether light-handed regulation provides a suitable alternative approach to direct regulation depends on the market circumstances and the design characteristics of the light-handed approach.

The initial jurisprudential response to the gig economy above has included the exploration of two new legal personae: algorithmic persons and dependent contractors. The author uses the word ‘exploration’ here, because neither figure has become an established character on the legal landscape in the United States – yet. Given the sector’s claims of absolute novelty, it may seem that the best way to develop regulations is to identify new positions and actors, define them, and then apply existing regulations and expectations or develop new ones accordingly. This chapter explains why this approach is misguided. First, legal personae have only a tangential relationship with actually existing human beings. Much regulatory energy could be caught up in elaborate definitions and descriptions intended to develop robust regulation, only to find that they create the blueprint for future business models that avert these very frameworks. Second, these legal personae are developed within the existing frameworks of employment law and corporate regulation, which in the United States, are determined by a phantasmagoric understanding of ‘the market’. Unless this basic framework is questioned, one can expect that these new legal personae will fail to protect actual workers and consumers.