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This paper aims to investigate the impact of sharia governance on organizational performance in zakat management institutions in Indonesia over the period 2017–2021.

This study examined 33 zakat management organizations in Indonesia from 2017 through 2021 for 151 observations. Gross allocation ratio and growth of ZIS collection are used as organizational performance measures. The independent variables in this study are board of director size, educational background of the board of directors, sharia supervisory board size, sharia supervisory expertise, supervisory size and management size. Also, the study uses size, age and audit opinion as control variables to help measure the relationship between sharia governance and organizational performance.

This study shows that the board of directors and supervisory size positively and significantly affect organizational performance. Then, the educational background of board of directors has a negative and significant effect on organizational performance. In Model 1, sharia supervisory board size has a positive and significant effect on organizational performance, but in Model 2, sharia supervisory board size does not. Meanwhile, sharia supervisory expertise and management board size do not affect organizational performance.

The findings in this study illustrate the importance of transparency in the zakat management organization. Transparency helps minimize conflicts of interest and information asymmetry in the zakat management organization. In addition, sharia governance mechanism helps regulators and top management to make effective policies to improve and enhance organizational performance.

Sharia governance is essential for zakat management organizations to increase accountability, credibility and public trust and support the practice of zakat management organizations.

This study discusses sharia governance and organizational performance in socioreligious organizations, especially zakat management organizations, which are still rarely carried out. Thus, this study broadens the insights of sharia governance and highlights the importance of performance appraisal in zakat management organizations.

In a review of the literature, supported by six case studies, executive development for senior managers in public and private organisations is explored in depth. The study looks at the roles and responsibilities of the chairman, CEO, executive and non‐executive directors, the required capabilities to achieve successful performance, and the related executive development activity implemented to support these. Methods of delivery, development needs analysis and evaluation are explored in case organisations to ascertain current practice. A detailed review of the leadership and governance literatures is included to highlight the breadth of knowledge required at director level. Key findings of the study include the importance of focusing executive development on capability enhancement, to ensure that it is supporting organisational priorities, and on its thorough customisation to the corporate context. Deficiencies in current corporate practice are also identified.

The corporate board of directors is a body entrusted with power to make economic decisions affecting the well‐being of investors' capital, employees' security, communities' economic health, and executives’ power and perquisites. The power of the board of directors is often forgotten in this complex society. Managers, the government, and special interest groups seem to impose upon the corporation situations that are never addressed by the board of directors. Yet it is the board that has the ultimate internal authority within the corporation. Corporate charters granted by the various states specifically assign to the board of directors the responsibility of management, or the delegation of that management. The directors act as trustees for the shareholders, selecting the management structure of the firm, and delegating to that management structure those administrative matters the board itself chooses. The degree of delegation is a decision of each board, with most boards delegating away the major portion of their decision‐making authority.

This study seeks to explore how non-executive directors address governance problems on Dutch two-tier boards. Within this board model, challenges might be particularly difficult to address due to the formal separation of management boards' decision-management from supervisory boards' decision-control roles.

Semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire among non-executive directors provide unique insights into three major challenges in the boardrooms of two-tier boards in The Netherlands.

The study indicates that non-executive directors mainly experience challenges in three areas: the ability to ask management critical questions, information asymmetries between the management and supervisory boards and the management of the relationship between individual executive and non-executive directors. The qualitative in-depth analysis reveals the complexity of the contributing factors to problems in the boardroom and the range of process and social interventions non-executive directors use to address boardroom issues with management and the organization of the board.

While policy makers have been largely occupied with the “right” board composition, the results highlight the importance of adequately addressing operational challenges in the boardroom. The results emphasize the importance of a better understanding of board processes and the need of non-executive directors to carefully manage relationships in and around the boardroom.

Whereas most studies have focussed on regulatory initiatives to improve the functioning of boards (e.g. the independence of the board), this study explores how non-executive directors attempt to enhance the effectiveness of boards on which they serve.

Taking a micro-perspective of governance that includes problem-solving and stakeholder involvement capabilities as part of the strategic steering role, we wish to contribute to the understanding of the human side of governance. Thus we have studied the relationships between the board and its management and stakeholders, and in so doing we recognize internal and external actors as well as the board itself, and how they all contribute to the implementation of the governance function.

Based on an interpretative approach that focuses on change over time, we performed a qualitative empirical study of the governance of Robotdalen, a small non-profit public organization in Sweden that is a joint public and private collaboration. This chapter forms part of a longitudinal study that has been carried out since 2009. It is based primarily on interviews with board members, management and other stakeholders, and complemented by document studies and observations.

Governance practice entails multiple and multilevel tasks, and the tensions between representativeness/professional boards, conformance/performance, and controlling/partnering up with management, are prevalent in both small non-profit and public organizations. According to our results the apparent choice between the extremes of each tension is, however, not a choice at all but rather a balancing act. In trying to balance tensions through collaboration between managers, board, financiers, and the hosting university, new governance structures and practices emerge at the organizational level.

By following the process of the emergence of a new board, we illustrate how various actors work together to co-produce governance functions in practice. In the past little or no effort has been made to take into account contextual factors such as organizational size – an aspect that may influence or shape board characteristics and work methodology. We therefore attempt to do so in our chapter, by studying the emergence of a new board in a small public organization, what possible paradoxes and tensions are involved in such work, and how such tensions are managed.

After the Royal Ahold accounting scandal occurred in 2003, the Dutch government responded by publishing a new Corporate Governance code, often referred to as the “Tabaksblat Code”, updated in 2016. The Code focuses on long-term value creation by emphasizing risk management and accountability and reinforcing the roles and duties of management board, internal audit function, and supervisory board in designing adequate risk management and control systems and in assessing their effectiveness. Differently than the rule-based Anglo-Saxon regulations, the Code is based on best practices provisions and adopts a “comply or explain” approach. Professional bodies are actively supporting their associates in developing skills in current and emerging risk management areas. Despite these efforts, it is worth noting that there are still significant differences on how companies apply the risk management provisions. For instance, in terms of appointing a dedicated manager as Chief Risk Officer (CRO), in the frequency and scope of risk assessment, and in defining the risk appetite of the company.

This study looks at board governance in Ontario hospitals.

We conducted a research of the hospitals’ websites and a survey of board directors to study the board structure and examine governance practice in Ontario hospitals.

The findings suggest that the board structure and process in Ontario hospitals are in compliance with Accreditation Canada’s Governance Standards, and such administrative controls are appropriate. Ontario hospital boards, in general, have fulfilled their key functions of governance in terms of working as an effective board; developing a clear direction; supporting the organization to achieve its mandate; maintaining positive relationships with external stakeholders; and being accountable and achieving sustainable results. Building knowledge through information is an area where improvement is needed.

Ontario hospitals have implemented appropriate administrative controls in terms of board composition and committee structure. The results of a survey of 99 board directors from over 25 hospitals suggest that directors, in general, have a good understanding of their governance role and relationship with senior management as well as the government. The findings are also supportive of good governance practice where executives manage and nonexecutive directors monitor the performance of the executives. According to the respondents, Ontario’s hospital boards are actively involved in setting the mission, strategic goals and objectives of their organizations, and they take appropriate steps to ensure that risk management, client safety, and quality improvements are incorporated in their governance and strategic planning process. In order to discharge their fiduciary duty effectively, respondents would like to have more information from different sources. This is an area where management accounting professionals can become involved such that relevant information from a variety of sources, especially external sources, are provided to board directors for decision making.

Ontario’s hospital sector has undertaken initiatives through research and publications to promote good governance practice. Such leadership is critical to ensure that directors have the competence and skills to discharge their duties and responsibilities diligently. Hospital boards should focus on renewal while ensuring that board directors are equipped for the challenging task of governing through professional development and continuing education.

Limitations related to the use of questionnaire applies to this research study. Self-selection bias and low response rate limit the generalizability of the findings. Future research can examine the behavior of directors in the boardroom and the impact of governance variables on hospital performance, such as quality of care and patient safety.

This paper examines how board structure influences real earnings management and the interaction effect of CEO narcissism on board structure-real earnings management relationship.

The authors used panel data derived from secondary sources from publicly listed firms in Kenya during 2002–2017. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses.

The results indicate that board independence, board tenure and size have significant negative effect on real earnings management, while CEO duality positively affects real earnings management. Further, the interaction results show that CEO narcissism moderates the relationship between CEO duality and real earnings management.

The results suggest that real earnings management reduces when boards are independent, large and comprising of long-tenured members. However, when the CEO plays dual role of a chairman, real earnings management increases. The authors also find that when CEOs are narcissists, the monitoring role of the board is compromised.

The study adds value to the understanding of how board structure and CEO narcissism influence the monitoring role of the board among firms listed at Nairobi Securities Exchange.

Joint board management meetings bring boards of directors and top management teams together to share information and discuss company matters. The authors investigate whether these joint meetings are associated with higher agency costs or information sharing benefits in the context of firm earnings management.

Using publicly disclosed data on the frequency of joint board management meetings in Indonesian firms, the authors examine the relationship between joint board management meetings and earnings management during 2010–2017.

The authors find that more joint board management meetings are associated with lower earnings management. This is consistent with joint board management meetings providing net information sharing benefits. Additional testing indicates that the results are the strongest when firms hold more joint board management meetings than regular board meetings.

The findings suggest that in addition to holding regular board and audit committee meetings, formal meetings between boards of directors and top management teams are beneficial to shareholders by restricting opportunistic accounting choices by firm management.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between gender diversity on the management board and the financial performance of Indonesian listed companies.

Cross‐sectional regression analysis was conducted based on a sample comprising 92.4 percent of public firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The dependent variable was firm performance, measured by return on assets (ROA) and Tobin's q. The explanatory variable was gender diversity, proxied by the proportion of women, the presence of women, and a gender heterogeneity index.

It was found that the representation of female top executives is negatively related to both ROA and Tobin's q, suggesting that female representation is not associated with an improved level of performance. From correlation analysis, the results also reveal that smaller firms, which tend to be family‐controlled, are more likely to have a higher proportion of female members on management boards. This implies that large firms are “tougher” for women in terms of opportunities to hold seats on the board.

The data only cover one single financial year (2007); hence, the results may lack generalizability.

Studies on the relationship between board gender diversity and financial performance have been conducted in the context of a few developed economies. This study contributes to the literature by examining such an issue in a developing economy that has a different environment from that of developed economies.