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The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence on how firm-specific and macroeconomic uncertainty affects shareholders’ valuation of a firm’s cash holdings. This extends previous work on this issue by highlighting the importance of the source of uncertainty. The findings indicate that increases in firm-specific risk generally increase the value of cash while increases in macroeconomic risk generally decrease the value of cash. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of the unexpected change in cash. The authors extend the analysis to financially constrained and unconstrained firms.

The authors test the hypothesis that the marginal effect of cash holdings on excess stock returns is sensitive to uncertainty. To compute this marginal effect, the authors adopt and extend the approach of Faulkender and Wang (2006) to the authors’ more elaborate model.

The findings indicate that different sources of uncertainty affect the value of cash holdings differently. Findings indicate that increases in firm-specific risk generally increase the value of cash while increases in macroeconomic risk generally decrease the value of cash. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of the unexpected change in cash. The authors also extend the findings to financially constrained and unconstrained firms.

The findings indicate that the source of uncertainty firm-specific vs macroeconomic risk matters. The two sources of risk may have quite different effects on shareholders’ valuation of a firm’s cash holdings. Results from alternative sources of findings are new. These new findings are robust to alternative definitions of the unexpected change in cash.

In this paper, the authors examine the association between a firm's geographical location and the value of its cash holdings.

Following Loughran and Schultz (2005) and Nielsson and Wójcik (2016), the authors define firms as either geographically remote or geographically proximate based on their distance to areas that are either largely populated or concentrated in financial expertise. We also estimate the marginal value of cash using the model developed by Faulkender and Wang (2006).

The authors find that the marginal value of cash is $0.10–$0.16 lower in remotely located firms than in geographically proximate firms. The lower marginal value of cash is prominent among remotely located firms with greater severity of information asymmetry. Our findings support the view that the inability of shareholders to closely monitor how managers use of firm cash may increase the perceived conflicts of interest associated with managers' cash spending and decrease the value of cash.

Previous studies try to explain the cash holdings puzzle by attributing it to CEO overconfidence, external funding constraints, poor corporate governance, difference in corporate financial policy, poor investor protection, lack of firm diversification and large operating losses. This study contributes to the extant literature by offering new evidence of the role of geographic location on the value of cash holdings.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how investors’ valuation of cash holdings is related to firm-level investment.

As prior studies note that holding excess cash serve as a driver to would be over-investing, and that over-investment imposes substantial agency costs on shareholders, the authors focus on the value implications of holding cash in the presence of over-investment from the perspective of shareholders.

By examining the publicly traded companies on Taiwan stock market, the authors uncover that cash is valued less in firms with over-investment than in those with under-investment and the magnitude of over-investment is negatively related to the marginal value of cash holdings (MVCH). It reveals that investment activities impact the value that shareholders place on cash holdings. Moreover, further tests indicate that higher block holdings and the presence of independent directors on boards can effectively mitigate the negative impact of over-investment on the MVCH.

This paper enhances the understanding of the valuation implications of cash reserves held by firms with over-investment and the effectiveness of governance structures in containing the detrimental effect of investment-related agency costs on the value of holding cash.

This paper provides pioneering evidence that outside investors discount cash assets in over-investing firms to reflect their expectations that they will not receive the full benefit of these assets; and this paper extends the literature on corporate governance by assessing the role of governance mechanisms in reversing the negative relation between over-investment and the MVCH.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between corporate tax aggressiveness and cash holdings and that between corporate tax aggressiveness and the value of cash. Further, this study explores the impact of the tax enforcement level on the above associations.

Under a Chinese special institutional background, this study constructs tax aggressiveness and tax enforcement measures. On this basis, using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies over the period from 1990 to 2010, this study empirically tests the association between tax enforcement, corporate tax aggressiveness, and cash holdings.

By empirically testing with Chinese listed companies as the sample, this paper finds the following: with the increase in the tax avoidance level, the precautionary incentives of cash, and the level of financial constraint likewise increase, which will make the level of firm cash savings increase. Meanwhile, although tax avoidance will induce lower transparency and higher agency costs, the marginal value of the cash held by the more aggressive firms is higher due to the higher market competition effect of the cash. Additional tests suggest that, the tax enforcement level can weaken the effect of tax avoidance on the transparency and agency problem; however, because the tax enforcement level can also increase the tax risk of the firm, the positive relation between firm’s tax avoidance and cash savings is strengthened correspondingly. On the value of cash holdings, the tax enforcement level can also make the marginal value of tax aggressive firms higher.

First, this paper provides new evidence on the determinants of firm’s cash holdings from the perspective of cash savings. Second, this paper examines the association between Chinese firm’s tax aggressiveness and the value of cash, which not only provides evidence for the local tax literature but also has reference value for the foreign literature. Third, this paper has reference value for research on the association between corporate tax avoidance activities and other operating decisions. Finally, this paper not only provides new evidence on the association between tax enforcement and corporate governance, but also extends the prior literature on the association between corporate tax aggressiveness and cash holdings.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether the presence of an audit committee (AC) members with Chief Executive Officer (CEO) experience (supervisory experts) affects the market value of cash holdings.

To estimate the marginal value of cash holdings, this study uses the model proposed by Faulkender and Wang (2006). The sample is 2,031 firm-year observations in Korea from 2000 through 2015.

The authors find that the presence of supervisory experts on ACs has a negative impact on the value of cash holdings. This result suggests that supervisory experts on ACs weaken monitoring of managerial actions. The authors also find that the negative effect of supervisory experts on the value of cash holdings is mitigated when there are other AC members with accounting expertise.

The findings that AC supervisory expertise impairs the effectiveness of ACs, and thus destroys shareholder value have policy implications because the current regulations in many countries use a broad definition of financial expertise that includes supervisory expertise.

This is the first study that directly examines the effect of AC supervisory expertise on the value of cash holdings. The study also contributes to the literature on the role of ACs in emerging markets by documenting the limitations of corporate governance systems adopted from the Anglo–Saxon model.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate debt-like compensation and the value of excess cash holdings.

The sample comprises 876 US firms covered by ExecuComp over the period 2006-2013. The authors apply the valuation regression of Fama and French (1998) to examine the marginal value of excess cash as a function of CEO inside debt holdings.

This paper proposes one hypothesis. The results constitute evidence that the value of excess cash to shareholders declines as CEO inside debt increases. More interestingly, excess cash holdings contribute less to firm value when shareholders expect their value to be destroyed due to managers’ conservative behavior.

The sample comprises only US firms, owing to a lack of firms data from other countries. It would be interesting to conduct future research on an international sample.

This paper contributes to a deeper understanding of investor valuation of excess cash in the presence of CEO inside debt. The findings complement previous studies on US firms by confirming the existence of a relationship between the agency costs of debt and firm policy decisions.

This work is, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the first to examine the relationship between debt-like compensation and excess cash valuation, and it supports the view that the conflict between shareholders and debtholders largely affects firm cash policy, and hence, cash valuation.

This paper assesses how discretionary accruals (DAs) affect corporate cash savings policies and the motivation behind this cash saving behavior and, also whether the linkage between DAs and cash saving affect the market-perceived cash value.

We construct the measure of DAs using the previous five-year average information to investigate the association of DAs with the change in cash. Moreover, the Faulkender and Wang (2006) methodology is utilized to examine the market-perceived cash value in DAs.

The key finding is that firms with high DAs save significantly more cash. A one standard deviation increase in DAs saves cash by 12.59%. Furthermore, the value of cash is low for these firms. The effect is stronger in firms with poor governance but not present in financially constrained firms.

The empirical evidence highlights DAs have negative effect on market-perceived cash value, which underscores the insight that managers manage earnings opportunistically using DAs.

Taken together, we provide more evidence on the literature of accruals in earnings manipulation.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between firm value and cash holdings for the period 2003-2008. This study seeks to find if there are costs and benefits associated with holding too much or too little cash, then an optimal cash level exists where marginal benefits are offset by their costs. If this optimal point exists, then firm value will be maximized at that point and deviation from it will affect the firm value negatively.

Optimal cash level between firm value and cash holding is determined by investigating the concave relationship. If concave relationship exists then a residual term is included in the equation to see how deviations from the optimal level affect firm value. A two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is used in estimating all results. GMM controls for unobserved firm heterogeneity and endogeneity problems.

Results showed that a concave relationship exists between firm value and cash holdings, which confirmed that there is an optimal cash level that maximizes firm value. It was also found that deviations from the optimal level affect firm value negatively.

The paper provides the existence of an optimal point of cash between costs and benefits wherein firm value is maximized. It has implications for firms’ investment and financing decisions when there is limited access to external finance. At higher level of cash the study has implications for agency theory and governance practices.

The study establishes a conclusive relationship between firm value and cash holdings within the context of the Pakistani market.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the strength of corporate governance and the value of firm-level investment policies following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 and the associated changes to the listing requirements of major stock exchanges. In particular the authors seek to examine potential changes in the market’s assessed value of capital expenditures after the passage of the SOX Act relative to before.

The authors employ a difference-in-difference methodology, centred on the year of the passage of the SOX Act to test for the role of governance on the marginal value of capital expenditures. Excess stock returns are calculated by subtracting Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market portfolio value-weighted returns from the firms’ annual stock returns. Each firm is grouped into one of 25 size and book-to-market portfolios for each year in the sample, with size and the book-to-market ratio proxying for sensitivity to common risk factors in stock returns (Fama and French, 1993).

The authors find that markets responded to the change in governance brought about by the new regulation by altering the value of firm-level capital expenditures in a way that is generally consistent with predictions of agency theory. While the overall findings imply a reduction in agency conflicts post-SOX, there is some evidence that certain firms may have suffered excessive costs of compliance, while still others saw managers become excessively risk averse.

The study has implications related to the efficacy of legislation. Cross-sectional variation in the effect of SOX on the marginal value of capital expenditures suggests that one-size-fits-all legislative approach can have both expected as well as unintended consequences. The study limits its analysis to examining the impact of three significant provisions of the Act. While, the value implications of the Act are largely captured by the selected three, a more comprehensive study could expand on the set of provisions studies to obtain a more granular level impact.

This research should add to the growing body of the literature examining the effect of SOX on firms’ real activities and decisions, as well as contribute to the debate on whether the Act was beneficial or costly to firms. With particular reference to the impact of capital expenditure on firm value, the research contributes to the sparse literature examining the contribution of capital expenditures to firm value and the role that agency conflicts play in this relationship. Additionally, this research adds to the growing body of the literature that examines the costs and benefits of the sweeping new regulations brought on by the adoption of SOX.

Given the importance of investment policy for economic productivity and growth, the insights provided by findings in this research should benefit lawmakers both within the USA as well as in countries where corporate misconduct and fraud is a concern.

This is the first study that examines the impact of the SOX Act on the way capital markets value firm-level investment in capital expenditures. Since use of corporate resources by managers is fraught with agency conflicts, the role of SOX in potentially alleviating this conflict as revealed by the tests in this study are very valuable.

Prior research has documented a guilt by association phenomenon whereby instances of corporate misconduct generate a negative spillover to innocent firms due to their shared industry membership with the wrongdoing firm. However, research on competitive dynamics predicts a positive spillover whereby some firms benefit from the revelation of financial misconduct by an industry peer. This study lends support to both these effects by highlighting the role product similarity plays in the understanding of investors' perceptions surrounding corporate misconduct.

The study assesses the investors' valuation of cash using Faulkender and Wang's (2006) methodology. The difference-in-differences approach is employed to compare the market valuation of cash held by non-accused firms with higher and lower litigation spillover risk operating in industries with higher vs lower product similarity.

The findings show that an increase in the volume and severity of misconduct by industry peers is associated with an undeserved loss in the value of cash held by non-accused firms operating in industries with high product similarity. In contrast, firms that sell differentiated products stand to gain from the troubles of the accused peer. Moreover, non-accused firms in industries with high product similarity reduce capital expenditures more following misconduct accusations against peers to preserve cash in anticipation of future lawsuits.

This study contributes to the growing spillover literature that investigates how a crisis caused by one firm affects the valuation of its peers.