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Organisational resilience is a strategic resource within the contingencies of organising in Small and Micro businesses (SMEs). In this regard, the notion of resilient human capital in propelling a resilient organisation has come to dominate the contemporary discourse on the performance of SMEs. Drawing on human capital theory as a meta-theoretical lens, we examine the cumulative effect of managerial training on managers’ performance in the context of relatively underdeveloped institutions and markets. Employing a quantitative research methodology, data for our empirical inquiry comes from a survey of 506 Ghanaian SMEs operating in diverse sectors of the economy. Following SMEs being at the convergence point of resource constraint, we show why some firm managers are more likely to exhibit managerial resilience than those in other firms. Our data evidence suggests that targeted managerial training, in practice, has the potential to strengthen organisational resilience. Nevertheless, the content, efficiency and frequency of the training received, we argue, accounts for the differential performance of managers within the contingencies of everyday organising. We conclude by delineating some relevant implications of our study for the theory and practice of managerial resilience nurturing in organising.

For work organizations and their members, establishing and maintaining mutually satisfying employment relationships is a fundamental concern. The importance that scholars attach to employment relationships is reflected in research streams that explore the optimal design of strategic human resource management systems, the nature of psychological contract fulfillment and violation, and the factors associated with achieving person-environment fit, among others. Generally missing from theory and research pertaining to employment relationships is the perspective of individuals who reside at the employee-employer interface – managerial leaders. We argue that, for managerial leaders, a pervasive concern involves the tangible and intangible resource requirements of specific employees. We then provide the groundwork for study of the leader’s perspective on employment relationships by proposing a model that identifies how employees come to be perceived as low versus high maintenance and how these perceptions, in turn, influence leader cognition, affect, and behavior.

Purpose – This study investigates the interplay between strategic performance measurement and management accounting to gain a deeper understanding of how strategic measures of performance evolve with the managerial accounting practices.

Design/Methodology/Approach – The study explored the performance measures used at a bank focused on the development and sustainability initiatives in Africa. Thirty-two semistructured interviews were conducted with directors, managers, and analysts from nine different categories of job families.

Findings – Analysis shows that managers assimilate a comprehensive, multifaceted measurement system to understand the creation and delivery of sustainable value. The results show that the managerial accounting practices adapt to incorporate an integrated set of performance measures that afford sustainable value to the stakeholders. The findings provide rich insights into how the managers adapt their information assimilation practices to the changing demands of the different stakeholders and adopt practices which innovate measures of performance that are aligned to the strategic goals. Finally, the findings illustrate that the interplay between strategic performance and managerial accounting practices has the potential to improve or inhibit sustainable development.

Originality/Value – Little is known about how performance measures evolve, and how they interplay with the managerial accounting practices within organizations. This study reveals that the interplay of strategic performance measurement and managerial accounting can only be understood in the confluence of organizational change and sustainability. While acknowledging the need to embrace change and sustainability simultaneously, the study offers insights into the dynamics of change – the duality of emergent managerial accounting practices and the evolution of strategic performance measurement systems.

The 2008–2009 financial crisis has renewed concerns about managerial short-termism and its negative effects. Based on intertemporal choice theory, this chapter aims to identify the role that performance measurement and compensation systems can play in orienting managers toward building long-term performance potential in addition to achieving short-term results.

The findings suggest that certain types of measures used – in particular broader, more inclusive financial indicators, risk-adjusted measures, and key nonfinancial value drivers – as well as the timing of measurement and payment of rewards can lead to reduced time discounting and a lower devaluation of the future, and consequently to a prioritized managerial attention focus on long-term company goals.

This chapter contributes to a better understanding of the institutional determinants of managerial long-term orientation and the influence of organizational systems on goal prioritization in managerial intertemporal choice processes.

The findings have practical relevance for the design of incentive systems that aim to place an emphasis on ensuring long-term value creation.

Systems that guide managerial behavior toward the long term can help to increase economic and societal sustainability.

Despite the emergence of more integrated performance measurement approaches, time horizon has not been in the main focus of research in the field yet. This review provides a first structured overview of the temporal effects of different elements of performance measurement and compensation systems.

The main purpose of the study is to examine the influence of family directors on the firm performance of public listed companies (PLCs) in Malaysia. This study provides empirical evidence on the agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority interests in the concentrated ownership setting.

Samples of the study are 112 PLCs in year 2006. Two measures of firm performance are used: return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. Managerial ownership refers to the percentage shareholdings of executive directors with direct and indirect holdings. It was further categorized into family ownership and non-family ownership.

In relation to ROA, managerial ownership is found positively significant. The results also show that the positive relationship between managerial ownership is contributed by the managerial-non-family ownership. In relation to Tobin’s Q, the results show a U-shape with turning point at 31.38% for managerial ownership and 28.29% for the managerial-family ownership. The results found significant and positive relationships between managerial ownership and both measures of firm performance which indicates that managerial ownership and family ownership yield greater efficiency.

The study highlights the effects of corporate governance on ROA and Tobin’s Q are somewhat different. It provides some evidence on the need to use appropriate measure of firm performance. The significant relationship supports the argument of Chami (1999), Fama and Jensen (1983), and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and empirical evidence of Lee (2004) that family ownership enhances monitoring activities.

Differentiating the types of managerial ownership into family and non-family categories enriches our knowledge about who actually contributes to the improved performance.

In our framework, we examine the influence of both reactive and proactive cognitive variables on strategic change. Reactive sources that impact strategic change are perceptions and attributions – cognitions that determine the “what” and the “why” of performance. Perceptions are first-order cognitions that assess what is the performance feedback: positive or negative? After performance feedback is perceived, attributions are second-order cognitions that attempt to establish why the performance is positive or negative.

We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible “stewards” rather than “agents” of the state.

We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of state-owned assets.

Managerial compensation depends on political connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political goals. These effects were attenuated since the market-oriented governance reform.

Economic reform without reforming the human resources policies at the executive level enables the autocratic state to exert political power on corporate decision making, so as to ensure that firms’ business activities fulfill the state’s political objectives.

As a powerful social elite, the state-steward managers in China have the same interests as the state (the government), namely extracting rents that should adhere to the nation (which stands for the society at large or the collective private citizens).

As China has been a communist country with a single ruling party for decades, the ideas of socialism still have a strong impact on how companies are run. The legitimacy of the elite’s privileged rights over private sectors is central to our question.

Chinese executive compensation stimulates not only the maximization of shareholder value but also the preservation of the state’s interests.

This research fills a gap in the literature regarding managerial retention and performance in the context of cross-border acquisitions (CBA). Blending institutional with resource-based theories, this study posits that retaining acquired managers becomes more important in unfamiliar environments where the institutional infrastructure is underdeveloped. Our results support the theory. Contrary to expectations and prior research, however, the results also call into question the long-held belief that managerial retention is generally beneficial to post-acquisition performance. The findings and implications are discussed regarding managerial turnover, CBA, and the institutional environment.

The widespread adoption of the Balanced Scorecard has led to a need to understand how performance measures affect employees’ attitudes and behaviors. Despite the growing trend in the implementation of the Balanced Scorecard, there is little research evidence available on the behavioral outcomes resulting from the use of nonfinancial performance measures. This study seeks to address this gap by examining several behavioral outcomes, including job satisfaction, organizational commitment and managerial performance, resulting from the use of financial and nonfinancial performance measures.

Data were collected using a mailed questionnaire survey to manufacturing organizations in Singapore. Path analysis technique was employed in this study to investigate the relationships.

The results of the study show that behavioral outcomes are indifferent regardless of the nature and type of performance measures used. However, the relationships between performance measures and behavioral outcomes are indirect through procedural fairness and trust in supervisor.

Survey questionnaire method was used in this study and there are limitations associated with survey questionnaire method. As our sample was selected from large organizations, it is unclear if our results are generalizable to small organizations. Also, as our sample was selected from the manufacturing sector, generalizing our results to the nonmanufacturing sectors should be made with caution.

This study highlights the need for organizations to pay attention to issues pertaining to procedural fairness and interpersonal trust in the design and implementation of performance measurement systems.

This empirical study conceptualizes the institutional environment within which firms function in a transition economy as a number of dimensions, representing the externally set ‘rules of the game’ as perceived by senior managers. It then proposes a mediating model of the links between that environment and the commercial performance of enterprises in which incentive intensity is a key strategic choice, influenced by perceptions of the institutional setting and the influence of that choice is carried on to commercial performance by a set of managerial orientations. The model is tested using survey data from a sample of 959 Chinese enterprises.