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Visual inspection remains the dominant method of assessing component lead solderability and finished board solder joint quality. In recent years the wetting balance has received much attention as an attractive alternative to the inherently subjective visual inspection method of assessing component termination solderability. Whether direct visual inspection or wetting balance methods are used, the method can be shown to be effective only if the results are in agreement with board‐level soldering performance. This paper addresses the issue of the agreement of visual board‐level solder joint quality with both visual ‘dip and look’ solderability assessment and wetting balance measurement of the components prior to board assembly. A description of visual ‘dip and look’ solderability test assessment and of wetting balance methodology for components is presented, and a compendium of wetting balance tests and indices are documented in the Appendix. The experimental strategy employed is outlined, and details of the experimental technique (including the equipment, materials and component sample preparations) are provided. The experimental results present a comparison of both ‘dip and look’ visual solderability assessment and wetting balance measures with regard to actual board‐level soldering performance. The ability of the various assessment methods to predict board level defects is also explored.

The increased interest in the electronics industry to search for alternatives to lead‐containing solders is evidenced by the number of recently published articles on lead‐free solders in this journal and other journals. At the latest Surface Mount International conference, several papers were presented on lead‐free solder alloys, conductive adhesives and organic preservatives, all in search of replacements for lead‐containing finishes. The efforts to find a replacement for tin/lead are in response to possible legislation banning lead or possible taxation on the use of lead. In an attempt to reduce the use of lead in this company's assembly operation, five lead‐free solder pastes and four corresponding flux vehicles (for A, B, C and E pastes) were evaluated. All of the flux vehicles passed the standard industry tests except for two flux vehicles (pastes B and C) that failed the copper mirror test. An assembly trial of the lead‐free pastes was carried out by building liquid crystal display panels with minimal process modification. Printability, process compatibility and solder joint reliability were assessed. This paper describes the preliminary results of the authors' investigation.

A combination of analytical methods was used on printed circuit board coupons to conclude the following: (1) while steam ageing deteriorates solderability of tinned coupons, it does not increase the oxide thickness or tin‐lead ratio of the surface (top 50 Angstroms) of tinned coupons; (2) therefore, some other factor, probably oxidation of the copper or tin/copper intermetallic substrate, determines solderability of the coupons.

A significant number of integrated circuit (IC) package leads failing solderability tests also had a very thin eutectic solder coating. Poor solderability is attributed to degradation of this coating during various burn‐in times and temperatures. Techniques were developed to pre‐tin IC leads with lead‐rich solder (95Pb‐5Sn) as this finish had been reported in the literature to be particularly effective and superior to the eutectic composition in preserving solderability even after long ageing treatments. The present work has not confirmed those recommendations. In fact, surface analyses and various solderability tests performed on steam‐aged finishes demonstrate that 95Pb‐5Sn is not a viable alternative to 63Sn‐37Pb if standard spacecraft soldering practices are to be followed. Good solder wetting was always achieved if the artifically aged leads had a minimum eutectic coating thickness of 5–7 micrometres.

John Kwoka’s Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies is a meta-analysis of “retrospective” academic studies of consummated mergers and other horizontal arrangements. Based on this meta-analysis, Kwoka strongly criticizes federal enforcement policies, claiming that the agencies permit far too many anticompetitive mergers to go unchallenged, and are far too willing to accept remedies that fail to prevent a significant loss of competition. Kwoka claims further that this excessive leniency is the culmination of a trend reflecting deliberate policy choices made over the last several decades.

In a forthcoming critique, Vita and Osinski challenge Kwoka’s analysis and his conclusions, identifying serious flaws in the size, construction, and composition of his sample, and in the statistical analysis of the data drawn from that sample. In a published response to Vita and Osinski, Professor Kwoka offers a number of objections and counter-arguments. In this rejoinder, I respond to Professor Kwoka.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

This paper aims to examine empirically if the encouragement by government policy of merger and acquisition activity involving municipal and provincially owned electricity distribution utilities (LDCs) in the Province of Ontario has had positive effects in terms of value creation, operating performance and economies of scale.

It was anticipated that with LDC consolidation, there will be increased operational efficiency and improvement in the cost-effectiveness of the merged electrical utility. Using matched pairs dependent t-testing and Wilcoxon signed-rank testing, the authors compared data for three years before and after the merger or acquisition of 16 municipal utilities (616 total observations) to determine if there were any statistically significant changes (positive or negative) in measures of financial, operational and service efficiency.

The findings indicate statistically significant increases in debt as a percentage of shareholder equity in post-merger/acquisition utilities and consequently leveraged higher returns on equity. However, there were no statistically significant changes in financial, operational or service efficiency measures (with the exception of decreased efficiency in telephone response).

A total of 16 mergers or acquisitions were reviewed involving 32 of 79 LDCs, with the research implications pointing to a need for existing policy to be reviewed to determine whether a more detailed examination is required by the provincial energy regulator, including a closer examination of managerial motives, before approving mergers between municipal electricity distributors. This research involves only a quantitative approach and further research would examine these transactions using qualitative measures for a deeper examination as to managerial motives.

The results suggest that the mergers or acquisitions to date have served only to increase shareholder risk without improvement in other financial, operational or service efficiencies, a contradiction to the rationale behind the Province’s merger policy.

The consolidation policy for Ontario LDCs has not resulted in any statistically significant improvement in electricity rates or service for consumers.

This paper is the first examination of the effects of Ontario’s LDC consolidation policy in terms of specific financial, operational and service efficiency measures.