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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between firm value and cash holdings for the period 2003-2008. This study seeks to find if there are costs and benefits associated with holding too much or too little cash, then an optimal cash level exists where marginal benefits are offset by their costs. If this optimal point exists, then firm value will be maximized at that point and deviation from it will affect the firm value negatively.

Optimal cash level between firm value and cash holding is determined by investigating the concave relationship. If concave relationship exists then a residual term is included in the equation to see how deviations from the optimal level affect firm value. A two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is used in estimating all results. GMM controls for unobserved firm heterogeneity and endogeneity problems.

Results showed that a concave relationship exists between firm value and cash holdings, which confirmed that there is an optimal cash level that maximizes firm value. It was also found that deviations from the optimal level affect firm value negatively.

The paper provides the existence of an optimal point of cash between costs and benefits wherein firm value is maximized. It has implications for firms’ investment and financing decisions when there is limited access to external finance. At higher level of cash the study has implications for agency theory and governance practices.

The study establishes a conclusive relationship between firm value and cash holdings within the context of the Pakistani market.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the asymmetric adjustment of cash holdings in Pakistani firms for above and below target firms.

The study employs generalized method of moments (GMM) to investigate the adjustment of cash holdings.

The study found that the firms which hold cash above the optimal level of cash holdings have higher speed of adjustment than the firms which hold cash below the optimal level. Financially constrained (FC) firms also adjust their cash holdings faster than financially unconstrained (FUC) firms but high speed of downward adjustment does not remain persistent after financial constraints are controlled. Findings of this study reveal this asymmetric adjustment in above and below target firms and extend these results in FC and FUC Pakistani listed firms, respectively.

The conclusion of this study has been derived under certain limitations. There is a vast space to extend this study in different dimensions. Firms operating in capital-intensive industries may provide different results for financial constraints because their policy designing would be quite different from other firms.

This study contributes to cash holdings research in Pakistan by exploring the adjustment behavior of cash holdings across Pakistani non-financial firms using econometric modeling. Downward adjustment rate is supposed to be higher than upward adjustment rate and this rate is tested using dynamic panel data model. Similarly, it is inferred that this relationship holds for above target firms even after including the financial constraints in the presented model.

This paper aims to consider the effect of the chief executive officer’s (CEO) ability on the amount of cash stock at the firm level.

The empirical hypothesis is examined via fixed-effect regression models using data from US incorporated firms.

Consistent with the upper echelon theory and cash holding motives, the results reveal that able CEOs are associated with an increased level of cash stock, ceteris paribus. Further analysis shows that the association between CEO ability and firm cash holding is more profound for financially sound firms. The authors also demonstrate that firm size significantly affects the relationship between CEO ability and cash management. The results are robust to various sensitivity analyses and additional tests.

This work is subject to limitations inherent in the use of relevant proxies. Thus, the study implements several model specifications to ensure the validity of findings in a more generic context. Future research should investigate the board structure’s role and the monitoring procedures on the CEOs’ cash holding behavior as a natural extension to this study.

The insights derived from the study are expected to advance the decision-making process of cash policies and CEO selection for shareholders, business executives and investment strategists.

Overall, the study provides new evidence that CEO ability is a contingent factor of corporate cash stock.

This study aims to provide a review of corporate governance and cash holdings because strong corporate governance is necessary for the efficient utilization of firm’s liquid resources such as cash, to minimize the agency cost of high cash holdings and to improve the value of cash.

The authors provide a literature review of corporate governance and cash holdings through a conceptual and theoretical argument rather than empirical research.

The authors review an empirical and theoretical work surrounding key corporate governance variables and identify avenues for future research. The authors find that corporate governance mechanisms and cash holdings have received much attention during the past two decades. However, the significant role of corporate governance (both country-level and the firm-level) in controlling the entrenched behaviour of the managers is discussed separately in the literature. The combined effect of both country-level and the firm-level governance is lacking in the cash holdings literature. Additionally, this study has found that much attention is paid to the developed markets, while only a few focused on the developing markets regarding cash holding literature, although the agency problems are high in developing markets.

The study contributes to the growing literature on corporate governance and cash holdings and provides a further understanding of the role of governance in minimizing the agency cost to increase value by assuring that firms’ assets are used efficiently and productively in the best interests of investors and other stakeholders. In addition, it provides a new idea to the policymaker and future researchers where they need to do more work.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of firms' cash holdings and ownership concentration on the firms' valuation using an unbalanced panel dataset of non‐financial listed firms in Australia.

The author used a generalized method of moments approach suitable for unbalanced panel dataset to examine the impact of firms' cash holdings and ownership concentration on firms' q‐ratios after controlling for the impact of financing, dividend and investment decisions, respectively.

The paper finds a positive relationship between cash holdings and q‐ratio of Australian firms. The ownership structure moderates the effect of cash holdings on q‐ratio in asymmetric fashion, i.e. for widely held firms, there is a positive relationship between cash holdings and q‐ratio; while for closely held firms, there is significant negative relationship between cash holdings and q‐ratio. Furthermore, changes associated with corporate governance reforms, also effect q‐ratio besides ownership structure. The paper also examined the impact of cash holdings on the market value of the firms over time. As the author predicted, increase in the cash holdings has a negative effect on the firms' market valuation, and this effect slows down over time. Overall, the empirical analysis finds support for similar findings documented for the developed countries in the literature.

The sample consists of non‐financial listed firms over the period of 1995 to 2010.

The results imply that widely‐owned firms have lower cash holdings because managers are able to access capital market easily compared to firms with concentrated ownership, which might have complex agency and information asymmetry problems. These findings are consistent with the agency costs. Managers in less widely‐held firms have more discretion over cash holding policies, and the value reduction imposed on these firms may reflect shareholders' recognition of the possibility of managerial expropriations.

This is believed to be the first paper to explore agency costs of cash holdings for Australian firms.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how investors’ valuation of cash holdings is related to firm-level investment.

As prior studies note that holding excess cash serve as a driver to would be over-investing, and that over-investment imposes substantial agency costs on shareholders, the authors focus on the value implications of holding cash in the presence of over-investment from the perspective of shareholders.

By examining the publicly traded companies on Taiwan stock market, the authors uncover that cash is valued less in firms with over-investment than in those with under-investment and the magnitude of over-investment is negatively related to the marginal value of cash holdings (MVCH). It reveals that investment activities impact the value that shareholders place on cash holdings. Moreover, further tests indicate that higher block holdings and the presence of independent directors on boards can effectively mitigate the negative impact of over-investment on the MVCH.

This paper enhances the understanding of the valuation implications of cash reserves held by firms with over-investment and the effectiveness of governance structures in containing the detrimental effect of investment-related agency costs on the value of holding cash.

This paper provides pioneering evidence that outside investors discount cash assets in over-investing firms to reflect their expectations that they will not receive the full benefit of these assets; and this paper extends the literature on corporate governance by assessing the role of governance mechanisms in reversing the negative relation between over-investment and the MVCH.

A large body of empirical literature has identified the key drivers of corporate cash holdings. The extant literature posits that the existence of real options significantly influences a firm's demand for liquidity. The literature, however, has relied on indirect proxies to assess this influence. The purpose of this paper is to provide a direct method for assessing this hypothesis. It is posited that firms with valuable real options hold excess cash and liquid assets, relative to firms lacking such opportunities.

The author utilizes a procedure originally proposed by Copeland and Antikarov to identify firms with valuable real options. This procedure assumes that an option's value will rise with its underlying uncertainty and with firm's managerial flexibility, i.e. discretion over the timely exercise of the option. Without a large cash hoard, a firm with “in‐the‐money” real options may face “financing constraints” that result in foregone or delayed exercise of these options. The author extends the Copeland and Antikarov procedure to account for the firm's financing constraints. Using data from a large sample of US companies, new insights are presented on how managerial flexibility, financing constraints, and the value of the firm's real options drive its cash holdings to levels that may appear to be “irrational,” if these factors are ignored.

Cash holdings are consistently higher for firms' valuable real options. All else being the same, financially unconstrained firms hold more cash. It is also shown that: an increase in a firm's weighted average cost of capital will lead to higher cash holdings; firms with higher market power (relative sales) hold less cash; and firms with less operational flexibility (higher fraction of fixed‐to‐total assets) hold less cash. Additional results are shown in the paper.

The paper shows that the existence of valuable real options leads to an unambiguous increase in corporate cash holdings. Whether this addition to firm's cash holdings is capitalized into its equity price is an open and challenging question that deserves further study. Other promising areas for improving this line of research include: developing other measures of managerial flexibility; partitioning the volatility‐flexibility into high, intermediate, and low categories (like the Kaplan and Zingales index); and expanding the analysis to cover a longer time period. The author believes that the results are robust and will be confirmed with these and other extensions.

This is the first paper that considers the effect of a firm's real options on its demand for liquid assets and cash.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate debt-like compensation and the value of excess cash holdings.

The sample comprises 876 US firms covered by ExecuComp over the period 2006-2013. The authors apply the valuation regression of Fama and French (1998) to examine the marginal value of excess cash as a function of CEO inside debt holdings.

This paper proposes one hypothesis. The results constitute evidence that the value of excess cash to shareholders declines as CEO inside debt increases. More interestingly, excess cash holdings contribute less to firm value when shareholders expect their value to be destroyed due to managers’ conservative behavior.

The sample comprises only US firms, owing to a lack of firms data from other countries. It would be interesting to conduct future research on an international sample.

This paper contributes to a deeper understanding of investor valuation of excess cash in the presence of CEO inside debt. The findings complement previous studies on US firms by confirming the existence of a relationship between the agency costs of debt and firm policy decisions.

This work is, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the first to examine the relationship between debt-like compensation and excess cash valuation, and it supports the view that the conflict between shareholders and debtholders largely affects firm cash policy, and hence, cash valuation.

US corporations are now sitting on an enormous stockpile of cash. Instead of investing their resources and creating jobs, the firms are holding on to excess cash. Academicians and practitioners alike have tried to fathom the reasons why companies are holding on to so much cash. Numerous studies have talked about the various motives for holding cash. Many researchers have tried to correlate excess cash holding with particular firm characteristics. The purpose of this paper is to study the correlations that exist between excess cash holding and some measurable managerial characteristics.

Four different measures of managerial horizon (MH) were constructed. The first two constructs (MH1 and MH2) are based on the CEO’s age and how long he has been the CEO of the company. The next two constructs (MH3 and MH4) are based on compensation, proportion of current compensation and proportion of future compensation. This paper tries to examine if MH has any impact on excess cash holding.

The results clearly show that the CEO age and the proportion of CEO’s compensation (current and future) do determine level of cash holding in the company. Younger CEOs hold more cash compared to older CEOs. Older CEOs hold less cash suggesting that as CEOs grow older they might be motivated by the idea of leaving a long lasting legacy. CEOs who receive more of their compensation in future payments also hold on to more cash, whereas CEOs who receive more of their compensation in current payments hold less cash.

There is no previous literature dealing with MH and cash holding by corporations.

The purpose of this study is to explore the association between cash holdings and business strategy for nonfinancial and nonutility US firms over the period from 1970 to 2016.

The authors have used Miles and Snow's (1978, 2003) theoretical background and followed Bentley et al. (2013) to construct a strategy index. Thus, the authors have distinguished two extreme corporate strategies, prospectors and defenders, based on a firm's resource allocation and investment behavior patterns. Following the methodology of Bates et al. (2009), the authors have used the multiple regression analysis to explore the relationship between business strategy and corporate cash holdings.

The empirical results show that business strategy is positively related to cash holdings. Prospectors are more likely to hold higher cash levels than defenders. Furthermore, the authors have found that cash holding's speed of adjustment (SOA) is slower for prospectors than for defenders, suggesting that business strategy influences cash holding's trend. Interestingly, the results show that the market value of cash increases significantly only for the firms that pursue a defender strategy.

The results of this work have valuable implications for researchers, by unveiling the relationship between corporate strategy and firm's cash holdings. This study, however, is limited to a sample of US firms; empirical evidence based on international samples of firms would add value to the current literature.

The findings could be useful to financial managers and investment strategists, who seek to maximize firm value through the adoption of an effective liquidity policy. What is more, this study provides support for the view that strategic choice and optimal cash management are of great importance for firms' market value.

This study enriches the knowledge of business strategy's impact on financing policy of firms and contributes to the empirical literature of cash holdings' determinants. In addition, it complements previous studies on US firms by documenting the effect of business strategy on the SOA in cash holdings and firm value.